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THE    DARDANELLES    CAMPAIGN 


By  the  same  Author 


ESSAYS  IN 
REBELLION 

7/6  net 


The  Spectator  says : 

"  We  have  enjoyed  it  immensely." 

The  Bookman  says : 

"More  than  engrossing  ...  to 
read   it  is  to  add  to  one's  mental 
equipment." 
The  Westminster  Gazette  says  : 

"  Interested  and  delighted  us." 
Punch  says : 

"  A  gallant  book." 

NiSBET  &  Co,   Ltd. 


NEIGHBOURS  OF  OURS:   Scenes  of 

East  End  Life. 
IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    TOPHET : 

Scenes  of  Black  Country  Life. 
THE  THIRTY  DAYS'  WAR:   Scenes 

in  the  Greek  and  Turkish  War  of  1897. 

LADYSMITH  :  A  Diary  of  the  Siege. 

CLASSIC  GREEK  LANDSCAPE  AND 
ARCHITECTURE  :  Text  to  John  Ful- 
leylove's  Pictures  of  Greece. 

THE  PLEA  OF  PAN. 

BETWEEN  THE  ACTS:  Scenes  in 
the  Author's  Experience. 

ON  THE  OLD  ROAD  THROUGH 
FRANCE  TO  FLORENCE:  French 
Chapters  to  Hallam  Murray's  Pictures. 

BOOKS  AND  PERSONALITIES:  A 
Volume  of  Criticism. 

A  MODERN  SLAVERY  :  An  Investiga- 
tion of  the  Slave  System  in  Angola  and 
the  Islands  of  San  Thom6  and  Principe. 

THE  DAWN  IN  RUSSIA :   Scenes  in 

the  Revolution  of  1905-1906. 
THE    NEW     SPIRIT     IN     INDIA: 

Scenes  during  the  Unrest  of  1907-1908. 

ESSAYS  IN  FREEDOM. 

THE  GROWTH  OF  FREEDOM:  A 
Summary  of  the  History  of  Democracy. 


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GENERAL  SIR   IAN  H  AM  1  LTON  .  GC.B.D.S  O. 

FROM  A    PORTRAIT    BY    JOHN    S- SARGENT.  RA 


THE  DARDANELLES 
CAMPAIGN 


BY 


HENRY   W.    NEVINSON 


Xon&on 
NISBET    &    GO.    LTD. 

22    BERNERS    STREET    W. 


First  Published  in  igi8 


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DEDICATED    TO 

THOSE    WHO    FELL   ON    THE 

GALLIPOLI    PENINSULA 

Oi  S'  avTOv  Trept  rei^o^ 
OrJKas  'lAiaSos  yas 

Beside  the  ruins  of  Troy  they  lie  buried, 
those  men  so  beautiful ;  there  they  have  their 
burial-place,  hidden  in  an  enemy's  land. 

T^e  Agamemnon,  453-455. 

'AvSpwj/  eTTK^avwv  Tracra  yrj  rdcfios,  koI  ov 
(TTrjXuiv  fiovov  iv  rfj  oiKua.  (ny/xatvet  iTnypa(f>y], 
aXXa  KOI  iv  rfj  fir]  rrpoa-rjKOva-r]  aypa<^os  fxvrjfJi-q 
Trap  cKao-Tw  ti}s  yvw/^T^S  p.a.X\.ov  yj  tov  epyov 
evStatTarat. 

Of  conspicuous  men  the  whole  world  is  the 
tomb,  and  it  is  not  only  inscriptions  on 
tablets  in  their  own  country  which  chronicle 
their  fame,  but  rather,  even  in  distant  lands, 
unwritten  memorials  living  for  ever,  not  upon 
visible  monuments,  but  in  the  hearts  of 
mankind. 

Pericles'  Funeral  Speech  ; 

Thucydides,  ii.  43. 


PREFACE 

FROM    the    outset  the  Dardanelles  Campaign 
attracted   me    with    peculiar   interest.     The 
shores    of    the    Straits    were    the    scene    of 
the  Trojan  epics  and  dramas.     They  were  explored 
and  partly  inhabited   by  a    race  whose    legends  and 
history   had    been    more    familiar   to    me    from    boy- 
hood   than    my   own   country's,   and   more   inspiring. 
They  belonged  to  that  beautiful   part   of  the  world 
with  which   I  had  become  personally  intimate  during 
the  wars,  rebellions,  and    other    disturbances  of   the 
previous    twenty    years.       But,     above    all,     I     was 
attracted  to  the  Campaign  because   I   regarded  it  as 
a  strategic  conception  surpassing  others  in  promise. 
My  reasons   are    referred    to   in  various  chapters  of 
this    book,    and    indeed    they    were    obvious.      The 
occupation  of  Constantinople  would   have  paralysed 
Turkey  as  an  ally  of  the  Central  Powers ;  it  would 
have    blocked    their   path   to   the   Middle  East,  and 
averted    danger   from  Egypt,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
India ;    it  would    have    released    the   Russian    forces 
in  the  Caucasus  for  action  elsewhere ;  it  would  have 


viii  PREFACE 

secured  the  neutrality,  if  not  the  active  co-operation, 
of  the  Balkan  States,  and  especially  of  Bulgaria, 
not  only  the  most  resolute  and  effective  of  them, 
but  a  State  well  disposed  to  ourselves  and  the 
Russian  people  by  history  and  sentiment ;  by  secur- 
ing Bulgaria's  friendship,  it  would  have  delivered 
Serbia  from  fear  of  attack  upon  her  eastern  frontier, 
and  have  relieved  Roumania  from  similar  appre- 
hensions along  the  Danube  and  in  the  Dobrudja ; 
it  would  have  confirmed  the  influence  of  Venizelos 
in  Greece,  and  saved  King  Constantine  from  military, 
financial,  and  domestic  temptations  to  Germanise ; 
above  all,  it  would  thus  have  secured  Russia's  left 
flank,  so  enabling  her  to  concentrate  her  entire 
forces  upon  the  Lithuanian,  Polish,  and  Galician 
frontiers  from  the  Memel  to  the  Dniester. 

The  worst  apprehensions  of  the  Central  Powers 
would  then  have  been  fulfilled.  Blockaded  by  the 
Allied  fleets  in  the  Adriatic,  and  by  the  British 
fleet  in  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea,  they  would 
have  found  themselves  indeed  surrounded  by  an  iron 
ring,  and,  so  far  as  prophecy  was  possible,  it  seemed 
likely  that  the  terms  which  our  Alliance  openly 
professed  as  our  objects  in  the  war  might  have  been 
obtained  in  the  spring  of  191 6.  The  subsidiary  and 
more  immediate  consequences  of  success  in  the 
Dardanelles,  such  as  the  supply  of  munitions  to 
Russia,  and  of  Ukrainian  wheat  to  our  Alliance, 
were  also  to  be  considered.     The  saying  of  Napoleon, 


PREFACE  ix 

in  May,  1808,  still  held  good:  "At  bottom  the  great 
question  is — Who  shall  have  Constantinople  ? " 

Under  the  prevailing  influence  of  "Westerners" 
upon  French  and  British  strategy,  these  probable 
advantages  were  either  disregarded  or  dismissed, 
and  to  dwell  upon  them  now  is  a  useless  speculation. 
The  hopes  suggested  by  the  conception  in  1915 
have  faded  like  a  dream.  The  dominant  minds  in 
our  Alliance  either  failed  to  imagine  their  siofnificance, 
or  were  incapable  of  supplying  the  power  required 
for  their  realisation  while  at  the  same  time  pressing 
forward  the  proposed  offensive  in  France.  The 
international  situation  of  Europe,  and  indeed  of  the 
world,  is  now  changed,  and  the  strategic  map  has 
been  completely  altered.  Early  belligerents  have 
disappeared  from  the  field,  and  new  belligerents  have 
entered  the  shifting  scene.  Already,  in  19 18,  the 
Dardanelles  Expedition  has  passed  into  history,  and 
may  be  counted  among  the  ghosts  which  history 
tries  in  vain  to  summon  up.  It  is  as  an  episode  of 
a  vanished  past  that  I  have  attempted  to  represent 
it — a  tragic  episode  enacted  in  the  space  of  eleven 
months,  but  marked  by  every  attribute  of  noble 
tragedy,  whether  we  consider  the  grandeur  of  theme 
and  personality,  or  the  sympathy  aroused  by  the 
spectacle  of  heroic  figures  struggling  against  the 
unconscious  adversity  of  fate  and  the  malign  in- 
fluences of  hostile  or  deceptive  power. 

In  treatment,   I    have  made  no  attempt  to  rival 


X  PREFACE 

my  friend  John  Masefield's  GalHpoli — that  excellent 
piece  of  work,  at  once  so  accurate  and  so  brilliantly 
illuminated  by  poetic  vision.  Mine  has  been  the 
humbler  task  of  simply  recording  the  events  as  they 
occurred,  with  such  detail  as  seemed  essential  to 
complete  the  history,  or  was  accessible  to  myself. 
In  this  endeavour,  I  have  trusted  partly  to  the 
books  and  documents  mentioned  below,  partly  to 
information  generously  supplied  to  me  by  many  of 
the  principal  actors  upon  the  scene ;  also  to  my 
own  notes,  writings,  and  memory,  especially  with 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  events 
of  which  I  was  a  witness.  Accuracy  and  justice 
have  been  my  only  aims,  but  in  a  work  involving 
so  much  detail  and  so  many  controverted  questions 
mistakes  in  accuracy  and  justice  are  scarcely  to  be 
avoided.  I  know  the  confusion  of  mind  and  the 
distorted  vision  so  frequent  in  all  great  crises  of 
war,  and  I  know  from  long  experience  how  ignorant 
may  be  the  criticism  applied  to  any  soldier  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief  down  to  the  private  with  a 
rifle. 

The  mention  of  the  private  with  a  rifle  suggests 
my  chief  regret.  The  method  I  have  followed,  in 
treating  divisions  or  brigades  or,  at  the  lowest, 
battalions  as  the  units  of  action,  almost  obliterates 
the  individual  soldier  from  consideration.  Divisions, 
brigades,  and  battalions  are  moved  like  pieces  on 
a   board,    and    Commanding    Officers    must   regard 


PREFACE  xi 

each  of  them  only  as  a  certain  quantity  of  force 
acting  under  the  laws  of  time  and  space.  Yet  each 
of  the  so-called  units  is  made  up  of  living  men 
— men  of  distinctive  personality  and  incalculably 
varying  nature.  Men  are  the  actual  units  in  war 
as  in  the  State,  and  I  do  not  forget  the  "common 
soldiers."  I  do  not  overlook  either  their  natural 
failures  or  their  astonishing  performance.  In  various 
campaigns  and  in  many  countries  I  have  shared 
their  apprehensions,  their  hardships,  their  brief 
intervals  of  respite,  and  their  laborious  triumphs. 
They,  like  the  rest  of  mankind,  have  always  filled 
me  with  surprised  admiration  or  poignant  sympathy. 
Among  the  soldiers  of  many  races,  but  especially 
among  the  natives  of  these  islands,  whom  I  could 
best  understand,  I  have  always  found  the  fine 
qualities  which  distinguish  the  majority  of  hard- 
working people,  all  of  whom  live  perpetually  in 
perilous  hardship.  I  have  found  a  freedom  from 
rhetoric  and  vanity,  a  simple-hearted  acceptance  of 
hfe  "  in  the  first  intention,"  taking  life  and  death 
without  much  criticism  as  they  come,  and  concealing 
kindliness  and  the  longing  for  happiness  under  a 
veil  of  silence  or  protective  irony.  But  a  book  of 
this  kind  has  little  place  for  the  mention  of  them, 
and  that  is  my  regret.  Like  a  general,  I  have 
been  obliged  to  consider  forces  mainly  in  the  mass, 
and  must  leave  to  readers  the  duty  of  remembering, 
as    I    never   cease   to    remember,    that   all    divisions 


xii  PREFACE 

and  all  platoons  upon  the  Peninsula  were  composed 
of  ordinary  men  like  ourselves — individual  per- 
sonalities subject  to  the  common  sufferings  of  hunger, 
thirst,  sickness,  and  pain ;  filled  also  with  the 
common  delight  in  life,  the  common  horror  of  death, 
and  the  desire  for  peace  and  home.  As  in  the  case 
of  general  mankind,  it  was  their  endurance,  their 
courage,  self-sacrifice,  and  all  that  is  implied  in 
the  ancient  meanings  of  "virtue,"  which  excited  my 
wonder. 

Among  those  who  have  given  me  very  kind 
assistance  either  on  the  Dardanelles  Peninsula  or 
in  London,  I  may  mention  with  gratitude  General 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  G.C.B.,  etc.  ;  General  Sir  William 
R.  Birdwood,  K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I.,  etc.  ;  Major-General 
Sir  Alexander  Godley,  K.C.B.,  etc. ;  Major-General 
Sir  A.  H.  Russell,  K.C.M.G.,  etc. ;  the  late  Lieut- 
General  Sir  Frederick  Stanley  Maude,  K.C.B.  ; 
Major-General  Sir  W.  R.  Marshall,  K.C.B. ;  Major- 
General  H.  B.  Walker,  C.B.  ;  Major-General  Sir 
William  Douglas,  K.C.M.G.  ;  Major-General  F.  H. 
Sykes,  C.M.G. ;  Major-General  Sir  D.  Mercer,  K.C.  B.  ; 
Brigadier-General  Freyberg,  V.C.  ;  Colonel  Leslie 
Wilson,  D.S.O.,  M.P.  ;  and  Lieut.  Douglas  Jerrold, 
R.N.V.D. ;  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Roger  Keyes,  K.C.B., 
etc.;  Rear- Admiral  Heathcote  Grant,  C.B.,  etc.; 
Captain  A.  P.  Davidson,  R.N.  ;  Captain  the  Hon. 
Algernon  Boyle,  R.N. ;  Staff-Surgeon  Levick,  R.N. ; 
and  the  Rev.  C.  J.  C.  Peshall,  R.N.     It  would  indeed 


PREFACE  xiii 

be  difficult  to  draw  up  a  complete  list  of  the  Naval 
and  Military  officers  to  whom  I  owe  my  thanks. 

Having  taken  many  photographs  on  the  Peninsula, 
I  posted  them,  as  I  was  directed,  to  the  War  Office, 
and  never  saw  them  again.  I  can  only  hope  that 
any  one  into  whose  possession  they  may  happen  to 
have  come  upon  the  route,  may  find  them  as  useful 
as  I  should  have  found  them  in  illustrating  this  book. 
My  friend.  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean,  has  generously 
supplied  me  with  some  of  his  own  photographs  in 
their  place.  For  the  rest  I  am  permitted  to  use 
official  pictures,  taken  by  my  friend,  Mr.  Brooks. 
They  are  of  course  far  superior  to  any  I  could 
have  taken,   but  some  are  already  familiar. 

The  maps  are  for  the  most  part  constructed 
from  the  Staff  Maps  (nominally  Turkish,  but  mainly 
Austrian  I  believe)  used  by  the  G.H.Q.  upon  the 
Peninsula.  Some  also  are  derived  from  drawings  by 
Generals  and  Staff  Officers.  For  the  larger  maps 
of  Anzac  and  Suvla  I  am  indebted  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Captain  Treloar  and  the  Australian  Staff 
in  London,  with  permission  of  Sir  Alexander  Godley, 
and  Brigadier-General  Richardson  (formerly  of  the 
Royal  Naval  Division). 

The  following  is  a  list  of  the  chief  books  and 
documents  which  I  have  found  useful  : — 

Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  Dispatches. 

Sir  Charles  Monro's  Dispatch  on  the  Evacuation. 

The  Dardanelles  Commission  Report,  Part  I. 


xiv  PREFACE 

With   the    Twenty-ninth    Division    in    Gallipoli, 

by  the   Rev.  O.  Creighton,  Chaplain   to   the 

86th   Brigade  (killed  in  France,  April  1918). 
The     Tenth    [Irish)    Division    in    Gallipoliy    by 

Major  Bryan  Cooper,  5th  Connaught  Rangers. 
With  the  Zionists  in  Gallipoli,  by  Lieut. -Colonel 

J.  S.  Patterson. 
The  Immortal  Gamble,  by  A.  J.  Stewart,  Acting 

Commander,    R.N.,    and    the    Rev.   C.    J.    E. 

Peshall,  Chaplain,  R.N. 
Uncensored  Letters  from  the   Dardanelles,  by  a 

French  Medical  Officer. 
Australia  in  Arms,  by  Phillip  F.  E.  Schuler. 
The  Story  of  the  Anzacs.     (Messrs.   Ingram    & 

Sons,  Melbourne.) 
Mr.    Ashmead    Bartlett's    Dispatches    from    the 

Dardanelles. 
What  of  the  Dardanelles  ?  by  Granville  Fortescue. 
Two     Years   in    Constantinople,    by    Dr.    Harry 

Stiirmer. 
Inside  Constantinople,  by  Lewis  Einstein. 
Nelsons  History  of  the    War,   by  Colonel   John 

Buchan. 
The  "  Times''  History  of  the  War. 
The    ''Manchester    Guardian''    History    of  the 

War. 

H.  W.  N. 

London,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I 
THE   ORIGIN 

PAGE 

Naval  Bombardment,  November  1914— Causes  of  German-Turkish  Alliance 
— Germany's  Eastern  aims — Mistakes  of  British  diplomacy— The 
Goeben  and  Breslan — The  position  of  Greece — Turkey  declares  war         i 

CHAPTER   n 
THE   INCEPTION 

Mr.  Churchill  first  suggests  attack  on  Gallipoli — Russia's  appeal  for  aid — 
A  demonstration  decided  upon— The  War  Council — Lord  Kitchener 
— Mr.  Asquith — Mr.  Churchill— Objects  of  his  scheme— Lord 
Kitchener's  objections  —  Admirals  Fisher  and  Arthur  Wilson — 
— Their  duty  as  advisers — Lord  Fisher's  opinion — Admiral  Jackson's 
view— Admiral  Garden  on  the  scheme — War  Council  orders  a  naval 
attack — Lord  Fisher's  opposition — He  gives  reluctant  assent — 
Decision  for  a  solely  naval  expedition  .  .  .  .12 

CHAPTER   HI 

THE   NAVAL  ATTACKS 

Council's  hesitation  renewed — A  military  force  prepared — The  29th  Division 
detained — Description  of  the  Dardanelles — Mudros  and  the  islands 
— Formation  of  the  fleet— Bombardment  of  February  19 — Renewed 
on  February  25 — Further  attacks  in  early  March — Effect  on  Balkan 
States— Mr.  Churchill  urges  greater  vigour— Admiral  de  Robeck 
succeeds  to  command— The  naval  attack  of  March  18 — Losses  and 
comparative  failure — Purely  naval  attacks  abandoned  .  .       40 

CHAPTER   IV 

THE   PREPARATION 

Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  appointment— His  qualifications— Misfortune  of  delay 
— Transports  returned  for  reloading— Sir  Ian  in  Egypt— The  forces 
there— The  '*  Anzacs"— Possible  lines  of  attack  considered— The 
selected  scheme— Chief  members  of  Sir  lan's  staff— Available  forces 
—Sir  lan's  address— Rupert  Brooke's  death  .  ,  .64 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V 
THE   LANDINGS 


PAGE 


The  Start  from  Mudros— Landing  at  De  Tott's  Battery— Seddel  Bahr  and 
V  Beach— The  River  C/j/^^— Landing  at  V  Beach— Night  there— 
W  Beach  or  Lancashire  Landing— Landing  at  X  Beach— Y2  and  Y 
Beaches— Landing  at  Y  Beach— Its  failure— Landing  at  Anzac— 
The  positions  won  there— Feint  off  Bulair— Captain  Freyberg's 
exploit — French  feint  at  Kum  Kali   .  .  .  .  .88 

CHAPTER   VI 

THE  TEN   DAYS  AFTER 

Sir  lan's  decision  to  hold  Anzac — Advance  from  V  Beach — Death  of 
Doughty-Wylie— The  French  at  V  Beach— Position  of  Krithia— 
Advance  of  April  28— Turkish  attack  of  May  i— Reinforcements 
arrive — Position  at  Anzac — Casualties — Underestimate  of  wounded 
— Unhappy  results    .  .  .  .  •  •  .123 

CHAPTER   Vn 

THE  BATTLES   OF  MAY 

State  of  Constantinople — Our  submarines — Sir  fan's  reduced  forces — The 
guns — May  6  at  Helles — May  7— May  8 — The  Australian  charge— 
The  29th  Division — Trench  warfare — Death  of  General  Bridges  at 
Anzac — May  19  at  Anzac — Armistice  at  Anzac — Loss  |by  hostile 
submarines — G.H.Q.  at  Imbros — Hope  of  Russian  aid  abandoned 
— Mr.  Churchill  and  Lord  Fisher  resign        .  .  .  -144 

CHAPTER  VIH 

THE   BATTLES   OF  JUNE 

Situation  on  Peninsula — ^June  4  at  Helles — French  Colonial  troops — 
Arrival  of  General  De  Lisle — ^June  6  to  8  at  Helles — Losses — Want 
of  guns — ^June  28  at  Helles — The  Gully  Ravine — Turkish  proclama- 
tions— Position  at  Anzac — June  29  at  Anzac — Discouragement — 
General  Gouraud  wounded — The  war  in  Poland  and^Italy   .  •     171 

CHAPTER   IX 
THE  PAUSE   IN  JULY 

Local  Turkish  attacks — Turkish  reinforcements — Our  attacks  of  July  12 
and  13  at  Helles — General  Hunter- Weston  invalided — General 
Stopford's  arrival — Description  of  Helles — Rations — Description  of 
Anzac — The  Aragon  at  Mudros — Arrival  of  General  Altham — The 
Saturnia — Arrival  of  Colonel  Hankey — The 'monitors,  "blister- 
ships,"  and  "beetles" — The  loth,  nth,  and  13th  Divisions — The 
53rd  and  S4th  Divisions — Total  forces  in  August — New  scheme  of 
attack  considered       .  .  .  .  .  ,  .19' 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER  X 
THE  VINEYARD,    LONE   PINE,   AND   THE   NEK 


PAGE 


Feints  and  arrangement  of  forces — August  6  at  Helles — August  7  to  13 — 
Fight  for  the  Vineyard — Leane's  trenches  at  Anzac — Lone  Pine — 
Assault  of  August  6— Continuous  fighting  till  August  12 — Assault 
on  German  officers'  trenches — Assault  on  the  Nek,  August  7  .     224 


CHAPTER   XI 

SARI    BAIR 

Description  of  the  range — Nature  of  the  approaches — General  Godley's 
force — His  dispositions— Evening  August  6  to  evening  August  7 — 
Capture  of  Old  No.  3  Post — Capture  of  Big  Table  Top — Capture  of 
Bauchop's  Hill — Ascent  of  Rhododendron  Ridge — General  Monash 
on  Aghyl  Dere — Evening  August  7  to  evening  August  8 — Fresh 
dispositions — Summit  of  Chunuk  Ridge  reached — Death  of  Colonel 
Malone — Attempt  at  Abdel  Rahman — Evening  August  8  to  evening 
August  9 — Error  of  Baldwin's  column — Major  Allanson  on  Hill  Q 
— View  of  the  Dardanelles — Party  driven  off  by  shells — Turks  regain 
the  summit — Baldwin  at  the  Farm — Party  on  Chunuk  Ridge  relieved 
— Evening  August  9  to  evening  August  10 — Fresh  party  on  Chunuk 
Ridge  destroyed — Turks  swarm  over  summit — Fighting  at  the  Farm 
— Death  of  General  Baldwin — Turks  driven  back  to  summit — 
Causes  of  comparative  failure  .....     247 

CHAPTER  Xn 
SUVLA  BAY 

Description  of  the  bay  and  surrounding  country — General  Stopford  and  IXth 
Corps — Divisional  Generals — Evening  August  6  to  evening  August 
7 — The  embarkation — Work  of  the  Navy — The  landing  beaches — 
Capture  of  Lala  Baba — Ill-luck  of  34th  Brigade — Delay  and  con- 
fusion of  Brigades  and  Divisions — Hill's  Brigade  (31st) — Its  advance 
round  Salt  Lake— Capture  of  Chocolate  Hill — General  Mahon  on 
Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt — Evening  August  7  to  evening  August  8 — 
— Silence  at  Suvla — Failure  of  water  distribution — Sir  Ian  visits 
Suvla — His  orders  to  General  Hammersley — Scimitar  Hill  aban- 
doned by  mistake — Evening  August  8  to  evening  August  9 — Turks 
reinforced  return  to  positions — Failure  of  our  attack  on  Scimitar 
Hill — Sir  Ian  proposes  occupation  of  Kavak  and  Tekke  Tepes — He 
sends  his  last  reserve  to  Suvla — Evening  August  9  to  evening  August 
10 — Renewed  attack  on  Scimitar  Hill — Its  failure — General  Stopford 
ordered  to  consolidate  line — Evening  August  10  to  evening  August 
II — Landing  of  54th  Division — Confusion  of  front  Hnes — Battalions 
reorganised — Evening  August  11  to  evening  August  12 — Sir  Ian 
again  urges  occupation  of  Kavak  and  Tekke  Tepes — Disappearance 

b 


xviii  CONTENTS 


PAGE 


of  5th  Norfolks— General  Stopford's  objections— The  loth  Division 
on  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt  (August  15) — Faihire  to  maintain  advance — 
General  De  Lisle  succeeds  General  Stopford  temporarily  in  com- 
mand of  IXth  Corps — Other  changes  in  command     .  .  .     286 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE    LAST   EFFORTS 

Causes  of  the  failure  in  August— Advantages  gained— Approximate  losses 
— Adequate  reinforcements  refused — Arrival  of  Peyton's  mounted 
Division— Renewed  attempt  against  Scimitar  Hill  (August  21)— 
Mistakes  in  the  advance  on  right — The  29th  Division  in  centre- 
Advance  of  the  Yeomanry — Failure  to  occupy  the  hill — Attack  on 
Hill  60  from  Anzac— Kabak  Kuyu  (August  21)— Connaught  Rangers 
— Slov/  progress  of  attack— Second  attack  (August  27)— Third 
attack  (August  29) — Last  battle  on  the  Peninsula      .  .  .     333 

CHAPTER   XIV 

SIR   lAN'S   RECALL 

Sickness  increases  during  September — Monotonous  food — Regret  for  dead 
and  wounded— New  drafts — Fears  of  winter — Sir  Julian  Byng  com- 
mands IXth  Corps — Events  in  France,  Poland,  and  the  Balkans — 
Attitude  of  Bulgaria  and  Greece — The  loth  Division  and  one  French 
sent  to  Salonika — Bulgaria  declares  war — Venizelos  resigns — Serbia 
invaded  —  Salonika  expedition  too  late,  but  destroys  hope  of 
Dardanelles — Lord  Kitchener  inquires  about  evacuation — Sir  lan's 
reply — He  is  recalled  ......     35^ 

CHAPTER    XV 

THE   FIFTH   ACT 

Sir  Charles  Monro  arrives — His  report — The  advocates  of  evacuation — 
Lord  Kitchener  visits  the  Peninsula — General  Birdwood  appointed 
to  command — Storm  and  blizzard  of  November — General  Birdwood 
ordered  to  evacuate  Suvla  and  Anzac — Estimate  of  Turkish  forces 
— Our  ruses — Arrangements  at  Suvla — Risks  of  the  final  nights — 
Embarkation  at  Suvla — Problem  at  Anzac — Final  arrangements — 
Evacuation  of  Anzac  —  Uncertainty  about  Helles  —  Evacuation 
ordered— Turkish  attacks— Final  withdrawal  (January  8,  19 16) — 
Recapitulation  of  causes  of  failure — Concluding  observations — The 
end    .......•■     374 


INDEX        .........     413 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS 


General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton 

From  a  portrait  by  John  S.  Sargent,  R.A. 


Fro7itispiece 


Service  on  Board  the  Queen  Elizabeth    . 

General  Sir  William  Birdwood 

The  R/yEJi  Clyde,  "V"  Beach,  and  Seddel  Bahr 

LiEUT.-CoL.  C.  H.  H.  Doughty-Wylie  . 

Anzac  Cove  ....... 

French  Dug-out  at  Helles       .... 

General  Gouraud  standing  with  General  Bailloud 

Water-Carriers  at  Anzac 

A  "  Beetle "  . 

General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  (igiS) 

Monash  Gully        .... 

Major-General  Sir  Alexander  Godley 
Big  Table  Top        .... 

Ocean  Beach  .... 

Anzac  in  Snow       .... 

Scene  on  Suvla  Point     . 


FACING    PAGE 
.  24 


44 

94 

128 

138 
174 
194 
206 
214 
228 
244 
256 
260 
284 
384 
394 


XX 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


MAPS 


Helles  and  the  Straits. 
Positions  at  Anzac 
SuvLA  Landing 
32ND  Brigade,  August  8 
iith  Division,  August  21 


FACING  PAGE 
78 


112 
286 
316 


At  End  of  Book 

1.  The  Peninsula,  the  Straits,  and  Constantinople. 

2.  British  and  French  Trenches  at  Helles. 

3.  Positions  at  Anzac  (end  of  August). 

4.  Positions  at  Suvla  (end  of  August). 


As  this    Book   is   in   g^rcat    demand,    it 

is    respectfully    requested    that    it    may   be 

^  returned    to    the   Library   as    soon   as    read 

in     oi'dcr    to     facilitate    other    Subscribers 

getting    it    without   undue    delay. 


THE    ORIGIN 

N  November  3,  19 14,  the  silence  of  the 
Dardanelles  was  suddenly  broken  by  an 
Anglo-French  naval  squadron,  which  opened 
I  fire  upon  the  forts  at  the  entrance  of  that  historic 
strait.  The  bombardment  lasted  only  ten  minutes, 
its  object  being  merely  to  test  the  range  of  the 
Turkish  guns,  and  no  damage  seems  to  have  been 
inflicted  on  either  side.  The  ships  belonged  to  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean  Allied  Squadrons,  commanded 
by  Vice- Admiral  Sackville  Garden,  and  the  order 
to  bombard  was  given  by  the  Admiralty,  Mr.  Winston 
Ghurchill  being  First  Lord.  The  War  Council  was 
not  consulted,  and  Admiral  Sir  Henry  Jackson, 
Gommander-in-Ghief  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  his 
evidence  before  the  Dardanelles  Commission  described 
the  bombardment  as  a  mistake,  because  it  was  likely 
to  put  the  Turks  on  the  alert.  Commodore  de 
Bartolom^,  Naval  Secretary  to  the  First  Lord,  also 
said  he  considered  it  unfortunate,  presumably  for  the 
same   reason.^     Even  Turks,  unaided   by  Germans, 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  46. 


2  THE  ORIGIN 

might  have  foreseen  the  ultimate  necessity  of 
strengthening  the  fortification  of  the  Straits,  but  at 
the  beginning  they  would  naturally  trust  to  the  long- 
recognised  difficulty  of  forcing  a  passage  up  the 
swift  and  devious  channel  which  protects  the  entrance 
to  the  Imperial  City  more  securely  than  a  mountain 
pass. 

War  between  the  Allies  and  Turkey  became 
certain  only  three  days  before  (October  31),  but  from 
the  first  the  temptation  of  the  Turkish  Government 
to  throw  in  their  lot  with  "  Central  Europe "  was 
powerful.  It  is  true  that,  during  three  or  four 
decades  of  last  century,  Turkey  counted  upon 
England  for  protection,  and  that  by  the  Crimean 
War  and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  England  had  pro- 
tected her,  with  interested  generosity,  as  a  serviceable 
though  frail  barrier  against  Russian  designs.  But 
the  British  occupation  of  Egypt,  the  British  inter- 
vention in  Crete  and  Macedonia,  and  perhaps  also 
the  knowledge  that  a  body  of  Englishmen  fought  for 
Greece  in  her  disastrous  campaign  of  1897,  shook 
Turkish  confidence  in  the  supposed  protection ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  Abdul  Hamid's  atrocious 
persecution  of  his  subject  races  proved  to  the  British 
middle  classes  that,  though  the  Turk  was  described 
as  "the  gentleman  of  the  Near  East,"  he  still 
possessed  qualities  undesirable  in  an  ally  of  pro- 
fessing Christians.  Besides,  within  the  last  eight 
years  (since  1906),  the  understanding  between 
England  and  Russia  had  continually  grown  more 
definite,  until  it  resulted  in  open  alliance  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war  ;  and  Russia  had  long  been  Turkey's 
relentless  and  insatiable  foe.     For  she  had  her  mind 


HOW  GERMANY  WON  TURKEY  3 

steadily  set  upon  Constantinople,  partly  because,  by 
a  convenient  and  semi-religious  myth,  the  Tsars  re- 
garded themselves  as  the  natural  heirs  of  the  Byzan- 
tine Emperors,  and  partly  in  the  knowledge  that  the 
possession  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  was 
essential  for  the  development  of  Russia's  naval  power. 

Germany  was  not  slow  in  taking  up  the  part  of 
Turkey's  friend  as  bit  by  bit  it  fell  from  England's 
hand.  If,  in  Lord  Salisbury's  phrase,  England  found 
in  the  'nineties  that  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War 
she  had  put  her  money  on  the  wrong  horse,  Germany 
continued  to  back  the  weak-kneed  and  discarded  out- 
sider. Germany's  voice  was  never  heard  in  the  wide- 
spread outcry  against  "the  Red  Sultan."  German 
diplomacy  regarded  all  Balkan  races  and  Armenians 
with  indifferent  scorn.  It  called  them  "  sheepstealers  " 
[Hammeldiebe),  and  if  Abdul  Hamid  chose  to  stamp 
upon  troublesome  subjects,  that  was  his  own  affair. 
With  that  keen  eye  to  his  country's  material  interest 
which,  before  the  war,  made  him  the  most  enterprise 
ing  and  successful  of  commercial  travellers,  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  11.,  repeating  the  earlier  visit  of  1889,  visited 
the  Sultan  in  state  at  the  height  of  his  unpopularity 
(1898),  commemorated  the  favour  by  the  gift  of  a 
deplorable  fountain  to  the  city,  and  proceeded  upon  a 
speculative  pilgrimage  to  Jerusalem,  which  holy  city 
German  or  Turkish  antiquarians  patched  with  the 
lath  and  plaster  restorations  befitting  so  curious  an 
occasion. 

The  prolonged  negotiations  over  the  concession 
of  the  Bagdad  railway  ensued,  the  interests  of  Turkey 
and  Germany  alike  being  repeatedly  thwarted  by 
England's   opposition,    up    to   the    very   eve    of   the 


4  THE  ORIGIN 

present  war,  when  Sir  Edward  Grey  withdrew  our 
objection,  providing  only  for  our  interests  on  the 
section  between  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf/ 
During  the  Young  Turk  revolution  of  1908- 1909, 
English  Liberal  opinion  was  enthusiastic  in  support 
of  the  movement  and  in  the  expectation  of  reform. 
But  our  diplomacy,  always  irritated  at  new  situations 
and  suspicious  of  extended  liberties,  eyed  the  change 
with  a  chilling  scepticism  which  threw  all  the  advan- 
tage into  the  hands  of  Baron  Marschall  von  Biberstein, 
the  German  Ambassador  in  Constantinople.  His 
natural  politeness  and  open-hearted  industry  con- 
trasted favourably  with  the  habitual  aloofness  or 
leisured  indifference  of  British  Embassies  ;  and  so  it 
came  about  that  Enver  Pasha,  the  military  leader  of 
Young  Turkey,  was  welcomed  indeed  by  the  oppo- 
nents of  Abdul  Hamid's  tyranny  at  a  public  dinner 
in  London,  but  went  to  reside  in  Berlin  as  military 
attachd 

Germany's  object  in  this  astute  benevolence  was 
not  concealed.  With  her  rapidly  increasing  popula- 
tion, laborious,  enterprising,  and  better  trained  than 
other  races  for  the  pursuit  of  commerce  and  technical 
industries,  she  naturally  sought  outlets  to  vast  spaces 
of  the  world,  such  as  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia  had  already  absorbed.  The  immense  growth 
of  her  wealth,  combined  with  formidable  naval  and 
military  power,  encouraged  the  belief  that  such  expan- 
sion was  as  practicable  as  necessary.  But  the  best  places 
in  the  sun  were  now  occupied.     She  had  secured  pretty 

*  Speech  in  Foreign  Office  Debate.  July  lo,  1914.  The  whole  ques- 
tion of  Germany's  relations  to  Turkey  is  discussed  with  his  usual 
ktiowledge  by  Mr.  H.  N.  Brailsford  in  A  League  of  Nations,  chap,  v. 


GERMANY'S  EASTERN  AIMS  5 

fair  portions  in  Africa,  but  France,  England,  and 
Belgium  had  better.  Brazil  was  tempting,  but  the 
United  States  proclaimed  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  a 
bar  to  the  New  World.  Portugal  might  sell  Angola 
under  paternal  compulsion,  but  its  provinces  were 
rotten  with  slavery,  and  its  climate  poisonous. 
Looking  round  the  world,  Germany  found  in  the 
Turkish  Empire  alone  a  sufficiently  salubrious  and 
comparatively  vacant  sphere  for  her  development ; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  more  suitable  sphere  we 
could  have  chosen  to  allot  for  her  satisfaction,  without 
encroaching  upon  our  own  preserves.  Even  the 
patch  remaining  to  Turkey  in  Europe  is  a  fine 
market-place  ;  with  industry  and  capital  most  of  Asia 
Minor  would  again  flourish  as  "the  bright  cities  of 
Asia  "  have  flourished  before ;  there  is  no  reason  but 
the  Ottoman  curse  why  the  sites  of  Nineveh  and 
Babylon  should  remain  uninhabited,  or  the  Garden  of 
Eden  lie  desolate  as  a  wilderness  of  alternate  dust  and 
quagmire. 

But  to  reach  this  land  of  hope  and  commerce  the 
route  by  sea  was  long,  and  exposed  to  naval  attack 
throughout  its  length  till  the  Dardanelles  were 
reached.  The  overland  route  must,  therefore,  be 
kept  open,  and  three  points  of  difficulty  intervened, 
even  if  the  alliance  with  Austria- Hungary  perma- 
nently held  good.  The  overland  route  passed 
through  Serbia  (by  the  so-called  "corridor"),  and 
behind  Serbia  stood  the  jealous  and  watchful 
power  of  the  Tsars ;  it  passed  through  Bulgaria, 
which  would  have  to  be  persuaded  by  solid  argu- 
ments on  which  side  her  material  interests  lay  ;  and  it 
passed  through  Constantinople,  ultimately  destined  to 


6  THE  ORIGIN 

become  the  bridgehead  of  the  Bagdad  railway — the 
point  from  which  trains  might  cross  a  Bosphorus 
suspension  bridge  without  unloading.  There  the 
German  enterprise  came  clashing  up  against  Russia's 
naval  ambition  and  Russia's  rooted  sentiment.  There 
the  Kaiser,  imitating  the  well-known  epigram  of 
Charles  v.,  might  have  said  :  "  My  cousin  the  Tsar 
and  I  desire  the  same  object — namely,  Constanti- 
nople." There  lay  the  explanation  of  Professor 
Mitrofanoff's  terrible  sentence  in  the  Preussische 
Jahrbiicher  of  June  1914  :  "  Russians  now  see  plainly 
that  the  road  to  Constantinople  lies  through  Berlin." 
The  Serajevo  murders  on  the  28th  of  the  same  month 
were  but  the  occasion  of  the  Great  War.  The  corridor 
through  Serbia,  and  the  bridgehead  of  the  Bosphorus, 
ranked  among  the  ultimate  causes. 

The  appearance  of  a  German  General,  Liman  von 
Sanders,  in  Constantinople  shortly  after  the  second 
Balkan  War  in  19 13,  if  it  did  not  make  the  Great  War 
inevitable,  drove  the  Turkish  alliance  in  case  of  war 
inevitably  to  the  German  side.  He  succeeded  to 
more  than  the  position  of  General  Colman  von  der 
Goltz,  appointed  to  reorganise  the  Turkish  army  in 
1882.  Accompanied  by  a  German  staff,  the  Kaiser's 
delegate  began  at  once  to  act  as  a  kind  of  Inspector- 
General  of  the  Turkish  forces,  and  when  war  broke 
out  they  fell  naturally  under  his  control  or  command. 
The  Turkish  Government  appeared  to  hesitate  nearly 
three  months  before  definitely  adopting  a  side.  The 
uneasy  Sultan,  decrepit  with  forty  years  of  palatial 
imprisonment  under  a  brother  who,  upon  those  terms 
only,  had  borne  his  existence  near  the  throne,  still  re- 
tained the  Turk's  traditional  respect  for  England  and 


ENGLAND'S  ATTITUDE  TO  TURKEY  7 

France.  So  did  his  Grand  Vizier,  Said  Halim,  So 
did  a  large  number  of  his  subjects,  among  whom 
tradition  dies  slowly.  With  tact  and  a  reasonable 
expenditure  of  financial  persuasion,  the  ancient  sym- 
pathy might  have  been  revived  when  all  had  given 
it  over ;  and  such  a  revival  would  have  saved  us 
millions  of  money  and  thousands  of  young  and  noble 
lives,  beyond  all  calculation  of  value. 

But,  most  disastrously  for  our  cause,  the  tact  and 
financial  persuasion  were  all  on  the  other  side.  The 
Allies,  it  is  true,  gave  the  Porte  "definite  assurances 
that,  if  Turkey  remained  neutral,  her  independence 
and  integrity  would  be  respected  during  the  war  and 
in  the  terms  of  peace."  ^  But  similar  and  stronger 
assurances  had  been  given  both  at  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Balkan  War  in 
191 2.  Unfortunately  for  our  peace,  Turkey  had  dis- 
covered that  at  the  Powers'  perjuries  Time  laughs, 
nor  had  Time  long  to  wait  for  laughter.  Following 
upon  successive  jiltings,  protestations  of  future  affec- 
tion are  cautiously  regarded  unless  backed  by  solid 
evidences  of  good  faith ;  but  the  Allies,  having  pre- 
viously refused  loans  which  Berlin  hastened  to 
advance,  had  further  revealed  the  frivolity  of  their 
intentions  the  very  day  before  war  with  Germany  was 
declared,  by  seizing  the  two  Dreadnought  battleships. 
Sultan  Os7nan  and  Reskadie,  then  building  for  the 
Turkish  service  in    British   dockyards.     Upon  these 

^  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  October  14,  191 5  ; 
Foreign  Office  Statement,  November  i,  1914.  On  the  authority  of  the 
Kaiser,  in  conversation  with  M.  Theotokis,  Greek  Minister  in  Berlin,  it 
now  appears  that  Germany  had  already  concluded  an  alliance  with 
Turkey  on  August  4,  191 4.  (See  Greek  White  Book,  published  August 
24,  1917.) 


8  THE  ORIGIN 

two  battleships  the  Turks  had  set  high,  perhaps 
exaggerated,  hopes,  and  Turkish  peasants  had  con- 
tributed to  their  purchase ;  for  they  regarded  them 
as  insurance  against  further  Greek  aggression  among 
the  islands  of  the  Asiatic  coast.  Coming  on  the  top 
of  the  Egyptian  occupation,  the  philanthropic  inter- 
ference with  sovereign  atrocity,  the  Russian  alliance, 
and  the  refusal  of  loans,  their  seizure  overthrew  the 
shaken  credit  of  England's  honesty,  and  one  might 
almost  say  that  for  a  couple  of  Dreadnoughts  we  lost 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits/ 

With  lightning  rapidity,  Germany  seized  the 
advantage  of  our  blunder.  At  the  declaration  of  war, 
the  Goeben,  one  of  her  finest  battle-cruisers,  a  ship  of 
22,625  tons,  capable  of  28  knots,  and  armed  with  ten 
1 1 -inch  guns,  twelve  5*9-inch,  and  twelve  lesser 
guns,  was  stationed  off  Algeria,  accompanied  by  the 
fast  light  cruiser  Breslau  (4478  tons,  twelve  4*1 -inch 
guns),  which  had  formed  part  of  the  international 
force  at  Durazzo  during  the  farcical  rule  of  Prince  von 
Wied  in  Albania.  After  bombarding  two  Algerian 
towns,  they  coaled  at  Messina,  and,  escaping  thence 
with  melodramatic  success,  eluded  the  Allied  Mediter- 
ranean command,  and  reached  Constantinople  through 
the  Dardanelles,  though  suffering  slight  damage  from 
the  light  cruiser  Gloucester  (August  8  or  9).  When 
Sir  Louis  Mallet  and  the  other  Allied  Ambassadors 
demanded  their  dismantlement,  the  Kaiser,  with  con- 
strained but  calculated  charity,  nominally  sold  or 
presented  them  to  Turkey  as  a  gift,  crews,  guns,  and 
all.     Here,   then,   were   two    fine   ships,    not   merely 

^  See  Turkey,  Greece,  and  the  Great  Poiuers,  by  G.  F.  Abbott  (191 7), 
pp.  167-200. 


GERMANY  TAKES  HER  ADVANTAGE  9 

building,  but  solidly  afloat  and  ready  to  hand.  The 
gift  was  worth  an  overwhelming  victory  to  the  fore- 
seeing donor.  ^ 

Germany's  representatives  pressed  this  enormous 
advantage  by  inducing  the  Turkish  Government  to 
appoint  General  Liman  Commander-in-Chief,  and  to 
abrogate  the  Capitulations.  They  advanced  fresh 
loans,  and  fomented  the  Pan-Islamic  movement  in 
Asia  Minor,  Egypt,  Persia,  and  perhaps  in  Northern 
India.  They  even  disseminated  the  peculiar  rumour 
that  the  Kaiser,  in  addition  to  his  material  activities, 
had  adopted  the  Moslem  faith.  The  dangerous 
tendency  was  so  obvious  that,  after  three  weeks'  war, 
Mr.  Winston  Churchill  concluded  that  Turkey  might 
join  the  Central  Powers  and  declare  war  at  any 
moment.  On  September  i  he  wrote  privately  to 
General  Douglas,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff: 

"  I  arranged  with  Lord  Kitchener  yesterday  that 
two  officers  from  the  Admiralty  should  meet  two 
officers  from  the  D.M.O.'s  (Director  of  Military 
Operations)  Department  of  the  War  Office  to-day 
to  examine  and  work  out  a  plan  for  the  seizure,  by 
means  of  a  Greek  army  of  adequate  strength,  of  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula,  with  a  view  to  admitting  a  British 
Fleet  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora." 

Two   days  later.  General   Callwell,  the  D.M.O., 

^  Changing  their  religion  with  their  sky,  the  Goeben  and  Breslau 
became  the  Jawuz  Sultan  Selim  and  the  Midilli  in  the  Turkish  Navy. 
See  Two  War  Years  in  Constantinople,  by  Dr.  Harry  Stiirmer,  p.  113. 
In  an  action  at  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles,  January  20,  1918,  the 
Breslau  was  sunk,  and  the  Goeben  had  to  be  beached  at  Nagara  Point. 
We  lost  the  monitor  Lord  Raglan. 


lo  THE  ORIGIN 

wrote  a  memorandum  upon  the  subject,  in  which  he 
said  : 

"It  ought  to  be  clearly  understood  that  an  attack 
upon  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  from  the  sea  side 
(outside  the  Straits)  is  likely  to  prove  an  extremely 
difficult  operation  of  war." 

He  added  that  it  would  not  be  justifiable  to  under- 
take this  operation  with  an  army  of  less  than  60,000 
men.-^ 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  first  mention  of  the 
Dardanelles  Expedition.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the 
idea  was  Mr.  Churchill's,  that  he  depended  upon  a 
Greek  army  to  carry  it  out,  and  that  General  Callwell, 
the  official  adviser  upon  such  subjects,  considered  it 
extremely  difficult,  and  not  to  be  attempted  with  a 
landing  force  of  less  than  60,000  men. 

In  mentioning  a  Greek  army,  Mr.  Churchill  justly 
relied  upon  M.  Venizelos,  at  that  time  by  far  the 
ablest  personality  in  the  Near  East,  entirely  friendly 
to  ourselves,  and  Premier  of  Greece,  which  he  had 
saved  from  chaos  and  greatly  extended  in  territory  by 
his  policy  of  the  preceding  five  or  six  years.  But 
Mr.  Churchill  forgot  to  take  account  of  two  important 
factors.  After  the  Balkan  Wars  of  191 2  and  191 3, 
King  Constantine's  imaginative  but  unwarlike  people 
had  acclaimed  him  both  as  the  Napoleon  of  the  Near 
East  and  as  the  "  Bulgar-slayer,"  a  title  borrowed 
from  Byzantine  history.  Priding  himself  upon  these 
insignia  of  a  military  fame  little  justified  by  his  mili- 
tary achievements  from  1897  onward,  the  King  of 
Greece  posed  as    the    plain,   straightforward   soldier, 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;    First  Report,  par.  45  (omitted  in  first 
publication,  but  inserted  shortly  afterwards). 


TURKEY  DECLARES  WAR  ii 

and,  perhaps  to  his  credit,  from  the  first  refused 
approval  of  a  Dardanelles  campaign,  though  he  pro- 
fessed himself  willing  to  lead  his  whole  army  along 
the  coast  through  Thrace  to  the  City.  The  profession 
was  made  the  more  easily  through  his  consciousness 
that  the  offer  would  not  be  accepted/  For  the  other 
factor  forgotten  by  Mr.  Churchill  was  the  certain 
refusal  of  the  Tsar  to  allow  a  single  Greek  soldier  to 
advance  a  yard  towards  the  long-cherished  prize  of 
Constantinople  and  the  Straits. 

Turkish  hesitation  continued  up  to  the  end  of 
October,  when  the  war  party  under  Enver  Pasha, 
Minister  of  War,  gained  a  dubious  predominance 
by  sending  out  the  Turkish  fleet,  which  rapidly 
returned,  asserting  that  the  ships  had  been  fired  upon 
by  Russians  (Oct.  28) — an  assertion  believed  by  few. 
On  the  29th,  Turkish  torpedo  boats  (at  first  reported 
as  the  Goeben  and  Breslau)  bombarded  Odessa  and 
Theodosia,  and  a  swarm  of  Bedouins  invaded  the 
Sinai  Peninsula.  Turkey  declared  war  on  the  31st. 
Sir  Louis  Mallet  left  Constantinople  on  November  i, 
and  on  the  5th  England  formally  declared  war  upon 
Turkey. 

^  The  subject  was  fully  discussed  with  the  present  writer  by  M. 
Skouloudis,  at  that  time  Premier  in  Athens  (November  9,  191 5).  That 
veteran  statesman  was  apparently  honest  in  his  belief  both  in  the  King's 
military  genius  and  in  the  King's  good  faith  towards  the  Allies — a  belief 
unfounded  in  both  cases. 


T 


CHAPTER    II 
THE    INCEPTION 

"^HE  break  with  Turkey,  so  pregnant  with 
evil  destiny,  did  not  attract  much  attention 
in  England  at  the  moment.  All  thoughts 
were  then  fixed  upon  the  struggle  of  our  thin  and 
almost  exhausted  line  to  hold  Ypres  and  check  the 
enemy's  straining  endeavour  to  command  the  Channel 
coast  by  occupying  Dunkirk,  Calais,  and  Boulogne. 
The  Turk's  military  reputation  had  fallen  low  in  the 
Balkan  War  of  191 2,  and  few  realised  how  greatly 
his  power  had  been  re-established  under  Enver  and 
the  German  military  mission.  Egypt  was  the  only 
obvious  point  of  danger,  and  the  desert  of  Sinai  ap- 
peared a  sufficient  protection  against  an  unscientific 
and  poverty-stricken  foe ;  or,  if  the  desert  were  pene- 
trated, the  Canal,  though  itself  the  point  to  be  pro- 
tected, was  trusted  to  protect  itself.  On  November  8, 
however,  some  troops  from  India  seized  Fao,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Tigris- Euphrates,  and,  with  reinforce- 
ments, occupied  Basrah  on  the  23rd,  thus  inaugurat- 
ing that  Mesopotamian  expedition  which,  after  terrible 
vicissitudes,  reached  Bagdad  early  in  March  1917. 

These  measures,  however,  did  not  satisfy  Mr. 
Churchill.  At  a  meeting  of  the  War  Council  on 
November  25,  he  returned  to  his  idea  of  striking  at 
the    Gallipoli    Peninsula,    if  only  as   a    feint.      Lord 


THE  CAMPAIGN  SUGGESTED  13 

Kitchener  considered  the  moment  had  not  yet  arrived, 
and  regarded  a  suggestion  to  collect  transport  in 
Egypt  for  40,000  men  as  unnecessary  at  present.  In 
his  own  words,  Mr.  Churchill  **  put  the  project  on  one 
side,  and  thought  no  more  of  it  for  the  time,"  although 
horse-boats  continued  to  be  sent  to  Alexandria  "in 
case  the  War  Office  should,  at  a  later  stage,  wish  to 
undertake  a  joint  naval  and  military  operation  in  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean."  ^ 

On  January  2,  191 5,  a  telegram  from  our  Ambas- 
sador at  Petrograd  completely  altered  the  situation. 
Russia,  hard  pressed  in  the  Caucasus,  called  for  a 
demonstration  against  the  Turks  in  some  other 
quarter.  Certainly,  at  that  moment,  Russia  had 
little  margin  of  force.  She  was  gasping  from  the 
effort  to  resist  Hindenburg's  frontal  attack  upon 
Warsaw  across  the  Bzura,  and  the  contest  had  barely 
turned  in  her  favour  during  Christmas  week.  In  the 
Caucasus  the  situation  had  become  serious,  since 
Enver,  by  clever  strategy,  attempted  to  strike  at 
Kars  round  the  rear  of  a  Russian  army  which  was 
crossing  the  frontier  in  the  direction  of  Erzeroum.  On 
the  day  upon  which  the  telegram  was  sent,  the  worst 
danger  had  already  been  averted,  for  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Sarikamish  the  Russians  had  destroyed 
Enver's  9th  Corps,  and  seriously  defeated  the  loth 
and  nth.  But  this  fortunate  and  unexpected  result 
was  probably  still  unknown  in  Petrograd  when  our 
Ambassador  telegraphed  his  appeal. 

On  the  following  day  (January  3,  19 15)  an 
answer,  drafted  in  the  War  Office,  but  sent  through 
the  Foreign  Office,  was  returned,  promising  a  demon- 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  pars.  47,'  48, 


14  THE  INCEPTION 

stration  against  the  Turks,  but  fearing  that  it  would 
be  unlikely  to  effect  any  serious  withdrawal  of 
Turkish  troops  in  the  Caucasus.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
considered  that  "when  our  Ally  appealed  for  assist- 
ance we  were  bound  to  do  what  we  could."  But 
Lord  Kitchener  was  far  from  hopeful.  He  informed 
Mr.  Churchill  that  the  only  place  where  a  demonstra- 
tion might  have  some  effect  in  stopping  reinforce- 
ments going  East  would  be  the  Dardanelles.  But  he 
thought  we  could  not  do  much  to  help  the  Russians 
in  the  Caucasus  ;  "we  had  no  troops  to  land  any- 
where"  ;  "we  should  not  be  ready  for  anything  big 
for  some  months."^ 

So,  by  January  3,  we  were  bound  to  some  sort 
of  a  demonstration  in  the  Dardanelles,  but  Lord 
Kitchener  regarded  it  as  a  mere  feint  in  the  hope 
of  withholding  or  recalling  Turkish  troops  from  the 
Caucasus,  and  he  evidently  contemplated  a  purely 
or  mainly  naval  demonstration  which  we  could  easily 
withdraw  without  landing  troops,  and  without  loss  of 
prestige.  In  sending  this  answer  to  Petrograd,  he 
does  not  appear  to  have  consulted  the  War  Council 
as  a  whole.  His  decision,  though  not  very  enthusi- 
astic, was  sufficient ;  for  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  he 
dominated  the  War  Council,  as  he  dominated  the 
country. 

The  War  Council  had  taken  the  place  of  the  old 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  (instituted  in  1901, 
and  reconstructed  in  1904).  The  change  was  made 
towards  the  end  of  November  19 14,  but,  except  in 
one  important  particular,  it  was  little  more  than  a 
change    in    name.       Like    the    old    Committee,    the 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  pars.  50-52, 


THE  WAR  COUNCIL  15 

Council  were  merely  a  Committee  of  the  Cabinet, 
with  naval  and  military  experts  added  to  give  advice. 
The  main  difference  was  that  the  War  Council,  in- 
stead of  laying  its  decisions  before  the  Cabinet  for 
approval  or  discussion,  gave  effect  even  to  the  most 
vital  of  them  upon  its  own  responsibility,  and  thus 
Sfathered  into  its  own  hands  all  deliberative  and  exe- 
cutive  powers  regarding  military  and  naval  move- 
ments. Sir  Edward  Grey,  as  Foreign  Secretary, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer, 
and  Lord  Crewe,  as  Secretary  for  India,  occasionally 
attended  the  meetings,  and  Mr.  Balfour  was  invited 
to  attend.  But  the  real  power  remained  with  Mr. 
Asquith,  the  Prime  Minister,  Lord  Kitchener,  the 
Secretary  for  War,  and  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  In  Mr.  Asquith's  own  words  : 
"The  daily  conduct  of  the  operations  of  the  war  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  Ministers  responsible  for  the 
Army  and  Navy  in  constant  consultation  with  the 
Prime  Minister."^ 

This  inner  trinity  of  Ministers  was  dominated,  as 
we  said,  by  Lord  Kitchener's  massive  personality. 
In  his  evidence  before  the  Dardanelles  Comm^ission, 
Mr.  Churchill  thus  described  the  effect  of  that  re- 
markable man  upon  the  other  members : 

"  Lord  Kitchener's  personal  qualities  and  position 
played  at  this  time  a  very  great  part  in  the  decision 
of  events.  His  prestige  and  authority  were  immense. 
He  was  the  sole  mouthpiece  of  War  Office  opinion  in 
the  War  Council.  Every  one  had  the  greatest  ad- 
miration for  his  character,  and  every  one  felt  fortified, 

^  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  upon  the  Dardanelles  Commis- 
sion s  First  Report,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1743). 


1 6  THE  INCEPTION 

amid  the  terrible  and  incalculable  events  of  the  open- 
ing months  of  the  war,  by  his  commanding  presence. 
When  he  gave  a  decision,  it  was  invariably  ac- 
cepted as  final.  He  was  never,  to  my  belief,  over- 
ruled by  the  War  Council  or  the  Cabinet  in  any 
military  matter,  great  or  small.  No  single  unit  was 
ever  sent  or  withheld  contrary,  not  merely  to  his 
agreement,  but  to  his  advice.  Scarcely  any  one  ever 
ventured  to  argue  with  him  in  Council.  Respect  for 
the  man,  sympathy  for  him  in  his  immense  labours, 
confidence  in  his  professional  judgment,  and  the  belief 
that  he  had  plans  deeper  and  wider  than  any  we  could 
see,  silenced  misgivings  and  disputes,  whether  in 
the  Council  or  at  the  War  Of^ce.  All-powerful,  im- 
perturbable, reserved,  he  dominated  absolutely  our 
counsels  at  this  time."  ^ 

These  sentences  accurately  express  the  ideal  of 
Lord  Kitchener  as  conceived  by  the  public  mind. 
His  large  but  still  active  frame,  his  striking  appear- 
ance, and  his  reputation  for  powerful  reserve,  in  them- 
selves inspired  confidence.  His  patient  and  ultimately 
successful  services  in  Egypt,  the  Soudan,  South 
Africa,  and  India  were  famed  throughout  the  country, 
which  discovered  in  him  the  very  embodiment  of  the 
silent  strength  and  tenacity,  piously  believed  to  distin- 
guish the  British  nature.  Shortly  before  the  outbreak 
of  war,  Mr.  Asquith  as  Prime  Minister  had  taken  the 
charge  of  the  War  Of^ce  upon  himself,  owing  to 
Presbyterian  Ulster's  threat  of  civil  war,  and  the 
possibility  of  mutiny  among  the  British  garrison  in 
Ireland,  if  commanded  to  proceed  against  that  rather 
self-righteous  population.  When  war  with  Germany 
was  declared,  it  so  happened  that  Lord  Kitchener 
was  in  England,  on  the  point  of  returning  to  Egypt, 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  q. 


LORD  KITCHENER'S  POWER  l^ 

and  Mr.  Asquith  handed  over  to  him  his  own  office 
as  Secretary  for  War.  The  Cabinet,  and  especially 
Lord  Haldane  (then  Lord  Chancellor,  but  Minister 
of  War  from  1905  to  191 2),  the  most  able  of  army 
organisers,  urged  him  to  this  step.  But  he  needed 
no  persuasion.  He  never  thought  of  any  other 
successor  as  possible.     As  he  has  said  himself: 

"  Lord  Kitchener's  appointment  was  received 
with  universal  acclamation,  so  much  so  indeed  that 
it  was  represented  as  having  been  forced  upon  a 
reluctant  Cabinet  by  the  overwhelming  pressure  of  an 
intelligent  and  prescient  Press."  ^ 

By  the  consent  of  all.  Lord  Kitchener  was  the  one 
man  capable  of  conducting  the  war,  and  by  the  con- 
sent of  most  he  remained  the  one  man,  though  he 
conducted  it.  Yet  it  might  well  be  argued  that  the 
public  mind,  incapable  of  perceiving  complexity, 
accepted  a  simple  ideal  of  their  hero  which  he  himself 
had  deliberately  created.  A  hint  of  the  mistake  may 
be  found  in  Mr.  Asquith's  speech.^  He  admitted 
that  Lord  Kitchener  was  a  masterful  man  ;  that  he 
had  been  endowed  with  a  formidable  personality,  and 
was  by  nature  rather  disposed  to  keep  his  own 
counsel.  But  he  maintained  that  he  "  was  by  no 
means  the  solitary  and  taciturn  autocrat  in  the  way 
he  had  been  depicted."  One  may  describe  him  as 
shy  rather  than  aggressive,  genial  rather  than  relent- 
less, a  reasonable  peacemaker  rather  than  a  man  of 
iron.  Under  that  unbending  manner,  he  studiously 
concealed  a  love  of  beauty,  both  human  and  artistic. 
Under  a  rapt  appearance  of  far-reaching  designs,  his 

^  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1746). 
2  Ibid. 

2 


1 8  THE  INCEPTION 

mind  was  much  occupied  with  inappropriate  detail, 
and  could  relax  into  trivialities.  He  was  distin- 
guished rather  for  sudden  flashes  of  intuition  than  for 
reasoned  and  elaborated  plans.  During  the  first  year 
of  the  war,  his  natural  temptation  to  occupy  himself 
in  matters  better  delegated  to  subordinates  was  in- 
creased by  the  absence  in  France  of  experienced 
officers  whom  he  could  have  trusted  for  staff  work. 
He  became  his  own  Chief  of  Staff,^  and  diverted 
much  of  his  energy  to  minor  services.  At  the  War 
Council  he  acted  as  his  own  expert,  and  Sir  James 
Murray,  who  always  attended  the  meetings  as  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  was  never  even  asked 
to  express  an  opinion.  The  labours  thus  thrown 
upon  Lord  Kitchener,  or  mistakenly  assumed,  when 
he  was  engaged  upon  the  task  of  creating  new 
armies  out  of  volunteers,  and  organising  an  unmilitary 
nation  for  war  while  the  war  thundered  across  the 
Channel,  were  too  vast  and  multifarious  for  a  single 
brain,  however  resolute.  It  is  possible  also  that  the 
course  of  years  had  slightly  softened  the  personal  will 
which  had  withstood  Lord  Milner  in  carrying  through 
the  peace  negotiations  at  Pretoria,  and  Lord  Curzon 
in  reforming  the  Viceroy's  Council  at  Simla.  Never- 
theless, when  all  is  said,  all-powerful,  imperturbable, 
reserved.  Lord  Kitchener  dominated  absolutely  the 
counsels  of  the  war's  first  year,  and  his  service  to 
the  country  was  beyond  all  estimate.  It  raises  his 
memory  far  above  the  reach  of  the  malignant  detrac- 
tion attempted  after  his    death  by  certain  organs  of 

^  Mr.  Asquith,  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917. 
Cf.  Sir  James  Wolfe  Murray  :  "  Lord  Kitchener  acted  very  much  as  his 
own  Chief  of  the  Staff."    Dardanelles  Commission  j  First  Report,  par.  18. 


MR.  ASQUITH  AS  PRIME  MINISTER  19 

that    "  intelligent   and   prescient    Press "    which    had 
shrieked  for  his  appointment.^ 

Second  in  authority  upon  the  War  Council  and 
with  the  nation,  but  only  second,  stood  Mr.  Asquith. 
For  six  years  he  had  been  Prime  Minister — years 
marked  by  the  restlessness  and  turbulence  of  expand- 
ing liberty  at  home,  and  abroad  by  ever-increasing 
apprehension.  Yet  his  authority  was  derived  less 
from  his  office  than  from  personal  qualities  which,  as 
in  Lord  Kitchener's  case,  the  English  people  like  to 
believe  peculiarly  their  own.  He  was  incorruptible, 
above  suspicion.  His  mind  appeared  to  move  in  a  cold 
but  pellucid  atmosphere,  free  alike  from  the  generous 
enthusiasm  and  the  falsehood  of  extremes.  Sprung 
from  the  intellectual  middle-class,  he  conciliated  by 
his  origin,  and  encouraged  by  his  eminence.  His 
eloquence  was  unsurpassed  in  the  power  of  simple 
statement,  in  a  lucidity  more  than  legal,  and,  above 
all,  in  brevity.  The  absence  of  emotional  appeal,  and, 
even  more,  the  absence  of  humour,  promoted  con- 
fidence, while  it  disappointed.  Here,  people  thought, 
was  a  personality  rather  wooden  and  unimaginative, 
but  trustworthy  as  one  who  is  not  passion's  slave. 
No  one,  except  rivals  or  journalistic  wreckers,  ever 

^  "  I  suppose  that  upon  no  man  in  our  history  has  a  heavier  burden 
fallen  than  fell  upon  him,  and  nothing  in  connection  with  this  Report — 
it  may  be  no  imputation  upon  anybody  connected  with  the  Report  itself 
— has  filled  me  with  more  indignation  and  disgust  than  that  the  pub- 
lication of  the  criticisms  made  in  it  of  Lord  Kitchener's  conduct  and 
capacity  should  have  been  taken  advantage  of  by  those  who  only  two 
years  ago  were  in  a  posture  of  almost  slavish  adulation  to  belittle  his 
character,  and,  so  far  as  they  can,  to  defile  his  memory.  Lord  Kitchener's 
memory  is  in  no  danger.  It  lives,  and  will  live,  in  the  gratitude  and 
admiration  of  the  British  people  and  of  the  whole  Empire." — Mr.  Asquith, 
Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1748). 


20  THE  INCEPTION 

questioned  his  devotion  to  the  country's  highest 
interests  as  he  conceived  them,  and,  as  statesmen  go, 
he  appeared  almost  uninfluenced  by  vanity. 

Balliol  and  the  Law  had  rendered  him  too  fastidi- 
ous and  precise  for  exuberant  popularity,  but  under 
an  apparent  immobility  and  educated  restraint  he 
concealed,  like  Lord  Kitchener,  qualities  more  attrac- 
tive and  humane.  Although  conspicuous  for  cautious 
moderation,  he  was  not  obdurate  against  reason,  but 
could  sing  a  palinode  upon  changed  convictions.^ 
Unwavering  fidelity  to  his  colleagues,  and  a  mag- 
nanimity like  Caesar's  in  combating  the  assaults  of 
political  opponents,  and  disregarding  the  treachery  of 
most  intimate  enemies,  surrounded  him  with  a  personal 
affection  which  surprised  external  observers ;  while 
his  restrained  and  unexpressive  demeanour  covered  an 
unsuspected  kindliness  of  heart.  In  spite  of  his  lapses 
into  fashionable  reaction,  most  supporters  of  the 
Gladstonian  tradition  still  looked  to  him  for  guidance 
along  the  lines  of  peaceful  and  gradual  reform,  when 
suddenly  the  war-cloud  burst,  obliterating  in  one  deluge 
all  the  outlines  of  peace  and  progress  and  law.  The 
Tsar  who,  with  assumed  philanthropy,  had  proposed 
the  Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague ;  the  ruler  to 
whom  the  ambition  of  retaining  the  title  of  "  Friedens- 
kaiser  "  was,  perhaps  honestly,  attributed ;  the  Presi- 
dent who  had  known  how  passionately  France  clung 
to  peace  ;  the  Belgian  King  who  foresaw  the  devasta- 
tion of  his  wealthy  country  ;  the  stricken  Emperor 
who,  through  long  years  of  disaster  following  disaster, 
had  hoped  his   distracted   heritage    might    somehow 

^  See  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  Woman  Sufifrage, 
March  28,  191 7. 


MR.  CHURCHILL'S  IDEA  21 

hang  together  still — all  must  have  suffered  a  torture 
of  anxiety  and  indecision  during  those  fateful  days  of 
July  and  August  19 14.  But  upon  none  can  the 
decision  have  inflicted  deeper  suffering  than  upon  a 
Prime  Minister  naturally  peaceful,  naturally  kindly, 
naturally  indisposed  to  haste,  plagued  with  the 
scholar's  and  the  barrister's  torturing  ability  to  per- 
ceive many  sides  to  every  question,  and  hoping  to 
crown  a  laborious  life  by  the  accomplishment  of 
political  and  domestic  projects  which,  at  the  first 
breath  of  war,  must  wither  away.     Yet  he  decided. 

Third  in  influence  upon  the  War  Council  (that  is 
to  say,  upon  the  direction  of  all  naval  and  military 
affairs)  stood  Mr.  Winston  Churchill.  In  his  evidence 
before  the  Commission,  Mr.  Churchill  stated  : 

**  I  was  on  a  rather  different  plane.  I  had  not 
the  same  weight  or  authority  as  those  two  Ministers, 
nor  the  same  power,  and  if  they  said.  This  is  to  be 
done  or  not  to  be  done,  that  settled  it."^ 

The  Commissioners  add  in  comment  that  Mr. 
Churchill  here  "  probably  assigned  to  himself  a  more 
unobtrusive  part  than  that  which  he  actually  played." 
The  comment  is  justified  in  relation  to  the  Dardan- 
elles, not  merely  because  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
Mr.  Churchill  playing  an  unobtrusive  part  upon  any 
occasion,  but  because,  as  we  have  seen,  the  idea  of 
a  Dardanelles  Expedition  was  specially  his  own.  It 
was  one  of  those  ideas  for  which  we  are  sometimes 
indebted  to  the  inspired  amateur.  For  the  amateur, 
untrammelled  by  habitual  routine,  and  not  easily 
appalled  by  obstacles  which  he  cannot  realise,  allows 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  16. 


22  THE  INCEPTION 

his  imagination  the  freer  scope,  and  contemplates  his 
own  particular  vision  under  a  light  that  never  was  in 
office  or  in  training-school.  In  Mr.  Churchill's  case, 
the  vision  of  the  Dardanelles  was,  in  truth,  beatific. 
His  strategic  conception,  if  carried  out,  would  have 
implied,  not  merely  victory,  but  peace.  Success 
would  at  once  have  secured  the  defence  of  Egypt,  but 
far  more  besides.  It  would  have  opened  a  high  road, 
winter  and  summer,  for  the  supply  of  munitions  and 
equipment  to  Russia,  and  a  high  road  for  returning 
ships  laden  with  the  harvests  of  the  Black  Earth.  It 
would  have  severed  the  German  communication  with 
the  Middle  East,  and  rendered  our  Mesopotamian 
campaign  either  unnecessary  or  far  more  speedily 
fortunate.  On  the  political  side,  it  would  have  held 
Bulgaria  steady  in  neutrality  or  brought  her  into  our 
alliance.  It  might  have  saved  Serbia  without  even 
an  effort  at  Salonika,  and  certainly  it  would  have 
averted  all  the  subsequent  entanglements  with  Greece. 
Throughout  the  whole  Balkans,  the  Allies  would  at 
once  have  obtained  the  position  which  the  enemy 
afterwards  held,  and  have  surrounded  the  Central 
Powers  with  an  iron  circle  complete  at  every  point 
except  upon  the  Baltic  coast,  the  frontiers  of  Den- 
mark, Holland,  and  Switzerland,  and  a  strip  of  the 
Adriatic.  Under  those  conditions,  it  is  hardly  pos- 
sible that  the  war  could  have  continued  after  19 16. 
In  a  speech  made  during  the  summer  of  the  year 
before  that  (after  his  resignation  as  First  Lord),  Mr. 
Churchill  was  justified  in  saying  : 

**  The  struggle  will  be  heavy,  the  risks  numerous, 
the  losses  cruel ;  but  victory,  when  it  comes,  will  make 
amends  for  all.     There  never  was  a  great  subsidiary 


V- 


LORD  KITCHENER'S  EARLY  OBJECTION       23 

operation  of  war  in  which  a  more  complete  harmony 
of  strategic,  political,  and  economic  advantages  has 
combined,  or  which  stood  in  truer  relation  to  the  main 
decision  which  is  in  the  central  theatre.  Through  the 
Narrows  of  the  Dardanelles  and  across  the  ridges  of 
the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  lie  some  of  the  shortest  paths 
to  a  triumphant  peace."  ^ 

The  strategic  design,  though  not  above  criticism 
(for  many  critics  advised  leaving  the  Near  East  alone, 
and  concentrating  all  our  force  upon  the  Western 
front) — the  design  in  itself  was  brilliant.  All  de- 
pended upon  success,  and  success  depended  upon  the 
method  of  execution.  Like  every  sane  man,  pro- 
fessional or  lay,  Mr.  Churchill  favoured  a  joint  naval 
and  military  attack.  The  trouble — the  fatal  trouble 
— was  that  in  January  19 15  Lord  Kitchener  could 
not  spare  the  men.  He  was  anxious  about  home 
defence,  anxious  about  Egypt  (always  his  special 
care),  and  most  anxious  not  to  diminish  the  fighting 
strength  in  France,  where  the  army  was  concentrat- 
ing for  an  offensive  which  was  subsequently  aban- 
doned, except  for  the  attack  at  Neuve  Chapelle  (in 
March).  He  estimated  the  troops  required  for  a 
Dardanelles  landing  at  150,000,  and  at  this  time 
he  appears  hardly  to  have  considered  the  suggested 
scheme  except  as  a  demonstration  from  which  the 
navy  could  easily  withdraw. 

Mr.  Churchill's  object  was  already  far  more  exten- 
sive. Like  the  rest  of  the  world,  he  had  marvelled 
at  the  power  of  the  German  big  guns — guns  of  unsus- 
pected calibre — in  destroying  the  forts  of  Lidge  and 
Namur.      In  his  quixotic  attempt    to   save  Antwerp 

^  Speech  at  Dundee,  June  5,  191 5. 


24  THE  INCEPTION 

(an  attempt  justly  conceived  but  revealing  the 
amateur  in  execution)  by  stiffening  the  Belgian 
troops  with  a  detachment  of  British  marines  and  the 
unorganised  and  ill-equipped  Royal  Naval  Division 
under  General  Paris,  he  had  himself  witnessed 
another  proof  of  such  power.  For  he  was  present 
in  the  doomed  city  from  October  4  to  7,  two  days 
before  it  fell.  Misled  by  a  false  analogy  between 
land  and  sea  warfare,  he  asked  himself  why  the  guns 
of  super- Dreadnoughts  like  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
should  not  have  a  similarly  overwhelming  effect 
upon  the  Turkish  forts  in  the  Dardanelles  ;  especially 
since,  under  the  new  conditions  of  war,  their  fire 
could  be  directed  and  controlled  by  aeroplane  obser- 
vation, while  the  ships  themselves  remained  out  of 
sight  upon  the  sea  side  of  the  Peninsula.  It  was  this 
argument  which  ultimately  induced  Lord  Kitchener 
to  assent,  though  reluctantly,  to  a  purely  naval  at- 
tempt to  force  the  Straits,  for  he  admitted  that  "as  to 
the  power  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth  he  had  no  means  of 
judging."^ 

But,  for  the  moment,  Mr.  Churchill  contented 
himself  with  telegraphing  to  Vice-Admiral  Garden 
(January  3) : 

"  Do  you  think  that  it  is  a  practicable  operation  to 
force  the  Dardanelles  by  the  use  of  ships  alone  ?  .  .  . 
The  importance  of  the  results  would  justify  severe 
loss." 

At  the  same  time  he  stated  that  it  was  assumed 
that  "  older  battleships  "  would  be  employed,  furnished 
with  mine-sweepers,  and  preceded  by  colliers  or  other 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  53. 


'14-^.M    :    ^ 


THE  ADMIRALS  IN  AUTHORITY  25 

merchant  vessels    as    sweepers    and    bumpers.      On 
January  5  Garden  replied  : 

"  I  do  not  think  that  the  Dardanelles  can  be 
rushed,  but  they  might  be  forced  by  extended  opera- 
tions with  a  large  number  of  ships." 

Next  day  Mr.  Churchill  telegraphed :  "  High 
authorities  here  concur  in  your  opinion."  He  further 
asked  for  detailed  particulars  showing  what  force 
would  be  required  for  extended  operations.^ 

Among  the  "high  authorities,"  Garden  naturally 
supposed  that  one  or  more  of  the  naval  experts  who 
attended  the  War  Gouncil  were  included.  These 
naval  experts  were,  in  the  first  place,  Lord  Fisher 
(First  Sea  Lord)  and  Sir  Arthur  Wilson,  Admirals 
of  long  and  distinguished  service.  Both  were  over 
seventy  years  of  age,  and  both  were  regarded  by  the 
navy  and  the  whole  country  with  the  highest  respect, 
though  for  distinct  and  even  opposite  qualities. 
Lord  Fisher  had  been  exposed  to  the  criticism 
merited  by  all  reformers,  or  bestowed  upon  them. 
Especially  it  was  argued  that  his  insistence  upon  the 
Dreadnought  type,  by  rendering  the  former  fleet  ob- 
solete, had  given  our  hostile  rival  upon  the  seas  the 
opportunity  of  starting  a  new  naval  construction  on 
almost  equal  terms  with  our  own.  But,  none  the  less, 
Lord  Fisher  was  recognised  as  the  man  to  command 
the  fleet  by  the  right  of  genius,  and  his  authority 
at  sea  was  hardly  surpassed  by  Lord  Kitchener's  on 
land.  The  causes  of  the  confidence  and  respect  in- 
spired by  Sir  Arthur  Wilson  are  sufficiently  suggested 
by  his   invariable   nickname  of  "Tug."      Both   Ad- 

^  Ibid.^  pars.  54,  55. 


26  THE  INCEPTION 

mirals  were  members  of  the  War  Staff  Group,  in- 
stituted by  Prince  Louis  of  Battenberg  in  the 
previous  November/  and  both  attended  the  War 
Council  as  the  principal  naval  experts.  Admiral 
Sir  Henry  Jackson  and  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Henry 
Oliver  (Chief  of  the  Staff)  were  also  present  on 
occasion. 

The  expert's  duty  in  such  a  position  has  been 
much  disputed.  The  question,  in  brief,  is  whether 
he  acts  as  adviser  to  his  Minister  only  (in  this  case, 
Mr.  Churchill),  or  to  the  Council  as  a  whole.  Lord 
Fisher  and  Sir  Arthur  Wilson,  supported  by  Sir 
James  Wolfe  Murray,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff  under  Lord  Kitchener  (who  was  always  his  own 
expert),  maintained  they  were  right  in  acting  solely 
as  Mr.  Churchill's  advisers.  Though  they  sat  at  the 
same  table,  they  did  not  consider  themselves  members 
of  the  War  Council.  It  was  not  for  them  to  speak, 
unless  spoken  to.  They  were  to  be  seen  and  not 
heard.  The  object  of  their  presence  was  to  help  the 
First  Lord,  if  their  help  was  asked,  as  it  never  was. 
In  case  of  disagreement  with  their  chief,  there  could 
be  "no  altercation."  They  must  be  silent  or  resign. 
Their  office  doomed  them,  as  they  considered,  to  the 
old  Persian's  deplorable  fate  of  having  many  thoughts, 

^  This  War  Staff  Group  took  the  place  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty  in 
strategical  matters,  the  Second,  Third,  and  Fourth  Sea  Lords  being 
thus  released  for  their  special  functions  of  manning,  shipbuilding,  and 
transport.  Its  other  members  were  the  First  Lord,  the  Chief  of  the 
Staff  (Sir  Henry  Oliver),  the  Secretary  of  the  Board  (Sir  Graham 
Greene),  and  the  Naval  Secretary  (Commodore  de  Bartolome).— See 
"The  Dardanelles  Report,"  by  Mr.  Archibald  Hurd  {Fortnightly 
Review^  April  191 7),  where  the  whole  subject  is  discussed  with  the 
writer's  well-known  knowledge  of  naval  affairs. 


THEIR  DUTY  AS  ADVISERS  27 

but  no  power/  In  this  view  of  their  duties,  they 
were  strongly  supported  among  the  Dardanelles 
Commissioners  by  Mr.  Andrew  Fisher  (representing 
Australia)  and  Sir  Thomas  Mackenzie  (representing 
New  Zealand).  Following  official  etiquette,  they 
were,  it  seems,  justified  in  holding  themselves  bound 
by  official  rules  to  acquiesce  in  anything  short  of 
certain  disaster  rather  than  serve  the  country  by  an 
undisciplined  word.^ 

If  this  attitude  was  technically  correct,  it  is  the 
more  unfortunate  that  the  Ministers  most  directly 
concerned,  as  being  members  of  the  War  Council, 
should  have  taken  exactly  the  opposite  view,  though 
masters  of  parliamentary  technique.  In  his  evidence 
before  the  Commission,  Mr.  Churchill,  the  man  most 
closely  concerned,  protested  : 

"  Whenever  I  went  to  the  War  Council  I  always 
insisted  on  being  accompanied  by  the  First  Sea  Lord 
and  Sir  Arthur  Wilson,  and  when,  at  the  War 
Council,  I  spoke  in  the  name  of  the  Admiralty,  I  was 
not  expressing  simply  my  own  views,  but  I  was  ex- 
pressing to  the  best  of  my  ability  the  opinions  we  had 
agreed  upon  at  our  daily  group  meetings ;  and  I  was 
expressing  these  opinions  in  the  presence  of  two 
naval  colleagues  and  friends  who  had  the  right,  the 
knowledge,  and  the  power  at  any  moment  to  correct 
me  or  dissent  from  what  I  said,  and  who  were  fully 
cognizant  of  their  rights."^ 

Mr.  Asquith  said  "he  should  have  expected  any 

ExoiaTT)  Se  68vvr]  earl  rav  iv  avOpairoicri  avrt],  TroXKa  (ppoveovra 
^ri8fv6s  Kpareeiv. — HerodotUS,  ix.  l6. 

2  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  pars.  19,  87  ;  minutes  i 
and  2. 

^  3icl.,  par.  20. 


28  THE  INCEPTION 

of  the  experts  there,  if  they  entertained  a  strong 
personal  view  on  their  own  expert  authority,  to  ex- 
press it."^  Lord  Grey,  Lord  Haldane,  Lord  Crewe, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  Colonel  Maurice  Hankey, 
the  very  able  Secretary  to  the  War  Council,  gave 
similar  evidence.  Mr.  Balfour  said  :  "  I  do  not  be- 
lieve it  is  any  use  having  in  experts  unless  you  try 
and  get  at  their  inner  thoughts  on  the  technical 
questions  before  the  Council."^  In  the  House  of 
Commons,  at  a  later  date,  Mr.  Asquith  maintained  : 

"They  (the  experts)  were  there — that  was  the 
reason,  and  the  only  reason,  for  their  being  there — to 
give  the  lay  members  the  benefit  of  their  advice.  .  .  . 
To  suppose  that  these  experts  were  tongue-tied  or 
paralysed  by  a  nervous  regard  for  the  possible  opinion 
of  their  political  superiors  is  to  suppose  that  they  had 
really  abdicated  the  functions  which  they  were  in- 
tended to  discharge."^ 

These  views  appear  so  reasonable  that  we  might 
suppose  them  unofficial,  had  not  the  speakers  occu- 
pied the  highest  official  positions  themselves.  The 
result  of  this  difference  of  opinion  regarding  the  duty 
of  expert  advisers  was  disastrous.  The  War  Council 
assumed  the  silence  of  the  experts  to  imply  acquies- 
cence, whereas  it  sprang  from  obedience  to  etiquette. 
Before  the  Commission,  Lord  Fisher  stated  that  from 
the  first  he  was  "instinctively  against  it"  {i.e.  against 
Admiral  Garden's  plan)  ;^  that  he  "  was  dead  against 
the  naval  operation  alone  because  he  knew  it  must  be 
a  failure  " ;  and  he  added,  "I   must  reiterate  that  as 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  26.       ^  /^/^.^  par.  22. 

^  Speech  of  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1744). 

*  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  16. 


MR.  CHURCHILL'S  OBJECTS  29 

a  purely  naval  operation  I  think  it  was  doomed  to 
failure."^  It  may  be  supposed  that  these  statements 
were  prophecies  after  the  event,  and  the  Commis- 
sioners observe  that  Lord  Fisher  did  not  at  the  time 
record  any  such  strongly  adverse  opinions.  Never- 
theless, on  the  very  day  when  a  demonstration  was 
first  discussed,  he  wrote  privately  to  Mr.  Churchill : 

"  I  consider  the  attack  on  Turkey  holds  the  field, 
but  only  if  it  is  immediate ;  however,  it  won't  be. 
We  shall  decide  on  a  futile  bombardment  of  the  Dar- 
danelles, which  wears  out  the  invaluable  guns  of  the 
Indefatigable^  which  probably  will  require  replacement. 
What  good  resulted  from  the  last  bombardment  ? 
Did  it  move  a  single  Turk  from  the  Caucasus  ?  "  ^ 

Two  days  later  he  sent  Mr.  Churchill  a  formal 
minute,  saying  that  our  policy  must  not  jeopardise 
our  naval  superiority,  but  the  advantages  of  possess- 
ing Constantinople  and  getting  wheat  through  the 
Black  Sea  were  so  overwhelming  that  he  considered 
Colonel  Hankey's  plans  for  Turkish  operations  vital 
and  imperative,  and  very  pressing.  The  object  of 
these  plans  (circulated  to  the  Wq,r  Council  on 
December  28,  19 14)  was  to  strike  at  Germany 
through  her  allies,  particularly  by  weaving  a  web 
around  Turkey ;  and  for  this  purpose  Lord  Fisher 
sketched  a  much  wider  policy  requiring  the  co-opera- 
tion of  Roumania,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  and  Serbia.^ 
The  scheme  was  not  identical  with  another  design 
of  naval  strategy  which  was  already  occupying  Lord 

^  Ibid.^  Majority  Report,  par.  68. 

^  Ibid..,  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  11.     The  reference  is  to  the  brief 
bombardment  of  November  3. 
^  Ibid..,  pars.  7-12. 


30  THE  INCEPTION 

Fisher's  mind,  and  the  frustration  of  which  by  the 
Dardanelles  Expedition  ultimately  caused  his  resigna- 
tion (in  May).  But  the  evidence  here  quoted  shows 
that  Lord  Fisher  could  not  be  included  among  the 
"high  authorities"  referred  to  by  Mr.  Churchill  as 
concurring  with  Admiral  Garden's  opinion.  Mr. 
Churchill  said  in  his  evidence  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
include  either  Lord  Fisher  or  Sir  Arthur  Wilson  (who 
throughout  agreed  with  Lord  Fisher  in  the  main). 
He  was  thinking  of  Admirals  Jackson  and  Oliver. 
Yet  to  Admiral  Garden's  mind  Lord  Fisher  would 
naturally  be  suggested  as  one  of  the  high  authorities ; 
and  was  suggested.^ 

So  soon  as  a  demonstration  of  some  sort  was 
decided  upon,  Mr.  Churchill  asked  Admiral  Jackson 
to  prepare  a  memorandum,  which  the  Admiral  de- 
scribed as  a  "  Note  on  forcing  the  passages  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus  by  the  Allied  fleets  in 
order  to  destroy  the  Turko-German  squadron  and 
threaten  Constantinople  without  military  co-opera- 
tion," The  last  three  words  are  important,  for  it  is 
evident  that,  though  Admiral  Jackson  expressed  no 
resolute  opposition  at  the  time,  he  was  strongly 
opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  merely  naval  attack.  In 
this  memorandum  he  pointed  out  facts  which  even  a 
layman  might  have  discerned  :  that  the  ships,  even  if 
they  destroyed  the  enemy  squadron,  would  be  ex- 
posed to  torpedo  at  night,  to  say  nothing  of  field-guns 
and  rifles  in  the  Straits,  and  would  hold  no  line  of 
retreat  unless  the  shore  batteries  had  been  destroyed ; 
that,  though  they  might  dominate  the  city,  their  posi- 
tion would  not  be  enviable  without  a  large  military 
^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  56. 


ADMIRAL  JACKSON'S  OPINION  31 

force  to  occupy  it ;  that  the  bombardment  alone  would 
not  be  worth  the  considerable  loss  involved  ;  that  the 
city  could  not  be  occupied  without  troops,  and  there 
was  a  risk  of  indiscriminate  massacre.^ 

The  dangers  of  an  unsupported  naval  attack  were 
so  obvious  that  Admiral  Jackson  can  have  needed  no 
further  authority  in  urging  them.  Yet  he  may  have 
recalled  a  memorandum  drawn  up  by  the  General 
Staff  (December  19,  1906),  stating  that  "military 
opinion,  looking  at  the  question  from  the  point  of 
view  of  coast  defence,  would  be  in  entire  agreement 
with  the  naval  view  that  unaided  action  by  the  Fleet, 
bearing  in  mind  the  risks  involved,  was  much  to  be 
deprecated,"^ 

Admiral  Jackson's  discouraging  memorandum  of 
January  5  was  not  shown  to  the  War  Council.  Yet 
it  was  of  vital  importance.  In  his  evidence,  Admiral 
Jackson  insisted  that  he  had  always  stuck  to  this 
memorandum  : 

**  It  would  be  a  very  mad  thing,"  he  said,  "to  try 
and  get  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora  without  having  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula  held  by  our  own  troops  or  every 
gun  on  both  sides  of  the  Straits  destroyed.  He  had 
never  changed  that  opinion,  and  he  had  never  given 
any  one  any  reason  to  think  he  had." 

Long   afterwards,   Mr.    Churchill   suggested    that 

^  Ibid.,  Majority  Report,  par.  57 ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  14. 
Admiral  Jackson's  view  as  to  the  unenviable  position  of  a  fleet  bottled 
up  off  Constantinople  without  commanding  the  line  of  retreat  was  prob- 
ably influenced  by  the  record  of  Admiral  Duckworth's  risk  when  in  a 
similar  position  (1807),  and  Admiral  Hornby's  hesitation  about  entering 
the  Straits  in  1877. — See  Nelson's  History  of  the  IVar,  by  John  Buchan, 
vol.  vi.  pp.  130-36. 

2  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  43. 


32  THE  INCEPTION 

what  Admiral  Jackson  meant  by  a  mad  thing  was  an 
attempt  to  rush  the  Straits  without  having  strong 
landing-parties  available,  and  transports  ready  to 
enter  when  the  batteries  were  seen  to  be  silent.^  It 
is  just  possible  to  put  that  interpretation  on  the  words, 
but  both  they  and  the  memorandum  itself  appear 
naturally  to  imply  a  far  larger  military  force  than 
landing-parties  as  essential. 

On  January  ii  Vice-Admiral  Garden  telegraphed 
a  detailed  scheme  for  gradually  forcing  the  Dar- 
danelles by  four  successive  stages,  the  operations  to 
cover  about  a  month.  The  plan  was  considered  by 
the  War  Staff  Group  at  the  Admiralty,  and  in  sub- 
sequent evidence  all  agreed  that  they  were  very 
dubious,  if  not  hostile.  Lord  Fisher  said  he  was 
instinctively  against  it.  Sir  Arthur  Wilson  said  he 
never  recommended  it.  Admiral  Oliver  and  Gom- 
modore  Bartolome  said  they  were  definitely  opposed 
to  a  purely  naval  attempt.  But  all  agreed  that  the 
operations  could  not  lead  to  disaster,  as  they  might 
be  broken  off  at  any  moment.^  Admiral  Jackson 
(not  a  member  of  the  Group)  also  drew  up  a  detailed 
memorandum  upon  all  stages  of  the  plan,  "  concurring 
generally,"  and  suggesting  that  the  first  stage  should 
be  approved  at  once,  as  the  experience  gained  might  be 
useful.  He  insisted  in  evidence  that  he  recommended 
only  an  attack  on  the  outer  forts.  He  accepted  the 
policy  of  a  purely  naval  attack  solely  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  not  for  him  to  decide.  His  responsibility 
was  limited  to  his  staff  work,  which  he  performed.^ 

^  Speech  in  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1780). 
"  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  16. 
2  Ibid.^  par.  20 ;  Majority  Report,  pars.  60-62. 


THE  WAR  COUNCIL'S  FIRST  DECISION         33 

The  two  decisive  meetings  of  the  War  Council  on 
January  13  and  January  28  followed.  At  the  former 
meeting  Mr.  Churchill  explained  the  details  of 
Admiral  Carden's  plan,  adding  that,  besides  certain 
older  ships,  two  new  battle-cruisers,  one  being  the 
Queen  Elizabeth,  could  be  employed.^  He  thus  re- 
vived his  Antwerp  experience  of  big-gun  power 
against  fortresses.  When  the  exposition  of  the  whole 
design  was  completed.  Lord  Kitchener  gave  it  as  his 
opinion  that  "the  plan  was  worth  trying.  We  could 
leave  off  the  bombardment  if  it  did  not  prove  effec- 
tive." In  this  delusive  belief  the  War  Council 
arrived  at  the  momentous  decision  : 

"  The  Admiralty  should  prepare  for  a  naval  ex- 
pedition in  February  to  bombard  and  take  the  Galli- 
poli  Peninsula,  with  Constantinople  as  its  objective."^ 

Although  the  word  "  take  "  is  used,  the  Council  had 
no  intention  at  this  time  of  employing  a  military  force. 
It  was  assumed  that  none  was  available.  The  same 
meeting  sanctioned  Sir  John  French's  plan  for  an 
offensive  in  France  (the  offensive  which  degenerated 
into  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle  in  March).  In 
case  of  a  naval  failure,  the  ships  could  be  withdrawn  ; 
in  case  of  success,  there  was  talk  of  a  revolution  in 
Constantinople,  and  upon  that  hope  the  Council 
gambled.^ 

During  this  meeting  Lord  Fisher,  together  with 
Admiral  Wilson  and  Sir  James  Murray,  sat  dumb  as 

^  Lord  Fisher  had  himself  suggested  the  use  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
to  Admiral  Oliver  the  day  before.     Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  17. 
2  Majority  Report,  par.  69.     Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  18. 
^  Majority  Report,  par.  94. 
3 


34  THE  INCEPTION 

usual,  and  his  silence  was  as  usual  taken  for  assent. 
When  the  Council  had  arrived  at  their  resolution,  he 
considered  his  sole  duty  was  to  assist  in  carrying  it 
out.  The  very  next  day  he  signed  a  memorandum 
from  Mr.  Churchill  strongly  advising  that  we  should 
devote  ourselves  to  "  the  methodical  forcing  of  the 
Dardanelles,"^  and  he  added  the  two  powerful  battle- 
ships Lord  Nelson  and  Agamemnon  to  the  fleet  allotted 
for  this  operation.  But  his  underlying  difference 
of  opinion  became  steadily  stronger.  In  evidence, 
Mr.  Churchill  said  he  "  could  see  that  Lord  Fisher  was 
increasinelv  worried  about  the  Dardanelles  situation. 
He  reproached  himself  for  having  agreed  to  begin 
the  operation.  ...  His  great  wish  was  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  whole  thing.  ...  I  knew  he  wanted  to 
break  off  the  whole  operation  and  come  away."^  On 
January  25  Lord  Fisher  took  the  unusual  course  of 
writing  to  Mr.  Asquith  and  stating  his  objections. 
He  considered  the  Dardanelles  would  divert  from 
another  large  plan  of  naval  policy  which  he  had  in 
mind  ;  further,  that  it  was  calculated  to  dissipate  our 
naval  strength,  and  to  risk  the  older  ships  (besides 
the  invaluable  men)  which  formed  our  only  reserve 
behind  the  Grand  Fleet.^ 

Mr.  Churchill  replied  in  a  similar  memorandum 
to  the  Prime  Minister,  defending  his  Dardanelles 
plan  on  the  plea  of  its  value,  even  at  a  cost  which, 
after  all,  would  be  relatively  small.  In  hope  of 
obtaining  some  agreement,  Mr.  Asquith  invited  Lord 
Fisher  and  Mr.  Churchill  to  his  room  just  before 
the  meeting  of  the  War  Council  on  January  28 — the 

1  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  68. 

2  Ibid.^  par.  83.  ^  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  22. 


MR.  CHURCHILL'S  INSISTENCE  35 

second  decisive  meeting.  After  discussion,  the  Prime 
Minister  expressed  his  satisfaction  with  Mr.  Church- 
ill's view,  and  all  three  proceeded  to  the  Council. 
It  was  a  fairly  full  meeting,  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
Mr.  Balfour  being  present,  besides  the  three  dominat- 
ing members  and  the  experts.  Mr.  Churchill  pressed 
his  plan  with  eloquent  enthusiasm.  "He  was  very 
keen  on  his  own  views,"  said  Sir  Arthur  Wilson  in 
evidence  ;  "he  kept  on  saying  he  could  do  it  without 
the  army  ;  he  only  wanted  the  army  to  come  in  and 
reap  the  fruits  .  .  .  and  I  think  he  generally  mini- 
mised the  risks  from  mobile  guns,  and  treated  it  as 
if  the  armoured  ships  were  immune  altogether  from 
injury."  ^  Mr.  Churchill  re-stated  the  political  and 
strategic  advantages  of  success.  He  said  that  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  had  replied  with  enthusiasm, 
and  that  the  French  Admiralty  had  promised  co- 
operation.^ He  said  the  Commander-in-Chief  in 
the  Mediterranean  believed  it  could  be  done  in  three 
weeks  or  a  month.  The  necessary  ships  were  already 
on  their  way. 

All  the  members  of  the  War  Council  were  won 
by  these  persuasive  arguments.  They  needed  little 
persuasion,  and  no  persuasion  is  so  strong  as  an 
enterprise  begun.  But  Lord  Fisher  for  once  broke 
silence.  He  said  he  had  not  supposed  the  matter 
would  be  raised  that  day,  and  that  the  Prime  Minister 
was  well  aware  of  his  views.  When  he  found  that  a 
final  decision  was  to  be  taken,  he  got  up  to  leave  the 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  88. 

2  M.  Augagneur,  Minister  of  Marine,  had  visited  London  after  the 
decision  of  January  13.  He  approved  the  subsequent  plan,  pronouncing 
it  "prudent  et  prevoyant."     Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  29. 


36  THE  INCEPTION 

room,  intending  to  resign.  But  Lord  Kitchener 
intercepted  him,  and  taking  him  to  the  window 
strongly  urged  him  to  remain,  pointing  out  that  he 
was  the  only  dissentient  and  it  was  his  duty  to  carry 
on  the  work  of  his  office  as  First  Sea  Lord.  Where- 
upon Lord  Fisher  reluctantly  yielded  to  the  entreaty 
and  returned  to  his  seat.^ 

It  is  remarkable  that  at  a  meeting  of  such  decisive 
moment  no  mention  was  made  of  Lord  Fisher's 
memorandum,  nor  of  Mr.  Churchill's  reply,  nor  of 
their  conference  with  the  Prime  Minister  an  hour 
before.  None  the  less,  not  only  Mr.  Asquith  and 
Mr.  Churchill  knew  of  Lord  Fisher's  opposition. 
Lord  Kitchener  knew  of  it ;  so  did  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Yet  the  opinion  of  the  chief  naval  authority  in  Eng- 
land was  overruled.  Mr.  Asquith  subsequently  stated 
that  "the  whole  naval  expert  opinion  available  to  us 
(the  War  Council),  whether  our  own  or  the  French, 
was  unanimously  and  consentiently  in  favour  of  this 
as  a  practical  naval  operation.  There  was  not  one 
dissentient  voice."  As  to  Lord  Fisher,  he  continued, 
it  was  quite  true  that  he  expressed  on  the  morning 
of  that  day  an  adverse,  or  at  least  an  unfavourable 
opinion,  but  not  upon  the  ground  of  its  merits  or 
demerits  from  a  technical  naval  point  of  view  : 

"  Lord  Fisher's  opinion  and  advice  were  not 
founded  upon  the  naval  technical  merits  or  demerits 
of  this  operation,  but  upon  his  avowed  preference 
for  a  wholly  different  objective  in  a  totally  different 
sphere." 

No  doubt  Lord  Fisher  insisted  mainly  upon  that 
different  objective  as  being  the  more  important  cause 

^  Majority  Report,  pars.  86,  87  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  pars.  25,  26. 


LORD  FISHER'S  RELUCTANT  ASSENT  37 

of  his  opposition.  But  it  seems  evident  that  from 
the  first  he  was  also  opposed  to  a  merely  naval  attack 
and  bombardment.  His  letter  to  Mr.  Churchill  on 
January  2  (quoted  above)  proves  this.  And  so  does 
the  following  clause  in  his  memorandum  to  the  Prime 
Minister  on  January  25  : 

"The  sole  justification  of  coastal  bombardments 
and  attacks  by  the  fleet  on  fortified  places,  such  as  the 
contemplated  prolonged  bombardment  of  the  Dar- 
danelles forts  by  our  fleet,  is  to  force  a  decision  at  sea, 
and  so  far  and  no  further  can  they  be  justified."^ 

Yet,  in  this  case,  there  was  no  suggestion  or  possibility 
of  forcing  a  decision  at  sea. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (January  28) 
Mr.  Churchill  had  a  private  interview  with  Lord 
Fisher,  and  "  strongly  urged  him  to  undertake  the 
operation."  Lord  Fisher  definitely  consented.  Mr. 
Churchill  says  that  if  he  had  failed  to  persuade  him, 
there  would  have  been  no  need  to  altercate,  or  to 
resign,  or  even  to  argue.  He  would  have  gone  back 
to  the  War  Council  and  told  them  they  must  either 
appoint  a  new  Board  of  Admiralty  or  abandon  the 
project.  "  For  the  First  Sea  Lord  has  to  order  the 
fleets  to  steam  and  the  guns  to  fire."^  Lord  Fisher, 
on  the  other  hand,  insisted  in  evidence  that  he  had 
taken  every  step,  short  of  resignation,  to  show  his 
dislike  of  the  proposed  operations ;  that  the  chief 
technical  advisers  of  the  Government  ought  not  to 
resign  because  their  advice  is  not  accepted,  unless 
they   think    the    operations    proposed    must  lead  to 

^  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  pars.  11  and  22. 

2  Speech  in  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1783, 
1784). 


38  THE  INCEPTION 

disastrous  results  ;  and  that  the  attempt  to  force  the 
Dardanelles  as  a  purely  naval  operation  would  not 
have  been  disastrous  so  long  as  the  ships  employed 
could  be  withdrawn  at  any  moment,  and  only  such 
vessels  were  employed  as  could  be  spared  without 
detriment  to  the  general  service  of  the  fleet.^ 

The  divergence  of  opinion  here  is  not  so  complete 
as  it  seems ;  for  by  admitting  that  the  War  Council 
could  have  appointed  a  new  Board  of  Admiralty  if 
Lord  Fisher  had  refused  to  carry  out  their  decision, 
Mr.  Churchill  showed  that,  though  the  First  Sea 
Lord  could  order  the  fleets  to  steam  and  the  guns  to 
fire,  the  ultimate  control  did  not  lie  with  him.  The 
ultimate  control  lay  with  the  Government  (in  this 
case  the  War  Council),  and  Lord  Fisher  was  un- 
doubtedly right  in  thinking  his  constitutional  duty 
consisted  in  carrying  out  the  Council's  decisions  or 
resigning  his  office.  He  did  not  resign  at  this  time, 
because  he  thought  the  naval  attack  did  not  necessarily 
imply  disaster.  He  agreed  to  undertake  the  charge. 
He  considered  it  his  duty  simply  to  carry  out  the 
Council's  decision  as  best  he  could.  With  Mr. 
Churchill  he  attended  another  Council  meeting  later 
in  the  afternoon,  and  there  the  fateful,  if  not  fatal, 
step  was  taken.  It  was  decided  that  an  attack  should 
be  made  by  the  fleet  alone,  with  Constantinople  as  its 
objective.^ 

Though  Lord  Fisher  agreed  to  do  his  best,  and 
though  the  members  of  the  War  Council  accepted 
the  plan  with  more  or  less  enthusiasm,  the  ultimate 
decision    was   arrived    at   owing   to    Mr.    Churchill's 

^  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  28. 

2  Majority  Report,  pars.  89-93  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  pars.  28,  29. 


A  NAVAL  EXPEDITION  DECREED  39 

insistence  upon  his  own  brilliant  idea,  and  his  resolve 
to  attempt  it  even  without  military  aid.  The  Com- 
missioners remark  that  in  this  resolve  he  was  carried 
away  by  his  sanguine  temperament  and  his  firm 
belief  in  the  success  of  the  undertaking  which  he 
advocated/  They  were  probably  right.  But  as 
evidence  of  the  complexity  in  all  natures — even  in 
a  character  apparently  so  self-confident,  impetuous, 
and  sanguine — we  may  recall  the  passage  in  Mr. 
Churchill's  speech  upon  these  events,  where,  after 
referrino-  to  "the  doubts  and  the  misg-ivings  which 
arise  in  every  breast  when  these  great  hazards  of 
war  are  decided,"  he  went  on  to  say  : 

"  No  one  who  has  not  had  to  take  these  decisions 
can  know  how  serious  and  painful  are  the  stresses 
which  search  every  man's  heart  when  he  knows  that 
an  order  is  going  to  be  given  as  a  result  of  which 
great  ships  may  be  lost,  great  interests  may  be 
permanently  ruined,  and  hundreds  or  even  thousands 
of  men  may  be  sent  to  their  last  account."^ 

If  ever  the  heart  of  man  was  searched  by  serious 
and  painful  stress,  it  may  well  have  been  in  that 
Council  chamber  of  January  28,  191 5.  For  then  a 
decision  was  taken,  and  an  order  given,  as  a  result 
of  which  great  ships  were  lost,  great  interests 
permanently  ruined,  and  thousands  of  men  sent  to 
their  last  account. 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  92. 
^  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917. 


A 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    NAVAL   ATTACKS 

T  the  War  Council  meetings  of  January  28 
a  demonstration  extending  to  the  possible 
capture  of  Constantinople  was  thus  decided 
upon,  and  the  demonstration  was  to  be  purely  naval. 
All  the  members  of  the  Council  would  have  agreed 
that  a  joint  naval  and  military  (or  "amphibious") 
attack  would  have  made  success  surer ;  but  Lord 
Kitchener  declared  the  necessary  troops  could  not 
be  supplied,  and  his  decision  was  accepted  without 
question.  The  evidence  shows  that  when  first 
Admiral  Carden  was  commanded  to  attack,  no  hint 
of  military  support  was  given  him.  He  was  expected 
to  depend  entirely  upon  small  landing-parties  of  his 
own  marines  to  demolish  the  forts/  Mr.  Churchill 
has  himself  told  us  that,  if  an  amphibious  attack 
had  then  been  thought  essential  or  seriously  con- 
templated, nothing  at  all  would  have  been  done. 
Nothing  less  than  100,000  or  150,000  men  could 
have  been  asked  for,  together  with  large  supplies 
of  high  explosives  and  artillery.  Whereupon,  "all 
the  military  experts  "  {i.e.   Lord  Kitchener,  with  the 

1  Mr.  Archibald  Hurd  ("The  Dardanelles  Report,"  7^<7r/«z^/^//)//?e- 
vtew,  April  1917,  pp.  587,  591)  considers  that  a  military  force  "was 
apparently  a  part  of  the  original  scheme."  But  the  whole  evidence  of 
the  Report  and  of  Mr.  Churchill's  speech  of  March  20,  1917,  appears 
to  be  against  him. 


HESITATION  RENEWED  41 

possible  addition  of  Lord  French)  "  unanimously 
would  have  said  that  the  men  were  not  available, 
and  the  ammunition  could  not  be  spared  from  the 
French  front."  ^  Whether  it  would  not  have  been 
well,  even  at  this  last  moment,  to  abandon  the 
whole  scheme  rather  than  act  contrary  to  the  best 
judgment  of  experts  and  laymen  alike,  has  now, 
unfortunately,  become  a  matter  of  vain  speculation. 

Hardly  had  the  naval  orders  been  given,  and 
the  ships  dispatched,  when  the  Council  began  to 
waver.  It  is  impossible  to  fix  a  day  for  this  change, 
for  the  change  itself  wavered.  In  his  evidence, 
General  Callwell  (the  D.M.O.)  said:  "We  drifted 
into  the  big  military  attack  "  ;  ^  and  "  drift "  is  the 
precise  word  for  the  Council's  uncertain  course. 
By  the  middle  of  February  the  feeling  had  evidently 
set  towards  an  amphibious  movement ;  but  up  to  the 
middle  of  March  they  hoped  that  the  need  of  landing 
troops  upon  a  large  scale  might  be  avoided  by  purely 
naval  success.  It  appears  that  early  in  February 
Lord  Kitchener  began  to  yield.  Probably  his  former 
decision  was  shaken  by  the  abandonment  of  a  large- 
scale  offensive  in  France,  and  by  the  failure  of  the 
Turkish  attack  upon  the  Suez  Canal  (February  3 
and  4).  Though  the  Turkish  force  was  allowed  to 
retreat  without  the  destruction  which  greater  energy 
in  the  Egyptian  Command  might  have  brought  upon 
it,  the  troops  then  in  Egypt  had  proved  more  than 
sufficient  for  defence  ;  and  Egypt,  as  we  have  noticed, 
was    always    Lord    Kitchener's   peculiar    care.       On 

^  Speech  in  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  1917  (Hansard,  1789). 
Cf.  Majority  Report,  par.  94,  and  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  pars .  29,  32. 
2  Majority  Report,  par.  95. 


42  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

February  9  he  remarked  in  the  War  Council  that 
"if  the  Navy  required  the  assistance  of  the  land 
forces  at  a  later  stage,  that  assistance  would  be 
forthcoming." 

But,  by  the  majority  of  the  Council,  the  claim 
for  assistance  was  not  postponed  to  a  later  stage. 
On  February  15  Sir  Henry  Jackson  sent  a  long 
memorandum  of  "suggestions"  to  Admiral  Carden 
in  regard  to  the  approaching  naval  attack.  Not 
only  did  this  memorandum  speak  of  strong  military 
landing-parties  with  strong  covering  forces  as  neces- 
sary, but  it  added  that  "full  advantage  of  the 
undertaking  would  only  be  obtained  by  the  occupation 
of  the  Peninsula  by  a  military  force  acting  in  con- 
junction with  the  naval  operations."  The  very 
next  day  (February  16)  the  War  Council  decided 
to  send  the  29th  Division  (hitherto  destined  for 
France)  at  the  earliest  possible  date  to  Lemnos  ; 
to  arrange  for  a  force  from  Egypt,  if  required  ;  and 
to  order  the  Admiralty  to  prepare  transport  for  the 
conveyance  and  landing  of  50,000  men.^  The  navy 
and  army  were  thus  at  last  committed  to  an  am- 
phibious enterprise  ;  but  nineteen  days  had  been  lost. 
What  was  worse :  the  29th  Division  was  to  have 
started  on  February  22,  but  on  the  20th  Lord 
Kitchener,  on  his  own  initiative,  without  consulting 
the  First  Lord  or  the  Admirals,  told  the  Director 
of  Naval  Transport  to  stop  the  preparation  of 
transport,  as  the  Division  was  not  to  go.  In  spite 
of  Mr,  Churchill's  vehement  protests  (for  even  his 
confidence  in  a  purely  naval  attack  was  now  shaking), 
Lord  Kitchener  stood  by  his  decision  till  March  10, 

^  Majority  Report,  par.  96  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  pars.  32,  33. 


THE  29th  division  DETAINED  43 

and  the  Division  did  not  begin  to  start  till  March  16. 
Twenty-two  more  days  lost !  Add  the  nineteen  of 
the  Council's  hesitation,  and  forty-one  days  were 
lost  in  all.  Forty-one  days  in  an  enterprise  which 
depended  upon  speed  and  secrecy ! 

Undoubtedly  Lord  Kitchener  had  sufficient 
reason  for  delay.  The  Russian  armies  were  hard 
pressed  on  their  right  or  northern  flank,  and  in  the 
centre  Hindenburg  was  pushing  his  third  attempt 
upon  Warsaw.  If  the  Germans  were  successful  at 
either  point,  it  was  probable  that  they  would  transfer 
laree  forces  to  their  Western  front,  with  which  the 
French  were  then  heavily  engaged  in  Champagne 
and  between  the  Moselle  and  Meuse,  while  the 
British  were  preparing  and  executing  the  assault 
at  Neuve  Chapelle  (March  10  to  14).^  There  may 
have  been  other  reasons,  but  those  were  enough  to 
justify  caution  in  allowing  a  splendid  Regular  Division 
like  the  29th  to  be  diverted  from  the  critical  strategic 
lines  in  France.  Its  retention,  without  due  notice 
to  the  War  Council,  was  sudden  and  arbitrary. 
That  was  Lord  Kitchener's  way,  and  no  more  could 
be  said.  Perhaps  the  Division  should  not  have 
been  offered,  and  the  Secretary  for  War,  who  also 
held  supreme  military  command,  could  not  be  blamed 
for  retaining  it  under  his  hand.  Nevertheless,  its 
retention  stands  high  among  the  causes  of  ultimate 
disaster. 

By  the  middle  of  February  the  War  Council  had 
tacitly  abandoned  the  idea  of  a  mere  demonstration 
from  which  the  ships  could  be  at  any  moment  with- 

^  Mr.  Asquith  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March  20,  191 7  (Hansard, 

1752). 


44  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

drawn.  But  both  Lord  Kitchener  and  Mr.  Churchill 
still  thought  that  troops,  if  used  at  all,  would  be 
wanted  only  for  "minor  operations,"  such  as  the  final 
destruction  of  batteries,  and  both  clung  to  this  idea 
for  about  four  weeks  longer.  Yet,  in  the  first  week 
of  March,  General  Birdwood,  who  had  been  sent 
from  Egypt  to  report  upon  this  very  question,  tele- 
graphed to  Lord  Kitchener  that  he  was  doubtful  if 
the  navy  could  force  a  passage  unassisted,  and  that 
Admiral  Garden's  forecast  was  too  sanguine.^ 

By  that  time  General  Birdwood  had  definite 
experience  to  guide  him  ;  for,  in  obedience  to 
Mr.  Churchill's  orders,  Admiral  Garden  had  on 
February  19  begun  to  execute  his  detailed  plan  for 
forcing  the  Straits  by  naval  power  alone.  The 
scene  of  our  narrative  accordingly  shifts  from  the 
Council  Chambers  of  Whitehall  to  that  famous 
channel  which,  like  a  broad,  deep  river,  divides 
the  European  from  the  Asiatic  coast.  Celebrated 
beyond  all  other  waters  of  the  world  by  legend  and 
history,  and  by  one  of  mankind's  noblest  poems, 
it  is  haunted  by  almost  overwhelming  memories,  to 
which  the  great  tragedy  here  described  has  added 
new.  At  the  very  entrance,  where  the  passage 
is  three  miles  broad,  you  see  upon  your  right  hand 
the  Hat  and  gently  curving  beach  upon  which 
Agamemnon  tied  his  ships  for  the  prolonged  siege 
of  a  low  hill,  formed  even  in  his  time  of  ruined  and 
piled-up  cities.  It  rises,  still  quite  visible  from  the 
opposite  shore,  above  the  marshes  where  Simois  and 
Scamander  unite  their  small  and  immortal  streams. 

Steering  north-east,  a  vessel  beats  up  against  the 

^  Majority  Report,  pars.  100-103  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  38. 


GENERAL  SIR   WILLIAM    BIRDWOOD 


THE  DARDANELLES  45 

swirling  eddies  of  a  tideless  current,  always  pouring 
down  against  her  bows,  with  a  force  that  varies 
from  three  knots  to  four,  and  even  to  five  in  the 
centre  when  the  wind  drives  it  on.  Sailors  have 
told  me  that  they  believe  an  undercurrent  passes  the 
water  back  ;  else,  they  think,  it  could  not  perpetually 
run  so  strong.  What  was  the  experience  of  sub- 
marine officers  like  Lieutenant  Holbrook,  who,  on 
December  13,  19 14,  groped  his  way  below  the 
surface  and  through  the  mines  till  he  emerged  near 
the  entrance  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  destroyed 
the  Turkish  warship  Messoudiek,  I  do  not  know. 
But  it  seems  probable  that  enough  water  is  poured 
into  the  Black  Sea  by  the  Dnieper,  Dniester,  and 
Don,  rivers  of  the  Steppes,  to  account  for  a  rapid 
current,  not  to  speak  of  the  glacier  streams  issuing 
from  the  snows  of  the  Caucasus  beyond  the  magic 
Phasis.  All  the  more  likely  is  the  current  to  be 
swift  since  the  waters  from  the  shores  of  Azoff,  the 
Euxine,  and  Marmora  are  discharged  down  a  con- 
stricted funnel,  which  at  the  narrowest  point,  between 
Chanak  and  Kilid  Bahr,  is  hardly  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  across.  At  Chanak,  as  a  ship 
makes  its  way  against  the  stream,  the  strait  turns 
north  from  north-east  for  about  four  miles,  and  at 
the  point  of  Nagara  (the  old  Abydos)  the  channel 
becomes  again  almost  as  narrow  as  at  Chanak. 
That  part  of  the  strait  between  Chanak  and  Nagara 
(both  on  the  Asiatic  side)  is  called  especially 
"The  Narrows,"  and  it  forms,  as  it  were,  "The 
Gut "  of  the  whole  salt  river.  Here  Xerxes  stretched 
his  bridge  of  boats,  having  chained  and  flogged  the 
turbulent    waters.       Here    Alexander   crossed   upon 


46  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

his  way  to  India.  Seven  hundred  years  later  the 
Goths  crossed  here,  and  the  Turks  here  entered 
Europe,  a  century  before  they  stormed  the  city  of 
Constantine,  which  still  retained  the  traditions  of 
the  classic  world.  Beyond  the  Narrows  the  strait 
runs  north-east  again  with  a  channel  about  two 
miles  broad  for  some  twenty  miles,  until  between 
Gallipoli  and  Chardak  it  begins  to  widen  gradually 
into  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  The  total  length  of  the 
strait  from  Cape  Helles  to  Gallipoli  is  between  thirty- 
five  and  forty  miles.  The  Asiatic  side  is  the  coast 
of  the  ancient  Troad,  rising  to  high  hills  when  the 
plain  of  Troy  is  passed.  On  the  European  side  the 
long  promontory  or  peninsula  of  Gallipoli  precludes 
the  channel  from  issuing  into  the  Gulf  of  Xeros  at 
the  neck  of  Bulair,  or  lower  down  into  the  ^gean 
Sea.  It  is  the  south-western  third  of  that  peninsula 
which  is  the  scene  of  the  present  tragic  episode  in 
history.  There  is  no  railway  on  either  side  of  the 
strait.  A  coast  road  is  marked  from  Kum  Kali  (at 
the  entrance  on  the  Asiatic  side)  up  to  Chanak  ; 
but  it  is  probably  of  the  usual  Turkish  quality,  as 
were  all  roads  upon  the  peninsula.  Along  both 
coasts  the  inhabitants  in  peace  -  time  communicate 
chiefly  by  water,  in  spite  of  the  current. 

The  small  island  of  Tenedos  lies  about  fifteen  miles 
south-west  from  Kum  Kali,  and  the  domed  hill  at 
the  farther  end  of  the  island  stands  up  like  a  large 
haycock,  visible  not  only  from  the  Trojan  plain,  but 
from  all  the  surrounding  seas  and  islands.  The 
town  is  a  pleasant  and  well-built  place,  serviceable 
to  the  French  for  the  purchase  of  extra  luxuries  in 
the   months  following ;    and  as   Turkey  had  refused 


THE  ISLAND  OF  LEMNOS  47 

to  yield  the  island  to  Greece  at  the  end  of  the  Balkan 
Wars  of  19 1 2-1 913,  it  had  been  seized  by  the  Allies 
as  a  station  for  watching  the  mouth  of  the  strait. 
From  epic  times,  however,  it  was  known  as  an 
untrustworthy  anchorage,  and  for  a  naval  base  the 
Allies  occupied  the  great  harbour  of  Mudros  upon 
the  island  of  Lemnos,  sixty  miles  from  the  scene 
of  action.  The  greater  part  of  this  island  is  bare 
of  trees,  and  barren  but  for  patches  of  cultivation 
around  the  scattered  villages.  In  summer  the  low 
hills  are  scorched  to  a  pale  brown,  and,  for  an 
JEgean  island,  the  country  possesses  little  beauty 
or  interest  apart  from  the  hot  springs  for  which  it 
was  consecrated  to  the  god  of  fire.^  But  into  the 
centre  of  the  southern  coast  runs  a  deep  and  broad 
inlet,  protected  at  its  entrance  by  two  small  islands, 
and  affording  space  and  anchorage  enough  for  a  vast 
navy.  Its  size  is  indeed  excessive ;  for  when  the 
wind  sweeps  down  from  the  north-east  across  the 
dismal  and  dusty  town  of  Mudros,  it  can  raise  such 
a  storm  in  the  harbour  that  pinnaces  and  smaller 
boats  have  trouble  in  lying  alongside  the  ships,  and 
in  loading  up  or  unloading.  There  are,  of  course, 
no  docks  or  wharves,  though  our  sailors  subsequently 
constructed   a    few    small    piers  and    landing-stages. 

^  "  Nor  was  his  name  unheard  or  unadored 
In  ancient  Greece  ;  and  in  Ausonian  land 
Men  call'd  him  Mulciber  ;   and  how  he  fell 
From  heaven  they  fabled,  thrown  by  angry  Jove 
Sheer  o'er  the  crystal  battlements  :   from  morn 
To  noon  he  fell,  from  noon  to  dewy  eve, 
A  summer's  day ;  and  with  the  setting  sun 
Dropt  from  the  zenith  like  a  falling  star, 
On  Lemnos,  the  ^gean  isle." 

Paradise  Lost,  Book  I. 


48  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

All  supplies,  including  most  of  the  water,  had  to  be 
brought  from  the  remote  base  at  Alexandria;  but 
the  harbour  became,  none  the  less,  invaluable  as  a 
secure  port  for  our  navy  and  transports,  a  forwarding 
station  for  supply  and  ammunition,  the  headquarters 
of  the  Communication  and  Transport  departments, 
and  an  advanced  hospital  base.  The  use  of  it  was 
granted  by  the  Greek  Government  under  Venizelos  ; 
for  the  island  had  fallen  into  Greek  possession  in 
consequence  of  the  Balkan  Wars ;  and  King  Con- 
stantine  appears  to  have  acquiesced  graciously  in  a 
concession  which  could  not  be  refused. 

In  this  vast  harbour,  and  upon  the  open  road- 
stead of  Tenedos,  Admiral  Garden  had  gathered 
a  large  fleet  by  the  middle  of  February.  Ships 
were  collected  from  various  parts  of  the  world  (the 
Triumph  had  lately  come  from  Ghina) ;  ^  but 
Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Egypt  supplied  most  of  them. 
At  Lord  Fisher's  own  suggestion  the  super- 
Dreadnought  Queen  Elizabeth  had  been  added  to 
the  pre-Dreadnought  ships  upon  which  Mr.  Churchill 
had  originally  depended.  The  Inflexible  was  also 
a  "  Dreadnought "  battle  -  cruiser  (she  had  shared 
in  the  Falkland  Islands  battle  of  December  8, 
19 14),  and  the  sister  ships  Agamemnon  and  Lord 
Nelson,  which  Lord  Fisher  also  added  a  little  later 
than  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  were  generally  regarded 
as  fit  to  fight  in  line  with  "  Dreadnoughts."  The 
French  Admiralty,  at  our  request,  also  supplied 
a  few  ships,  though  of  old  types,  which  have  an 
overhampered  and  top-heavy  appearance.     The  most 

1  With   the   Fleet  in   the  Dardanelles,   by  William    Harold    Price, 
sometime  Chaplain  of  the  Triumph. 


SHIPS  OF  THE  FLEET 


49 


important  units  in   the  fleet  as  concentrated  at  that 
time  may  be  tabulated  thus  : 


British. 


Com- 
pleted. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Queen  Elizabeth 

1915 

27,500 

8  15-in. 

12  6-in. 

Ififlexible 

1908 

17,250 

8  i2-in. 

16  4-in 

Agamemnon   . 

1908 

16,500 

4  i2-in. 

10  9'2-in. 

Lord  Nelson   . 

1908 

16,500 

4  i2-in. 

10  9-2-in. 

Irresistible 

1 901 

1 5,000 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Majestic . 

1895 

14,900 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Prince  George 

1896 

14,900 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Cornmallis 

1904 

14,900 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Vengeance 

1 901 

12,950 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Albion     . 

1902 

12,950 

4  l2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Ocean 

1900 

12,950 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Canopus . 

1899 

12,950 

4  i2-in. 

12  6-in. 

Triujnph 

1904 

11,800 

4  lo-in. 

14  7-5-in. 

Swiftsure 

1904 

11,800 

4  10- in. 

14  7-5-m. 

Fren 

2H. 

Sujff^ren   .... 

1903 

12,520 

4  i2-in. 

10  6'4-in. 

Botivet    .... 

1898 

12,007 

2  i2-in. 

(2  io8-in. 
\8  5-5-in. 

Gaulois  .... 

1899 

11,080 

4  i2-in. 

10  5'5-in. 

Charlemagne  . 

1898 

11,000 

4  i2-in. 

10  5  5-in.i 

To  these  main  fighting  ships  were  added  four 
light  cruisers  (the  Amethyst,  Sapphh^e,  Dublin^  and 
Doris),  two  destroyer  depots,  sixteen  destroyers,  six 
submarines,  twenty-one  mine-sweeping  trawlers,  and 
a  seaplane  ship  (the  Ark  Royal)  accommodating  six 
seaplanes  ;  besides  from  the  French  navy  six  torpedo- 
boats  and  fourteen  mine-sweepers. 

Out  of  this  fleet,  Admiral  Garden  selected  the 
British  ships  Inflexible,  Agamemnon,  Cornwallis, 
Triumph,  and    Vengeance,  together  with  the  French 

^  ^'■Manchester  Guardian''''  History  of  the  War. 
4 


50  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

ships  (under  Admiral  Guepratte)  Sitffren,  Bouvet,  and 
Gaulois,  covered  by  a  large  number  of  destroyers, 
for  the  first  attack  upon  the  outer  forts.  Orders  for 
washing  and  clean  clothes  (to  avoid  septic  wounds) 
were  issued  on  February  i8,  and  next  morning,  in 
clear  and  calm  weather,  "General  Quarters"  was 
sounded.  The  firing  began  at  eight,  and  the  first 
scene  in  the  drama  of  the  Dardanelles  Expedition  was 
enacted.^ 

The  main  forts  to  be  destroyed  were  four  in 
number ;  two  on  either  side  the  entrance.  One 
stood  on  the  cliff  of  Cape  Helles,  just  to  the  left  or 
south-west  of  the  shelving  amphitheatre  afterwards 
celebrated  as  V  Beach.  Another  lay  low  down,  on 
the  right  of  the  same  beach,  close  in  front  of  the 
medieval  castle  of  Seddel  Bahr,  where  still  one  sees 
lying  in  heaps  or  scattered  over  the  ground  huge 
cannon-balls  of  stone,  such  as  were  hurled  at  Duck- 
worth's fleet  more  than  a  century  before.  Upon  the 
Asiatic  side  stood  the  fort  of  Kum  Kali,  at  the  very 
mouth  of  the  strait,  not  far  from  the  cliff  village  of 
Yenishehr,  and  separated  from  the  plain  of  Troy  by 
the  river  Mendere,  near  neighbour  to  the  Simois  and 
Scamander  conjoined.  About  a  mile  down  the  coast, 
close  beside  Yenishehr  village,  is  the  remaining  fort 
of  Orkhanieh.  None  of  these  forts  was  heavily 
armed.  The  largest  guns  appear  to  have  been 
io'2  inch  (six  on  Seddel  Bahr,  and  four  on  Kum 
Kali),  and  when  our  squadron  drew  their  fire,  as 
before  narrated,  on  November  3,  19 14,  their  extreme 
range  was  found  to  be  12,500  yards. 

^  The  Immortal  Gamble,  by  A.  T.  Stewart  and  C.  J.  E.  Peshall  of  the 
Cornwallis,  p.  10. 


FIRST  NAVAL  ACTION  51 

Throughout  the  morning  Admiral  Garden  con- 
centrated his  bombardment  upon  these  forts  at  long 
range,  and  they  made  no  reply.  Hoping  that  he 
had  silenced  or  utterly  destroyed  them,  he  advanced 
six  ships  to  closer  range  in  the  afternoon,  and  then 
the  reply  came  in  earnest,  though  the  shooting  was 
poor.  At  sunset  he  withdrew  the  ships,  though 
Kum  Kali  was  still  firing.  In  evidence,  he  admitted 
that  "  the  result  of  the  day's  action  showed  apparently 
that  the  effect  of  long  range  bombardment  by  direct 
fire  on  modern  earthwork  forts  is  slight."^  It  was  a 
lesson  repeated  time  after  time  throughout  the  cam- 
paign. The  big  naval  shells  threw  up  stones  and 
earth  as  from  volcanoes,  and  caused  great  alarm. 
But  the  alarm  was  temporary,  and  the  effect,  whether 
on  earthworks  or  trenches,  usually  disappointing.  For 
naval  guns,  constructed  to  strike  visible  objects  at 
long  range  with  marvellous  accuracy,  have  too  flat  a 
trajectory  for  the  plunging  fire  (as  of  howitzers)  which 
devastates  earthworks  and  trenches.  It  was  with  heavy 
howitzers  that  the  Germans  destroyed  the  forts  of 
Li^ge,Namur,  and  Antwerp,  and,  owing  to  this  obvious 
difference  in  the  weapons  employed,  Mr.  Churchill's 
expectation  of  crushing  the  Dardanelles  defences  by 
the  big  guns  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth  and  the  Inflexible 
was  frustrated.^ 

Nevertheless,  after  a  few  days  of  driving  rain  and 
heavy  sea  (a  common  event  at  this  season,  which 
might  have  been  anticipated),  Admiral  Garden  re- 
newed the  bombardment  on  February  25,  employing 
the  Queen  Elizabeth,   Irresistible,   Agamemnon,    and 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  Majority  Report,  par.  97. 
'  Ibid.^  pars.  78-82. 


52  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

Gaulois.  The  Queen  Elizabeth,  firing  beyond  the 
enemy's  range,  assisted  in  silencing  the  powerful 
batteries  on  Cape  Helles,  and  though  the  Agamemnon 
was  severely  struck  at  about  ii,ooo  yards  range,  the 
subsidiary  ships  Coi^nwallis,  Vengeance,  Triumph, 
Albion,  Suffren,  and  Charlemagne  stood  in  closer, 
and  by  the  evening  compelled  all  the  outer  forts  to 
cease  fire.  Next  day  landing-parties  of  marines 
were  put  ashore  to  complete  their  destruction  ;  which 
they  did,  though  at  Kum  Kali  they  were  driven  back 
to  their  boats  with  some  loss.  The  story  that 
marines  had  tea  at  Krithia  and  climbed  Achi  Baba 
for  the  view- — places  soon  to  acquire  such  ill-omened 
fame — is  mythical.  But  certainly  they  met  with  no 
opposition  on  the  Peninsula,  and  if  a  large  military 
force  had  then  been  available,  the  gallant  but  appal- 
ling events  of  the  landing  two  months  later  would 
never  have  occurred.  Had  not  the  War  Council 
persisted  in  the  design  of  a  solely  naval  attack,  even 
after  their  resolve  had  begun  to  waver,  a  large 
military  force  might  have  been  available,  either  then, 
or  to  co-operate  with  a  similar  naval  movement  only 
a  week  or  two  later. 

Stormy  weather  delayed  further  attack  till  March  4, 
when  a  squadron,  including  the  Triumph,  Albion, 
Lord  Nelson,  and  Ocean,  passed  up  the  strait  to  a 
position  beyond  the  village  of  Erenkeui,  conspicuous 
upon  a  mountain-side  of  the  Asiatic  coast,  and  bom- 
barded Fort  Dardanus.  The  fort  stands  upon 
Kephez  Point,  which  projects  as  though  to  defend 
the  very  entrance  of  the  Narrows.  Over  the  top  of 
the  promontory  the  houses  and  mosques  of  Chanak 
and  Kilid  Bahr  could  be  plainly  seen,  where  those 


SUBSEQUENT  NAVAL  ACTIONS  53 

towns  face  each  other  across  the  narrowest  part  of  the 
passage.  Of  the  eight  hnes  of  mine-field  drawn 
across  the  strait,  five  lay  between  Kephez  Point  and 
Chanak.  Day  and  night  our  mine-sweeping  trawlers 
were  engaged  upon  them,  and  considerable  praise 
must  be  given  to  the  courage  and  endurance  of 
their  crews,  who  for  the  most  part  had  been  North 
Sea  fishermen  before  the  expedition.  Their  service 
throughout,  whether  for  mine-sweeping  or  transport, 
was  of  very  high  value.  It  almost  justified  the 
remark  made  to  me  by  a  skipper  whom  I  had  met 
before  on  the  Dogger  Bank  :  "If  the  Kayser  had 
knowed  as  we'd  got  trawlers,  he  would  never  have 
declared  war !  " 

A  similar  advance  to  engage  the  forts  at  Dardanus, 
and,  after  those  were  thought  to  be  silenced,  the  forts 
at  Chanak  and  Kilid  Bahr,  was  made  next  day,  and 
again,  in  stronger  force,  on  March  6}  The  Prince 
Geo7^ge,  Albion,  Vengeance,  Majestic,  and  Suffj'en 
were  employed,  and  suffered  damage,  though  without 
loss  of  life.  At  the  same  time,  on  the  6th,  the  Queen 
Elizabeth,  stationed  off  Gaba  Tepe  on  the  outer 
coast,  flung  her  vast  shells  clear  over  the  Peninsula 
into  the  Chanak  forts,  her  fire  being  directed  by 
aeroplanes.  She  was  supported  by  the  Agamemnon 
and  Ocean,  and  there  were  high  hopes  of  thus  crushing 
out  the  big  guns  defending  the  Narrows,  some  of 
which  were  believed  to  be  14-inch.  Nevertheless, 
when  the  four  French  battleships  advanced  up  the 
strait  on  the  following  day  (March  7),  supported  at 
long  range  by  the  Agamemnon  and  her  sister  ship 
Lord  Nelson,    the    Chanak    forts    replied    with    an 

^  With  the  Fleet  in  the  Dardanelles,  pp.  38-40. 


54  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

effective  and  damaging  fire.  It  was  impossible  to  say 
when  a  fort  was  really  out  of  action.  After  long 
silence,  the  Turkish  and  German  gunners  frequently 
returned  and  reopened  fire,  as  though  nothing  had 
happened.  In  his  evidence,  Admiral  Garden  stated 
that  when  the  demolition  parties  landed  after  the 
bombardment  of  the  outer  forts,  they  found  70  per 
cent,  of  the  guns  apparently  intact  upon  their  mount- 
ings, although  their  magazines  were  blown  up  and 
their  electrical  or  other  communications  destroyed.^ 
Still  worse  than  these  disappointing  results  was  the 
opportunity  left  to  the  enemy  of  moving,  not  only 
bodies  of  men,  but  field-guns  and  heavy  howitzers 
from  one  point  of  the  Peninsula  and  Asiatic  coast 
to  another,  and  opening  fire  upon  the  ships  from 
concealed  and  unexpected  positions.  Our  landing- 
parties  of  marines  also  suffered  considerably  from  the 
advantage  thus  given  to  the  enemy,  as  happened  to  a 
body  which  landed  at  Kum  Kali  for  the  second  time 
on  March  4.  All  such  dangers  and  hindrances  would 
have  been  removed  if  the  navy  had  been  supported  by 
sufficient  military  force  to  occupy  the  ground  behind 
the  ships  as  they  advanced. 

A  bombardment  of  the  Smyrna  forts  farther  down 
the  coast  of  Asia  was  carried  out  on  March  5  and  7 
by  a  detachment  under  Vice- Admiral  Peirse.  It  was 
hoped  that  the  Vali  of  Smyrna  might  come  over  to 
us,  and  that  in  any  case  the  attack  would  detain  a 
Turkish  force  there  by  means  of  a  rather  obvious 
feint.^     Nothing    of    vital    importance    was    as   yet 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  par.  97. 
^  With  the  Fleet  in  the  Dardanelles,  p.  66  ;  the  Triumph  was  one  of 
the  ships  detailed  for  this  operation. 


EFFECT  ON  BALKAN  STATES  55 

accomplished  there  or  in  the  Straits,  but  up  to  about 
March  10  the  Admiralty  at  home  remained  sanguine, 
in  spite  of  General  Birdwood's  rather  discouraging 
telegram  of  March  5,  mentioned  above.  They  had 
a  right  to  consider  that  the  attack  upon  the  Dar- 
danelles had  produced  a  stirring  effect  in  the  Near 
East.  The  Turks  withdrew  large  forces  from  the 
Caucasus,  greatly  easing  the  situation  for  the  Russian 
Grand  Duke.  They  concentrated  more  troops  round 
Adrianople,  fearing  that  Bulgaria  might  clutch  this 
opportunity  for  retrieving  her  loss  of  that  city  in  19 13. 
Bitter  as  was  the  Bulgarian  hatred  of  Serbia  and 
Greece  for  their  reversal  of  the  Balkan  League  policy 
in  that  year,  and  for  their  breach  of  treaties  and 
territorial  arrangements,  it  now  seemed  certain  that 
if  Bulgaria  departed  from  neutrality  at  all,  she  would 
stand  among  our  Allies.  Only  a  few  days  later 
(March  17)  General  Paget,  then  engaged  on  a  special 
mission  to  the  Balkans,  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Kitchener : 

"  The  operations  in  the  Dardanelles  have  made  a 
deep  impression  ;  all  possibility  of  Bulgaria  attacking 
any  Balkan  State  that  might  side  with  the  Entente 
is  now  over,  and  there  is  some  reason  to  think  that 
shortly  the  Bulgarian  army  will  move  against  Turkey 
to  co-operate  in  the  Dardanelles  operations."  ^ 

That  was  a  high  hope,  for  the  attitude  of  Bulgaria 
was  then,  as  it  became  still  more  definitely  later  on, 
the  key  of  the  Near  Eastern  situation.  But  for  the 
moment,  the  effect  upon  Greece  appeared  even  more 
propitious.  M.  Venizelos  had  in  the  previous  month 
refused  to  allow  Greece  to  be  drawn  into  a  war  for 

'  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  43. 


56  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

the  defence  of  Serbia,  though  England  and  France 
promised  a  Division  each  at  Salonika,  and  it  was 
believed  that  this  strategy  was  specially  favoured  by 
Mr.  Lloyd  George.  Now,  however  (March  i),  he 
voluntarily  offered  our  Minister  in  Athens  three 
Greek  Divisions  for  Gallipoli  on  condition  that  Greece 
received  the  vilayet  of  Smyrna  ;  and  next  day  our 
Minister  telegraphed  that  the  King  had  been  sounded 
and  "wanted  war."^  The  proposal  was  abruptly 
checked  by  the  jealousy  of  the  Tsar's  Government, 
which  refused  to  allow  a  Greek  soldier  to  approach 
the  long-desired  prize  of  Constantinople.  But  to 
make  Constantine  "want  war"  must  have  required 
a  miraculous  interposition,  and  the  effect  of  three 
Divisions — even  Greek  Divisions — landing  upon  the 
Peninsula  at  that  moment  might  have  been  more 
miraculous  still. ^  Of  even  greater  ultimate  importance 
was  the  influence  upon  Italy  ;  for  it  was  now  that, 
under  the  guidance  of  Baron  Sonnino,  and  the  strong 
encouragement  of  Mr.  Asquith,  she  entered  upon  the 
devious  negotiations  which  led  to  her  declaration  of 
war  against  Austria  on  May  23. 

But  valuable  as  were  these  political  results,  the 
naval  attack  itself  was  going  slow,  and  Mr.  Churchill 
read  the  daily  telegrams  with  increasing  impatience. 
The  fact  was  that  the  enemy,  having  the  free  run  of 

^  It  appears  to  have  been  on  this  occasion  that  the  King,  yielding  to 
the  representations  of  M.  Venizelos  in  favour  of  actively  sharing  in  the 
Dardanelles  enterprise,  exclaimed,  "  So  be  it  then,  for  the  love  of  God  !  " 
See  M.  Venizelos'  speech  to  the  Chamber  in  Athens,  August  26,  1917 
{The  Times,  August  31). 

^  Mr.  Roch's  Minute,  par.  43  ;  Mr.  Churchill's  speech  on  March  20, 
191 7  (Hansard,  1793).  Unhappily,  M.  Venizelos  resigned  on  March  6, 
191 5,  owing  to  Constantine's  renewed  opposition  to  a  combination  with 
the  Allies. 


MR.  CHURCHILL  URGES  GREATER  VIGOUR     57 

the  Peninsula  as  well  as  of  the  Asiatic  coast,  could 
plant  and  conceal  his  movable  howitzers  and  other 
armaments  where  he  pleased,  and  it  was  becoming 
increasingly  evident  that,  unless  the  Peninsula  was 
occupied  by  our  military  forces,  the  passage  of  the 
Narrows  would  mean  extreme  risk  for  our  ships,  and, 
even  if  they  got  through,  the  channel  would  not  be 
cleared  for  transports  following  them.  Now  was  the 
moment  when  a  permanent  landing  would  be  of  the 
highest  service,  and  on  March  10  Mr.  Churchill 
evidently  realised  the  need  of  troops  acutely.  But 
it  was  only  on  that  very  day  that  Lord  Kitchener 
finally  decided  to  allow  the  29th  Division  to  start 
from  England,  and  they  did  not  leave  port  till  the 
1 6th.  Regarding  the  other  detailed  troops  as  less 
trained  and  experienced  than  they  really  were,  Lord 
Kitchener  refused  to  allow  a  landing  till  the  Regular 
Division  arrived.  And,  indeed,  he  still  clung  to  the 
idea  that  no  landing  would  be  necessary. 

Accordingly,  Mr.  Churchill,  though  striving  to 
restrain  his  impatience,  strongly  urged  Admiral 
Carden  to  press  forward  the  naval  attack  with  the 
utmost  vigour.  In  a  telegram  of  March  11  he 
wrote  : 

"  If  success  cannot  be  obtained  without  loss  of 
ships  and  men,  results  to  be  gained  are  important 
enough  to  justify  such  a  loss.  The  whole  operation 
may  be  decided,  and  consequences  of  a  decisive 
character  upon  the  war  may  be  produced  by  the  turn- 
ing of  the  corner  Chanak.  .  .  .  We  have  no  wish  to 
hurry  you  or  urge  you  beyond  your  judgment,  but  we 
recognise  clearly  that  at  a  certain  period  in  your  opera- 
tions you  will  have  to  press  hard  for  a  decision  ;  and 
we    desire    to  know  whether,    in  your  opinion,    that 


58  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

period  has  now  arrived.  Every  well-conceived 
action  for  forcing  a  decision,  even  should  regrettable 
losses  be  entailed,  will  receive  our  support," 

To  this  Admiral  Garden  replied  that  he  considered 
the  stage  for  vigorous  action  had  now  been  reached, 
but  that,  when  the  fleet  entered  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
military  operations  on  a  large  scale  should  be  opened 
at  once,  so  as  to  secure  communications.  On  March 
15  Mr.  Churchill,  still  anxious  not  to  allow  his  im- 
patience to  drive  him  into  rashness,  telegraphed  again 
that,  though  no  time  was  to  be  lost,  there  should  be 
no  undue  haste.  An  attempt  to  rush  the  passage 
without  having  cleared  a  channel  through  the  mines 
and  destroyed  the  primary  armament  of  the  forts  was 
not  contemplated.  The  close  co-operation  of  army 
and  navy  must  be  carefully  studied,  and  it  might  be 
found  that  a  naval  rush  would  be  costly  without 
military  occupation  of  the  Kilid  Bahr  plateau.  On 
these  points  the  Admiral  was  to  consult  with  the 
General  who  was  being  sent  out  to  take  command  of 
the  troops.  To  all  of  this  Admiral  Garden  agreed. 
He  proposed  to  begin  vigorous  operations  on  March 
1 7,  but  did  not  intend  to  rush  the  passage  before  a 
channel  was  cleared.  This  answer  was  telegraphed 
on  March  16.  But  on  the  same  day  the  Admiral 
resigned  his  command  owing  to  serious  ill-health.^ 

Rear-Admiral  Sir  John  de  Robeck,  second  in 
command,  was  next  day  appointed  his  successor.  He 
was  five  years  younger,  was,  of  course,  fully  cognizant 
of  the  plans,  and  expressed  his  entire  approval  of 
them.  Yet  it  appears  from  his  evidence  that  though 
strongly  urged  by  Mr.  Ghurchill  to  act  on  "  his  in- 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  Majority  Report,  par.  109. 


DE  ROBECK  SUCCEEDS  GARDEN  59 

dependent  and  separate  judgment,"  and  not  to 
hesitate  to  state  objections,  his  real  motive  in  carrying 
on  the  pre-arranged  scheme  was  not  so  much  his  con- 
fidence in  success  as  his  fear  lest  a  withdrawal  might 
injure  our  prestige  in  the  Near  East ;  and,  secondly, 
his  desire  to  make  the  best  he  could  of  an  idea  which 
he  regarded  as  an  order.  "  The  order  was  to  carry 
out  a  certain  operation,"  he  said,  "  or  try  to  do  it,  and 
we  had  to  do  the  best  we  could."  If  the  ships  got 
through,  he,  like  many  others,  expected  a  revolution 
or  other  political  change  in  Turkey.  Otherwise,  he 
saw  that  transports  could  not  come  up,  and  that  the 
ships  could  not  remain  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora  for  more 
than  a  fortnight  or  three  weeks,  but  would  have  to  run 
the  gauntlet  coming  down  again,  just  as  Admiral 
Duckworth  did  in  1807.^  In  his  telegram  accepting 
the  command,  however,  he  made  no  mention  of  these 
considerations,  but  only  said  that  success  depended 
upon  clearing  the  mine-fields  after  silencing  the  forts. 
Indeed,  he  had  small  time  for  any  considerations. 
For  on  the  very  first  day  after  receiving  his  command 
(March  18)  he  undertook  the  main  attempt  to  force 
the  Narrows.  The  weather  was  favourable — no  mist 
and  little  wind.  The  scheme  was  to  attack  in  three 
squadrons  successively.  The  first  blow  was  given 
by  the  four  most  powerful  ships — Queen  Elizabeth, 
Inflexible,  Lord  Nelson,  and  Agamemnon — which 
poured  heavy  shell  at  long  range  into  the  forts  at 
Chanak  and  Kilid  Bahr,  while  the  Triumph  and 
Prince  George  bombarded  Fort  Dardanus  on  the 
Asiatic  coast,  and  Fort  Soghandere,  opposite  to  it 
upon  the  Peninsula.     This  bombardment  lasted  from 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  Majority  Report,  par.  iii. 


6o  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

about  II  a.m.  till  12.30  p.m.,  and  all  six  ships  found 
themselves  exposed  to  heavy  fire  from  the  forts,  and 
from  hidden  howitzers  and  field-guns  in  varied 
positions  upon  both  shores.  At  about  12.30  the 
second  squadron,  consisting  of  the  four  French  ships, 
came  up  into  action,  advancing  beyond  the  former 
line  in  the  direction  of  Kephez  Point.  Though 
suffering  considerably  (chiefly  owing  to  their  inability 
to  manoeuvre  in  such  narrow  waters,  thus  presenting 
very  visible  and  almost  fixed  targets  to  the  enemy's 
guns),  the  ten  ships  maintained  the  bombardment 
for  about  an  hour  (till  nearly  1.30).  The  enemy's 
forts  then  fell  silent,  and  it  was  hoped  that  many  of 
them,  at  all  events,  had  been  destroyed. 

Accordingly,  the  third  squadron,  consisting  of  six 
British  ships  {^Irresistible,  Vengeance,  Ocean,  Swift- 
sure,  Majestic,  and  Albion),  were  brought  up,  with 
the  design  of  advancing  first  through  the  Narrows, 
so  as  to  ensure  a  clear  passage  for  the  greater  ships 
which  made  the  first  attack.  At  the  same  time  the 
four  French  ships,  together  with  the  Triumph  and 
Prince  George,  were  ordered  to  withdraw,  so  as  to 
leave  more  room  for  the  rest.  During  this  manoeuvre, 
all  or  nearly  all  the  guns  in  the  forts  opened  fire 
again,  their  silence  having  been  due,  not  to  destruc- 
tion, but  to  the  absence  of  the  gunners,  driven  away 
by  the  gases  or  terror  of  our  shells.  Most  of  the 
ships  suffered,  and  as  the  Bouvet  moved  down 
channel  with  her  companion  ships,  she  was  struck 
by  three  big  shells  in  quick  succession.  The  blows 
were  immediately  followed  by  a  vast  explosion.  It 
is  disputed  whether  this  was  due  to  a  shell  bursting 
in    her    magazine,   or    to   a   torpedo    fired    from    the 


THE  MAIN  NAVAL  ACTION  6i 

Asiatic  coast,  or,  as  the  Admiralty  report  said,  to  a 
mine  drifting  down  the  current.  In  two  or  three 
minutes  she  sank  in  deep  water  just  north  of  Erenkeui, 
carrying  nearly  the  whole  of  her  crew  to  the  bottom. 
The  cries  of  the  men  dragged  down  with  her,  or 
struggling  in  the  water  as  they  were  swept  down- 
stream, sounded  over  the  strait. 

At  2,30  the  bombardment  of  all  the  forts  was 
renewed,  but  they  were  not  silenced.  At  4  o'clock 
the  Irresistible  drew  away  with  a  heavy  list.  Ap- 
parently she  also  was  struck  by  a  mine  adrift ;  but 
she  remained  afloat  for  nearly  two  hours,  and  nearly 
all  her  crew  were  saved  by  destroyers,  which  swarmed 
round  her  at  great  risk  to  themselves,  since  they 
offered  a  crowded  target.  A  quarter  of  an  hour  after 
she  sank,  the  Ocean  was  struck  in  a  similar  manner 
(6.5  p.m.)  and  sank  with  great  rapidity.  Most  of 
her  crew,  however,  were  also  saved  by  destroyers 
near  at  hand.  Many  of  the  other  ships  were 
struck  by  shell.  The  InHexible  and  Gaulois  suffered 
especially,  and  only  just  crawled  back  to  be  beached, 
the  one  at  Tenedos,  the  other  at  Rabbit  Island.  At 
sunset  the  fleet  was  withdrawn.  It  had  been  proved 
once  more  that,  in  an  attack  upon  land  forts,  ships 
lie  at  a  great  disadvantage.  In  this  case  the  dis- 
advantage was  much  increased  by  the  narrowness  of 
the  waters,  which  brought  the  ships  within  range  of 
howitzer  and  other  batteries  hidden  upon  both  shores, 
and  also  gave  special  opportunity  for  the  use  of 
mines  drifting  on  the  rapid  current,  or  anchored 
right  across  the  channel  in  successive  rows.  The 
mines  of  the  second  row  were  opposite  the  intervals 
in  the  first,  and  so  on,  until  the  passage  was  covered 


62  THE  NAVAL  ATTACKS 

as  with  a  net,  each  row  containing  twenty-six  mines. 
Whether  shore-torpedoes  were  also  used  is  still  un- 
certain. But,  without  them,  the  fleet  suffered  under 
sufficient  disadvantages  to  explain  the  failure.  The 
first  serious  attempt  to  force  the  Straits  was  the  last.^ 
Mr.  Churchill  wished  to  renew  the  attempt  at 
once.  Perhaps  he  thought  that  English  people  are 
given  to  exaggerate  the  loss  of  a  battleship.  After 
all,  the  loss  of  even  three  battleships  is  far  surpassed 
by  the  loss  of  lives  and  calculable  wealth  in  one  day's 
ordinary  fighting  in  France,  and  the  objective  in  the 
Dardanelles  was  at  least  as  vital. ^  Lord  Fisher  and 
Sir  Arthur  Wilson  agreed  that  the  action  should  be 
continued,  and  the  London  and  Prince  of  Wales,  in 
addition  to  the  Queen  and  Implacable,  were  actually 
sent  to  reinforce.  The  French  also  sent  an  old 
battleship  (the  Henri  IV.^  to  replace  the  Bouvet. 
At  first  Admiral  de  Robeck  shared  this  view.  It 
was  suspected  at  the  Admiralty  that  the  ammunition 
in  the  forts  was  running  short,  and,  at  a  much  later 
date,  Enver  Pasha  is  reported  to  have  said  : 

**  If  the  English  had  only  had  the  courage  to  rush 
more  ships  through  the  Dardanelles,  they  could  have 
got  to  Constantinople ;  but  their  delay  enabled  us 
thoroughly  to  fortify  the  Peninsula,  and  in  six  weeks' 
time  we  had  taken  down  there  over  200  Austrian 
Skoda  guns."^ 

^  In  What  of  the  Dardanelles?  Mr,  Martin  Fortescue,  an  American 
correspondent,  gives  a  brief  but  interesting  criticism  of  this  unfortunate 
action  from  the  Turkish-German  point  of  view  (pp.  27-47).  As  seen 
from  the  Cornwallis  the  action  is  described  in  The  Immortal  Gamble^ 

PP-  45-53- 

^  The  total  British  casualties  during  the  whole  naval  enterprise  were 
350  ;  on  March  18  they  were  61. 

^Dardanelles  Commission;    First  Report,  par.  119.      Speaking  o 


PURELY  NAVAL  ACTION  ABANDONED        63 

That  delay  of  six  weeks  was  fatal,  but  the  navy- 
was  not  to  blame.  On  March  22  Admiral  de  Robeck 
and  Admiral  Wemyss  consulted  with  Sir  Ian  Hamilton 
(who  on  the  very  day  before  the  engagement  had 
arrived  at  Tenedos  to  take  command  of  the  land 
forces)  and  with  General  Birdwood ;  and  as  their 
decision  to  await  the  concentration  of  the  army  was 
accepted  by  Lord  Fisher  and  the  other  Admiralty 
advisers,  Mr.  Churchill  reluctantly  yielded.  General 
Birdwood,  it  is  true,  wished  to  land  at  once,  even 
with  such  troops  as  were  at  hand.  Sir  Ian  "  thought 
there  was  a  good  deal  to  be  said  for  it,"  and  as  to 
the  fleet,  he  urged  the  Admiral  to  keep  on  hammer- 
ing the  forts.  But  his  orders  from  Lord  Kitchener 
were  "not  to  land  if  he  could  avoid  it,"  and  in  any 
case  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  29th  Division.^ 

And  where  was  the  29th  Division  ?  On  March 
23  its  first  transport  was  just  reaching  Malta,  where 
nearly  all  the  officers  attended  a  special  performance 
of  Faust} 

this  naval  attack,  Dr.  Stiirmer  writes  :  "  To  their  great  astonishment 
the  gallant  defenders  of  the  coast  forts  found  that  the  attack  had 
suddenly  ceased.  Dozens  of  the  German  naval  gunners  who  were 
manning  the  batteries  of  Chanak  on  that  memorable  day  told  me  later 
that  they  had  quite  made  up  their  minds  the  fleet  would  ultimately  win, 
and  that  they  themselves  could  not  have  held  out  much  longer." — Two 
War  Years  in  Constantinople,  p.  84. 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  pars.  115,  119. 

^  With  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  in  Gallipoli,  by  Chaplain  D. 
Creighton,  p.  23. 


A 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    PREPARATION 

S  was  mentioned,  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  reached 
Tenedos  on  March  17,  the  day  before  the 
naval  engagement.  The  appointment  to 
command  the  military  forces  had  come  to  him  un- 
expectedly but  five  days  earlier,  and  on  March  13  he 
started  from  London.  He  had  received  only  slight 
and  vague  instructions  from  Lord  Kitchener,  but  on 
certain  limitations  the  Secretary  for  War  insisted,  and 
all  of  them  strongly  influenced  Sir  lan's  subsequent 
action.  If  possible  a  landing  was  to  be  avoided ; 
none  was  to  be  attempted  until  the  fleet  had  made 
every  effort  to  penetrate  the  Straits  and  had  failed  ; 
if  a  landing  became  unavoidable,  none  should  be 
made  until  the  full  force  available  had  assembled  ; 
and  no  adventurous  operations  were  to  be  undertaken 
on  the  Asiatic  side.  All  these  instructions  were 
followed.^ 

But  they  revealed  the  hesitating  reluctance  with 
which  the  Dardanelles  campaign  was  regarded,  not 
only  by  Lord  Kitchener  himself,  but  by  his  sub- 
ordinate generals  at  home  and  in  France.  The 
"  Westerners "  were,  naturally,  in  the  ascendant. 
The  danger  to  the  Allied  cause  lay  close  at  hand.  It 
had   only   recently   been    averted   from   the   Channel 

^  Dardanelles  Commission  ;  First  Report,  pars.  107,  108. 
64 


SIR  lAN'S  APPOINTMENT  65 

and  from  Paris.  The  British  Staff,  equally  with  the 
French,  represented  that  not  a  man  could  be  spared 
from  France,  and  that  the  only  assured  road  to 
victory  lay  straight  through  the  German  lines.  The 
opposition  to  any  "  side-show,"  especially  if  it  diverted 
a  Regular  Division  such  as  the  29th,  was  expressed 
with  the  emphasis  of  jealous  alarm. 

Even  the  appointment  of  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  to 
the  distant  enterprise  was  likely  to  be  received  with 
mingled  sentiments.  He  counted  forty-two  years  of 
service  in  the  army.  Since  the  days  of  the  Afghan 
War  and  Majuba  Hill  (where  his  left  hand  was 
shattered),  he  had  risen  step  by  step  to  all  but  the 
highest  commands.  The  Nile,  Burma,  Chitral,  and 
Tirah  had  known  him.  He  commanded  the  infantry 
in  the  rapid  but  vital  engagement  at  Elandslaagte, 
and  during  the  siege  of  Ladysmith  had  charge  of  the 
extensive  and  dangerous  sector  known  as  Csesar's 
Camp  and  Wagon  Hill.  In  the  final  months  of  the 
Boer  War  he  was  Lord  Kitchener's  Chief  of  Staff, 
and  commanded  mobile  columns  in  the  Western 
Transvaal,  greatly  contributing  to  the  conclusion  of 
the  war.  Since  then  he  had  served  at  home  as 
Quartermaster-General,  as  G.O.C. -in-Chief  of  the 
Southern  Command,  and  as  Adjutant  -  General. 
Abroad  he  had  served  as  Military  Representative  of 
India  with  the  Japanese  army  in  Manchuria  (1904- 
1905,  when,  in  A  Staff  Officer  s  Sa^ap-Book,  he  fore- 
told the  disappearance  of  cavalry  and  the  preval- 
ence of  the  trench  in  future  warfare),  as  General 
Officer-Commanding-in-Chief  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and  Inspector-General  of  the  Overseas  Forces 
(1910-1915).  Except  that  he  had  never  yet  held 
5 


66  THE  PREPARATION 

supreme  command  in  any  considerable  campaign, 
his  experience  in  military  affairs  and  in  almost 
every  phase  of  our  army's  activity  was  hardly  to 
be  surpassed. 

On    the    other    hand,    he    was    sixty-two ;    and, 
though  he  was  a  year  younger  than  Lord  French,  and 
retained  a  slim  and  active  figure  such  as  enabled  Lord 
Roberts  to  take  command  in  South  Africa  at  seventy, 
sixty-two  was  regarded  as  a  full  age  for  any  officer 
in  so  difficult  a  campaign  upon  a  desert  promontory. 
From  a  mingled  Highland  and  Irish  descent  he  had 
inherited    the    so-called    Celtic    qualities    which    are 
regarded    by    thorough     Englishmen    with    varying 
admiration   and   dislike.      His    blood    gave    him    so 
conspicuous  a  physical  courage  that,  after  the  battles 
of  Caesar's    Camp    and    Diamond    Hill,   the    present 
writer,    who    knew    him    there,   regarded  him  as   an 
example  of  the  rare  type  which  not  merely  conceals 
fear  with  success,  but  does  not  feel  it.     Undoubtedly 
he  was  deeply  tinged  with  the  "  Celtic  charm" — that 
glamour  of  mind   and  courtesy  of   behaviour  which 
create  suspicion  among  people  endowed  with  neither. 
Through  his  nature  ran  a  strain  of  the  idealistic  spirit 
which  some  despise  as  quixotic,  and  others  salute  as 
chivalrous,  while,  with  cautious  solicitude,  they  avoid 
it   in  themselves.      It  was  known  also  that  Sir    Ian 
was  susceptible  to   the  influence  of  beauty  in  other 
forms  than  those  usually  conceded  to  military  men. 
He  was  an  acknowledged  master  of  English  prose, 
and  though    our  people  read  more  in  quantity  than 
any  other  nation,  the  literary  gift  is  regarded  among 
us  as  a  sign  of  incapacity,  and  is  not,  as  in  France  and 
ancient  Greece,  accepted  as  assurance  of  far-reaching 


SIR  lAN'S  QUALIFICATIONS  67 

powers.  What  was  worse,  he  was  known  to  have 
written  poetry. 

Before  the  war,  his  opposition  to  the  introduction 
of  conscription  in  the  United  Kingdom  had  roused 
the  animosity  of  all  who  aimed  at  establishing  militar- 
ism as  a  permanent  system  in  this  country.  Thus 
political  animosity  was  added  to  the  official  prejudice 
against  a  buoyant  and  liberal  temperament,  conjoined 
with  a  politeness  and  an  open-hearted  manner  start- 
lingly  at  variance  with  official  usage.  One  must 
acknowledge  that,  in  choosing  the  man  for  command, 
Lord  Kitchener  hardly  took  sufficient  account  of 
qualities  likely  to  arouse  antipathy  among  certain 
influential  classes  and  the  newspapers  which  represent 
their  opinions.  But  careless  of  such  prudent  con- 
siderations, as  his  manner  was,  he  allowed  his  decision 
to  be  guided  by  the  General's  long  experience  of  war- 
fare, and  designedly  selected  an  eager  temperament, 
liable  to  incautious  impetuosity,  but  suited,  as  might 
be  supposed,  to  an  undertaking  which  demanded 
impetuous  action.  It  was,  however,  probably  in  fear 
lest  natural  impulse  should  be  given  too  loose  a  rein 
that  the  instructions  mentioned  above  impressed  only 
caution  upon  the  appointed  commander.  In  view 
of  the  strong  opposition  to  the  whole  enterprise,  it 
was  also  assumed  that  no  reinforcements  could  be 
promised,  and  none  should  be  asked  for.  Even  the 
allotted  Divisions  were  not  allowed  the  ten  per  cent, 
extra  men  usually  granted  to  fill  up  the  gaps  of 
immediate  loss. 

After  that  conference  in  the  Queen  Elizabeth  on 
March  22  (when  Sir  Ian  left  the  final  decision  to  the 
naval    authorities),    it    was    evident   that   a   military 


68  THE  PREPARATION 

landing  could  not  be  avoided,  unless  the  whole  expedi- 
tion were  abandoned.  It  is  easy  now  for  belated 
prudence  to  maintain  that  Sir  Ian  should  then  have 
abandoned  it,  secured  (if  he  could)  the  acquiescence 
of  the  navy  in  defeat,  counter-ordered  the  assembling 
troops,  and  returned  to  London.  Prudence  could 
have  said  much  for  such  a  retirement.  Small  pre- 
paration had  been  made  ;  the  strongest  part  of  the 
striking  force  was  still  distant ;  the  number  of  the 
enemy  (though  roughly  estimated  at  40,000  on  the 
Peninsula,  and  30,000  in  reserve  beyond  Bulair)  was 
quite  unknown  ;  ever  since  the  appearance  of  our 
fleet,  Turks  had  been  digging  like  beavers  every  night 
at  most  of  the  possible  points  of  our  offence ;  and  it 
had  been  proved  that  the  cross-fire  of  naval  guns 
could  not  dislodge  them  even  from  the  toe  of  the 
Peninsula,  where,  for  about  five  miles  up  to  the  rising 
ground  in  front  of  Achi  Baba,  the  surface  appeared 
comparatively  level.  All  these  objections  could  have 
been  urged,  and,  indeed,  were  urged  at  the  time  by 
Generals  to  whom,  as  to  the  German  commanders  of 
the  Turkish  defence,  a  landing  appeared  impossible. 
But  if  any  one  believes  that  a  high-spirited  and  opti- 
mistic officer  was  likely  to  consider  a  retirement  to  be 
his  duty  just  when  he  had  received  a  command  which 
he  regarded  as  the  surest  means  of  terminating  the 
war,  he  errs  like  a  German  psychologist  in  his  judg- 
ment of  mankind. 

So,  in  the  face  of  all  objections,  the  preparations 
for  an  assault  upon  the  Peninsula  began.  The  imme- 
diate difficulty  was  a  question  of  transport.  Besides 
5000  Australians  from  Egypt,  the  Royal  Naval 
Division  (less  three  battalions)  had  already  arrived  at 


DELAY  OF  RELOADING  TRANSPORTS         69 

Mudros,  and  their  twelve  transports  were  anchored  in 
the  great  harbour.      But  it  was  found  that  the  ships 
were  indeed  well  enough  packed  for  peace  conditions, 
but  the  freight  had  not  been  arranged  with  a  view  to 
launching  separate  units  complete  upon  the  field  of 
action.     Men  were   divided  from  their   ammunition, 
guns  from  their  carriages,   carts   from   their  horses. 
Perhaps,  for  a  long  voyage,  it  is  impossible  to  load 
transports  so  as    to  make  each  unit  self-supporting. 
At   all    events,    it   was  not  done,  and  on  the  desert 
shores  of  the  Mudros  inlet  it  was  impossible  to  unload 
and  sort  out  and   repack.      Unless  incalculable  time 
was  to  be  lost,  such  a  confused  piece  of  work  could 
not   be  undertaken   apart  from   wharves  and   cranes 
and   docks.      Wharves  and  cranes    and  docks    were 
to  be  found  at   Alexandria,   but  no   nearer ;    and  to 
Alexandria   the    transports    were   ordered   to  return. 
That    historic    city    thus    became    the    main    base — 
Mudros  harbour,  which  had  previously  been  selected, 
now    serving    as    intermediate    or    advanced    base.^ 
Lord   Kitchener  approved  the  return  and  repacking 
of   the    transports,    and    certain    advantages    in    the 
matter  of  drill  and  organisation  were  gained  by  the 
delay,  to  say  nothing  of  the  inestimable  advantage  of 
more   settled   weather.      But  the  enemy  also  gained 
advantages,   and   in    the  extra  month    allowed  them 
they  increased   their  defensive  works  with  laborious 
anxiety. 

On  March  25  (a  calendar  month  before  the  great 
landing)  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  followed  the  transports  to 
Egypt  and  remained  there  till  April  7.  While  he 
was  there  his  Administrative  Staff  arrived  (April   i). 

^  See  Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  first  dispatch. 


70  THE  PREPARATION 

It  had  been  appointed  after  he  left  England,  and 
until  its  arrival  the  administrative  work  had  been, 
with  much  extra  exertion,  carried  on  by  his  Chief  of 
Staff,  General  Braithwaite,  and  the  rest  of  the 
General  Staff.  Sir  Ian  took  the  opportunity  of  his 
presence  in  Egypt  to  inspect  the  29th  Division 
(under  Major-General  Hunter-Weston),  which  began 
to  arrive  in  Alexandria  on  March  28  and  was 
encamped  at  Mex  outside  the  city  while  its 
transports  were  being  reloaded  for  the  landing.  He 
also  inspected  the  Royal  Naval  Division  (under 
Major-General  Paris)  at  Port  Said,  and  the  French 
Division  (under  General  d'Amade)  near  Alexandria, 
where  their  transports  also  were  being  reloaded.  At 
least  equally  significant,  when  viewed  from  what  was 
then  the  future,  was  his  inspection  of  the  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  Army  Corps,  or  "  Anzacs,"  as  they 
came  to  be  called.  The  corps  was  commanded  by 
Lieut. -General  Sir  W.  R.  Bird  wood  :  the  Australian 
Division  under  Major-General  W.  T.  Bridges,  the 
mixed  New  Zealand  and  Australian  Division  under 
Major-General  Sir  Alexander  Godley.  The  Australian 
Division  was  encamped  at  Mena,  near  the  Pyramids  ; 
the  mixed  Division  at  Heliopolis  on  the  other  side 
of  Cairo.  Sir  Ian  also  inspected  the  42nd  (East 
Lancashire)  Division  (under  Major  -  General  W. 
Douglas,  the  first  Territorials  to  volunteer  for 
foreign  service),  although  they  were  not  as  yet  part 
of  his  own  force,  but  stood  under  command  of 
Major-General  Sir  John  Maxwell  for  the  defence 
of  Egypt.  Beside  these  fighting  Divisions,  since 
so  renowned,  there  remained  the  Assyrian  Jewish 
Refugee  Mule  Corps  (better  known  as  "the  Zionists  "), 


THE  FORCES  IN  EGYPT  71 

organised  only  a  few  days  before  out  of  Jewish 
refugees  from  Syria  and  Palestine,  chiefly  Russian 
subjects,  who  had  sought  safety  in  Egypt.  Colonel 
J.  H.  Patterson  had  been  commissioned  to  select  a 
body  of  about  500,  with  750  transport  mules.  Orders 
were  given  in  Hebrew  and  partly  in  English  ;  the 
men  were  armed  with  rifles  taken  from  the  Turks  in 
the  battle  of  the  Canal ;  and  the  regimental  badge 
was  the  Shield  of  David.  Probably  this  was  the  first 
purely  Jewish  fighting  corps  that  went  into  action  since 
Jerusalem  fell  to  the  Roman  armies  under  Titus.^ 

The  fortunate  presence  of  the  "  Anzacs  "  in  Egypt 
was  due  to  Lord  Kitchener's  constant  apprehension 
of  a  Turkish  attack  upon  the  Suez  Canal  and  the 
main  country,  in  which  it  was  natural  to  suppose  that 
a  nationalist  and  religious  feeling  would  rally  a  large 
part  of  the  inhabitants  to  the  enemy's  side.  At  the 
outbreak  of  war  with  Germany  thousands  of  the 
youth  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand  (including  large 
numbers  of  Maoris)  had  eagerly  volunteered,  moved 
by  love  of  adventure  and  a  racial  affection  for  the 
mother-country.  After  nearly  three  months'  prepara- 
tion— a  difficult  task,  persistently  effected  in  Australia 
by  Major-General  Bridges,  who  for  three  years  had 
been  commandant  of  Duntroon  Military  College — 
the  whole  force  assembled  at  King  George  Sound  on 
October  31,  19 14,  and  set  sail  next  day  (the  day  of 
Turkey's  entrance  into  the  war  as  the  Central  Powers' 
Ally).  Thirty-eight  transports  carried  the  army  corps, 
and  they  were  convoyed  by  cruisers,  one    of   which 

1  The  formation  and  subsequent  exploits  of  this  peculiar  body  are 
described  by  Colonel  Patterson  himself  in  With  the  Zionists  in 
Gallipoli. 


72  THE  PREPARATION 

(the  Sydney,  under  Captain  Glossop)  gained  the 
distinction  upon  the  route  of  destroying  the  active 
raider  Emden  at  Cocos  Island,  and  taking  her  gallant 
and  resourceful  captain,  Karl  von  Miiller,  prisoner 
(November  9).  Having  reached  Egypt  on  December 
3,  the  "  Anzacs  "  went  into  camps  at  points  near  Cairo 
for  further  training,  and  some  selected  battalions  took 
part  in  the  repulse  of  Djemal  Pasha's  attack  upon  the 
Canal  near  Ismailia  in  the  first  week  of  February  19 15. 
A  finer  set  of  men  than  the  "Anzacs"  after  their 
three  months'  training  upon  the  desert  sands  could 
hardly  be  found  in  any  country.  With  the  aid  of 
open-air  life,  sufficient  food,  and  freedom  from 
grinding  poverty,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  had 
bred  them  as  though  to  display  the  physical  excellence 
of  which  the  British  type  is  capable  when  released 
from  manufacturing  squalor  or  agricultural  subjection. 
Equally  distinguished  in  feature  and  in  figure — the 
eyes  rather  deep-set  and  looking  level  to  the  front, 
the  nose  straight  and  rather  prominent,  shoulders 
loose  and  broad,  moving  easily  above  the  slim  waist 
and  lengthy  thighs,  the  chest,  it  is  true,  rather  broad 
than  deep,  owing  to  Australia's  clear  and  sunny  air — 
they  walked  the  earth  with  careless  and  dare-devil  self- 
confidence.  Gifted  with  the  intellig-ence  that  comes 
of  freedom  and  healthy  physique,  they  were  educated 
rather  to  resourceful  energy  in  the  face  of  nature  than 
to  scientific  knowledge  and  the  arts.  Since  they 
sprang  from  every  Colonial  class,  and  had  grown 
up  accustomed  to  natural  equality,  military  discipline 
at  first  appeared  to  them  an  irritating  and  absurd 
superfluity,  and  they  could  be  counted  upon  to  face 
death  but  hardly  to  salute  an  officer.     Indeed,  their 


THE  ANZACS  IN  EGYPT  73 

general  conception  of  discipline  was  rather  reasonable 
than  regular,  and  their  language,  habitually  violent, 
continued  unrestrained  in  the  presence  of  superiors ; 
so  to  the  natural  irony  of  our  race  was  added  a 
Colonial  independence. 

Except  in  action,  the  control  of  such  men  was 
inevitably  difficult.  Released  from  a  long  voyage, 
exposed  to  the  unnatural  conditions  of  warfare,  and 
beguiled  by  the  curious  amenities  of  an  Oriental  city, 
now  for  the  first  time  experienced,  many  availed 
themselves  of  Cairo's  opportunity  for  enjoyment 
beyond  the  strict  limit  of  regulations.  The  most 
demure  of  English  tourists  upon  the  Continent, 
having  escaped  from  the  trammels  of  identity,  have 
been  known  in  former  times  to  behave  as  they  would 
not  behave  in  their  own  provincial  towns ;  much 
more  might  unrestrained  behaviour  be  expected  in 
men  whose  sense  of  personal  responsibility  in  a 
foreign  city  had  been  further  reduced  by  uniform,  and 
who  were  encouraged  to  excess  by  the  easy  standard 
of  military  tradition,  and  by  the  foreknowledge  that, 
to  get  beforehand  with  death,  the  interval  for  pleasure 
might  be  short.  It  was  no  wonder,  therefore,  that, 
while  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  Colonial  forces  (later  ten 
per  cent.)  poured  into  Cairo  daily  upon  any  animal 
or  conveyance  which  could  move,  the  beautiful  city 
became  a  scene  of  frequent  turmoil.^ 

^  For  the  history  of  the  Austrahans  in  Egypt  and  Gallipoli,  see 
Australia  in  Arms,  by  Phillip  Schuler,  the  fine  young  correspondent 
of  The  Age,  Melbourne.  To  the  deep  regret  of  all  who  knew  him,  he 
was  afterwards  killed  by  a  chance  shell  while  teaching  cookery  to  some 
men  in  France.  Everything  written  by  Captain  Bean  and  Mr.  Malcolm 
Ross,  the  authorised  correspondents  for  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
respectively,  is  also  invaluable  for  history. 


74  THE  PREPARATION 

Upon  his  journey  back  to  the  advanced  base, 
there  were  many  thoughts  to  divide  and  even  oppress 
the  mind  of  the  most  sanguine  Commander-in-Chief. 
The  fateful  decision  had  now  to  be  made — a  decision 
upon  which  the  future  destiny  of  the  war,  and,  indeed, 
of  his  country,  so  largely  depended.  The  burden  of 
responsibility  lay  upon  his  head  alone.  To  his  single 
judgment  were  entrusted,  not  only  the  lives  of  many 
thousand  devoted  men,  but  the  highest  interests  of 
an  Alliance  in  the  justice  of  whose  cause  he  whole- 
heartedly believed.  As  the  inevitable  hour  approached, 
the  difficulties  of  the  appointed  task  were  recognised 
as  greater  even  than  foreseen.  The  strongest  nerve 
might  well  hesitate  to  confront  them.  Even  at  this 
crisis  of  decision,  the  chief  among  his  commanding 
Generals  were  inclined  to  turn  aside  from  the 
Peninsula  as  from  impossibility.  One  advocated  an 
attack  upon  Asia  Minor,  with  a  view  to  diverting  the 
enemy's  main  force,  and  so  clearing  a  passage  for  the 
fleet.  Another  favoured  further  delay  and  continuous 
training,  in  hope  of  some  more  propitious  opportunity. 
A  third,  while  offering  no  alternative,  considered  the 
attempt  too  desperate  to  be  tried.  Upon  a  sensitive 
and  imaginative  nature  the  risk,  the  sacrifice  of  lives, 
the  difficulties  of  a  small  force  too  rapidly  organised, 
insufficiently  equipped  with  modern  ammunition,  and 
unsupported  by  reinforcements,  weighed  heavily.  To 
these  were  added  the  discouraging  representations 
of  friendly,  trusted,  and  experienced  officers,  upon 
whose  diligent  co-operation  the  success  of  the  whole 
design  entirely  depended.  In  such  hours  as  those, 
deep  searchings  of  mind  and  heart  are  the  unenviable 
lot  of  the  man  whose  word  decides. 


ATTACK  THROUGH  BULAIR  CONSIDERED     75 

But  Sir  lan's  decision  was  already  taken,  and 
subsequent  conference  witli  the  Admirals  de  Robeck 
and  Wemyss  only  confirmed  it.  On  their  arrival  at 
Mudros,  his  Generals  also  agreed,  and  the  General 
whose  objections  to  landing  on  any  condition  had 
been  the  most  serious,  became  enthusiastic  for  the 
scheme,  if  landing  was  attempted.  Various  lines  of 
attack  were  possible,  and  each  was  carefully  con- 
sidered. To  the  lay  mind,  an  assault  upon  the  neck 
of  the  Peninsula  at  Bulair  appeared  so  obvious  that, 
from  the  very  outset  of  operations,  Sir  Ian  was  blamed 
for  not  attempting  it.  The  neck  is  narrow — not  more 
than  three  miles  across.  If  it  were  cut,  the  enemy  on 
the  main  Peninsula  might  be  expected  to  surrender 
for  want  of  supplies  ;  the  Straits  would  then  be  free 
from  obstacle  on  the  European  side,  and  the  Asiatic 
side  could  be  commanded  by  big  guns  on  Achi  Baba 
and  the  Kilid  Bahr  plateau  opposite  Chanak.  The 
main  objection  to  this  obvious  strategy  was  the  dis- 
concerting truth  that  the  enemy's  chief  line  of  com- 
munication did  not  run  through  Bulair,  but  across  the 
strait  itself,  chiefly  from  the  Asiatic  coast  to  the  town 
of  Gallipoli,  and  even  if  Bulair  were  occupied,  the 
supply  of  the  Turkish  army  on  the  Peninsula  could 
be  maintained  ;  while  an  Allied  force  advancing  from 
Bulair  towards  the  Narrows  (which  was  the  objective 
of  the  whole  expedition)  would  be  perpetually 
threatened  from  the  rear,  Bulair  itself  was  also  a 
formidable  obstacle.  The  famous  lines,  originally 
fortified  by  the  Allies  in  the  Crimean  War,  and  re- 
newed to  resist  Russian,  Bulgarian,  and  Greek  attacks 
from  the  north,  had  been  incalculably  strengthened  in 
the  preceding  weeks  under  German    direction.     On 


76  THE  PREPARATION 

his  first  survey  (March  i8)  Sir  Ian  had  observed  the 
labyrinth  of  white  Hnes  marking  the  newly-con- 
structed trenches  upon  which  thousands  of  Turks  had 
already  been  long  at  work.  The  gleam  of  wire  was 
apparent  around  the  only  two  possible  points  of  land- 
ing, both  difficult,  and  unsuited  for  naval  co-operation. 
An  assault  upon  Bulair  would  have  involved  immense 
losses,  and,  even  if  successful,  could  not  have  ad- 
vanced the  solution  of  the  problem — the  problem  of 
the  Narrows — without  further  dubious  and  specula- 
tive fighting,  front  and  rear. 

Another  proposal,  which  found  favour  with  some, 
was  a  landing  at  Enos,  on  the  mouth  of  the  Thracian 
river  Maritza  (the  ancient  Hebrus).  Except  that  the 
actual  landing  upon  the  level  coast  might  have  been 
easier,  the  same  objections  held,  but  in  exaggerated 
form.  The  distance  from  the  Narrows  was  more 
than  twice  as  long.  An  army  on  the  march  round 
the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Xeros  would  have  had  its  left 
flank  exposed  the  whole  way  to  the  large  Turkish 
reserves  known  to  be  stationed  at  Rodosto  and 
Adrianople.  The  two  main  roads  from  those  import- 
ant towns  meet  at  Keshan,  about  fifteen  miles  from 
the  Xeros  coast,  and  from  that  base  fairly  good  roads 
extend  to  Enos  on  the  one  side,  and  to  Kavak,  at  the 
head  of  the  Bulair  neck,  on  the  other.  The  Turkish 
armies  could  thus  concentrate  as  at  the  handle  of  a 
fan,  ready  to  strike  at  any  point  along  the  edge  where 
the  British  were  moving  within  reach  of  the  coast. 
Nor  could  the  navy  have  afforded  much  protection 
to  our  troops  upon  the  march,  the  head-waters  of  the 
gulf  being  shallow  far  out  from  shore.  Had  Sir  Ian 
attempted,  as  others  have  suggested,  to  turn  inland 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  LINES  OF  ATTACK  y^ 

and  fight  his  way  towards  Constantinople,  disregard- 
ing his  appointed  task  at  the  Straits,  he  would,  of 
course,  have  lost  the  assistance  of  the  navy  alto- 
gether, except  as  defence  to  his  precarious  base  and 
lines  of  communication  along  the  bit  of  coast ;  and, 
apart  from  the  navy,  he  had  no  transport  available 
for  a  long  march. 

Between  Bulair  and  the  sharp  northern  point  of 
Suvla  Bay,  steep  cliffs  and  the  absence  of  beach, 
except  in  tiny  inlets,  prevent  the  possibility  of  land- 
ing. But  inland  from  Suvla  Bay  itself  there  is  open 
ground,  and  a  practicable  beach  extends  south  as  far 
as  the  cliff  promontory  of  Gaba  Tepe,  although  the 
main  m.ass  of  the  Sari  Bair  mountain  rises  close 
behind  the  southern  part  of  the  beach  in  a  series  of 
broken  precipices  and  ravines.  From  Suvla  Point  to 
Gaba  Tepe  it  would  certainly  have  been  possible  to 
put  the  whole  united  force  ashore,  and,  to  judge  from 
subsequent  events,  this  might  have  been  the  wisest 
course.  On  the  other  hand,  Suvla  is  far  removed 
from  the  Narrows  ;  a  straight  line  thence  to  Maidos 
measures  nearly  fifteen  miles ;  it  passes  over  the  top 
of  Sari  Bair,  a  formidable  barrier  ;  while,  upon  the 
long  and  devious  route  alone  possible  for  a  movement 
of  troops,  the  army  would  have  had  both  flanks  ex- 
posed, on  the  right  to  the  strong  Turkish  position  of 
Kilid  Bahr  plateau,  and  on  the  left  to  large  forces 
available  to  the  enemy  from  Rodosto  and  Gallipoli. 
It  is  probable  that  Sir  Ian  s  troops  were  not  then 
numerous  enough  to  hold  so  long  a  line  of  com- 
munications and  at  the  same  time  resist  flank  attacks, 
especially  the  strong  attack  to  be  anticipated  from  the 
left. 


78  THE  PREPARATION 

A  landing  at  Gaba  Tepe  itself,  where  north  and 
south  the  ground  is  open,  and  a  fairly  level  gap 
between  the  Sari  Bair  range  and  the  Kilid  Bahr 
plateau  allows  the  long  and  wandering  road  from 
Krithia  to  cross  the  Peninsula  to  Maidos,  would  have 
exposed  the  army  to  similar  flank  attacks ;  but  the 
distance  is  short  (not  much  over  five  miles),  and  in  all 
probability  a  landing  in  full  force  might  have  been 
attempted  here  had  not  the  fortification  and  armament 
on  the  promontory  itself,  and  on  the  gradually  slop- 
ing land  upon  both  sides  of  it,  appeared  too  powerful 
for  assault.  The  barbed-wire  entanglements  ex- 
tended into  the  sea,  and  the  country  formed  the  most 
dangerous  of  all  approaches — a  glacis  with  no  dead 
ground  and  little  cover.  South  of  this  position  the 
cliffs  rise  abruptly  again,  and  along  all  the  coast 
round  Cape  Helles  to  Morto  Bay  (which  was  com- 
manded by  guns  from  the  Asiatic  side)  a  survey 
showed  no  beach  or  opening,  except  at  a  few  small 
gaps  and  gullies,  so  soon  to  be  celebrated. 

As  he  rejected  the  coast  between  Suvla  and  Gaba 
Tepe,  Sir  Ian  was  compelled  to  disregard  Napoleon's 
maxim  of  war  and  divide  his  forces.  His  object  was 
to  shake  the  enemy's  moral,  and  puzzle  the  command 
by  several  simultaneous  attacks,  threatening  front 
and  rear,  and  keeping  the  Turkish  Staff  in  flustered 
uncertainty  where  the  main  defence  should  be  con- 
centrated. Accordingly,  a  few  of  those  small  but 
practicable  landing-places  round  the  extremity  of  the 
Peninsula  were  selected.  Here  the  assault  upon  the 
Turkish  defences  was  to  be  made  chiefly  by  units  of 
the  29th  Division.  The  chosen  points  were  S  Beach, 
or  De  Tott's  Battery,  on  the  farther  side  of  Morto 


^  yyuUs 


HELLES   AND   THE    STRAITS 


To  face  /.  78 


W  -  i 


THE  SELECTED  LANDING-PLACES  79 

Bay,  where  only  a  small  force  was  to  attempt  holding 
on  so  as  to  protect  our  right  flank  ;  V  Beach,  just 
below  the  larg-e  villaafe  and  ancient  castle  of  Seddel 
Bahr,  where  a  main  attack  was  to  be  made  and  the 
ground  permanently  occupied ;  W  Beach,  where  a 
similar  force  was  to  land,  and  link  up  with  V  Beach, 
having  the  same  object  in  view  ;  X  Beach  (round  the 
point  of  Cape  Tekke,  looking  out  towards  the  Gulf  of 
Xeros),  where  a  force  was  to  work  up  the  face  of  a 
cliff  and  attempt  to  join  hands  with  W  Beach  ;  and 
Y  Beach,  about  three  and  a  half  miles  north  along  the 
cliffs,  where  a  small  body  was  to  scramble  up  a  pre- 
cipitous ravine  and  make  a  feint  upon  Krithia.  Both 
flanks  of  the  main  attack  were  further  protected  by 
the  sea  and  the  naval  guns. 

Such  was  the  task  of  the  29th  Division,  their 
general  objective  being  the  low  but  formidable  posi- 
tion of  Achi  Baba,  a  hill  sitting  asquat  almost  across 
the  Peninsula  about  five  miles  from  Cape  Helles,  and 
rising  by  gradual  and  bare  slopes  to  a  truncated 
pyramid,  some  600  to  700  feet  high.  About  nine 
miles  along  the  coast  beyond  Y  Beach,  between  a 
point  north  of  Gaba  Tepe  and  a  slight  projection  then 
called  Fisherman's  Hut,  three  miles  farther  up  the 
coast  from  Gaba  Tepe,  the  Anzacs  were  to  land  on 
Z  Beach,  and  work  their  way  into  the  defiles  and  up 
the  heights  of  Sari  Bair.  Their  main  purpose  was 
to  distract  the  enemy  forces  south  of  Achi  Baba  by 
threatening  their  rear  and  communications.  With  a 
similar  object  the  greater  part  of  the  Royal  Naval 
Division,  which  had  no  guns,  and  for  which  no  small 
boats  could  be  supplied,  was  to  make  a  feint  near  the 
Bulair  lines  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf.     Further  to  dis- 


8o  THE  PREPARATION 

tract  the  enemy's  attention,  one  infantry  regiment  and 
one  battery  from  the  French  mixed  Division  were 
instructed  to  land  on  the  Asiatic  shore  near  Kum 
Kali ;  but  not  to  remain  there,  nor  advance  beyond 
the  river  Mendere.  Such,  in  brief,  was  the  general 
design  for  attacking  the  Peninsula  position,  con- 
fidently described  by  German  authorities  as  im- 
pregnable. 

By  the  middle  of  April  the  force  appointed  to  ac- 
complish this  overwhelming  task  had  assembled  in  the 
Mudros  harbour  or  loch.  Large  as  that  inlet  is,  the 
surface  was  so  crowded  with  ships  that  the  naval 
authorities,  among  whom  Commodore  Roger  Keyes 
was  Chief  of  Staff  to  Admiral  de  Robeck,  had 
difficulty  in  finding  anchorage  for  all.  Beside  the 
ships  of  war,  places  had  to  be  fixed  for  io8  transports 
and  other  vessels.  The  29th  Division  had  arrived  in 
twenty  transports ;  ^  the  Anzacs  in  forty ;  the  Royal 
Naval  Division  in  twelve ;  the  French  Division  in 
twenty-three ;  the  Supply  and  Store  Ships  numbered 
twelve,  and  the  Arcadian  was  detailed  for  General 
Headquarters. 

The  names  of  the  officers  appointed  to  the 
most  important  positions  upon  Sir  lan's  Staff 
may  here  be    mentioned,   his  personal   Aides   being 

^  One  of  these  transports,  the  Manito7(,  had  a  narrow  escape  upon 
the  voyage  from  Egypt.  She  was  attacked  by  a  Turkish  destroyer, 
whose  captain  courteously  gave  an  opportunity  for  removing  the  men  in 
their  boats.  In  the  hurry  two  of  the  boats  were  overturned  and  fifty-one 
men  drowned.  The  enemy  destroyer,  apprehending  the  approach  of 
British  ships,  then  drew  in  close,  and  fired  three  torpedoes,  all  of  which 
passed  under  the  transport,  the  range  being  too  short  to  allow  a  torpedo 
to  rise  after  its  plunge.  The  destroyer  was  afterwards  driven  ashore  in 
Asia  by  two  of  our  destroyers  and  broken  up.^ — See  The  Immortal 
Gamble,  p.  67. 


PRINCIPAL  STAFF  OFFICERS  8 1 

Captain  S.    H.   Pollen  and    Lieutenant    G.   St.   John 
Brodrick  : 

Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Major-General  W.  F.  Braithwaite ; 
other  members  of  the  General  Staff,  Lieut.-Colonel  M.  C. 
P.  Ward,  R.A.  ;  Lieut.-Colonel  Doughty-Wylie  (Royal 
Welsh  Fusiliers)  ;  Captain  C.  F.  Aspinall  (Royal  Munster 
Fusiliers)  ;  Captain  G.  P.  Dawnay  (Reserve  of  Ofificers) ; 
Captain  W.  H.  Deedes  (King's  Royal  Rifles). 

Deputy  Adjutant-General,  Brigadier-General  E.  M.  Woodward. 

Deputy  Quartermaster-General,  Brigadier-General  S.  H.  Winter. 

Liaison  Officers,  with  the  British,  Commandant  de  Cavalerie  Brevete 
Berthier  de  Sauvigny,  Lieut.  Pelliot,  and  Lieut,  de 
Laborde. 

With  the   French,   Lieut.-Colonel  H.  D.  Farquharson, 
and  Captain  C.  de  Putron. 

Camp  Commandant,  Major  J.  S.  S.  Churchill  (Oxfordshire  Fusiliers). 

Censor,  Captain  William  Maxwell  (the  well-known  war  corre- 
spondent in  former  campaigns). 

Principal  Chaplain,  The  Rev.  A.  C.  Hordern. 

Headquarters  of  Base. 
Base  Commattdant,  Brigadier-General  C.  R.  M'Grigor,  C.B. 
General  Staff  Officer,  Major  E.  A.  Plunkett  (Lincolnshire  Regiment). 
Assistaftt    Quartermaster-General,    Lieut.-Colonel    P.   C.   J.    Scott 

(A.S.C.). 
Assistant   Director   of  Medical   Services,    Major    M.   J.   Sexton 

(R.A.M.C.). 

Headquarters  of  Administrative  Services. 

Director  of  Army  Signals,  Lieut.-Colonel  M.  G.  E.  Bowman- 
Manifold  (R.E.). 

Director  of  Supplies  and  Transport,  Colonel  F.  W.  B.  Koe,  C.B. 

Assistant  Director  of  Transport,  Major  O.  Striedinger  (A.S.C.). 

Director  of  Ordnance  Services,  Colonel  R.  W.  M.  Jackson,  C.B., 
C.M.G. 

Director  of  Works,  Brigadier-General  G.  S.  M'D.  EUiot. 

Director  of  Medical  Services,  Surgeon-General  W.  E.  Birrell. 

Pay  master-in- Chief,  Lieut.-Colonel  J.  C.  Armstrong  (A.P.D.). 

The  total  number  of  the  Staff  at  the  beginning 
of  the  great  enterprise  was  eighty-four.      Brigadier- 
General  Woodward  and  Surgeon-General  Birrell  did 
not  arrive  till  April   19,  having  remained  in  Egypt 
6 


82  THE  PREPARATION 

under  orders  to  organise  the  hospitals.  In  their 
absence  the  general  scheme  for  the  evacuation  of  the 
wounded  was  drawn  up  by  Lieut. -Colonel  A.  E.  C. 
Keble,  R.A.M.C. 

The  military  force  under  Sir  Jan's  command  at 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign  was  composed  as 
follows  : 

The  29TH  Division. 
Commander,  Major-General  A.  G.  Hunter- Weston,  C.B.,  D.S.O. 
Divisional  Artillery  Commander,  Brigadier-General  R.  W.  Breeks. 
Division  Engineers   Commander,   Lieut. -Colonel   C.    B.    Kingston 
(R.E.). 

86//i!  Infantry  Brigade. 

Cotnmander,  Brigadier-General  S.  W.  Hare. 
(i)  2nd  Royal  Fusiliers. 

(2)  I  St  Lancashire  Fusiliers. 

(3)  1st  Royal  Munster  Fusiliers. 

(4)  1st  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers. 

87//?  Infantry  Brigade. 

Comma7ider,  Brigadier-General  W.  R.  Marshall. 
(i)  2nd  South  Wales  Borderers. 

(2)  1st  King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers. 

(3)  1st  Royal  Inniskilling  Fusiliers. 

(4)  1st  Border  Regiment. 

88/-^  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,  Brigadier-General  H.  E.  Napier. 
(i)  4th  Worcester  Regiment. 

(2)  2nd  Hampshire  Regiment. 

(3)  1st  Essex  Regiment. 

(4)  5th  Royal  Scots  (Territorials). 

The  Anzac  Army  Corps. 
General  Officer  Conunanding,  Lieut.-General  Sir  W.  R.  Birdwood, 

K.C.S.L,  C.B.,  CLE.,  D.S.O. 
Brigadier-General,  General  Staff,  Brigadier-General  H.  B.  Walker, 

D.S.O. 
General  Staff  Officer,  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  Skeen  (24th  Punjabis). 
Deputy  Adjutant  and  Quartermaster-General,  Brigadier-General 

R.  A.  Carruthers,  C.B. 
Medical  Officer,  Colonel  C.  S.  Ryan,  V.D.  (A.A.M.C). 
Attached  as  Specialist  on  Water  Supply,  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  C.  Joly 

de  Lotbini^re,  C.S.I.,  CLE. 


AVAILABLE  FORCES  83 

Australian  Division. 
Commander^  Major-General  W.  T.  Bridges,  C.M.G. 
General  Sta^ff  Officer,  Lieut.-Colonel  C.  B.  B.  White  (R.A.A.). 
Commanding  Divisional  Artillery,  Colonel  J.  J.  T.  Hobbs,  V.D. 
Commanding  Divisional  Engineers,  Lieut.-Colonel  G.  C.  E.  Elliott 
(R.E.). 

1st  {New  South  Wales)  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,  Colonel  H.  N.  M'Laurin.  (ist,  2nd,  3rd,  and 
4th  Battalions,  New  South  Wales.) 

ind  ( Victoria)  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,  Colonel  the  Hon.  J.  W.  M'Cay,  V.D.  (5th,  6th, 
7th,  and  8th  BattaHons,  Victoria.) 

"^rd  {Australia)  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,  Colonel  E.  G.  Sinclair  Maclagan,  D.S.O.  (York- 
shire Regiment).  (9th  Queensland,  loth  South  Australian, 
nth  West  Australian,  12th  South  Australian,  West 
Australian,  and  Tasmania.) 

Divisional.     4th  (Victoria)  Light  Horse. 

New  Zealand  and  Australian  Division. 
General  Officer  Cofumanding,   Major-General   Sir  A.   J.  Godley, 

K.C.M.G.,  C.B. 
Chief  Staff  Officer,    Lieut.-Colonel   W.    G.    Braithwaite,    D.S.O. 

(Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers). 
Commanding  Divisional  Artillery,  Lieut.-Colonel  G.  N.  Johnston 

(R.A.). 
Commanding  Divisional  Engineers,  Lieut.-Colonel  G.  R.  Pridham 

(R.E.). 

New  Zealand  Moutited  Rifle  Brigade. 

Commander,  Brigadier-General  A.  H.  Russell,  A.D.C.  (Auck- 
land, Canterbury,  and  Wellington  Mounted  Rifles.) 

\st  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade. 

Commander,  Colonel  H.  G.  Chauvel,  C.M.G.  (ist  New  South 
Wales,  2nd  Queensland,  3rd  South  Australian,  and 
Tasmania  Regiments.) 

New  Zealand  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,    Colonel    F.    C.  Johnston   (North    Staffordshire 
Regiment).    (Auckland,  Canterbury,  Otago,  and  Wellington 
Battalions.) 
4/A  Australian  Infantry  Brigade. 

Commander,  Colonel  J.  Monash.  (13th  New  South  Wales, 
14th  Victoria,  isth  Queensland  and  Tasmania,  and  i6th 
South  and  West  Australia  Battalions.) 

Divisional.    Otago  Mounted  Rifles. 


84  THE  PREPARATION 

Corps  Troops. 
ind  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade.    (5tli,  6th,  and  7th  Regiments.) 
Commander,  Colonel  G.  de  L.  Ryrie. 

^rd Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade.    (8th,  9th,  and  lolh  Regiments.) 
Commander,  Colonel  F.  G.  Hughes,  V.D. 

The  Mounted  Units  had  left  their  horses  behind 
them  in  Egypt,  and  the  popular  pictures  represent- 
ing cavalry  charging  over  broken  ground  upon  the 
Peninsula  are  imaginative. 

Royal  Naval  Division. 
General  Officer  Commanding,  Major-General  A.  Paris,  C.B. 
General  Staff  Officer,  Lieut.-Colonel  A.  H.  Ollivant  (R.A.). 

(The  Division  had  no  guns.) 
Commanding  Divisional  Engineers,  Lieut.-Colonel   A.   B,    Carey 

(R.E.). 

First  Naval  Brigade. 

Commander,  Brigadier-General  D.  Mercer  (R.M.L. I.).  (Drake, 
Nelson,  Hawke,  and  CoUingwood  Battalions.) 

Second  Naval  Brigade. 

Commander,  Commodore  O.  Backhouse  (R.N.).  (Howe,  Hood, 
Anson,  and  Benbow  Battalions.) 

Third  Naval  Brigade.     (Marine.) 

Co!n7?iander,  Brigadier-General  C.  N.  Trotman  (R.M.L.I.). 
(Chatham,  Portsmouth,  Plymouth,  and  Deal  Battalions.) 

French  Expeditionary  Force. 
GdnSral  Commandant  le  Corps  Expeditiofinaire  Franqais  d'' Orient, 

General  de  Division  d'Amade. 
Chef  d'Etat- Major,  Lieut.-Colonel  Descoins. 
Commandant  d'Armes  de  la  Base,  General  Baumann. 

Division. 
Ghiiral  Comma7idant,  General  Masnou. 
Chef  d^Etat-Major,  Commandant  Romieux. 
Colonel  Commandant  VArtillerie,  Lieut.-Colonel  Branet. 
Commandant  du  Genie,  Capitaine  Bouyssou. 

\lre  Brigade  Metropolitaine. 

General  de  Brigade,  General  Vandenberg.  Comprising  i75^me 
Regiment  d'Infanterie  Metropolitaine  (Lieut.-Colonel 
Philippe),  and  a  Regiment  de  marche  d'Afrique  (Lieut.- 
Colonel  Desruelles),  mixed  Zouaves  and  Foreign  Legion. 


SIR  lAN'S  ADDRESS  85 

Brigade  Coloniale. 

General  de  Brigade^  Colonel  Ruef.  Comprising  4eme  Regi- 
ment mixte  Colonial  (Lieut.-Colonel  Vacher),  and  6^me 
Regiment  mixte  Colonial  (Lieut-Colonel  Nogu^s).  The 
Division  had  six  batteries  of  "75's,"  and  three  of  "65" 
mountain  guns  ;  four  guns  to  each  battery. 

Most  unfortunately,  the  Indian  Brigade,  under 
General  Cox,  was  for  the  present  left  in  Egypt, 
though  its  service  there  was  no  longer  required, 
and  Sir  Ian  had  appealed  to  Lord  Kitchener 
for  it.  Ultimately  it  arrived,  just  too  late,  on 
May  I. 

The  total  number  of  the  force  was  under  70,000  ; 
of  these  certainly  not  more  than  60,000  could  be  used 
for  action,  even  including  the  necessary  reserves. 

Landing  was  intended  on  April  23,  but  on  the 
20th  a  heavy  wind  arose,  and  blew  for  forty-eight 
hours,  rendering  the  movement  of  small  boats  difficult 
even  in  Mudros  harbour.  On  the  21st  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief issued  the  following  address  to  his 
forces : 

'*  Soldiers  of  France  and  of  the  King  : 

"  Before  us  lies  an  adventure  unprecedented  in 
modern  war.  Together  with  our  comrades  of  the 
Fleet,  we  are  about  to  force  a  landing  upon  an  open 
beach  in  face  of  positions  which  have  been  vaunted 
by  our  enemies  as  impregnable. 

"  The  landing  will  be  made  good,  by  the  help  of 
God  and  the  Navy  ;  the  positions  will  be  stormed, 
and  the  War  brought  one  step  nearer  to  a  glorious 
close. 

"  '  Remember,'  said  Lord  Kitchener,  when  bidding 
adieu  to  your  Commander,  '  Remember,  once  you  set 
foot  upon  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  you  must  fight  the 
thing  through  to  a  finish.' 


86  THE  PREPARATION 

"  The  whole  world  will  be  watching  your  progress. 
Let  us  prove  ourselves  worthy  of  the  great  feat  of 
arms  entrusted  to  us. 

"  Ian  Hamilton, 
General^ 

A  few  further  points  remain  to  be  mentioned. 
On  April  17,  one  of  our  submarines,  E15,  ran 
aground  off  Kephez  Point,  and  by  a  very  gallant 
action  was  destroyed  by  the  two  picket-boats  of  the 
Triumph  and  Majestic  (ships  afterwards  sent  to  the 
bottom  by  submarines).  Lieut. -Commander  Eric 
Robinson  was  in  command,  and,  though  coming 
under  heavy  fire,  he  succeeded  in  torpedoing  the 
submarine  and  rendering  it  useless  to  the  enemy. 

On  the  23rd,  just  after  the  transports  had  started, 
news  came  from  the  rugged  island  of  Skyros,  eighty 
miles  south-west  of  Lemnos,  that  Rupert  Brooke,  the 
poet,  had  died  there  of  blood-poisoning  that  evening. 
During  his  visit  to  the  Royal  Naval  Division  at  Port 
Said,  Sir  Ian  had  seen  him  in  his  tent  upon  the  sand, 
prostrate  with  fever,  and  had  offered  him  a  place  on 
his  Staff.  With  fine  resolution,  and  a  modesty  equally 
characteristic,  Brooke  refused,  being  determined  to 
abide  by  the  Royal  Naval  Division,  which  he  had 
joined  before  the  quixotic  fiasco  at  Antwerp.  On 
April  20  he  took  part  in  a  field-day  on  Skyros,  and 
in  an  olive  grove  there,  high  up  on  the  mountain 
Pephko,  looking  over  Trebaki  Bay,  he  was  buried  at 
midnight  of  the  23rd,  his  own  petty  officers  carrying 
his  body  over  the  rocks  and  prickly  bushes.  A 
wooden  cross,  surrounded  by  lumps  of  marble,  marks 
the  spot.  His  colonel  in  the  Hood  Battalion, 
Arnold    Quilter,  Grenadier  Guards,  who  was    killed 


CONTEMPORARY  EVENTS  87 

a  fortnight  later,  wrote  to  his  mother  :  "His  men  were 
devoted  to  him,  and  he  had  all  the  makings  of  a  first- 
rate  officer."  Alas  !  his  friends  know  that  he  had  all 
the  makings  of  so  much  beside,  and  for  them  the 
world  was  darkened  by  the  loss  of  so  singularly 
beautiful  a  character,  a  personality  so  fine  and  full  of 
the  noblest  promise/ 

Upon  other  fronts  of  the  war,  the  chief  events  of 
the  weeks  following  the  costly  and  inconclusive  move- 
ment at  Neuve  Chapelle  (March  10)  were  the  capture 
of  Przemysl  by  the  Russians  (March  22),  followed  by 
heavy  fighting  in  the  Carpathian  passes,  and  the 
second  battle  of  Ypres,  inaugurated  (April  22)  on  the 
German  side  by  the  earliest  use  of  poison  gas. 

1  See  also  Charles  Lister^  by  Lord  Ribblesdale,  p.  164.  Charles 
Lister  himself  was  one  of  the  young  men  of  brilliant  promise  whose 
death  was  due  to  the  Gallipoli  campaign.  After  gallant  service  in  the 
Hood  Battalion  of  the  Royal  Naval  Division  at  Helles,  he  died  of  his 
third  wound,  August  28,  191 5. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  LANDINGS 

THE  wind,  which  had  continued  to  blow  hard 
on  April  22,  abated  next  day,  and  in  the 
afternoon  the  transports  bearing  the  cover- 
ing force  of  the  29th  Division  began  very  slowly  to 
move  out  from  Mudros  harbour.  In  that  land-locked 
inlet,  the  water  was  now  still,  and  singularly  blue. 
"The  black  ships,"  as  the  navy  called  the  transports 
owing  to  their  fresh  coat  of  black  paint,  wound  their 
way  in  and  out  among  others  still  lying  at  anchor. 
They  passed  the  battleships  and  cruisers  of  our  own 
fleet ;  they  passed  the  Anzac  transports,  which  were 
to  follow  them  next  day  ;  they  passed  the  battleships 
and  transports  of  the  French  contingents,  and  the 
five-funnelled  Russian  cruiser  Askold,  lying  nearer 
the  little  islands  which  protect  the  entrance  of  the  far- 
extended  haven  ;  and  as  they  passed,  the  pellucid  air 
which  still  illuminates  the  realms  of  ancient  Greece 
rang  with  the  cheers  of  races  whose  habitation  the 
Greeks  had  not  imagined.  Perhaps  it  is  in  Greek 
history  that  we  find  the  nearest  parallel  to  such  a 
scene  of  heroic  joy,  the  preface  to  heroic  disaster. 
For  when  the  bright  troops  of  Athenians  started  for 
the  conquest  of  Sicily,  we  read  that  nearly  the  whole 
population  of  the  city  accompanied  their  five-mile 
march    down    the     Pirceus ;    that    there,    in    sacred 


THE  FORCE  LEAVING  MUDROS  89 

silence,  libation  to  the  gods  was  made  ;  and  issuing 
in  line  ahead  from  the  harbour,  the  transport  galleys 
raced,  in  pure  exhilaration  of  heart,  to  the  pointed 
island  of  ^gina,  fifteen  miles  away,  while  far  in  the 
air  bystanders  heard  the  cries  of  invisible  spirits,  like 
the  wailings  of  women  upon  the  Phoenician  shore 
lamenting  the  beauty  of  Adonis  yearly  wounded/ 

The  British  covering  force  consisted  mainly  of 
the  86th  Brigade  (29th  Division),  under  Brigadier- 
General  S.  W.  Hare,  but  two  battalions  of  the 
87th  Brigade  and  half  a  battalion  of  the  88th  were 
attached  to  it,  beside  the  Plymouth  Battalion  of  the 
Royal  Naval  Division,  as  the  General's  own  reserve, 
and  the  Anson  Battalion,  detailed  for  beach  duties. 
Their  three  transports  were  escorted  by  the  Euryalus 
(flagship  of  Admiral  Wemyss,  commanding  the  first 
and  fourth  of  the  seven  squadrons  into  which  the  fleet 
was  divided),  the  hnplacable,  and  the  Coi^nwallis, 
and  their  station  was  Tenedos.  The  next  afternoon 
(Saturday,  April  24)  they  were  followed  from 
Mudros  harbour  by  the  Queen  Elizabeth  (flagship 
of  Admiral  de  Robeck),  with  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  and 
the  General  Headquarter  Staff  on  board,  leading  the 
other  battleships  in  line  ahead.  After  them  went  the 
Anzac  covering  force,  consisting  of  the  3rd  Brigade 
under  Colonel  Sinclair  Maclagan  (the  Queensland, 
South  Australian,  West  Australian,  and  a  mixed 
Australian  and  Tasmanian  battalion).  The  re- 
mainder of  the  Anzac  army  corps  followed,  escorted 

1  Thucydides,  vi.  32  ;  Diodorus,  xiii.  3.  From  Athens  herself  only 
about  3000  of  the  troops  for  the  Sicilian  expedition  started.  It  is  curious 
to  remember  that  Plato  was  a  boy  in  yEgina  at  the  time,  and  probably 
watched  the  race. 


90  THE  LANDINGS 

by  the  Queen  (flagship  of  Admiral  Thursby,  com- 
manding the  second  squadron),  the  London,  and  the 
Prince  of  Wales.  Their  destination  was  a  point  off 
Imbros,  near  Cape  Kephalos,  where  they  were  to 
wait  during  the  night  till  the  moon  went  dow^n.  The 
covering  force  occupied  four  transports,  beside  the 
1500  men  of  the  brigade  placed  upon  the  Queen. 
General  Birdwood's  headquarters  were  on  the 
Minnewaska,  and  about  thirty  transports  carried 
the  remainder  of  his  corps.  As  they  passed  out 
of  harbour,  leaving  the  Lemnian  shore  with  which 
many,  by  practised  landings,  had  become  familiar, 
they  too  were  greeted  with  tumultuous  cheering  by 
the  ships  which  had  not  started  yet,  and  tumultuously 
they  replied.  Moved  onward  irresistibly  into  immi- 
nent death,  knowing  that  by  the  morrow's  afternoon 
at  least  one  in  ten  of  their  numbers  would  have  fallen 
in  all  the  splendour  of  youthful  vitality,  still  they 
cheered  like  schoolboys  bound  for  a  football  match  or 
a  holiday  by  the  sea.  Excitement,  comradeship,  the 
infectious  joy  of  confronting  a  dangerous  enterprise 
side  by  side,  made  them  cheer.  Never  before  had 
those  men  known  what  battle  means,  but  the  sinking 
dread  of  the  unknown,  which  all  men  feel  as  the 
shadow  of  extreme  peril  approaches,  was  allayed  by 
the  renunciation  of  self,  and  the  clear  belief  that, 
whoever  else  was  wrong  in  the  world,  it  was  not 
they. 

The  night  was  very  still.  The  three-quarter 
moon  set  soon  after  3  a.m.,  and  there  was  total 
darkness  over  sea  and  mountains  until  a  cold  and 
windless  dawn  gradually  appeared.  The  water  was 
smooth  as  a  mirror,  and  a  thin  veil  of  mist  covered 


LANDING  AT  DE  TOTl^'S  91 

the  shore.  Just  before  the  sun  rose  in  a  blaze  of 
gold,  four  of  the  battleships  and  four  cruisers  opened 
fire  upon  the  defences  at  the  main  landing-places 
round  Cape  Helles,  and  continued  a  heavy  bombard- 
ment. At  the  same  time,  the  landing  of  the  covering 
parties  at  the  five  selected  points  around  the  end 
of  the  Peninsula  began,  and  account  of  them  may 
here  be  given  in  succession  from  the  extreme  right 
flank  at  S  to  the  extreme  left  at  Y. 

On  the  evening  of  the  24th,  about  750  of  the 
2nd  South  Wales  Borderers  under  Colonel  Casson 
had  come  on  board  the  Cornwallis  in  four  trawlers 
from  their  transport.  Just  before  sunrise  they  put 
off  in  the  trawlers  again,  each  trawler  towing  six 
boats,  and  proceeded  up  the  strait  for  about  2\  miles 
to  the  point  called  Eski  Hissarlik  or  De  Tott's  Battery, 
on  the  north-east  end  of  Morto  Bay.  The  Cornwallis 
followed,  with  the  Lord  Nelson  as  covering  ship, 
but,  being  delayed  by  the  Agamemnon  and  some 
French  mine-sweepers  coming  across  her  course,  she 
did  not  reach  the  point  till  the  men  had  approached 
the  shore,  rowing  the  boats  as  best  they  could, 
though  unaccustomed  to  the  water,  and  encumbered 
with  their  packs,  rifles,  and  trenching  tools.  Almost 
before  the  boats  grounded,  they  leapt  into  the  sea, 
and  struggled  to  shore,  under  a  heavy  rifle  fire  which 
immediately  opened  from  the  Turkish  trenches. 

In  perfect  order,  but  at  great  speed,  these  veteran 
troops  made  for  the  height,  some  scrambling  up  the 
cliff,  some  approaching  by  a  gradual  slope  on  the 
west  side.  They  were  already  nearing  the  summit 
when  a  mixed  naval  party  of  about  100  marines 
and  sailors  put  to  shore,  and  were  of  great  assistance 


92  THE  LANDINGS 

in  taking  two  lines  of  trenches  and  working  side  by 
side  with  the  South  Wales  Borderers,  who  were 
already  driving  the  Turks  down  the  farther  slope 
of  the  ridge.  Guns  from  the  Asiatic  side  opened 
fire  upon  the  beach,  but  most  of  the  shells,  striking 
the  mud  at  the  water's  edge,  did  not  burst,  and  the 
Comwallis,  firing  by  signal  from  shore,  silenced  the 
battery  about  lo  a.m.  Being  urgently  summoned 
from  W  Beach,  and  seeing  that  the  soldiers  now 
held  the  position  firmly,  Captain  Davidson  then 
withdrew  the  naval  party,  and  steamed  to  his  second 
position  down  the  strait.^  Colonel  Casson's  battalion 
clung  to  the  point  they  had  gained  for  the  critical 
forty-eight  hours  of  the  landing,  thus  preventing 
Turkish  reinforcements  from  coming  down  to  Seddel 
Bahr,  and  protecting  the  right  flank  of  our  possible 
advance.  The  post  was  then  taken  over  by  the 
French,  who  held  it  throughout  the  campaign,  though 
much  exposed  to  the  Asiatic  guns.  This  successful 
enterprise  cost  about  sixty  casualties,  including  Major 
Margesson,  who  was  killed. 

Walking  along  the  coast  south-west  from  De 
Tott's  Battery,  one  rounds  the  two-mile  arc  of  Morto 
Bay,  near  the  middle  of  which  the  combined  "  Deres  " 
or  watercourses  of  the  Krithia  region  run  out  into 
the  strait.  Across  the  valley,  nearly  a  mile  inland, 
a  few  lofty  piles  of  an  ancient,  perhaps  Byzantine, 
aqueduct  then  stood,  probably  at  one  time  carrying 
water  to  a  more  ancient  town  than  Seddel  Bahr. 
Later  in  the  campaign  they  were  destroyed,  but  for 
some  months  they  formed  a  conspicuous  landmark. 

^  The  Iimnortal  Gamble,  pp.  72-82  and  98-104  (account  by  Captain 
Davidson,  who  went  ashore  himself). 


SEDDEL  JBAHR  93 

Along  the  rest  of  the  bay  the  land  slopes  gently- 
down  to  the  beach,  and  had  been  laid  out  in  gardens 
cypress-fringed,  such  as  Islam  loves.  The  gardens 
were  now  entrenched  and  thickly  netted  with  barbed 
wire  ;  but  the  bay  would  have  afforded  the  finest 
landing-place  upon  the  southern  Peninsula,  had  it 
not  been  fully  commanded  by  guns  across  the  strait. 
Upon  the  south-west  point  of  the  bay,  the  old 
Turkish  castle  and  fortress  of  Seddel  Bahr,  pro- 
jecting boldly  into  the  sea,  guards  the  entrance  to 
the  strait,  and,  as  already  described,  at  the  foot  of 
its  towers  and  curtain-walls  are  still  heaped  the  huge 
round  stones  which  the  Turks  once  deemed  sufficient 
to  hurl  at  intruders  beating  up  against  the  current. 
Behind  the  castle  was  huddled  a  grey  stone  village 
or  small  town,  of  the  usual  Turkish  character,  with 
narrow  and  winding  alleys  between  secretive  houses, 
and  just  beyond  the  point  there  projected  a  low  reef 
of  rocks  round  which  the  deep-blue  water,  hurrying 
out  to  the  open  sea,  perpetually  eddied. 

From  the  Seddel  Bahr  point  the  coast  falls  back 
a  little  into  the  shallow  arc  of  a  bay  barely  over  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  long  if  one  follows  the  sandy  beach. 
Around  the  curve,  the  ground  rises  rather  steeply, 
almost  exactly  in  the  form  of  a  classic  theatre,  to 
which  the  beach  would  serve  as  orchestra  and  the 
sea  as  stage.  This  little  bay,  to  be  renowned  as 
V  Beach,  ends  on  the  western  side  in  precipitous 
cliff's,  round  the  foot  of  which  it  is  possible  to  clamber 
over  masses  of  fallen  rocks,  but  no  path  leads.  On 
the  top  of  the  cliff  stood  one  of  the  most  powerful 
of  the  entrance  forts  destroyed  by  the  naval  attack 
on  February  19.     The  beach  itself  is  narrow — about 


94  THE  LANDINGS 

lo  yards  across — and  was  edged  by  a  small  but 
perpendicular  bank,  not  over  4  or  5  feet  in  height. 
The  slopes  of  the  theatre  were  at  that  time  covered 
with  grass,  to  be  changed  later  on  for  dust  and  heavy 
sand.  The  slope  measures  about  200  yards  from 
beach  to  summit.  Along  the  edge  of  the  beach  ran 
an  entanglement  of  the  peculiarly  strong  barbed  wire 
used  by  the  Turks  ;  a  second  entanglement  ran  round 
the  curving  slope  two-thirds  of  the  way  up,  and  a 
third  joined  the  two  at  right  angles  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  bay.  The  upper  part  of  the  semicircle 
was  strongly  entrenched  and  armed  with  pom-poms, 
while  in  the  ruins  of  the  old  fortress,  in  the  village, 
and  in  a  shattered  barrack  on  the  top  of  the  western 
summit,  machine-guns  and  a  multitude  of  snipers 
were  concealed.  Nature  and  man's  invention  had 
converted  the  little  bay  into  a  defensive  engine  of 
manifold  destruction. 

At  daybreak  the  Albion  opened  a  heavy  bombard- 
ment. There  was  no  answer.  The  little  semicircle 
remained  still  as  an  empty  theatre,  and  sanguine 
spirits  hoped  that  defence  had  been  abandoned. 
Transhipping  rapidly  from  a  fleet-sweeper,  three 
companies  of  the  ist  Dublin  Fusiliers  and  a  party 
of  the  Anson  Battalion,  Royal  Naval  Division,  arranged 
themselves  in  six  tows,  each  made  up  of  a  pinnace 
and  four  cutters,  and  carrying  125  men  apiece. 
In  line  abreast  the  tows  started  for  the  shore  over 
the  glassy  water,  pale  with  morning.  Except  for 
the  continuous  crash  of  our  bursting  shells,  not  a 
sound  came  from  the  shore.  On  the  right  of  the 
main  party  of  tows  loomed  a  large  collier,  called 
the  River  Clyde,  but  known  to  the  classical  as  the 


THE  RIVER  CLYDE  AT  V  BEACH  95 

"Trojan  Horse,"  and  to  the  unlearned  as  the  "Dun 
Cow."  She  carried  the  ist  Munster  FusiHers,  half 
the  2nd  Hampshire  Regiment,  one  company  of  the 
Dublin  Fusiliers,  and  details  of  sappers,  signallers, 
field  ambulance,  and  an  Anson  beach-party.  Com- 
mander Edward  Unwin,  R.N.,  was  in  charge  of 
her,  a  man  of  eagle  features  and  impetuous  but 
noble  personality,  inclined  to  pour  imprecations 
upon  "the  Army"  while  he  assisted  them  with 
untiring  ingenuity  and  a  courage  conspicuous  even 
on  that  heroic  day.  His  orders  were  to  run  his 
ship  hard  aground  after  the  tows  had  landed  their 
first  party.  A  hopper  alongside  the  collier  was  then 
to  proceed  under  her  own  steam  and  momentum, 
towing  a  string  of  lighters  so  as  to  form  a  pontoon 
for  the  troops,  who  were  to  issue  from  square  iron 
doors  opening  close  up  to  the  ship's  bow  on  the  port 
and  starboard  sides.  Either  the  tows  were  delayed, 
or,  with  characteristic  enthusiasm,  Commander  Unwin 
drove  the  collier  too  fast.  For  the  tows  and  the 
ship  touched  ground  almost  at  the  same  moment. 
The  hopper  ran  forward  with  the  lighters,  which 
were  secured  after  a  short  delay.  The  gangways 
dropped.  Shoving  each  other  eagerly  forward,  the 
Munster  Fusiliers  rushed  from  the  opened  ports. 

Hardly  had  the  first  man  set  foot  on  the  gang- 
ways, when  the  invisible  enemy  broke  the  silence 
with  an  overwhelming  outburst  of  rifle  fire,  pom-poms, 
and  machine-guns.  The  Munster  Fusiliers  of  the 
first  company  fell  so  thick  that  many  were  suffocated 
or  crushed  by  the  sheer  weight  of  the  dead  dropping 
upon  them.  Few  if  any  of  those  eager  Irishmen 
struggled  across  the  lighters  to  the  beach  unwounded. 


96  THE  LANDINGS 

In  the  tows,  the  boats  were  riddled  with  holes,  and 
the  greater  number  destroyed.  The  Dublin  Fusiliers 
and  the  crews  supplied  by  the  navy  were  shot  down 
either  in  the  boats  or  as  they  leapt  into  the  shallow 
water  and  attempted  to  rush  across  the  narrow  beach. 
A  few  succeeded  in  reaching  the  low  and  perpen- 
dicular bank  of  sand,  and  lay  under  its  uncertain 
cover,  unable  to  show  a  head  above  the  top  without 
death.  The  Turks  had  carefully  marked  the  ranges 
of  every  point  along  the  shore  with  stakes,  and  they 
fired  in  security  from  dug-outs  and  deep  trenches, 
against  which  no  naval  bombardment  availed. 

Inspired  by  a  courage  which  baffles  reason  with 
amazement  (for  what  reasonable  motive  had  these 
men — these  Irishmen — to  spring  into  the  face  of 
instant  death?),  the  second  company  of  Munster 
Fusiliers  crowded  upon  the  gangway,  and  rushed 
along-  the  lighters  over  the  dead  bodies  of  their 
friends.  As  they  ran,  the  end  of  the  pontoon  nearest 
the  shore  was  torn  loose  by  the  rip  of  the  current, 
and  drifted  off  into  deep  water.  The  men  fell  in 
masses,  and  many,  either  to  escape  the  torrent  of 
bullets  or  in  passionate  eagerness  to  reach  the  shore, 
attempted  to  swim  to  land,  but  were  dragged  down 
by  the  weight  of  their  equipment,  and  lay  visible 
upon  the  sand  below.  With  unwavering  decision, 
the  sailors  laboured  to  restore  the  pontoon. 
Commander  Unwin  ran  down  the  gangway  and, 
plunging  into  the  sea,  worked  beside  the  men. 
Midshipman  Malleson  and  Midshipman  Drewry  (in 
honour  of  whom  the  French  afterwards  named  the 
jetty  which  they  built  on  the  spot)  swam  out,  carrying 
ropes    to   and   from  the   drifting   lighters   under    the 


THE  V  BEACH  LANDING  97 

ceaseless  splash  of  bullets  and  shells.  The  names  of 
all  these  have  become  celebrated,  and  they  won  the 
most  envied  of  all  our  country's  distinctions,  but  it  is 
almost  invidious  to  select  even  such  names  as  theirs 
among  the  men  and  boys  of  every  rank,  and  of  both 
services,  whose  self-devotion  made  that  day  and  place 
so  memorable.^ 

By  such  devoted  efforts,  a  reserve  lighter 
was  brought  into  position,  and  the  pontoon  again 
completed.  A  third  company  of  the  Munster  Fusiliers 
dashed  along  it,  with  similar  heroism,  towards  the 
shore,  suffering  terrible  loss  from  accurate  and  low- 
firing  shrapnel,  now  added  to  the  other  missiles  of 
death.  The  survivors  joined  the  survivors  under 
shelter  of  the  low  bank  of  sand.  There  was  a  brief 
pause  in  the  attempt  to  land,  but  when  it  began 
again,  the  pontoon  was  again  carried  adrift  by  the 
current,  bearing  upon  it  a  number  of  Hampshire  men, 
together  with  Brigadier-General  Napier,  commanding 
the  88th  Brigade,  and  his  Brigade-Major,  Captain 
Costeker.  They  lay  down  fiat  upon  the  lighters,  but 
nearly  all  were  killed  as  they  lay,  including  these  two 
officers  of  distinguished  military  name.  Connection 
with  the  shore  was  thus  severed.  Nearly  all  the 
boats  in  the  tows  had  been  destroyed,  and  some  were 
idly  drifting,  manned  only  by  the  dead.  The  dead 
lay  upon  the  lighters,  and  below  the  water,  and 
awash  upon  the  edge  of  the  beach.  The  ripple  of 
the  tormented  sea  broke  red  against  the  sand. 

^  Besides  the  names  here  mentioned,  Vice-Admiral  de  Robeck  in  his 
dispatch  especially  noticed  Able  Seaman  William  Williams  (killed), 
Seaman  George  M'Kenzie  Samson  (dangerously  wounded),  Lieutenant 
John  A.  V.  Morse,  R.N.,  and  Surgeon  P.  B.  Kelly,  R.N.,  as  rendering 
great  and  perilous  service  at  this  landing. 
7 


98  THE  LANDINGS 

One  of  the  tows  had  taken  half  a  company  of  the 
DubHn  Fusiliers  to  a  point  called  the  "  Camber 
Beach,"  just  north-east  of  the  Seddel  Bahr  castle. 
Perhaps  they  were  intended  to  threaten  the  enemy's 
position  from  his  left  flank  by  creeping  round  the 
castle  and  attacking  the  village  streets.  This  they 
proceeded  to  do,  and,  as  the  Turks  had  not  entrenched 
this  position,  the  Irishmen  with  great  skill  crawled 
from  cover  to  cover  till  they  reached  the  village 
windmills  and  the  entrance  to  the  houses.  There 
they  were  overwhelmed  by  the  crowd  of  snipers. 
Many  were  killed,  some  cut  off,  only  twenty-five 
returned.  The  wounded  had  to  be  left.  It  is  said 
that  they  were  slaughtered  with  great  atrocity 
and  the  dead  mutilated  by  order  of  the  Germans. 
Throughout  the  whole  of  this  campaign,  few  such 
charges  were  brought  against  the  Turks  themselves.^ 

Before  noon,  any  further  attempt  to  effect  a 
landing  was  abandoned,  and  the  main  body  of  troops 
which  was  to  have  followed  close  upon  the  covering 
party  was  diverted  to  W  Beach.  The  mixed 
survivors  of  Dublin  and  Munster  Fusiliers,  and  of 
the  Hampshire  companies,  remained  crouching  behind 
the  low  parapet  of  the  bank,  with  no  food  or  water 
beyond  such  small  quantities  as  they  had  brought 
with  them.  There  they  lay,  exposed  to  the  full  blaze 
of  sun,  and  only  just  sheltered  from  the  incessant  rain 
of  bullets  and  shells.  But  for  some  machine-guns 
mounted  on  the  bows  of  the  River  Clyde  and 
protected  by  sandbags,  the  Turks  would  have  found 

^  For  this  incident  and  others  at  V  Beach,  see  The  Immortal 
Gainble,  pp.  81-92,  besides  Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  and  Admiral  de  Robeck's 
dispatches, 


THE  NIGHT  ON  V  BEACH  99 

little  difficulty  in  exterminating  their  whole  number. 
With  them  were  two  officers  of  the  General  Staff — 
Colonel    Doughty-Wylie,    our    humane    and    gallant 
military  consul  at  Konia  during  the  Adana  massacres 
in  1909,  and  Colonel  W.  de  L.  Williams  (Hampshire 
Regiment),  who  did  their  utmost  to  hearten  the  men 
during  the  remaining  hours  of  that  terrible  day  and 
through  the  night.     As  the  Turks  had  no  big  guns 
on  the  spot,  and  the  fire  of  the  Asiatic  guns  was  to 
some  extent  checked  by  the  fleet,  the  remainder  of 
the  party  on  board  the  River  Clyde  were  comparatively 
secure.     The    heavy    loss    in    officers    included    the 
General    of    the    88th    Brigade,    as    we    have    seen, 
and    Colonel    Carrington    Smith,    commanding    that 
brigade's  Hampshire  Regiment,  both  killed.      During 
the    afternoon    and    evening   the    naval    boats    were 
constantly  engaged   in   removing  the  wounded  from 
the  River  Clyde  and  other  points  where  they  could 
be  reached.      In  this  duty  Commander  Unwin  again 
distinguished    himself,   going  along    the    shore   in    a 
lifeboat  and   rescuing  the  wounded  lying  in  shallow 
water,    under    persistent    fire   from    the    semicircular 
heights.     Throughout    the    day    and    far    into    the 
moonlit  night  the  Qtieen  Elizabeth,   Cornwallis,  and 
Albion  and  other  ships  maintained  a  heavy  bombard- 
ment, which  restrained  the  furious  Turkish  attempts 
at  counter-attack,  and  assisted  the  remainder  of  the 
covering   party    in    landing   from    the    River    Clyde 
under   the  comparative   darkness.      But  later   in   the 
night  the  noise  of  battle  was  renewed.     The  rattle  of 
machine-guns  and   rifies  spitting  out  flashes  of  fire, 
the  vibrating  boom  of  enormous  guns,   the  whirling 
roar  of  shells,  like  trains   rushing  headlong  down  a 


lOO  THE  I>ANDINGS 

tunnel  to  the  crash  of  collision,  allowed  no  rest  to  the 
wearied  men. 

At  V  Beach,  in  spite  of  the  incalculable  courage 
and  skill  of  the  Irish  Regulars  and  the  sailors  com- 
bined, the  landing  on  the  25th  had  failed.  At 
W  Beach,  not  much  more  than  half  a  mile  north- 
west, over  the  cliff  of  Cape  Helles  where  the  light- 
house and  Fort  I  had  stood,  the  English  covering 
party  displayed  equal  heroism  and  gained  greater 
success.  W  Beach  is  a  shallower  but  lono^er  arc  of 
sandy  shore,  curving  between  Cape  Helles  and  Cape 
Tekke,  the  two  extreme  points  of  the  Peninsula. 
Between  the  two  inaccessible  cliffs  and  the  fallen 
rocks  which  the  sea  washes,  a  gully  has  been  cut  by 
a  short  watercourse,  draining  the  extremity  of  the 
high  and  slightly  undulating  plateau  in  which  the 
Peninsula  ends.  Except  after  heavy  rains,  the  gully 
is  dry,  but  its  occasional  stream,  working  upon  the 
sandstone  formation,  and  aided  by  the  north-east 
wind  blowing  dust  over  the  plateau's  surface,  has 
piled  up  low  heaps  of  sand  dune,  at  that  time  covered 
with  bent-grass,  spring  flowers,  and  the  aromatic 
herbs  which  flourish  upon  the  dry  seacoasts  of  the 
Near  East.  Along  its  gentle  curve  the  actual  beach 
is  rather  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  length, 
and  its  broadest  part,  where  the  gully  runs  out,  is 
some  40  yards  across.  Hidden  in  the  shallows  a 
strong  wire  entanglement  had  been  laid,  and  another 
protected  the  whole  length  of  the  beach  from  end  to 
end  at  the  water's  edge.  To  check  communication 
with  V  Beach,  two  redoubts  had  been  constructed 
upon  the  plateau  south-east,  and  from  them  thick 
entanglements  ran  down  to  the  cliffs  edge  at  Cape 


W  BEACH  LANDING  loi 

Helles.  Other  entanglements  on  the  north-west  cut 
off  communication  with  the  more  distant  X  Beach. 
The  top  rows,  as  it  were,  of  the  theatre,  broken  near 
the  centre  of  the  gully,  were  strongly  entrenched ; 
machine-guns,  commanding  the  beach  by  converging 
fire,  were  lodged  in  caves  upon  the  cliffs  on  both 
sides ;  and  the  land  and  sea  were  planted  with  mines. 
In  his  dispatch,  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  justly  says  : 

"  So  strong,  in  fact,  were  the  defences  of 
W  Beach  that  the  Turks  may  well  have  considered 
them  impregnable,  and  it  is  my  firm  conviction  that 
no  finer  feat  of  arms  has  ever  been  achieved  by 
the  British  soldier — or  any  other  soldier — than  the 
storming  of  these  trenches  from  open  boats."  ^ 

These  unsurpassed  soldiers  were  men  of  the  ist 
Lancashire  Fusiliers  (86th  Brigade),  and,  in  their 
honour,  W  Beach  was  afterwards  generally  known 
as  "  Lancashire  Landing."  The  Euryalus  was  the 
guardian  ship  of  this  covering  party,  and  after  half 
an  hour's  naval  bombardment,  to  which  no  answer 
came,  eight  picket  boats  in  line  abreast,  towing  four 
cutters  apiece,  steamed  toward  the  shore  till  they 
reached  the  shallows,  and  the  tows  were  cast  off  to 
row  to  land.  As  at  V  Beach,  the  Turks  maintained 
their  silence  till  the  boats  grated.  Then,  in  an  in- 
stant, a  storm  of  lead  and  iron  swept  down  upon 
the  Lancashire  men.  Some  leapt  into  the  water, 
and  were  caught  by  the  hidden  entanglement  there. 
The  foremost  hurled  themselves  ashore,  and  struggled 
with  the  terrible  wire,  compared  with  which  our 
British  barbed  wire  is  as  cotton  to  rope.  In  vain 
the  first  line  hacked  and  tore.      Machines  and  rifles 

^  Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  first  dispatch,  "The  Gallipoli  Landing." 


102  THE  LANDINGS 

mowed  them  flat  as  with  a  scythe.  Witnesses  eagerly 
watching  from  the  distant  ships  asked  each  other, 
"  What  are  they  resting  for  ?  "     But  they  were  dead. 

Fortunately  two  of  the  tows,  carrying  a  company, 
with  which  was  General  S.  W.   Hare,   CO.  of  this 
86th  Brigade,  put  to  shore  a  little  to  the  left  of  the 
central  beach,   and  found   shelter  under  a   ledge   of 
rock  at  the  foot  of  Cape   Tekke  cliff.      Here  they 
escaped  the    cross-fire,  and  were  able  partly  to  en- 
filade the  enemy's  trenches.     The  Brigadier-General 
was  severely  wounded,  either  at  this  time  or  a  little 
later,  but  part  of  the  company  succeeded  in  scrambling 
up   the   rocks  in  front  of  them  to  the    summit,  and 
a  party  from  three  tows   to  the   right  of  the  beach 
were  equally  successful  upon  the  Cape   Helles  side.^ 
Meanwhile  the  covering  warships  had   moved  close 
in  to  bombard  the  trenches  along  the   edge  of  the 
summit,  and  the  beach   entanglements  were  at  last 
broken.     The  companies,  re-formed  under   cover  of 
the  cliffs  on  both  sides  of  the  beach,  chiefly  to  the 
left,  and  supported  by  the  arrival    of  further   tows, 
began    the    assault    on    the    highest    point    of    the 
plateau    above  the    bay   (known  as   Hill   138,   about 
the    spot    where    the    military    cemetery    was    after- 
wards laid  out).      In  the  centre  the  assault  was  made 
with    bayonets    only,  the    rifles   being   clogged    with 
sand.      By   11.30    three  trenches    had  been  taken — 
in  spite  of   the    explosion  of   many  land  mines — the 
point  was   occupied,   and  communication   established 

^  See  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett's  dispatches,  "  Seddel  Balir  Landing," 
p.  92.  Mr.  Bartlett  was  not  present,  being  at  the  Anzac  landing,  and 
Sir  lan's  dispatch  mentions  only  the  company  at  the  foot  of  Cape 
Tekke  on  the  left. 


THE  LANDING  EFFECTED  103 

with  the  landing-party  at  X  Beach,  to  be  afterwards 
described/ 

Similarly,  a  small  party  of  Lancashire  Fusiliers 
succeeded  in  scrambling  to  the  summit  on  the  right 
(Hill  141),  above  Cape  Helles,  but  were  there  held 
up  by  the  redoubts  and  entanglements,  and  there 
they  lost  Major  Frankland,  Brigade-Major  of  the 
86th.  No  further  advance  could  be  made  till 
2  p.m.,  when,  owing  to  the  positions  held  by  the 
companies  on  the  left,  the  landing  had  become  fairly 
secure.  Colonel  Woolly-Dod,  of  the  Divisional 
General  Staff,  then  took  the  place  of  General  Hare 
in    command,  and   the  Worcester  and   Essex    Regi- 

^  Excellent  personal  accounts  of  W  Beach  landing  by  three  ist 
Lancashire  officers  are  given  in  With  the  Twenty-ninth  Division, 
pp.  57-63.  It  is  hard  to  choose  between  the  three  ;  but  I  give  some 
sentences  from  Major  Adams,  who  had  been  twenty-five  years  in  the 
regiment,  and  was  killed  a  few  days  later,  as  were  the  other  two  :  "  As 
the  boats  touched  the  shore  a  very  heavy  and  brisk  fire  was  poured 
into  us,  several  officers  and  men  being  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
entanglements,  through  which  we  were  trying  to  cut  a  way.  Several 
of  my  company  were  with  me  under  the  wire,  one  of  my  subalterns  was 
killed  next  to  me,  and  also  the  wire-cutter  who  was  lying  the  other  side 
of  me.  I  seized  his  cutter  and  cut  a  small  lane  myself,  through  which 
a  few  of  us  broke  and  lined  up  under  the  only  available  cover  pro- 
curable— a  small  sand  ridge  covered  with  bluffs  of  grass.  I  then 
ordered  fire  to  be  opened  on  the  crests  ;  but  owing  to  submersion  in 
the  water  and  dragging  rifles  through  the  sand,  the  breech  mechanism 
was  clogged,  thereby  rendering  the  rifles  ineffective.  The  only  thing 
left  to  do  was  to  fix  bayonets  and  charge  up  the  crests,  which  was  done 
in  a  very  gallant  manner,  though  we  suffered  greatly  in  doing  so. 
However,  this  had  the  effect  of  driving  the  enemy  from  his  trenches, 
which  we  immediately  occupied.  ...  In  my  company  alone  I  had 
95  casualties  out  of  205  men." 

A  still  more  detailed  account  of  the  Lancashire  landing,  specially 
describing  the  services  of  Major  Frankland  (killed  while  trying  to  take 
assistance  to  V  Beach  about  8.30  a.m.)  and  of  Captains  Willis,  Shaw, 
Cunliffe,  and  Haworth,  is  given  in  an  additional  chapter  by  Major 
Farmar  (Lancashire  Fusiliers)  at  the  end  of  the  same  book,  pp.  175-191. 


I04  THE  LANDINGS 

ments  (88th  Brigade)  were  sent  to  reinforce  the 
covering  party.  Following  a  heavy  naval  bombard- 
ment the  Worcesters  advanced,  cut  passages  through 
the  entanglements,  and  after  two  hours'  contest 
captured  the  redoubt,  though  with  heavy  loss. 

An  attempt  was  then  made  to  relieve  the  terrible 
situation  at  V  Beach  by  advancing  along  the  top 
of  the  headland  north-east.  Lancashire  and  Royal 
Fusiliers  from  W  and  X  Beaches  came  over  in 
small  parties  to  assist  the  Worcesters.  The  dis- 
tance to  V  Beach  was  not  great — barely  half  a 
mile — and  if  it  could  have  been  covered,  the  enemy 
must  have  abandoned  their  V  Beach  trenches.  Wire- 
cutters  fearlessly  advanced.  From  headquarters  on 
the  Queen  Elizabeth  they  could  be  watched,  clipping 
the  powerful  entanglements  as  though  pruning  a 
garden  at  home.  But  the  rows  of  wire  were  too 
thick,  the  fire  from  the  ruins  of  No.  i  Fort  too 
deadly.  Exhausted  by  a  sleepless  night  and  the 
hot  day's  fighting,  these  bravest  of  men  abandoned 
the  attempt,  and  sought  rest  in  the  trenches  along 
the  summit  of  the  cliffs  now  deserted  by  the  enemy. 
Violent  counter-attacks  were  repeated  through  the 
night.  Except  the  Anson  Battalion  beach-party 
and  a  company  of  sappers,  there  were  no  available 
reserves.  But  the  lines  defendingr  W  Beach  were 
held,  and  the  landing  of  stores,  rations,  and  water 
in  kerosine  tins  (for  the  Divisional  supply  of  which 
General  Hunter- Weston's  Staff  had  provided)  began 
without  interruption.  Part  of  the  remainder  of  the 
division  also  disembarked,  and  the  sappers  set  to 
work  at  constructing  the  road  which  afterwards  wound 
up  the  dusty  ascent  from  the  beach  to  the  plateau. 


LANDING  AT  X  BEACH  105 

If  one  could  scramble  round  the  foot  of  Cape 
Tekke  till  the  face  of  the  cliff  looking  westward 
towards  the  ^gean  and  Gulf  of  Xeros  was  reached, 
rather  over  half  a  mile  along  the  sea-washed  rocks, 
one  would  come  to  a  narrow  strip  of  sand  about 
200  yards  long.  The  cliff  above  it  is  lower  and 
less  steep,  the  surface  soft  and  crumbling.  This  is 
X  Beach,  to  be  known  afterwards  as  "  Implacable 
Landing,"  owing  to  the  fine  service  of  the  guardian 
battleship  Implacable  (15,000  tons,  1901  ;  Captain 
Lockyer).  Here  half  the  battalion  of  the  2nd  Royal 
Fusiliers  was  disembarked  from  the  Implacable  in 
four  tows  of  six  boats  each,  the  battleship  advancing 
in  the  centre  of  them  with  anchor  hanging  over  the 
bows  to  six  fathoms,  when  it  dragged.  Captain 
Lockyer  opened  fire  upon  the  slope  and  summit  of 
the  cliffs  at  very  short  range  with  every  available 
gun,  and  under  this  protection  the  half-battalion 
landed  with  small  loss.  Using  the  same  tows 
as  they  returned  empty,  the  second  half-battalion 
followed  from  two  mine-sweepers.  But  the  advanced 
party  were  already  swarming  up  the  face  of  the  cliffs 
under  Lieut.-Colonel  Newenham  (CO.  2nd  Royal 
Fusiliers).  At  the  summit  the  fire  from  rifies, 
machine-guns,  and  shrapnel  was  very  heavy.  Se- 
curing his  left  with  one  company,  and  the  front  with 
part  of  another,  and  leaving  one  company  to  bring 
up  ammunition  and  water.  Colonel  Newenham  pro- 
ceeded to  effect  communication  with  the  Lancashire 
Fusiliers  on  W  Beach.  This  was  accomplished  by 
a  violent  bayonet  attack  up  the  height  on  the  top 
of  Cape  Tekke  (Hill  114).  In  this  attack  the  re- 
mainder of  the  battalion   was   engaged,   encouraged 


io6  THE  LANDINGS 

by  cheers  from  the  Implacable^  so  close  to  shore  had 
the  ship  put  in.  After  heavy  loss,  the  summit  was 
taken  about  noon,  and  Royal  Fusiliers  shared  with 
the  W  Beach  troops  in  the  endeavour  to  relieve 
\'  Beach.  But  meantime  the  centre  above  X  Beach 
was  severely  threatened ;  Colonel  Xewenham  was 
wounded  :  and  the  situation  was  onh*  saved  by  the 
arrival  of  the  ist  Borderers  and  the  ist  Inniskilling 
Fusiliers  of  the  8 7th  Brigade,  whose  Brigadier, 
General  Marshall,  had  also  been  w^ounded.^ 

Rather  less  than  a  mile  farther  up  the  coast  from 
X  Beach  one  comes  to  a  wide  opening  in  the  cliffs, 
known  at  that  time  as  Y2,  and  later  as  Gully  Beach. 
Along  the  shore  it  could  be  reached  by  climbing 
over  rocks,  but  there  was  then  no  path.  Along  the 
summit  it  was  easily  reached  by  the  usual  Turkish 
tracks  from  the  high  ground  at  Cape  Helles  and  Cape 
Tekke.  but  these  tracks,  like  the  rest  of  the  Peninsula 
inland,  were  hidden  from  the  sea  by  the  slope  of  the 
ground  from  the  edge  towards  the  centre.  The 
opening  is  caused  partly  by  a  short  gully  running 
from  the  summit  almost  at  right  angles  to  the  beach, 
but  especially  by  a  long,  deep  gully,  or  "canon," 
coming  down  from  the  Krithia  direction,  and  running 
for  about  three  miles  almost  parallel  with  the  sea. 
from  which  its  existence  is  entirely  concealed.  In 
dry  weather  it  shows  a  trickle  of  .water  in  some 
places  ;  after  rain  it  becomes  the  bed  of  a  torrent 
or  a  channel  of  liquid  mud.  Owing  to  our  want  of 
trustworthy  maps,  its  course  was  at  that  time  un- 
known, but  it  came  to  be  called  the  Gully  Ravine,  or 

*  Beside  Sir  lan's  dispatch,  see  Colonel  Nevrenham's  own  account 
in  With  tJu  Twenty-ninth  Division^  pp.  55-57. 


Y2  AND  Y  BEACHES  107 

the  Gully  simply  (in  Turkish,  Saghir  Dere).  Its 
depth  might  conceal  an  army  in  ambush,  and  its  issue 
upon  the  shore  forms  a  broad,  fiat  beach,  commanded 
by  heights  in  a  semicircle  fronting  the  sea.  Here  the 
Turks  had  massed  large  forces  of  infantry,  deeply 
entrenched,  and  supported  by  machine  and  Hotchkiss 
guns.  Formidable  as  the  position  was,  it  could 
hardly  have  been  stronger  than  V  or  W  Beach,  and 
one  may  conclude  it  was  refused  by  the  General  in 
command  mainly  for  want  of  men  to  storm  another 
point  at  which  the  enemy  would  naturally  expect 
attack.  Perhaps  also  he  considered  the  position  not 
far  enough  removed  from  Helles  to  turn  the  defences 
there  and  threaten  the  line  of  retreat. 

About  two  miles  farther  up  the  coast  there  is 
another  beach  known  to  the  end  of  the  campaign  as 
Y.  The  navy  put  it  at  7000  yards  from  Cape  Tekke. 
So  small  is  it,  and  the  cleft  or  dry  waterfall  which 
forms  it  so  steep  and  narrow,  that  the  Turks  had 
neglected  the  position  as  unassailable.  Nevertheless, 
lying  south-west  from  Krithia  village,  and  about  four 
miles  from  Cape  Helles,  it  was  chosen  as  a  protection 
to  our  left  flank  and  a  threat  to  the  enemy's  line 
of  communication,  or  of  retreat  in  the  event  of  his 
withdrawal  from  the  end  of  the  Peninsula.  It  was 
intended  to  serve  the  same  purpose  as  De  Tott's 
Battery  (Eski  Hissarlik)  upon  our  extreme  right,  and, 
if  it  were  securely  held,  its  value  was  obvious. 

The  1st  King's  Own  Scottish  Borderers  and  one 
company  of  the  South  Wales  Borderers  had  been 
detailed  for  this  service,  but  the  Commander-in-Chief 
added  the  Plymouth  (Marine)  Battalion,  R.N.D.,  on 
account  of  the  importance  of  the  position,  or  because 


io8  THE  LANDINGS 

the  landing-party  was  beyond  reach  of  reinforcement. 
The  Goliath^  Sapphire,  and  Amethyst  were  the  con- 
ducting ships,  and  at  the  first  Hght  the  troops  were 
put  ashore  by  trawlers  with  four  tows.  They  had  to 
leap  out  into  deep  water  owing  to  reefs,  but  reached 
the  shore  without  opposition,  and  at  once  climbed  the 
precipitous  watercourse  and  cliffs  on  each  side.  The 
battleship  Goliath  shelled  the  summit,  perhaps  un- 
fortunately, for  the  party's  presence  was  thus  disclosed. 
Turkish  snipers  immediately  set  to  work,  and  the  fire 
became  more  and  more  searching  as  the  day  went  on. 
Still  there  was  no  organised  attack,  and  the  men  dug 
shallow  and  far-extended  trenches  along  the  summit 
on  both  sides  of  the  deep  ravine,  the  Marine  Battalion 
on  the  left,  the  K.O.S.B.  in  the  centre,  the  S.W. 
Borderers  on  the  right.  Colonel  Matthews  of  the 
Plymouth  Battalion  was  in  command  throughout,  but 
his  second  in  command.  Colonel  Koe  (K.O.S.B.),  was 
mortally  wounded  early  in  the  day.  It  was  impossible 
to  fulfil  Staff  orders  by  gaining  touch  with  X  Beach, 
because  communication  was  shut  off  by  the  powerful 
Turkish  force  at  Y2 — a  misfortune  which  might  have 
been  foreseen.  During  the  afternoon,  the  sniping 
developed  into  assault.  Turks  were  seen  swarming 
out  from  Krithia,  and  others  probably  came  up  from 
Y2  along  the  Gully  Ravine  (Saghir  Dere),  which  at 
this  point  is  only  a  short  distance  away,  and  was 
hitherto  unknown  to  our  men. 

At  twilight  the  repeated  assaults  increased  in 
violence.  Under  the  rising  moon,  line  after  line  of 
Turks  advanced,  at  some  points  reaching  the  trenches 
before  they  were  cut  down.  Sir  Ian  mentions 
a    pony    led    right    through    the    trenches    with    a 


THE  FAILURE  AT  Y  BEACH  109 

machine-gun  on  his  back,  and  an  eye-witness  saw  a 
German  officer  killed  by  a  blow  from  a  shovel  as, 
with  grenade  in  hand,  he  called  upon  a  trench  to 
surrender.  All  night  the  savage  conflict  continued, 
the  Turks  charging  with  religious  courage,  our  men 
driving  them  back  with  the  bayonet  when  the  rifles 
became  foul  and  choked  with  dirt.  But  just  before 
daylight  the  shrapnel  terrifically  increased,  the  Turks 
swarmed  round  in  irresistible  crowds,  the  centre  of 
the  K.O.S.B.  trenches  was  rushed,  and  the  men 
driven  headlong  down  the  gorge.  Only  those  who 
know  the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  cliffs  some  200 
feet  high,  and  the  depth  of  the  ravine,  half  hidden  by 
thick  and  prickly  scrub,  can  realise  the  horror  of  that 
scene,  or  the  superb  devotion  of  those  who  still 
remained  to  hold  the  summit  while  the  wounded  were 
being  carried  on  waterproof  sheets  (without  stretchers) 
down  to  the  beach.  More  than  half  the  officers  and 
nearly  half  the  men  were  killed  or  wounded.  By 
morning  it  had  become  impossible  to  cling  any  longer 
to  the  position.  Protected  by  a  small  and  heroic 
rearguard,  and  by  the  heavy  fire  of  the  ships  Goliath, 
Talbot,  Dublin,  Sapphire,  and  Amethyst,  the  wounded, 
the  stores,  and  the  survivors  of  the  two  battalions  and 
the  S.W.  Borderers  ;  company  were  taken  off  by  the 
boats  and  returned  in  the  early  afternoon  on  the  war- 
ships to  the  southern  end  of  the  Peninsula.  In  spite 
of  the  heroism  displayed,  and  in  spite  of  the  service 
in  holding  up  a  large  Turkish  force  for  the  critical 
twenty-four  hours,  the  effort  at  Y  Beach  failed,  and 
the  failure  was  serious. 

About  nine  miles   from    Y    Beach  farther   north 
along  the  coast,  the  snub-nosed  promontory  of  Gaba 


no  THE  LANDINGS 

Tepe  suddenly  projects.  It  is  of  no  great  height — 
just  under  loo  feet — but  deep  water  washes  the  foot 
of  the  steep  and  rugged  cliffs,  its  caves  and  artificial 
tunnels  concealed  guns  which  no  shell  could  touch, 
and  from  those  caves  and  tunnels  nearly  the  whole 
coast  north  and  south  could  be  enfiladed.  North,  the 
coast  falls  into  an  open,  gently  sloping  shore  of  quiet 
meadows  and  scattered  olive  groves,  crossed  by  a 
track  to  the  Old  Village  (Eski  Keui)  in  the  centre  of 
the  Peninsula,  and  so  to  Maidos  on  the  strait.  Next 
to  Bulair,  this  is  the  shortest  way  over,  for  it 
measures  less  than  five  miles  in  a  straight  line.  But 
on  the  right  stands  the  threatening  plateau  of  Kilid 
Bahr,  strongly  held,  and  forming  a  central  base  for 
the  enemy's  army,  and  on  the  left  rise  the  heights  of 
Sari  Bair,  intersected  by  inextricable  entanglements 
of  gully  and  ravine.  At  the  northern  end  of  that 
gentle  slope,  rising  like  the  fields  around  a  Lowland 
loch,  just  where  the  cliffs  begin  again,  the  main  land- 
ing of  the  Anzac  corps  was  intended.  Remembering 
the  V  and  W  Beaches,  no  one  can  call  any  position 
impregnable  to  such  men  as  ours  ;  but  the  spot  was 
thickly  wired  from  the  water's  edge ;  it  was  fully 
exposed  to  the  guns  hidden  on  Gaba  Tepe,  in  an 
olive  grove  farther  inland,  and  on  Kilid  Bahr  plateau 
itself;  to  advance  over  the  gradual  slope  would  have 
meant  advancing  up  an  unsheltered  glacis  crossed 
by  almost  impenetrable  obstacles,  in  the  face  of 
entrenched  and  invisible  machine-guns  and  rifles.  It 
was  fortunate  that  man's  proposals  here  went  astray. 

The  object  of  the  Anzac  landing  was  to  detain  the 
Turkish  forces  on  Kilid  Bahr  plateau,  to  check  the 
reinforcement  of  the  southern  Peninsula  by  them  or 


THE  ANZAC  ORDERS  iii 

by  other  troops  from  the  Bulair  district,  and  to 
threaten  the  Turkish  Hne  of  retreat.  The  enemy's 
forces  in  these  central  regions  were  vaguely  estimated  at 
about  20,000  ;  but  reconnaissance  had  been  impossible, 
the  country  was  unknown,  except  in  so  far  as  it  can 
be  surveyed  from  the  sea,  and  hitherto  the  Staff  had 
no  maps  even  fairly  trustworthy,  as  the  maps  after- 
wards found  on  the  bodies  of  Turkish  officers  were. 
The  landing  was  officially  called  Z  Beach,  but  was 
always  known  as  "  Anzac,"  and  so  history  will  know  it. 
As  already  stated,  the  covering  force  consisted  of  the  3rd 
Australian  Brig-ade  under  Colonel  Sinclair  Maclaoran. 
It  was  conveyed  in  four  transports,  but  the  first 
landing-party  (about  1500  men)  had  been  transferred 
at  Mudros  to  the  warships  Q^ieen  (Admiral  Thursby's 
flagship),  the  London,  and  the  Prince  of  Wales. 
Twelve  tows  were  provided,  each  consisting  of  a 
steam  pinnace  and  a  trail  of  four  cutters  or  "life- 
boats," and  carrying  about  125  men,^  As  soon  as 
the  first  party  had  started  in  the  tows,  the  remainder 
of  the  covering  party  was  to  tranship  from  the  trans- 
ports into  eight  destroyers,  and  to  follow  slowly 
towards  shore  until  taken  off  by  the  returning  tows, 
three  tows  being  allotted  to  each  pair  of  destroyers. 
When  the  coverings  brig"ade  had  made  sure  of  the 
landing,  the  transports  of  the  whole  army  corps  were 
to  close  in  to  shore  and  disembark.  The  Triumph,  the 
Majestic,  and  the  cruiser  Bacchante  were  to  cover  the 
landing  by  gun-fire.  As  throughout  the  expedition, 
the  entire  organisation  on  the  water  was  directed  by 
the    navy,    and  the  boats   were  commanded  by  boy 

^  Authorities  differ  widely  as  to  the  number  of  boats  to  each  tow, 
but  four  appears  to  be  right,  though  six  was  more  usual. 


112  THE  LANDINGS 

midshipmen,  whose  imperturbable  calm  in  moments 
of  extreme  peril  was,  from  beginning  to  end,  and  at 
every  crisis,  only  rivalled  by  the  dogged  heroism  of 
their  crews. 

The  whole  force  assembled  at  a  point  about  half- 
way between  Imbros  and  the  intended  landing.  It 
was  1.30  a.m.  of  the  25th.  The  smoke  rising  against 
the  westering  moon  probably  betrayed  their  presence, 
but  they  waited  till  the  moon  set  behind  the  jagged 
mountains  of  Imbros  soon  after  three.  As  directed, 
the  first  tows  were  then  manned,  and  the  three  war- 
ships moved  abreast  slowly  towards  the  shore, 
followed  by  the  trailing  boats.  At  4.10  a.m.  they 
stopped,  within  about  one  and  a  quarter  mile  of  shore, 
and  the  tows  moved  slowly  forward,  the  destroyers 
following  them  at  about  half  an  hour's  interval. 
Probably  it  was  in  that  interval  that  the  salutary 
mistake  occurred.  Whether  misled  by  ignorance  of 
the  coast  and  by  the  starlit  darkness,  or  carried 
unconsciously  by  a  current  which  sets  along  shore 
towards  the  Gulf  of  Xeros,  the  tows  approached  land 
rather  more  than  a  mile  north  of  the  appointed  land- 
ing. The  beach  to  which  they  made  is  a  shallow 
arc  of  sand  stretching  for  about  half  a  mile  between 
two  small  projections  in  the  coast-line — Ari  Burnu 
to  the  north,  and  what  the  Australians  called  Hell 
Spit  to  the  south.  One  deep  ravine,  starting  from 
an  almost  precipitous  cliff  (to  be  known  as  *'  Plugge's 
Plateau")  divides  the  arc  near  the  northern  extremity 
at  right  angles  to  the  shore  ;  but  confusedly  broken 
and  steep,  though  not  absolutely  precipitous,  ground 
rises  all  around  the  cove — "  Anzac  Cove  " — to  a 
general    height   of    over  200    feet.      Wherever  the 


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POSITION   AT   ANZAC    IN   THE    WEEKS    FOLLOWING    LANDING 
To  face  p.   112 


THE  ANZAC  LANDING  113 

ground — a  mixture  of  soft  sandstone  and  marl — was 
not  too  steep  for  vegetation,  it  was  then  covered 
with  thick  green  or  blackish  scrub,  chiefly  prickly  oak, 
difficult  to  penetrate,  and  in  places  six  feet  high.  In 
later  months  the  scrub  served  as  a  danger  signal,  for 
the  spots  where  it  remained  were  exposed  to  rifle  or 
shell-fire.  Everywhere  else  it  disappeared,  leaving 
the  yellow  surface  bare. 

The  tows  approached  the  beach  in  absolute 
silence.  Trusting  to  the  cliffs,  the  Turks  had 
neglected  defence  at  this  point,  but  for  two  slight 
trenches — one  close  to  the  water's  edge,  the  second 
a  little  up  the  height.  Even  these  seem  to  have  been 
left  unmanned,  for  about  a  battalion  of  Turks  was 
dimly  perceived  running  along  the  shore,  no  doubt 
hurried  up  from  the  open  ground  where  our  landing 
had  been  intended.  Just  before  5  a.m.  they  opened 
fire,  and  many  of  the  soldiers  and  crews  were  struck 
in  the  boats.  The  Australians  made  no  answer,  but 
before  the  keels  grated,  leapt  into  water  up  to  their 
chests,  and  surged  ashore.  Throwing  off  their  packs, 
they  dashed  straight  with  the  bayonet  upon  the  enemy 
wherever  they  could  see  him.  The  two  trenches 
were  carried  with  a  rush,  and  still  the  men  charged 
on.  They  began  to  struggle  up  the  gully  and  the 
steep  ascent  on  its  right  (afterwards  called  Maclagan's 
Ridge).  The  tows  returned  for  the  remainder  of  the 
brigade  on  the  destroyers,  and  these  men  joined  in  the 
rush  and  scramble.  Some  of  the  tows  crossed  each 
other,  and  added  to  the  excited  confusion.  Some, 
either  for  want  of  space  or  yielding  to  the  current, 
passed  north  of  Ari  Burnu  and  attempted  a  landing 
on   the   broad   and   open   beach    beside    fishermen's 


114  THE  LANDINGS 

huts,  standing  almost  in  front  of  the  perpendicular 
and  strangely  shaped  cliff  afterwards  called  "The 
Sphinx."  Here  they  suffered  terrible  loss  from  rifles 
and  machine-guns  ;  for  this  beach,  gradually  broaden- 
ing out  till  it  merges  into  the  open,  marshy  plain 
at  the  mouth  of  Anafarta  Biyuk  valley,  extends 
to  Suvla  and  the  Salt  Lake,  and  the  Turks  were 
here  prepared  to  oppose  a  landing,  A  few  of  the 
boats  went  adrift,  having  no  men  left  to  control  them. 
One  at  least  swayed  with  the  current,  full  of  dead. 
Several  had  to  be  left  for  some  days  aground  against 
the  beach,  full  also  of  dead. 

Crossing  the  top  of  Maclagan's  Ridge,  the  scattered 
groups  of  the  3rd  Brigade  suddenly  looked  down 
into  a  deep  valley  running  right  across  their  advance. 
It  was  the  hidden  valley  afterwards  known  as 
Shrapnel  Gully.  From  its  issue  upon  the  beach  just 
south  of  Hell  Spit,  it  runs  up  north-east  for  some- 
thing over  a  mile  through  the  very  heart  of  the 
subsequent  position.  Many  gullies  and  small  water- 
courses (all  dry  except  after  heavy  rain)  lead  into  it, 
and  it  afterwards  became  the  chief  means  of  com- 
munication with  the  outposts  along  the  centre  of  the 
Anzac  lines.  Down  into  this  valley  the  3rd  Brigade 
plunged.  The  thick  bushes  and  devious  watercourses 
split  them  up.  Battalions  and  companies  lost  touch 
in  haphazard  advance.  Shrapnel  from  the  opposite 
height  and  both  flanks  swept  the  valley  in  bursting 
storms.  From  the  rear  and  every  side,  hidden 
snipers  picked  the  isolated  men  off"  as  they  struggled 
forward.  Officers  fell.  Orders  ceased.  In  separate 
knots,  without  leading  or  control,  the  men  ran,  and 
leapt,  and  stumbled  on.     Right  across  the  valley  they 


THE  ANZAC  ADVANCE  115 

struggled,  shouting  their  battle-song,  "  Australia  will 
be  there,"  bayoneting  all  Turks  they  caught,  and 
cursing  as  they  fell.  Up  the  opposing  heights  they 
climbed — heights  so  steep  on  the  face  that,  later  in 
the  campaign,  steps  had  to  be  cut  for  paths,  and 
supplies  were  hauled  up  by  pullies.  Over  the  top  of 
that  steep  ridge  the  groups  charged  on.  Many  got 
farther  than  Anzacs  were  ever  to  go  again.  Some 
looked  down  into  the  valleys  where  the  nearest 
Turkish  camps  of  Koja  Dere  and  Boghali  stood. 
Many  disappeared  for  ever  into  the  unknown 
wilderness.  "  They  refused  to  surrender,"  the  Turks 
said  at  the  armistice  of  a  month  later — "they  refused 
to  surrender,  so  we  had  to  kill  them  all." 

In  a  contest  of  such  confusion,  the  thought  of  time 
is  lost,  and  it  becomes  impossible  to  trace  the  course 
of  consecutive  events.  But  early  in  the  morning — 
some  say  at  5.30,  others  about  9.30 — there  was  a 
pause  in  the  firing  for  about  an  hour.  The  Turks 
appear  to  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  dash  and 
violence  of  an  assault  such  as  that  leisurely  and 
dreamy  race  had  never  imagined.  It  seems  to  have 
been  about  this  time  that  Major  Brand  (Brigade- 
Major  of  the  3rd  Brigade)  with  a  party  of  the  9th 
(Queensland)  and  loth  (South  Australian)  battalions, 
standing  on  one  of  the  sharp  crests,  and  seeing  a 
redoubt  and  earthworks  upon  a  hillside  below, 
charged  down  the  valley  and  captured  a  battery  of 
three  Krupp  guns.  The  Turks,  after  the  pause,  were 
then  advancing  to  their  first  counter-attack,  and  the 
Australians  were  compelled  to  spike  and  destroy  the 
guns  instead  of  getting  them  away.  But  it  was  a 
serviceable  deed. 


ii6  THE  LANDINGS 

So  soon  as  it  was  light,  the  guns  hidden  on  Gaba 
Tepe  and  hidden  guns  on  some  hill  to  the  north 
poured  converging  shrapnel  upon  the  boats  coming 
to  shore,  and  upon  the  beach  itself,  although  it  was 
to  some  extent  protected  by  Hell  Spit  and  Ari  Burnu. 
The  Triumph  and  Bacchaitte  succeeded  in  keeping 
down  the  fire  from  Gaba  Tepe  at  intervals,  but  it 
repeatedly  burst  out  again  with  fury.  Under  this 
recurrent  storm  of  shell,  the  ist  (New  South  Wales) 
and  the  2nd  (Victoria)  Brigades,  closely  followed  by 
two  brigades  of  the  New  Zealand  and  Australian 
Division  (the  New  Zealand  and  the  4th  Australian), 
put  to  shore.  All  had  landed  soon  after  midday,  and 
two  batteries  of  Indian  mountain  guns  came  into 
action.  But  the  losses  were  severe,  and  the  shelling 
so  heavy  that  the  remaining  artillery  could  not  be 
landed.  In  the  extremity  of  peril  and  excitement, 
battalions  and  brigades  became  hopelessly  mixed  up, 
and  many  groups  lost  touch  with  units  and  officers. 
But  for  the  most  part,  the  2nd  Brigade  appears  to 
have  climbed  to  the  right  of  the  3rd  or  covering 
brigade,  to  have  crossed  the  long  (Shrapnel)  gully 
nearer  its  mouth,  and  to  have  advanced  up  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  farther  ridge  towards  the  point 
afterwards  called  M'Laurin  Hill  (Colonel  M'Laurin 
being  CO.  of  the  Victorians).  The  ist  Brigade 
appears  to  have  supported  the  3rd,  and  held  a  position 
on  its  left,  probably  near  "  Pope's  Hill."  The  ex- 
treme left  of  the  whole  position,  which  gradually  took 
the  shape  of  an  irregular  semicircle  or  triangle,  was 
later  occupied  and  held  by  the  joint  Division  of 
New  Zealanders  and  Australians.  Near  the  centre 
the  Auckland  Battalion  under  Colonel  Plugge  held 


THE  ANZAC  POSITIONS  117 

"  Plugge's  Plateau,"  overlooking  the  beach.  To  the 
left,  the  New  Zealanders  stormed  the  steep  ridge 
afterwards  known  as  "  Walker's,"  from  Brigadier- 
General  H.  B.  Walker,  of  the  General  Staff.  Just 
beyond  "  The  Sphinx  "  it  rises  steeply  from  the  beach 
to  a  height  which  faces  the  sea  in  a  sheer  precipice  of 
150  feet,  and  its  long  summit  became  the  main  line 
of  defence  on  the  north  and  north-east.  Moving  still 
farther  left,  over  a  broad  beach  ("Ocean  Beach") 
and  fairly  open  ground,  afterwards  crossed  by  the 
"Great  Sap,"  Captain  Cribb  with  a  party  of  New 
Zealanders  rushed  a  strong  redoubt  and  store  at  the 
"Fishermen's  Huts"  and  established  the  outlying 
position  of  "  No.  i  Post." 

In  the  afternoon  and  early  evening,  the  4th 
Australian  Brigade  (2nd  Division)  under  Colonel 
Monash,  apparently  advancing  from  the  beach  straight 
across  the  central  ridge,  filled  in  the  dangerous  gaps 
between  the  Australian  brigades  on  the  right  and 
the  New  Zealanders  on  the  left.  The  upper  end  of 
"Shrapnel  Gully,"  leading  up  to  "Pope's  Hill" 
between  "  Walker's  Ridge "  and  the  steep  farthest 
line  of  defence  afterwards  held  by  "  Quinn's  Post," 
"Courtney's"  and  "Steel's,"  was  accordingly  known 
as  "  Monash  Gully." 

By  the  evening  the  Anzac  position,  which  varied 
little  for  the  next  three  months,  was  thus  roughly 
drawn,  and  the  names  of  the  officers  who  had  seized 
the  various  points  were  vaguely  attached  to  them. 
The  whole  position  was  hardly  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  deep  by  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  not 
counting  the  outpost  by  Fishermen's  Huts.  In  fact, 
on  the  first  day  hardly  more  than  a  mile  in  length 


ii8  THE  LANDINGS 

was  gained.  But  to  the  end  it  was  almost  impossible 
to  realise  how  small  the  area  was,  so  steep  are  its 
heights  and  so  entangling  its  valleys  and  ravines. 
Entangled  in  those  ravines,  exhausted  by  scaling  the 
heights,  and  lost  in  the  deep  scrub  of  that  unknown 
country,  the  Anzacs  fought  till  dark  to  maintain  their 
plot  of  ground  against  repeated  counter-attacks. 
There  was  no  time  to  dig  in.  From  Koja  Dere, 
Boghali,  and  Kilid  Bahr  plateau,  the  Turks  rolled  up 
waves  of  reinforcement.  It  was  estimated  that  20,000 
came  clashing  against  the  3rd  Brigade  and  the  left 
of  the  2nd  in  the  middle  morning.  The  attack 
was  renewed  at  3  p.m.  and  again  at  5.  Groups  of 
Australians  were  driven  back  from  the  most  advanced 
positions  ;  many  were  cut  off  and  shot  down.  Only 
along  the  edge  of  the  heights  beyond  Shrapnel  Valley 
a  thin  line  held,  growing  hourly  thinner. 

In  the  afternoon.  General  Birdwood  came  ashore 
with  the  Divisional  Generals.  The  beach  was  a 
scene  of  wild  and  perilous  confusion.  Men,  stores, 
ammunition,  and  watercans  were  being  dumped  on 
the  sand  as  the  boats  brought  them  in.  Parties 
loaded  up  with  rations,  water,  and  cartridges  were 
climbing  out  to  supply  the  firing  lines.  In  long 
streams  the  wounded  were  staaorerinCT  or  beinCT  carried 

000  o 

down  to  lie  on  the  beach  till  boats  could  take  them 
off,  at  first  to  hospital  ships,  and  afterwards  to  any 
kind  of  ship  which  the  navy  could  allot.  For  here, 
as  elsewhere,  the  casualties  had  been  greatly  under- 
estimated. Originally  only  two  hospital  ships  had 
been  provided  for  the  whole  attack,  and  though  the 
navy  lent  two  more,  the  supply  was  not  nearly  ade- 
quate.    On  the  small  beach,  Colonel  N.  R.  Howse 


THE  FEINT  OFF  BULAIR  119 

(Assistant  Director  of  Medical  Service  to  the  Corps) 
hurriedly  erected  a  dressing-station  ;  but  the  wounded, 
however  heroic  in  their  suffering,  suffered  much. 
And  over  the  whole  scene,  shrapnel  crashed  and 
shrieked  perpetually,  while  the  air  was  filled  with  the 
tearing  wail  of  bullets  passing  in  thousands  across  the 
beach  from  the  cliffs  above,  and  dropping  like  hail- 
stones upon  the  boats  and  sea.  At  nightfall  the 
Turks,  shouting  their  batde-cry  of  "  Allah,  Allah 
Din  !  "  renewed  the  attack  with  intensified  violence. 
Appeals  for  reinforcement  came  pouring  in.  It 
seemed  impossible  to  hold  on.  Orders  to  prepare  for 
evacuation  were  whispered  from  group  to  group. ^ 

Still  farther  up  the  coast,  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf 
of  Xeros,  the  Royal  Naval  Division  (less  the  Ply- 
mouth Battalion  detailed  for  Y  Beach)  was  engaged 
upon  a  feint,  as  though  a  landing  were  intended 
either  north  of  the  Bulair  lines,  or  at  Karachali  on 
the  opposite  coast.  Accompanied  by  destroyers  and 
the  battleship  Canopus  (Captain  Grant)  of  Admiral 
Thursby's  squadron,  the  division  proceeded  in  its 
own  transports.  The  destroyers  opened  fire  at 
Karachali  and  other  points  along  the  shore.  Towards 
nightfall  the  Canoptis  bombarded  the  Bulair  lines,  and 
preparations  as  though  for  a  landing  were  ostensibly 
made.     There  was  no  answer  from  the  enemy,  but 

^  During  the  Anzac  landing,  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett  was  in  the 
London,  and  his  account  was  unusually  brilliant,  even  for  that  brilliant 
writer.  Besides  that  and  Sirlan's  dispatch,  the  best  published  account 
is  in  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  94-114.  Mr.  Schuler  was  not  present,  but 
he  had  the  advantage  of  going  over  the  ground  and  discussing  the 
action  thoroughly.  I  had  the  same  advantages,  especially  owing  to 
the  generous  assistance  of  the  Anzac  correspondents.  Captain  Bean  and 
Mr,  Malcolm  Ross. 


I20  THE  LANDINGS 

silence  never  proved  that  their  trenches  were  not 
manned,  and  their  guns  ready.  Later  in  the  campaign 
one  heard  rumours  of  a  landing  having  been  effected 
here  without  opposition  by  a  party  of  Marines,  but 
the  only  man  who  went  ashore  was  Lieut. -Commander 
Bernard  Freyberg  of  the  Hood  Battalion.  Painted 
brown  and  thickly  oiled,  he  was  dropped  from  a 
destroyer  into  a  boat  at  lo  p.m.  on  the  24th  and  from 
the  boat  swam  ashore,  about  two  miles,  carrying  four 
Homi  flares  and  three  oil  flares.  Landing  at  mid- 
night, he  crawled  400  yards  up  to  a  trench,  and  there 
heard  talking,  which  proved  that  the  trenches  were 
occupied.  Crawling  back,  he  lit  three  lots  of  flares  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  apart,  along  the  shore  in  the  direction 
of  Bulair.  Two  of  the  destroyers  at  once  opened  fire, 
and  the  Turks  fired  back.  Lieut.-Commander  Frey- 
berg then  swam  out,  and  was  picked  up  an  hour  later. 

During  the    night  the   Canopus   was   recalled   to 
Anzac  to  support  the  dubious  contest  there. 

Another  feint,  on  a  much  larger  scale,  was  made 
by  the  French  Division  upon  the  Asiatic  entrance  to 
the  Straits.  The  object  was  partly  to  hold  a  Turkish 
force,  partly  to  check  the  fire  from  the  Asiatic  side 
upon  the  S  and  V  landings.  For  this  purpose, 
General  D'Amade  selected  the  6th  Regiment  (Lieut.- 
Colonel  Nogues),  mixed  Senegalese  and  Lyons  men, 
of  the  Brigade  Coloniale,  supported  by  the  Jeanne 
d' Arc  and  the  Russian  cruiser  Askold  (called  the 
"  Woodbines,"  because  she  has  five  thin  funnels  close 
together,  like  the  five  cigarettes  in  a  penny  "  Wood- 
bine "  packet).  At  the  same  time,  the  remainder  of 
the  French  squadron  was  ordered  to  Besika  Bay,  five 
or  six  miles  south  of  the  point.     Landing  from  the 


THE  FRENCH  FEINT  AT  KUM  KALI         121 

boats  of  their  own  transports,  the  infantry  captured 
Kum  Kali  and  Yenishehr  villages  after  severe  fiohtinof, 
taking  about  600  prisoners.  I  n  spite  of  violent  counter- 
attacks, they  held  on  through  that  night  and  the 
following  day,  not  advancing  farther  along  the  coast 
than  the  mouth  of  the  Mendere,  but  drawing  the  fire 
of  the  Asiatic  guns,  and  thus  defending  both  our 
transports  and  landings.  The  action  was  in  every 
respect  successful,  but  the  regiment  was  re-embarked 
after  nightfall  on  the  26th  in  accordance  with  pre- 
arranged plans,  since  Lord  Kitchener  had  forbidden 
Asiatic  adventures.  The  French  lost  167  killed, 
459  wounded,  and  116  missing.  They  put  the 
Turkish  casualties  at  2000,  apart  from  prisoners.-^ 

When  night  came,  the  small  force  at  De  Tott's 
Battery  (E ski  Hissarlik)  was  fairly  secure  ;  the  land- 
ing at  V  Beach  had  failed,  and  the  few  survivors 
ashore  were  barely  sheltered  from  extreme  peril  by 
the  low  bank  of  sand  ;  W  Beach  was  held,  but  the 
partially  entrenched  troops  on  the  plateau  which  pro- 
tected it  were  exposed  to  repeated  attack  ;  X  Beach 
was  comparatively  safe,  owing  to  dead  ground  and 
the  Implacable  s  guns,  and  connection  with  W  had 
been  established ;  in  shallow  trenches  above  the 
ravine  on  Y  Beach  the  diminishing  companies  des- 
perately clung  to  the  ground,  but  were  exposed  to 
irresistible  numbers ;  at  Z  Beach  (Anzac)  the  cove 
and  a  rough  triangle  of  unexplored  cliffs  and  ravines 
were  barely  held  against  persistent  onsets  ;  near 
Bulair  the  feint  was  probably  successful  in  holding  a 
certain  number  of  Turkish  troops,  and  Captain  Frey- 

^  Uncensored  Letter  from  the  Dardanelles,  by  a  French   Medical 
Officer,  pp.  44-74. 


122  THE  LANDINGS 

berg  was  lighting  his  flares,  a  daring  and  lonely 
figure ;  at  Kum  Kali  the  French  were  fulfilling  their 
task,  but  under  orders  to  withdraw.  Of  the  three 
Brigadier-Generals  in  the  29th  Division,  one  had 
been  killed  and  the  other  two  wounded.  Upon  those 
scenes  of  anguish  and  death,  of  scarcely  endurable 
anxiety  and  a  self-devotion  unsurpassed  in  any 
annals,  the  Sabbath  evening  closed,  but  scarcely  for 
one  moment  did  the  tumult  of  battle  cease. 


CHAPTER   VI 
THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

THROUGHOUT  the  long  and  anxious  hours 
of  the  25th,  while  the  fate  of  his  army  hung 
uncertain,  the  Commander-in-Chief  was 
compelled  to  remain  on  board  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
with  his  Headquarter  Staff.  There  was  no  place  for 
him  ashore.  In  modern  warfare  a  commanding 
General  cannot  allow  himself  to  become  entangled  in 
one  part  of  the  widely-extended  front  or  in  another. 
When  once  his  dispositions  have  been  made  and  his 
orders  issued,  the  control  passes  out  of  his  hands  ;  and 
the  more  complete  his  dispositions  and  orders  have 
been,  the  less  is  the  part  he  is  justified  in  taking  upon 
himself.  He  can  but  await  the  result,  listening 
anxiously  to  reports  as  they  come.  The  wretched- 
ness of  such  a  position,  for  a  soldier  born  to  lead 
forlorn  hopes  or  to  command  the  rush  of  onset,  was 
here  increased  by  the  sea.  At  no  point  was  it  pos- 
sible even  to  remain  on  land  without  losing  touch 
with  all  the  other  points.  Only  at  sea  could  com- 
munication be  maintained  and  reports  delivered. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  was  reduced  to  a  position 
of  inactive  but  resdess  security,  all  the  more  pitiable 
because,  from  the  shelter  of  the  great  battleship, 
telescopes  revealed  incidents  of  heroic  resolution  in 
which  it  was  impossible  to  share. 


124  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

The  day  passed.  In  the  evening  the  Queen 
Elizabeth  flung  a  violent  bombardment  upon  the  de- 
fences of  V  Beach,  bringing  renewed  courage  to  the 
line  of  survivors  still  crouching  under  the  bank.  At 
midnight,  Sir  Ian  was  called  upon  to  take  a  decision 
as  rapid  as  vital.  It  has  been  already  mentioned 
that  rumours  of  evacuation  went  round  Anzac  cove 
at  sunset.  The  men  were  much  exhausted  by  pro- 
longed fighting,  extreme  danger,  and  heavy  loss ;  the 
battalions  were  mixed ;  ammunition  was  running 
short ;  water,  though  brought  ashore  in  boats,  and 
already  found  by  digging  in  one  or  two  places,  was 
scarce,  and  had  to  be  carried  up  the  cliffs  on  men's 
backs  ;  the  wounded — over  2000  in  number — though 
energetically  tended,  as  already  mentioned,  and 
taken  off  rapidly  to  any  available  ship,  still  lay 
thick  on  the  beach,  or  came  dribbling  back  from 
the  heights ;  along  the  bit  of  coast,  over  sea  and 
shore,  the  shrapnel  crashed  and  whirled  perpetually ; 
brave  as  the  Anzacs  had  proved  themselves,  they 
were  new  to  battle.  If  evacuation  was  unavoidable, 
now,  at  night,  was  the  only  possible  time. 

Sir  lan's  decision  was  unhesitating.  The  Turks 
were  actually  pressing  upon  the  Anzac  lines.  Evacu- 
ation could  not  remain  secret,  and  would  take  many 
hours.  It  would  involve  incalculable  slauohter  on 
the  shore  and  in  the  boats.  It  meant  defeat.  It 
meant  withdrawal  such  as  Lord  Kitchener  had  speci- 
ally ordered  him  never  to  consider.  It  meant  a  breach 
in  any  high-spirited  soldier's  instinct.  The  command 
was  quick.  Let  them  dig  for  their  lives.  Let  them 
cling  on  like  tigers.     Help  would  come  in  the  morning. 

And  in  the  morning  help  came.     Just  after  day- 


HOW  ANZAC  WAS  HELD  125 

light  the  Queen  Elizabeth  herself  appeared  off  Anzac 
cove.  For  three  hours  she  threw  her  huge  shrapnel 
from  15-in.  guns,  each  shell  flinging  out  a  cone  of 
some  13,000  bullets  far  to  both  sides  and  front.^  The 
Triumph  and  Bacchante  supported  her.  The  Anzacs, 
outworn  by  the  night  struggle  against  repeated 
charges,  stood  their  ground  with  courage  renewed. 
Along  the  very  edge  of  the  steep  cliff  or  ridge  on  the 
farther  side  of  Shrapnel  Gully  they  furiously  dug. 
Battalions  and  brigades  remained  still  confused. 
Men  and  groups  fought  or  dug  where  they  were 
wanted  at  the  nearest  line.  By  extreme  effort  thus 
was  gradually  formed .  that  famous  arc,  or  more  pro- 
perly triangle,  which  contained  the  Anzac  of  the  next 
three  months.  It  had  the  beach  as  base,  Pope's  Hill 
near  the  apex  (where  a  dangerous  gap  remained), 
Walker's  Ridge  as  one  irregular  side,  and  the  long 
and  devious  line  through  Quinn's  Post,  M'Laurin's 
Hill,  and  Bolton's  Hill  to  the  coast  as  the  other  side, 
more  irregular  still. 

The  trenches  began  to  afford  some  cover  from 
shrapnel.  A  few  i8-pounder  guns  were  dragged  up 
hastily  constructed  paths,  and  placed  right  in  the 
firing  line.  But  so  continuous  were  the  Turkish 
counter-attacks  throughout  the  whole  of  Monday  and 
the  greater  part  of  Tuesday  the  27th  that  little 
attempt  at  reorganising  the  brigades  was  possible, 
the  only  recognisable  distribution  being  that  as  a 
whole  the  Australians  held  the  right  side  of  the  tri- 
angle, and  the  New  Zealanders  the  left.  Even  within 
our  lines  many  Turkish  snipers  continued  for  some 
days  hidden  in  the  scrub,  maintained  there  by  bags  of 

^  The  Immortal  Gamble,  p.  147. 


126  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

provisions  and  cartridges  brought  with  them  to  the 
lairs.  The  main  or  Shrapnel  Gully  was  especially 
exposed  to  snipers  of  this  kind  and  to  more  regular 
fire  from  the  Nek,  a  narrow  connecting  link  between 
the  chief  Anzac  ridges  and  the  main  range  of  Sari 
Bair.  To  the  last  the  southern  end  of  the  gully  on 
its  right  side  was  so  harassed  by  rifle  fire  that  it 
retained  its  thick  coating  of  scrub,  as  being  too 
dangerous  for  dug-outs  or  any  movement  of  men. 
For  this  reason  the  gully  was  sometimes  called  by 
the  longer  name  of  the  Valley  of  the  Shadow  of 
Death,  and  it  appears  to  have  been  while  recon- 
noitring here  that  Colonel  M'Laurin,  Brigadier  of  the 
ist  Brigade,  and  Major  Irvine,  his  Brigade- Major, 
were  killed  side  by  side.^ 

The  more  regular  attacks  were  chiefly  aimed  at 
the  apex,  near  the  top  of  the  gully,  between  Pope's 
Hill  and  Ouinn's  Post.  The  dominating  position  of 
Pope's  Hill  had  been  stormed  early  on  Sunday  by  a 
party  of  the  ist  Battalion,  and  was  taken  over  that 
evening  by  Colonel  Pope  with  a  mixed  force  of  400 
men,  who  proceeded  to  entrench  it  as  the  valuable 
fortress  which  it  remained.  Quinn's  Post,  always  a 
point  of  danger,  being  within  a  few  yards  of  the 
enemy's  line,  was  gallantly  held  for  the  first  three 
days  by  a  party  of  the  14th  Battalion,  and  on 
Wednesday  (28th)  was  taken  over  by  Major  Quinn 
(15th  Battalion).^ 

On  Wednesday  (April  28)  the  general  reorganisa- 

^  Australia  in  Arms,  p.  122. 

^  Having  held  it  with  skill  and  resolution  for  a  month,  Major  Quinn 
was  himself  killed  there  in  a  furious  attempt  which  the  Turks  made  to 
mine  and  break  through  the  position  (May  29). 


ADVANCE  FROM  V  BEACH  127 

tion  and  sifting  out  of  Anzac  could  begin,  but  no 
attempt  to  reach  the  objective  of  Koja  Chemen 
Tepe  (Hill  971,  the  highest  point  of  the  Sari  Bair 
range)  or  to  cross  the  Peninsula  to  Maidos  could  then 
be  made.  In  the  fighting  of  Sunday  and  Monday- 
alone,  the  three  Australian  brigades  had  lost  4500 
killed  and  wounded.  By  Wednesday,  at  least  one- 
fifth  of  the  total  force  was  out  of  action.  Fortunately 
for  General  Birdwood,  the  Anzacs  could  fill  up  many 
gaps  by  the  ten  per  cent,  margin  usually  allotted  to 
divisions  on  active  service,  but  refused  to  Sir  lan's 
troops  from  home.  Hardly  any  amount  of  untried 
formations  can  reinforce  an  army  in  action  so  service- 
ably  as  drafts  added  to  divisions  which  have  proved 
their  quality  on  the  field,  as  the  29th  had  proved 
theirs. 

By  early  afternoon  of  Monday  the  26th,  the  posi- 
tion at  the  south  end  of  the  Peninsula  had  greatly 
improved.  After  dark  on  the  previous  evening,  the 
remainder  of  the  landing  force  on  V  Beach  had  come 
ashore,  as  already  narrated,  and  though  exposed  to 
a  violent  outbreak  of  fire  under  the  clear  moonlight 
about  1,30  a,m,,  they  had  found  better  cover  among 
the  rocks  at  the  foot  of  old  Seddel  Bahr  castle.  At 
daylight.  Admiral  Wemyss  opened  a  heavy  bombard- 
ment upon  the  castle,  village,  and  slopes  of  the  semi- 
circular theatre.  Thus  encouraged,  the  wearied  relics 
of  the  Hampshires  and  Dublin  and  Munster  Fusiliers 
prepared  for  advance.  To  such  an  advance  they 
were  largely  inspired  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Doughty- 
Wylie  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams  of  the 
Headquarter  Staff,  who,  as  narrated,  had  remained 
under  the  parapet  of  sand  all  night  to  keep  the  men 


128  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

in  good  heart.  Only  magic  personality  can  organise 
a  fresh  assault  out  of  hungry  and  thirsty  men,  who 
have  for  the  most  part  been  lying  under  almost  con- 
tinuous fire  for  twenty-four  hours,  and  who  leave 
more  than  half  of  their  friends  lying  dead  or  wounded 
behind  them.  Yet  it  was  done.  Led  by  Doughty- 
Wylie  and  Captain  Walford  (Brigade-Major,  29th 
Divisional  Artillery),  the  men  fought  their  way  up 
into  the  village  under  a  stream  of  rifle  and  machine- 
gun  fire,  and  from  the  village  advanced  to  the  attack 
of  the  plateau  above  it.  On  the  slope  Captain 
Walford  was  killed.  Between  the  village  and  the 
summit,  fearlessly  leading  the  men  forward,  Doughty- 
Wylie,  a  noble  type  of  English  soldier  and  adminis- 
trator, was  killed  in  like  manner.^  Irreparable  as 
was  the  loss  of  that  knightly  figure,  the  attack  pushed 
onward.  By  2  p.m.  Hill  141,  the  old  castle,  and  the 
battered  village  were  securely  gained.  On  the  south- 
west side  of  the  theatre,  connection  with  W  Beach 

^  From  an  account  privately  written  by  a  friend  who  knew  Doughty- 
Wylie  intimately,  I  may  quote  the  following  sentences :  "  As  the 
result  of  many  wounds,  he  had  suffered  in  health  and  had  transferred 
from  the  army  to  the  Consular  Service,  and  had  spent  some  years  in 
Asia  Minor.  I  arrived  in  Adana  after  the  massacres  in  1909,  just  before 
he  left  for  Abyssinia,  and  stayed  at  the  Consulate,  learning  much  from 
him  about  those  terrible  days  of  the  preceding  April.  My  memories  are 
permeated  with  a  sense  of  his  oneness  with  all  the  warring  sects  in  that 
fanatical  province.  He  was  the  emblem  of  what  they  needed  ;  unity — 
greatness  of  heart  and  mind  —  an  entire  absence  of  self-seeking  or 
pride.  .  .  .  An  Armenian  girl  described  the  scene  to  me  :  '  We  were  all 
in  a  church,  hundreds  of  us  huddled  together,  and  the  Turks  set  light 
to  it.  But  he  came,  the  Consul  Anglais.  He  forced  his  way  through 
the  mob,  and  we  saw  his  face.  "  Come,  my  children,"  he  called  to  us, 
and  we  followed  him  out.  Like  frightened  sheep  we  were,  but  he  calmed 
us  and  led  us  to  safety.'  .  .  .  '  The  oppressor  is  often  in  the  right,  and  the 
oppressed  always,'  he  used  playfully  to  quote  to  me."  A  permanent 
monument  to  Doughty- Wylie  and  Walford  was  erected  in  Seddel  Bahr. 


Beres/ord] 


LIEUT.-COLONEL   C     H.    H.    DOUGHTV-WYLIE 


THE  FRENCH  AT  V  BEACH  129 

was   confirmed,   and   V   Beach  became  a  fairly  safe 
landing-place  at  last. 

That   evening  and    next   day  the    French  Corps 
began   to   disembark  upon  that  scene  of  death  and 
persistent  courage.     To  the  end  of  the  campaign,  V 
Beach  remained  the  French  landing-place  and  depot 
for  stores.     The  French  constructed  a  solid  pier  out 
to  the  bow  of  the  River  Clyde,  and  kept  also  a  gang- 
way of  lighters  for  approach  to  the  floating  platforms 
under  shelter  of  her  port  side.     A  British  naval  and  a 
military  officer  remained  on  board  to  direct  the  land- 
ing of  troops  or  stores  and  the  embarkation  of  the 
wounded.     The  ship's  bridge  was  fortified  with  sand- 
bags, and  as  forming  a  north-east  breakwater  to  the 
small  harbour  the  old  collier  performed  useful  service. 
Though  fully  exposed  to  the  Asiatic  guns,  she  was 
rarely  shelled,  perhaps  because  her  funnel  served  as  a 
guide  to  the  gunners  for  dropping  over  the  headland 
heavy  shells  which  burst  upon  W  Beach.     This  they 
sometimes  did  with  deadly  success.     The  remainder 
of   V    Beach    and    the   sandy   theatre   above   it   the 
French  organised   with   characteristic    exactness  and 
practical    skill.     Stores    were   arranged    in    faultless 
piles,  and  a  light  railway  for  bringing  up  stone  was 
laid   along   the   shore   to   the    cliff  of  Cape   Helles. 
The    old    castle    served  as  a  depot  for  ammunition. 
Compressed   forage   was  piled  up  to  limit  the  effect 
of  shell-fire.      In  everything  except  "  sanitation  "  the 
arrangement   of    the    French   lines    surpassed    ours. 
They   were  forbidden   to  our  officers  and  men,  but 
between  adjacent  battalions   friendly  communication 
was    frequent,    and    by    simple    barter    our    tedious 
ration  of  apricot  jam  was  frequently  exchanged  for 
9 


130  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

the  French  ration  of  a  light  red  wine,  though  these 
articles  of  exchange  were  received  with  scornful  hilarity 
by  each  side. 

On  the  27th,  two  days  after  the  landing,  the  whole 
line  was  able  to  advance  without  opposition  so  as  to 
cover  all  the  landing  beaches  except  Y,  which  had  so 
unfortunately  been  abandoned  under  extreme  pressure 
of  numbers.  The  strong  Turkish  position  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Gully  Ravine  ("  Gully  Beach,"  or  "  Y2  ") 
was  found  deserted.  The  Turks  had  withdrawn 
farther  up  the  ravine,  their  flanks  being  now  exposed 
to  an  advance  of  the  Royal  Fusiliers  from  X  or  "  Im- 
placable Landing."  At  Gully  Beach  the  left  or  western 
end  of  our  line  was  accordingly  fixed,  and  the  line 
extended  for  about  three  miles  to  the  right,  across  the 
Peninsula  to  the  point  S,  or  Eski  Hissarlik.  This 
point  was  soon  afterwards  taken  over  by  the  French, 
who  now  put  four  battalions  on  their  front.  The 
expansion  of  ground  left  room  for  a  landing  of 
stores  and  guns  upon  the  beaches,  and  also  slightly 
increased  the  water  supply,  a  few  old  wells  being 
discovered  within  the  area,  and  new  wells  dug.  But, 
owing  to  the  heavy  losses,  the  men  holding  the  front 
made  but  a  thin  line  of  defence,  and  the  want  of 
water,  here  as  at  all  points  throughout  the  campaign, 
remained  a  perpetual  anxiety. 

Worn  out  as  his  men  were  by  Wednesday  (the 
28th)  morning,  almost  deprived  of  sleep  since  the 
Saturday  before,  reduced  by  heavy  loss,  especially 
in  officers,  and  calling  in  vain  for  reinforcements  to 
fill  up  their  ranks.  Sir  Ian  resolved  to  press  forward 
upon  the  Turks  while  they  were  still  disorganised. 
At  8  a.m.  a  general  advance  was  ordered,  the  29th 


KRITHIA  AND  THE  SOUTHERN  PENINSULA     131 

Division  moving  forward  on  the  left  and  centre,  with 
the   deserted  village    of    Krithia    as   objective,    the 
French   on  the  right   aiming  to   reach  the  western 
or  right  slope  of  Kereves  Dere,  a  broad  and  deep 
valley  which  runs  down  from  the  foot  of  Achi  Baba 
and   issues    into  the  strait  about  a  mile   above  De 
Tott's    Battery   (Eski    Hissarlik).     Next    to    Seddel 
Bahr,  the  village  of  Krithia  was  the  largest  collection 
of  houses  upon  the  end  of  the  Peninsula.     It  stands 
on  the  gradual  slope  leading  up  to  Achi  Baba,  about 
four  and  a  half  miles  from  Cape  Helles,  whence  its 
grey  walls  and  squat  windmills  are  distinctly  visible. 
The  land  between  the  high  plateau  at  Helles  and  the 
approaches  to  Achi  Baba  falls  from  both  ends  into  a 
long  and  shallow  scoop,  like  the  inside  of  a  flattish 
spoon.     On  the   ^gean,  or   Xeros  side,  the  rim  of 
the   spoon   looks  fairly  complete,   though   in   fact  it 
is  broken  at  the  Gully  Beach  by  the  mouth  of  that 
long   and   hidden   valley   of  Saghir    Dere   or  Gully 
Ravine.     On  the  side  of  the  strait  the  rim  is  much 
less   obvious,    being   broken   at   Morto    Bay   by  the 
combined  watercourses  which  drain  the  western  and 
central  slopes  of  Achi  Baba,  and  farther  north  by  the 
Kereves  Dere.     At  the  time  of  landing,  the  centre, 
or  scoop  of  the  spoon,  was  still  bright  with  grass  and 
aromatic  plants.     Olive  trees  were  scattered  over  it, 
and  here  and  there  thin  woods  of  stunted  fir.     At  one 
spot,  near  the  bottom  of  the  curve,  rose  large  trees 
like  elms,  which  afforded  a  welcome  grove  of  shade 
to  the  Royal  Naval   Division's  headquarters  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  campaign.     On  the  whole,  the 
French  lines  on  our  right  were  rather  more  thickly 
wooded  than  ours.     At  rare  intervals  stood  the  ruins 


132  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

of  some  isolated  cottage,  surrounded  by  a  patch  of 
cultivation  for  maize  or  vines. 

Almost  exactly  down  the  centre  ran  the  Krithia 
road  from  Seddel  Bahr,  having  the  "  Achi  Baba 
nullah,"  which  runs  into  Morto  Bay,  close  on  the 
right.  Almost  parallel  to  the  road,  at  an  average 
distance  of  300  yards  to  the  left  or  west  side,  runs 
the  main  or  "Krithia"  gully,  which  drains  the 
greater  part  of  the  central  scoop,  and  also  issues 
into  Morto  Bay.  A  track,  which  became  a  road,  ran 
beside  this  gully  as  far  as  a  dividing-point,  called 
"Clapham  Junction,"  where  the  trickle  of  water 
branched  into  East  Krithia  and  West  Krithia  nullahs. 
Almost  every  yard  of  this  wide  scoop  of  land  was 
fully  exposed  to  the  guns  on  Achi  Baba,  and  some  of 
it  to  the  Asiatic  guns  as  well.  In  consequence,  as 
the  campaign  continued,  it  rapidly  became  covered 
with  a  network  of  trenches  and  dug-outs,  looking  like 
a  vast  graveyard,  and  terminating  in  an  almost  in- 
extricable maze  at  the  front,  where  it  was  checked 
by  the  Turkish  system,  equally  elaborated.  Except 
close  to  the  front,  however,  transport  and  other 
communications  were  always  carried  on  above  ground  ; 
the  grass  was  turned  into  sandy  waste,  and  the 
paths  into  roads  thick  with  dust.  About  half-way 
between  Cape  Helles  and  Krithia,  the  Peninsula 
was  cut  right  across  from  sea  to  strait  by  the 
Eski  or  Old  Line,  which  crossed  the  Gully  Ravine 
near  Gully  Farm,  and  the  Krithia  nullah  about 
250  yards  north  of  Clapham  Junction,  and  ended 
about  a  third  of  a  mile  below  the  mouth  of  Kereves 
Dere. 

Over  this  slightly  hollow  plain,  and  these  roads 


ADVANCE  OF  APRIL  28  133 

and  gullies  then  unnamed,  the  advance  of  April  28 
was  made.     The  87th  Brigade  led  upon  the  left  or 
seacoast  flank,  and  penetrated  rapidly  over  the  open 
ground  almost  parallel  to  the  Gully  Ravine  for  nearly 
two  miles.     As  the    K.O.S.B.    and  S.W.   Borderers 
had  been  separately  engaged  at  Y  and  S   Beaches, 
the  Drake  Battalion,   R.  N.D.,  took  their  place,  the 
remainder   of   the    brigade    consisting   only    of    the 
ist    Border    Regiment   and    ist     Inniskillings.     The 
88th  Brigade  was  on    their   right ;    the    86th,  which 
had  covered  the  first  landings,  was  held  in  reserve 
under   Colonel    Casson   (S.W.   Borderers).      In  spite 
of  weariness  and  the  prolonged  shock  of  battle,  the 
relics  of  this  unsurpassed  Division  advanced  sturdily 
against  increasing  opposition  ;    but    by  midday  their 
progress  was  stopped.     Small  parties  came  within  a 
short    distance    of    Krithia,    but   the    86th    Brigade 
reinforced   them   in   vain.     There    is  a  human   limit 
even  for   the    bravest ;    ammunition    ran    short,    and 
could  not  be  brought  up  ;  and  only  a  few  guns  had 
yet   been  landed.     The  brigades,  accordingly,  made 
a  rough  line  conforming  with  the  88th  in  the  centre, 
and  the  hope  of  reaching  Achi  Baba  faded,  though 
near   fulfilment.       The    French    on    our    right    had 
reached  the   approaches   to    Kereves    Dere,   but   an 
attempt  to  advance  towards  Krithia  failed.     In  the 
afternoon  the  Turks  counter-attacked  with  the  bayonet, 
and    the    French   line    shook.       A    rapid    retirement 
exposed  the  Worcesters  to  heavy  loss  on  their  right 
flank,  and  a  line   had  to  be  rapidly  secured  from  a 
point  about  three  miles  up  the  coast   from    Tekke 
Bornu  to  a  point  about  a  mile  farther  up  the  strait 
than   De  Tott's   Battery.     Here  it  rested,  and  two 


134  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

days  were  spent  in   strengthening  the  defences  and 
sorting  out  the  confused  battaHons. 

In  order  to  encourage  the  worn-out  divisions  (for 
it  was  impossible  for  any  soldiers  to  maintain  the 
spirit  of  the  first  landing  without  flagging),  Sir  Ian 
issued  ^'the  following  order  on  April  29  : 

"  I  rely  on  all  officers  and  men  to  stand  firm  and 
steadfastly  to  resist  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to 
drive  us  back  from  our  present  position  which  has 
been  so  gallantly  won. 

"  The  enemy  is  evidently  trying  to  obtain  a  local 
success  before  reinforcements  can  reach  us  ;  but  the 
first  portion  of  these  arrive  to-morrow,  and  will  be 
followed  by  a  fresh  Division  from  Egypt. 

"  It  behoves  us  all,  French  and  British,  to  stand 
fast,  hold  what  we  have  gained,  wear  down  the 
enemy,  and  thus  prepare  for  a  decisive  victory." 

The  enemy  was  not  long  in  taking  up  the 
challenge.  On  the  29th,  Sir  Ian  visited  the  front 
lines  at  Helles  and  Anzac  with  his  personal  staff 
Next  day  he  visited  the  British  position  at  Helles 
again,  and  on  May  i  the  French  lines  in  the  same 
manner.  There  he  found  the  trenches  in  the  firing 
line  incomplete  compared  with  ours,  but  the  celebrated 
"75's"  were  already  in  action,  and  from  that  time 
onwards  the  French  gunners,  never  being  stinted  in 
shells,  were  the  envy  as  well  as  the  admiration  of  our 
artillery.  On  May  i  also  the  promised  reinforcements 
began  to  arrive,  the  29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade 
from  Egypt,  under  Major-General  Sir  Herbert  Cox, 
being  the  first  comers.  Hardly  had  they  taken  their 
position  as  reserve,  with  some  battalions  of  the  R.  N.  D., 
when,  in  the  darkness  before  the  waning  moon  had 


A  TURKISH  COUNTER-ATTACK  135 

risen,  the  Turks  began  a  furious  attack  upon  the 
whole  French  and  British  front.  The  Turks' 
enthusiasm  in  defence  of  their  splendid  city  (for 
the  fate  of  Constantinople  was  involved)  had  been 
further  stimulated  by  the  following  proclamation  over 
the  signature  of  their  German  commandant,  General 
von  Lowenstern  : 

"  Attack  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet  and  utterly 
destroy  him  ! 

"We  shall  not  retire  one  step;  for,  if  we  do,  our 
religion,  our  country,  and  our  nation  will  perish  1 

"  Soldiers  !  The  world  is  looking  at  you  !  Your 
only  hope  of  salvation  is  to  bring  this  battle  to  a 
successful  issue  or  gloriously  to  give  up  your  life  in 
the  attempt." 

The  Turks  responded  to  this  appeal  with  unusual 
hardihood  in  attack,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  best 
Nizam  troops  were  now  on  the  Peninsula.  For  this 
attack  16,000  were  employed,  with  2000  in  reserve.^ 
They  came  on  in  three  solid  lines.  All  crawled  on 
hands  and  knees  till  the  word  was  given,  and  the 
front  was  allowed  no  cartridges,  but  bayonets  only. 
Their  first  charge  aimed  in  the  centre  at  the  86th 
Brigade,  so  much  shaken  by  loss  of  men  and  officers. 
Here  they  forced  a  gap,  dangerous  had  not  the  5th 
Royal  Scots  at  once  filled  it.  This  battalion  (88th 
Brigade),  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  D.  R.  Wilson, 
was  the  only  Territorial  unit  in  the  29th  Division.  It 
was  anxious  to  prove  itself  worthy  of  that  unequalled 
corps,  and  now  it  proved  itself.  Facing  to  their  right 
flank,  the  men  charged  with  the  bayonet,  the  Essex 
(of  the  same  brigade)  supporting  them.     The  next 

^   With  the  Twenty-ninth  Division,  p.  191. 


136  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

attack  fell  heavily  upon  the  Senegalese,  immediately 
on  our  right.  Two  battalions  of  the  Worcesters 
(also  88th  Brigade)  were  sent  to  strengthen  the  line, 
and  later  in  the  night  one  R.N.D.  battalion  reinforced 
the  extreme  right  of  the  French. 

Between  ii  p.m.  and  2  a.m.,  the  conflict  appeared 
strangely  terrific.  The  boom  and  flash  of  guns,  the 
ceaseless  repetition  of  machine-guns  and  rifles,  the 
shouts  of  "Allah!  Allah!"  answered  by  British 
cheers  and  the  yells  of  savage  Africans,  the  liquid 
brilliance  of  star  shells,  the  Bengal  lights,  red,  white, 
and  green,  fired  by  Turkish  officers  from  their  pistols 
as  signals  to  their  gunners  to  lengthen  range,  or  to 
avoid  firing  on  taken  trenches  and  main  positions — 
all  produced  the  din  and  spectacle  of  some  battle  in 
hell,  lit  by  infernal  fireworks.  To  spectators  on  the 
ships  or  the  high  ground  in  our  rear,  the  scene 
was  the  more  terrible  as  the  bursting  shells  and 
variegated  lights  came  farther  and  farther  into  the 
hollow  land,  down  the  centre  of  which  the  Allies 
were  being  forced. 

But  with  approaching  light  the  worst  was  over, 
and  at  dawn  the  whole  of  the  Allied  line  advanced  to 
counter-attack.  The  British  forced  their  way  onward 
for  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  But  the  French  made 
no  progress.  Machine-guns  and  barbed  wire  were 
used  by  the  Turkish  defence  with  deadly  result,  and 
before  noon  the  whole  of  our  line  was  withdrawn  to 
its  former  position.  It  had  been  an  appalling  night 
for  both  forces,  and  the  Turks  spent  the  next  day 
burying  their  dead  under  the  Red  Crescent.  That 
night  and  the  next  (May  2  and  3)  violent  attacks 
were  repeated,  especially  upon  the  French  front,  and 


ARRIVAL  OF  THE  42nd  DIVISION  137 

terrifying  rumours  of  disaster  flew.  On  May  4  the 
2nd  Naval  Brigade,  R.N.D.  (under  Commodore 
Backhouse,  R.N.),  took  over  part  of  the  French  Hne, 
and  the  whole  position  was  reorganised.  Next  day 
the  Lancashire  Fusilier  Brigade  (East  Lancashire 
Division)  disembarked  as  welcome  reinforcement. 
While  Sir  Ian  was  in  Egypt  he  had  watched  this 
Division  (the  42nd)  with  admiration,  and  now,  by 
order  from  Lord  Kitchener,  General  Maxwell  sent  it 
in  his  support.  Barely  in  time  they  began  to  arrive. 
The  Division  was  under  command  of  Major-General 
Sir  William  Douglas,  and  consisted  of  the  Lancashire 
Fusiliers  (125th  Brigade),  the  East  Lancashire  (126th), 
and  the  Manchester  (127th).  All  were  Territorials.^ 
While  the  British  and  French  were  thus  strength- 
ening their  hold  upon  the  southern  end  of  the  Penin- 
sula, the  Anzacs  clung  desperately  to  the  rugged 
triangle  which  was  to  be  "  a  thorn  in  the  enemy's 
side."  By  Friday,  the  30th,  units  had  been  sorted 
out,  the  firing  line  was  reinforced  by  the  ist  Light 
Horse  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Chauvel)  and  by 
four  battalions  of  the  R.N.D.  Part  of  the  orio-inal 
fighting  line,  worn  out  by  continuous  firing,  digging, 
sleeplessness,  and  want  of  warm  food,  was  withdrawn 
into  sheltered  gullies  to  cook  and  rest.  For  the 
next  day  (May  i)  a  general  advance  was  ordered. 
The  Australian  Division  on  the  right  was  to  make 
for  the  villages  Koja  Dere  and  Boghali,  the  mixed 
Australian   and  New  Zealand   Division  on   the   left 

^  The  battalions  in  the  brigades  were  :  125th  Brigade,  the  5th,  6th, 
7th,  and  8th  Lancashire  Fusiliers  ;  126th  Brigade,  the  4th  and  5th  East 
Lancashire,  and  the  9th  and  loth  Manchester;  the  127th  Brigade,  the 
5th,  6th,  7th,  and  8th  Manchester. 


138  THE  TEN  BAYS  AFTER 

to  attempt  the  main  Sari  Bair  ridge,  leading  up  to 
the  dominating  heights  of  Chunuk  and  Koja  Tepe. 
On  the  previous  evening,  however.  General  Monash, 
commanding  the  4th  Brigade,  and  defending  the 
serious  gap  in  the  lines  at  the  top  of  Shrapnel  Gully, 
protested  that  such  a  movement  would  only  extend 
the  gap  still  more  dangerously.  As  it  was,  the 
R.N.D.  battalions,  which  had  been  thrust  in  to  hold 
this  gap  at  the  triangle's  apex,  were  at  that  moment 
very  hard  pressed,  and  after  further  reconnoitring 
both  General  Godley  and  General  Bridges  appear 
to  have  agreed  that  the  contemplated  advance  was 
impracticable.     At  all  events  it  was  not  attempted.^ 

To  close  that  gap  at  the  apex  was  obviously  the 
first  essential  move,  and  on  Sunday,  May  2  (a  week 
after  the  landing),  a  determined  effort  was  made. 
The  objective  was  a  round  knoll,  known  as  Baby 
700,  on  the  slope  of  Sari  Bair.  It  stood  about  three 
hundred  yards  beyond  the  lines  on  Pope's  Hill,  and 
its  possession  would  have  blocked  the  entrance  from 
which  the  enemy  commanded  large  sections  of 
Monash  Gully  and  Shrapnel  Gully.  The  attempt 
began  at  early  morning  with  a  rapid  bombard- 
ment, and  throughout  the  day  Australians  and  New 
Zealanders  fought  with  their  accustomed  self-confi- 
dence. The  Nelson  and  Portsmouth  Battalions, 
R.N.D.,  supported  them,  and  some  trenches  along 
the  edge  of  the  plateau  extending  left  from  Quinn's 
Post  to  the  Bloody  Angle  were  gained.  But  the 
plateau  had  by  now  been  carefully  fortified  by 
trenches,  wire,  and  machine-guns.     It  was  impossible 

^  In  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  136-139,  Phillip  Schuler  gives  a  detailed 
account,  obviously  derived  from  officers  who  were  present. 


ATTEMPT  TO  ADVANCE  ANZAC  LINES      139 

for  our  destroyers,  firing  up  the  length  of  Shrapnel 
Gully,  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe,  so  closely  were 
they  intermixed.  At  nightfall  much  confusion  arose, 
and  the  Portsmouth  Battalion  men  are  said  to  have 
yielded  to  the  terror  of  the  scene  and  spread  con- 
fusion further.  Parties  of  the  Otago  Battalion  and 
the  13th  and  i6th  Battalions  clung  to  the  positions 
till  far  into  the  following  day.  But  in  the  end,  all 
survivors  returned  to  the  original  lines.  The  attempt 
failed,  and  it  cost  800  men.^  On  the  following  day 
(May  4)  an  effort  to  seize  Gaba  Tepe  and  end  the 
continuous  loss  inflicted  by  its  shrapnel  upon  the 
beach  and  upon  bathers  in  Anzac  Cove  also  failed, 
owing  to  the  mass  and  strength  of  wire  along  the 
edge  of  the  sea.  Meantime,  the  warships  had  been 
continuously  assisting  all  troops  on  sea  and  land. 
On  the  27th  the  Queen  Elizabeth,  hearing  from  a 
seaplane  that  the  Goeben  had  ventured  down  the 
strait,  apparently  with  the  object  of  firing  over  the 
Peninsula,  forestalled  that  intention  by  dropping  one 
of  her  largest  shells  from  near  Gaba  Tepe  into  the 
strait.  Narrowly  missed,  the  Goeben  retired  under 
shelter  of  the  steep  shore,  but  the  Qzieen  Elizabeth's 
second  shell  sank  a  transport  in  the  middle  of  the 
current. 

By  May  5  the  phase  of  the  landing  was  completed. 
A  firm  hold  had  been  gained  upon  the  end  of  the 
Peninsula  and  at  Anzac.  The  world's  history  had 
been  enriched  by  hardly  credible  examples  of 
courage,  dan,  and  the  fortitude  of  endurance  which 
Napoleon  accounted  a  more  valuable  quality  in 
soldiers  than    courage   and   dlan.       But   the   objects 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch  ;  and  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  139-142. 


140  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

specified  in  the  scheme  of  attack  had  not  been  gained. 
The  Turks  were  still  at  Krithia.  They  still  held 
the  lines  drawn  across  the  slopes  of  Achi  Baba. 
Koja  Dere  and  Boghali  were  still  far  from  the  eager 
youths  clinging  like  flies  to  the  Anzac  cliffs.  Maidos 
was  farther  beyond,  nor  was  the  fleet  a  cable's  length 
nearer  to  the  Narrows  than  before.  It  was  evident 
to  all  that  the  campaign,  deprived  of  the  incalculable 
advantage  of  surprise  by  the  hesitation,  delay,  and 
disapproval  or  indifference  at  home,  would  now  be 
long  and  costly  in  life.  Already  in  ten  days  the  losses 
were  officially  reckoned  : 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Officers 

.       177 

412 

13 

Men    . 

.     1990 

7807 

3580 

These  figures  give  a  total  casualty  list  of  13,979. 
The  loss  may  be  realised  by  another  table.  On 
April  30  the  Fusilier  Brigade  (86th)  of  the  29th 
Division,  out  of  a  normal  strength  of  104  officers 
and  about  4000  men,  mustered  as  follows  : 


Officers. 

Men. 

2nd  Royal  Fusiliers    . 

.     12 

481 

1st  Lancashire  Fusiliers 

.     II 

399 

1st  Royal  Munster  Fusiliers 

.     12 

596 

1st  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers  . 

I 

374 

36  1850 1 

For  no  such  numbers  of  casualties  had  estimate 
or  preparation  been  made.  The  casualties,  in  fact, 
amounted  to  something  like  three  times  the  estimate, 
and  the  treatment  of  the  wounded  became  a  serious, 

^  With  the  Tiventy-ninth  Division,  p.  189.  The  one  surviving  officer 
of  the  Dublin  Fusiliers  was  Lieutenant  O'Hara,  afterwards  mortally 
wounded  at  Suvla  Bay. 


THE  WOUNDED  UNDERESTIMATED         141 

if  not  insoluble,  difficulty.  In  his  dispatch,  Sir 
Ian  notices  that  his  "Administrative  Staff  had  not 
reached  Mudros  by  the  time  when  the  landings  were 
finally  arranged."  We  have  seen  that  they  did  not 
reach  Alexandria  from  home  till  April  i  ;  that  they 
were  left  there  to  embark  the  remaining  troops  and 
complete  the  base  hospital  arrangements,  and  did 
not  reach  Mudros  till  April  18.  The  Administrative 
Staff  included  Brigadier-General  E.  M.  Woodward, 
who,  as  Deputy  Adjutant-General,  was  ultimately  re- 
sponsible for  all  questions  of  personnel  and  casualties. 
And  it  included  Surgeon-General  W.  E.  Birrell,  who, 
as  Director  of  Military  Services,  was  immediately 
responsible  for  the  treatment  of  the  wounded.  In 
the  absence  of  these  officers,  Sir  Ian  says  "all  the 
highly  elaborate  work  involved  by  these  landings 
was  put  through  by  my  General  Staff  working  in 
collaboration  with  Commodore  Roger  Keyes,"  who 
was  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  Admiral  de  Robeck.  But 
Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  E.  C.  Keble,  R.A.M.C,  Assist- 
ant Director  of  Medical  Services,  reached  Mudros 
before  the  chief  officers  of  the  Administrative  Staff, 
and  to  him,  as  above  noticed,  the  scheme  for  dealing 
with  the  wounded  was  due.  Merely  owing  to  a 
mistaken  estimate  of  the  enemy's  opposition,  the 
means  provided  were  inadequate  for  the  actual 
numbers.  As  we  have  seen,  only  two  hospital  ships, 
each  accommodating  about  500  cases,  had  been 
allotted  for  the  army.  -  Tne  navy  lent  two  more, 
and  supplied  such  transport  as  could  now  be  spared, 
but  these  were  not  fitted  with  hospital  necessities. 
Doctors,  nurses,  and  orderlies,  all  were  short.  Army 
surgeons   and   stretcher-bearers  displayed   their  fine 

/ 
/ 


142  THE  TEN  DAYS  AFTER 

devotion  in  bringing  the  wounded  to  the  beaches 
both  at  Helles  and  Anzac  ;  but  in  spite  of  the  navy's 
energy  and  fearlessness  in  control  of  the  boats,  many 
of  the  wounded  remained  waiting  long  for  treatment ; 
in  one  case  a  fleet-sweeper  crowded  with  Australian 
wounded  went  wandering  from  ship  to  ship  in  vain, 
and  at  last  tied  up  against  the  General  Headquarters 
ship  (at  that  time,  May  9,  the  Arcadian,  to  which 
Sir  Ian  had  transferred) ;  and  upon  the  transports 
taking  them  to  Alexandria — a  voyage  of  two  to 
three  days  and  nights — the  wounded  suffered  much. 
Many  were  unable  to  move  without  help,  and  no 
help  was  there.  Most  had  been  treated  only  with 
first  dressings.  In  some  cases  the  wounds  corrupted. 
Many  died.  Warships,  like  the  Cornwallis,  afforded 
as  much  room  as  they  could,  acting  as  clearing- 
stations  for  the  wounded,  and  transmittino-  the  dead 
to  a  trawler  which  daily  went  round  the  fleet  to 
collect  them.^  The  efforts  of  the  fleet  surgeons  were 
untiring.  But  no  scheme  and  no  effort  could  avail 
against  a  false  estimate  of  the  enemy's  strength  and 
defensive  power.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  the  campaign 
had  from  the  first  b^'en  regarded  in  London  as  of 
secondary  importance,  and  secondary  provision  had 
been  made  for  an  estimate  of  secondary  loss. 

My  main  authorities  for  this  chapter,  as  for  the 
last,  have  been  the  Dispatches  of  Sir  Ian  Hamilton 
and  Admiral  de  Robeck,  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett's 
Dispatches  fro7n  the  Dardanelles,  the  late  Phillip 
Schuler's  Australia  in  Arpts,  the  Rev.  D.  Creighton's 
With  the   Twenty-ninth   Division    in  Gallipoli,   The 

^  The  Immortal  Gamble,  p.  145. 


AUTHORITIES  143 

Immortal  Gamble,  by  Commander  A.T.  Stewart,  R.N., 
and  the  Rev.  C.  J.  E,  Peshall,  With  Machine- 
guns  in  Gallipoli,  by  Lieutenant-Commander  Josiah 
Wedgwood,  M.P.,  and  my  own  observation  of  the 
ground  and  conversations  with  eye-witnesses  on  the 
spot. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

IN  Constantinople  the  naval  attacks  of  February 
had  created  the  dismay  natural  to  a  crowded 
population  threatened  with  destruction.  Pre- 
parations were  hurriedly  made  for  removing  the 
Government  to  Eski  Chehir  in  Asia,  or  even  to 
Konia.  In  spite  of  Enver's  dominance,  the  Com- 
mittee was  charged  with  bringing  ruin  on  the  land, 
and  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  von  Wangen- 
heim,  feared  a  separate  peace.  Ahmed  Riza,  the 
honourable  visionary,  aging  survivor  of  the  Parisian 
Young  Turks  whose  revolution  seven  years  before 
inspired  all  Europeans  but  the  Governments  with 
enthusiasm,  now  stole  about  the  streets  honoured  but 
shunned.  In  his  palace  on  the  Bosphorus,  the  Sultan, 
Mehmed  v.,  for  some  inscrutable  reason  called  El 
Ghazi  (the  Hero),  maundered  with  imbecility.  Re- 
moved in  March  from  his  palace-prison  of  Beyler-bey 
on  the  Bosphorus  to  the  ancient  city  of  Magnesia, 
near  Smyrna,  the  "  Red  Sultan,"  Abdul  Hamid,  sur- 
rounded by  ministering  daughters,  beguiled  an  ab- 
stemious and  peaceful  old  age  by  watching  the 
progress  of  Christianity  with  sardonic  appreciation.^ 

The  failure  of  the  naval  attempt  to  force  the 
Narrows    in    March    restored    the    city's   confidence. 

1  Abdul  Hamid  died  at  last  in  Constantinople,  February  1918. 

M4 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  SUBMARINES        145 

People  felt  that,  since  the  British  Navy  failed,  the 
Dardanelles  indeed  formed  an  impregnable  pass. 
Enver  and  Liman  von  Sanders  regained  power,  if 
not  popularity.  The  German  bureaucracy,  organis- 
ing every  department  with  efficient  despotism,  justi- 
fied the  satiric  compliment  which  cried,  "  Deutschland, 
Deutschland  liber  Allah  !  "  During  the  subsequent 
five  weeks  of  our  silence  it  was  believed  that  the 
British  Government  admitted  failure  and  had  aban- 
doned the  campaign.  The  distant  sound  of  Russian 
ships  bombarding  the  Black  Sea  forts  at  the  entrance 
to  the  Bosphorus  was  listened  to  periodically  with  the 
indifference  of  custom.  When  news  of  the  landings 
began  to  filter  through,  decisive  Turkish  victories 
over  France  and  England  were  proclaimed.  In  Asia 
and  on  the  Peninsula  the  enemy,  it  was  said,  had 
been  repulsed  with  incredible  loss.  If  any  still  clung 
to  the  shores  of  Islam,  in  a  day  or  two  they  would  be 
driven  into  the  water.  The  anxious  citizens  had 
Enver's  word  for  that. 

Enver  himself  was  hurrying  reinforcements  to  the 
front.  Some  went  by  the  Bulair  road,  though  it  was 
exposed  to  possible  fire  from  British  warships  in  the 
Gulf  of  Xeros.  The  majority  were  transported  down 
the  Sea  of  Marmora  to  Gallipoli  or  Maidos.  But 
within  a  few  days  of  the  landings,  this  route  was 
rendered  equally  dangerous  by  the  skill  and  gallantry 
of  our  submarines,  two  of  which — E14  under  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Edward  Courtney  Boyle  and 
Eii  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Eric  Naismith — 
explored  their  way  under  the  minefields  of  the  strait, 
entered  the  Marmora  and  played  havoc  among 
Turkish    transports   and   gunboats.      E14    sank    two 


146  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

gunboats  and  one  transport  with  troops.  Eii  was 
even  more  successful,  sinking  two  transports,  one  gun- 
boat, one  communication  ship,  and  three  store  ships, 
and  driving  another  store  ship  ashore.  It  created 
alarm  in  the  city  by  emerging  close  to  the  quays,  and 
on  its  return  down  the  strait  it  stopped  and  backed  to 
torpedo  another  transport.^  After  this,  most  rein- 
forcements were  sent  either  through  Muradhi  (the 
nearest  station  to  Rodosto),  risking  the  Bulair  road, 
or  by  ships  hugging  the  Asiatic  coast  by  night  to  the 
ferry  at  the  Narrows,  both  routes  long  and  arduous. 
Some  also  went  by  rail  to  Smyrna  and  thence 
by  rail  to  Panderma  on  the  Marmora  before  being 
embarked. 

In  early  May,  Enver  admitted  that  the  Turkish 
losses  already  amounted  to  45,000,  and  all  Turkish 
towns,  even  to  the  distance  of  Kirk  Kilisse,  were 
crammed  with  wounded.  Liman,  in  command  at  the 
front,  called  for  50,000  reinforcements,  and  about 
30,000,  chiefly  brought  in  from  Adrianople  and 
Smyrna,  were  actually  sent.  Within  a  few  weeks, 
divisions  were  also  withdrawn  from  Syria  for  the 
same  destination.  For  Turkish  troops,  the  equip- 
ment was  unusually  good — arms,  guns,  and  other 
stores  passing  freely  through  Bulgaria,  or  coming 
from  the  Roumanian  port  of  Constanza  down  the 
Black  Sea,  where  the  Russian  patrols  remained  torpid 
or  unfortunate.  For  Turkish  troops,  the  commissariat 
was  also  sufficient,  the  disaster  of  Lula  Burgas  having 

^  The  submarine  campaign  began  with  E2,  11,  14,  and  15  ;  four  or 
five  were  subsequently  added.  Some  were  lost.  On  May  25  the  En 
also  torpedoed  the  transport  Statnboul  inside  the  Golden  Horn,  causing 
great  panic.  On  April  30  the  Australian  AE2  had  been  lost  at  the 
entrance  of  Marmora.     Her  crew  were  taken  prisoner. 


SIR  lAN'S  REDUCED  FORCES  147 

taught  the  authorities  that  even  Turks  cannot  fight 
beyond  a  certain  degree  of  starvation.^ 

Before  the  Turkish  reinforcements  could  consoli- 
date a  new  position  across  the  southern  slopes  of 
Achi  Baba,  and  convert  it  into  an  impenetrable  maze 
of  trench  and  wire,  it  was  essential  for  Sir  Ian  to 
continue  striking  at  their  front.  Only  so  could  the 
pressure  upon  the  beaches  be  relieved,  and  the  con- 
tinuous danger  from  dropping  shells  to  some  small 
extent  be  reduced  ;  and  only  so  could  the  Turks  be 
interrupted  in  their  schemes  for  driving  us  into  the 
sea.  So  heavy  had  been  the  losses  of  the  29th  Divi- 
sion that  the  new  Lancashire  Fusilier  Territorials  and 
the  29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade  were  added  to  the 
87th  and  88th  Brigades  so  as  to  make  up  the  Division, 
the  86th  being  now  so  much  reduced  in  numbers  that 
it  was  temporarily  divided  between  the  other  two 
brigades.  Two  brigades  (the  2nd  Australian  (Victoria) 
and  the  New  Zealand  Infantry)  were  withdrawn  from 
Anzac  and  formed  into  a  composite  division  in  reserve 
with  the  Drake  and  Plymouth  Battalions,  R.N.D. 
Two  battalions  of  the  2nd  Naval  Brigade,  R.N.D. 
(Howe  and  Hood),  were  sent  to  reinforce  the  French 
Division  on  the  right. 

On  May  6,  when  the  attempt  to  push  forward 
began.  Sir  Ian  could  count  only  on  about  SSy'^^o 
rifles,  of  which  only  5000  were  British  and  Irish 
Regulars.  This  total  included  about  8000  French 
troops  ;    but    of  these  at   least   5000  were  Africans. 

^  For  the  state  of  Constantinople  at  this  time,  see  Inside  Constanti- 
nople^ by  Lewis  Einstein,  special  agent  at  the  American  Embassy,  and 
Tivo  War  Years  in  Constantinople,  by  Dr.  Harry  Stiirmer,  correspon- 
dent of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  but  a  writer  of  decidedly  pro-Entente 
sympathies. 


148  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

The  remainder  of  his  army  consisted,  as  we  have 
seen,  of  Lancashire  Territorials,  Anzacs  (both  ex- 
cellent), and  the  Royal  Naval  Division,  that  finely 
tempered,  though  partially  trained,  body,  made  up 
partly  of  public-school  men,  but  chiefly  of  northern 
and  west  of  England  miners,  R.F.R,  stokers  and 
marines,  whose  heavy  losses  were  due  rather  to 
devotion  and  courage  than  to  lack  of  skill.  Against 
them  were  arrayed  at  least  40,000  regular  Turkish 
troops  (Nizam),  skilfully  disposed  in  a  system  of 
trenches  and  redoubts  designed  by  German  officers 
and  held  with  Turkish  tenacity.  As  to  guns,  the 
French  at  this  time  had  twenty-four  of  their  "75's," 
together  with  five  or  six  howitzers,  and  they  never  ran 
short  of  ammunition.  The  British  had  somethino- 
over  fifty  18-pounders,  a  few  old  and  inaccurate 
howitzers,  very  few  H.E.  shells,  and  other  ammu- 
nition always  so  short  that  a  bombardment  in  pre- 
paration for  attack  had  to  be  rigorously  limited  for 
fear  of  drawing  on  the  small  reserve.  The  Turkish 
guns  in  concealed  positions  on  Achi  Baba  and  its 
slopes,  or  behind  its  shelter,  were  estimated  at  about 
a  hundred.  In  addition,  the  Turks  had  large  guns  and 
howitzers  on  the  Asiatic  side,  the  most  dangerous 
being  hidden  between  the  Trojan  plain  and  Erenkeui 
village.  From  time  to  time  they  exploded  "Black 
Marias,"  as  the  soldiers  called  the  9-2  and  ii-inch 
shells,  among  the  French  depots  on  V  Beach  and 
among  the  British  signalling  stations  and  stores  on 
Lancashire  Landing.  Except  beneath  the  cliffs  on 
the  Xeros  coast,  no  point  upon  the  southern  Peninsula 
was  secure  from  fire. 

The  battle  lasted  three  days  (May  6  to  8  inclusive). 


MAY  6  AT  HELLES  149 

The  reorganised  29th  Division  began  the  attack  on 
the  left,  the  French  being  on  the  right,  the  Plymouth 
and  Drake  Battalions  keeping  the  two  sections  in 
touch  from  the  centre.  At  11  a.m.  the  advance  was 
prepared  by  a  brief  bombardment,  the  French  batteries 
as  usual  expending  far  the  greater  number  of  shells, 
and  firing  with  their  customary  method  and  precision. 
The  87th  Brigade  and  Lancashire  Fusiliers  (Terri- 
torials) on  the  British  left  then  moved  along  the 
flat  and  open  ground  between  the  Gully  Ravine 
(Saghir  Dere)  and  the  sea.  Part  also  penetrated  up 
the  gully  itself,  which  swarmed  with  Turkish  snipers, 
and  at  the  farther  end  was  commanded  by  machine- 
guns.  On  their  right,  the  88th  Brigade  with  the 
Indians  attempted  to  conform  to  the  advance,  fighting 
for  every  yard  over  ground  affording  cover  to  the 
enemy  in  unsuspected  pits  and  dry  ravines,  but 
especially  in  a  scattered  wood  of  firs,  which  grew 
along  the  edge  of  a  downward  slope  near  the  centre. 
Against  this  wood,  company  after  company  of  the 
88th  Brigade  was  led  in  vain.  Hidden  machine- 
guns  also  checked  the  progress  of  the  R.N.D. 
battalions.  On  the  right  the  French  threw  forward  a 
swarm  of  Senegalese  in  open  order.  They  struggled 
almost  to  the  crest  overlooking  Kereves  Dere,  but 
were  there  encountered  by  a  strong  redoubt.  The 
French  troops  advanced  through  the  Senegalese 
as  they  came  back,  but  made  no  further  progress. 
All  the  R.N.D.  battalions  suffered  heavy  loss.^ 
The  fighting  developed  into  a  struggle  of  scattered 

^  In  this  attack  Mr.  Asquith's  son  Arthur  (Hood  Battahon),  and 
Lieutenant-Commander  Josiah  Wedgwood,  M.P.,  who  had  come  out 
with  the  machine-gun  section,  were  wounded. 


ISO  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

groups  to  push  forward.  The  naval  guns  continued  a 
heavy  bombardment,  but  so  deep  and  narrow  were  the 
Turkish  trenches  that  naval  shells  had  little  but  moral 
effect,  and  moral  effect  rapidly  diminishes.  By  middle 
afternoon  (4.30)  it  became  evident  that  the  wearied 
and  harassed  men  could  go  no  farther,  and  the  order 
was  given  to  dig  in,  keeping  a  fairly  connected  line. 
By  sheer  hard  "hammering,"  between  200  and  300 
yards  had  been  gained,  but  no  more,  and  the  main 
Turkish  defences  were  still  far  ahead. 

In  the  night,  the  Turks  rushed  upon  the  French 
lines  with  the  bayonet,  but  the  French  lines  held. 
Next  morning  at  ten  o'clock  our  attack  was  resumed. 
After  a  short  but  violent  bombardment,  the  Lanca- 
shire Fusiliers  attempted  to  push  forward  again  upon 
the  extreme  left  so  as  to  clear  the  Gully  Ravine, 
about  half-way  between  Gully  Beach  and  Y  Beach, 
but  were  stopped  by  a  redoubt  and  machine-guns 
upon  the  ridge  overlooking  the  sea.  On  their  right, 
in  the  difficult  ground  of  scrub  and  donga  between 
the  Gully  Ravine  and  the  Krithia  Nullah,  the 
88th  Brigade  struggled  to  advance  the  line,  and  for 
a  time  the  5th  Royal  Scots  obtained  a  footing  in  the 
savagely  disputed  fir  wood.  Here  they  discovered 
snipers  perched  on  wooden  platforms  among  the 
branches ;  and  here,  as  in  other  places  during  the 
campaign,  Turks  had  cleverly  "camouflaged"  them- 
selves with  green  paint  and  boughs  of  trees  till  they 
looked  like  moving  or  stationary  bushes,  though 
hitherto  the  process  of  "  camouflage  "  had  not  been 
generally  practised.  The  Inniskilling  Fusiliers  of  the 
87th  Brigade  came  up  to  the  support  of  the  Scots, 
but   soon   after    i    p.m.    a    violent    Turkish  counter- 


MAY  7  AT  HELLES  151 

attack  recaptured  the  firs.     The  French  and  Naval 
Brigade  had  made  Httle   progress,  and  in  the  early- 
afternoon  the  battle  paused.     But  it  was  impossible 
to  lose  the  advantage  of  attack  and  leave  the  initiative 
to  an  enemy  only  eager  to  rush  forward  and  chase  the 
Allies  back  to  slaughter  upon  the  beaches.     Accord- 
ingly, just  before  five   o'clock,  after   another  violent 
bombardment,  especially  from  the  French  guns,  Sir 
Ian  ordered   a   general    advance    of  the  whole  line. 
French,  British,  and  Irish  (the  Dublins  and  Munsters 
having  been    united    into   the    "  Dubsters ")  all   rose 
visibly    together,     and    charged    forward    with    the 
bayonet.     The  firs  were  again  taken  and  held.     The 
line  swept  over  the  first  Turkish  trenches ;  consider- 
able ground  was  gained,   in  places   as  much  as  400 
yards.     The  success  was  general,  except  on  the  ex- 
treme left.     Here  the  original  failure  to  hold  Y  Beach 
at  the  first  landing  was  now  bitterly  felt,  for  in  that 
direction  the  Lancashire  Fusiliers  found  it  impossible 
to  advance,  and  the  call  to  attack  with  the  bayonet 
an  entrenched  redoubt  defended  by  hidden  machine- 
guns  was  a  stern  order  for  Territorials  inexperienced 
in  war.     For  a  time,  on  the  right  also,  the  situation 
was   serious.       Such    a   storm    of  shrapnel    met    the 
French    advance    that    African    fugitives    in    great 
numbers    came    sweeping   down    through   the  Naval 
Brigade,  and  spread  a  confusion  only  checked  by  the 
advance  of  the  French  reserves.^ 

The  battle  had  now  lasted  without  intermission 
for  two  days,  and  the  nights  brought  little  rest.  The 
Regular  troops  had  been  fighting  close  upon  a  fort- 

^  Compare   Ashmead  Bartlett's    Dispatches  from  the   Dardanelles^ 
p.  118, 


ifr  THE  Battles  of  may 

nigiil  nidwct  relieL      '.  '    :~   : 
were  kiEed,  woimde::    : :  ^   - 

tbe£r   o^^cers    rr^e..      Tze    :-    :-     .'    .- 


1    rj-  were 


.   -    __-       T      iL-t    ::    .:e5    znztr.-i-F:.    -     Mr 


MAY  8  AT  HELLES  153 

was  in  command,  a  bald-headed  veieran  of  severxty, 
ven^  small,  active,  and  alert,  endowed  with  an  irre- 
pressible sense  of  comedy,  which  he  gaily  diffused 
among  men  and  officers  alike.  One  of  his  brigades 
was  at  once  sent  forward  to  strengthen  the  French 
position.  On  the  British  section,  the  Lancashire 
Fusiliers  and  the  Indian  Brigade  were  withdrawn 
into  reserve  ;  the  87th  Brigade  was  left  to  struggle 
on  the  terribly  exposed  and  narrow  height  between 
the  Gully  Ravine  and  the  sea ;  the  New  Zealanders 
were  ordered  to  pass  through  the  88th  Brigade  and 
advance  directly  upon  Krithia ;  the  Austra. 1^:^.5  re- 
mained temporarily  on  their  right  in  reser\*e,  and,  as 
before,  R,X.D.  battalions  formed  the  connecting  link 
with  the  French  on  both  sides  of  the  main  Krithia  road. 
Sir  Ian  and  the  Headquarter  Staff  had  pitched 
camp  in  a  depression  of  the  ground  above  Cape 
Tekke,  too  close  to  the  Divisional  Headquarters,  but 
the  limited  space  allowed  no  choice.  Before  the 
neigrhbourinor  hiorh  around  above  \V  Beach,  beside 
the  cemetery,  the  scene  of  battle  lay  openly  extended, 
and  the  movements  of  each  section  could  be  watched 
from  hour  to  hour,  except  when  advancing  lines  dis- 
appeared for  a  while  into  dongas,  or  when  the  smoke 
and  upheaval  of  bursting  shells  obscured  the  view  with 
black  or  yellow  clouds.  Otherwise,  ail  was  \*isible 
except  the  enemy,  and,  from  the  vacant  appearance 

comprising  the  7eme  Regiment  Colonial  (Li«iL-C<^<Hiel  BordeanxX 
partly  Senegalese,  and  the  Seme  Regimoit  Colosiial  (LioiL-CfdcMid 
d'Adhemar),  also  partly  Senegalese.  The  Dryisjao  had  ax  battoies  of 
"  75''s  "  and  two  of  momitain  guns.  The  Corps  of  die  two  DhrisitHis  had 
two  regiments  of  Chasseurs  d'Afriqne,  fom-  120  mm.  gmis,  foor  155  mm. 
gmis  (long),  six  155  nmi.  gtms  (short\  besides  detachments  of  engine^s, 
supply,  aimy  service,  and  ambolance. 


154  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

of  the  ground  before  them,  it  would  have  seemed 
possible  for  the  army  to  advance  in  uninterrupted 
lines  across  the  gently  rising  slopes  to  Krithia  or  the 
truncated  pyramid  of  Achi  Baba  itself. 

At  10.15  on  May  8,  the  customary  bombardment 
from  sea  and  land  began,  and  was  received  with  the 
customary  silence.  At  10.30  the  infantry  moved, 
and  at  once  the  roar  of  rifles  and  machine-guns 
arose  from  the  Turkish  trenches,  while  overhead 
the  Turkish  shrapnel  burst  incessantly.  The  87th 
Brigade  attempted  to  push  forward,  but  could  hardly 
advance  a  hundred  yards,  the  South  Wales  Borderers 
losing  heavily.  Among  the  scattered  trees  and 
rugged  ravines  on  the  right  of  the  gully,  the  New 
Zealanders,  under  Brigadier-General  F.  E.  Johnston, 
advanced  by  short  rushes  for  nearly  300  yards,  but, 
exposed  to  machine-guns  on  both  flanks,  were  forced 
to  dig  in  soon  after  midday.^  Shortly  before.  General 
Paris,  R.N.D.,  commanding  the  composite  division, 
ordered  the  Australians  to  advance  into  the  centre  of 
the  attacking  line  upon  the  New  Zealanders'  right.^ 
They  were  under  command  of  Brigadier-General  J. 
W.  M'Cay,  who,  with  his  Brigade-Major,  Major  Cass, 
went  up  into  the  firing  line  with  his  battalions,  reck- 
lessly exposing  himself  to  the  heaviest  fire  until  even- 
ing, when  he  was  wounded,  as  Major  Cass  had  twice 
been  at  an  earlier  stage. 

^  The  brigade  consisted  of  the  WelUngton  Battalion  (Lieut.-Colonel 
W.  G.  Malone,  a  splendid  soldier  and  man,  afterwards  killed  at  Anzac), 
the  Auckland  (Lieut.-Colonel  A.  Plugge),  the  Canterbury  (Lieut.-Colonel 
D.  M.  Stewart),  and  the  Otago  (Lieut.-Colonel  T.  W.  M'Donald). 

2  The  2nd  Australian  Brigade  consisted  of  the  5th  Victoria  Battalion 
(Lieut.-Colonel  Wanliss),  the  6th  (Lieut.-Colonel  M'Nicol),  the  7th 
(Lieut.-Colonel  Garside),  and  the  8th  (Lieut.-Colonel  Bolton). 


THE  AUSTRALIAN  CHARGE  155 

The  Australians  advanced    to  a  slight  hollow  in 
the  ground,  giving  some  amount  of  cover.     Here  it 
seemed   likely   they   would   bivouac,  for   during  the 
early  afternoon  an  ominous  pause  ensued.     But  Sir 
Ian  had  determined  upon  one  more  effort  to  secure 
victory   by   movement.     At  5.15  all  the   battleships 
and  cruisers,  all  the  French  "  75's,"  and  such  heavy 
guns  as  we  possessed,  opened   a   tremendous   bom- 
bardment.   The  bursting  shells  concealed  the  slopes  of 
Achi  Baba  on  both  sides.     Sudden  volcanoes  spouted 
rock  and  earth  in  dark  cones.      The  orange  of  the 
lyddite  curled  over  the  enemy's  trenches.     It  seemed 
impossible  for  human  beings  to  survive  that  quarter 
of  an  hour.     At  5.30  all  guns  ceased  like  one,  and 
with  bayonets  fixed  and  rifles  at  the  slope,  the  whole 
line  again  moved  forward.     The  brunt  of  the  fighting 
now  fell  to  the  Australians.     Two  battalions  in  front 
and  two  in  support,  they  walked  or  ran  in   "  rushes  " 
of  50  or  60  yards  on  about   1000  yards  of  front  to 
the  left  of  the  Krithia  road.     The  ground  was  open, 
and  their  appearance  was  at  once  greeted  by  the  roar 
of  rifles,  machine-guns  and  field-guns,  which  the  bom- 
bardment had  again    utterly  failed    to  silence.     The 
Australians,  though  heavily  laden  with  packs,  shovels, 
picks,  and  entrenching  tools,  and  exposed  to  intense 
fire,    pressed    on,    rush    after    rush,    their    Brigadier 
directing  and  encouraging  by  waving  a  stick  in  front. 
Without  a  sight  of  their  deadly  enemy,  they  advanced 
over  800  yards,  the  support  battalions  joining  up  into 
the  bayonet  line.     They  swept  across  a  long  Turkish 
trench.     They  shot   those    who    ran,  and  bayoneted 
those  who  stayed.     They  came  within  half  a  mile  of 
the  eastern  approaches  to  Krithia  itself.     Seldom  in 


"S^ETfT 


4- 


156  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

this  war  has  so  reckless  and  irresistible  an  advance 
been  recorded.  None  the  less,  after  an  addition  of  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  beyond  our  original  lines,  it  was 
checked.  Suddenly  upon  the  right  Major  Cass, 
wounded  in  both  shoulders,  had  discovered  a  yawning 
gap  of  300  yards,  into  which  groups  of  Turks  were 
pouring  down  a  gully  to  harass  the  Australian  line  on 
flank  and  rear.^ 

The  French,  though  late,  had  advanced  gallantly 
to  the  attack,  drums  beating,  bugles  blowing,  as  in  a 
Napoleonic  battle.  The  French  white  troops  in  good 
order  fought  their  way  about  300  yards  farther  along 
the  Kereves  Ridge,  capturing  the  much-disputed 
redoubt.  But  the  gap  was  left.  The  Naval  Brigade 
were  delayed  in  filling  it,  and  in  the  falling  darkness 
the  whole  line,  exhausted  and  reduced,  had  barely 
life  left  in  them  to  dig  trenches  for  the  night.  An 
average  advance  of  500  yards  had  been  accomplished. 

Next  day  (May  9)  Sir  Ian  issued  the  following 
special  order  to  the  Australians  and  to  theBritish  troops, 
which  had  now  become  the  VII Ith  Army  Corps  : 

"  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  wishes  the  troops  of  the 
Mediterranean  Expeditionary  Force  to  be  informed 
that  in  all  his  past  experiences,  which  include  the 
hard  struggle  of  the  Russo-Japanese  campaign,  he 
has  never  seen  more  devoted  gallantry  displayed  than 
that  which  has  characterised  their  efforts  during  the 
past  three  days.  He  has  informed  Lord  Kitchener 
by  cable  of  the  bravery  and  endurance  displayed  by 
all  ranks  here,  and  has  asked  that  the  necessary 
reinforcements  be  forthwith  dispatched.  Meanwhile, 
the  remainder  of  the  East  Lancashire  Division  is 
disembarking,    and    will   henceforth    be   available    to 

^  See  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  143-156. 


THE  29th  division  PRAISED  157 

help  us  to  make  good  and  improve  upon  the  positions 
we  have  so  hardly  won." 

In  spite  of  a  heavy  counter-attack  against  the 
French  position  on  the  night  of  the  Qth-ioth,  compara- 
tive quiet  prevailed  during  the  next  two  or  three  days. 
But  at  Helles,  even  on  the  quietest  days,  shell-fire 
never  ceased,  and,  to  say  nothing  of  the  V  and  W 
Beaches,  the  troops  withdrawn  from  the  firing  line  to 
rest  were  continually  exposed  to  danger.  For  such 
rest,  it  was  time  to  withdraw  the  29th  Division,  now 
that  the  East  Lancashires  (42nd)  could  take  its  place. 
The  Division  had  lost  about  11,000  men  and  400 
officers.  The  relics  of  those  unyielding  battalions 
began  to  come  back  on  the  i  ith.  That  night  and  next 
day  it  rained  heavily  for  the  first  time,  but  the  over- 
wearied men  sank  down  into  mud  or  pools  of  water, 
indifferent  to  everything  but  sleep.  In  their  honour, 
so  well  deserved,  Sir  Ian  issued  a  second  special 
order,  dated  May  12  : 

"  For  the  first  time  for  eighteen  days  and  nights 
it  has  been  found  possible  to  withdraw  the  29th 
Division  from  the  fire  fight.  During  the  whole  of 
that  long  period  of  unprecedented  strain  the  Division 
has  held  ground  or  gained  it,  against  the  bullets 
and  bayonets  of  the  constantly  renewed  forces  of 
the  foe. 

"  During  the  whole  of  that  long  period  they  have 
been  illuminating  the  pages  of  military  history  with 
their  blood.  The  losses  have  been  terrible,  but 
mingling  with  the  deep  sorrow  for  fallen  comrades 
arises  a  feeling  of  pride  in  the  invincible  spirit  which 
has  enabled  the  survivors  to  triumph  where  ordinary 
troops  must  inevitably  have  failed. 

"  I  tender  to  Major-General   Hunter-Weston  and 


158  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

to  his  Division  at  the  same  time  my  profoundest 
sympathy  with  their  losses  and  my  warmest  con- 
gratulations on  their  achievement."  ^ 

Only  five  days'  rest  could  be  allowed.  Immedi- 
ately before  the  withdrawal  began,  the  29th  Indian 
Brigade,  as  though  to  prove  themselves  worthy  of  the 
Division  to  which  they  were  now  attached,  carried 
through  a  dashing  adventure,  suitable  to  the 
character  of  the  men.  The  design  was  due  to  Sir 
Herbert  Cox,  commanding  the  brigade,  and  the 
object  was  to  capture  the  high  cliff  or  "bluff"  over- 
looking the  ravine  of  Y  Beach  on  the  farther  side. 
It  has  been  seen  how  greatly  the  failure  to  hold  this 
position  at  the  first  landing  had  impeded  the  advance 
of  our  left  wing.  Upon  the  bluff,  the  Turks  had 
constructed  a  formidable  redoubt,  whence  machine- 
guns  and  rifles  rendered  movement  along  the  west 
side  of  the  Gully  Ravine  impossible.  On  the  night 
of  the  loth-i  ith,  the  scouts  of  the  6th  Gurkhas  (Lieut.- 
Colonel  the  Honourable  C.  G.  Bruce)  scrambled  along 
the  shore  to  the  foot  of  the  cliff,  and  climbed  right  up 
the  precipitous  face.  On  the  summit  they  were  met 
by  heavy  fire,  and  as  a  surprise  the  attempt  failed. 
But  on  the  evening  of  the  next  day  but  one  (the  12th), 
the  Manchester  Brigade  (one  of  those  Territorial 
Corps  fit  to  rank  with  veteran  Regulars)  made  a  feint 
upon  the  position  from  our  right,  assisted  by  the  29th 
Division's  artillery  and  the  guns  of  the  Dublin  and 
Talbot  from  the  sea.  While  the  attention  of  the 
Turks  was  thus  occupied,  a  double-company  of 
Gurkhas  again  crawled  up  the  cliff,  and  rushed  the 
redoubt  with  a  sudden  charge.      During  the  night  and 

'  With  the  Twenty-ninth  Division,  p.  94. 


TRENCH  WARFARE  BEGUN  159 

at  early  morning,  they  were  supported  by  three 
Gurkha  reinforcements  of  double-companies,  the 
entrenchment  was  rapidly  completed,  and  the  position 
permanendy  held.  It  was  afterwards  always  known 
as  "  Gurkha  Bluff,"  and  its  value  for  the  protection  of 
our  extreme  left  was  incalculable. 

It  had  now  become  evident  that  victory  by  open 
movement  upon  the  surface  could  scarcely  be  hoped 
for.  As  in  France  and  Flanders,  the  two  modern 
instruments  of  barbed  wire  and  machine-guns  had  so 
strengthened  the  power  of  defence  that  open  assault 
would  always  cost  many  lives,  and  was  rendered  im- 
possible without  a  "barrage"  of  shells  such  as  the 
Dardanelles  force  was  incapable  of  affording.  Indeed, 
the  very  word  "barrage"  was  then  hardly  known  to 
British  troops.  The  opposing  lines  were  brought 
almost  to  a  standstill,  and  advance  became  possible 
only  by  trench  and  sap,  as  in  an  old-fashioned  siege, 
varied  by  almost  continuous  attacks  and  Separate 
exploits,  designed  partly  to  save  our  own  men  from 
the  rot  of  inactivity,  but  chiefly  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  concentrating  his  efforts  to  drive  us  off  the  land. 
The  line  was,  accordingly,  organised  into  four 
permanent  sections  from  left  to  right — the  29th 
Division  (with  the  Indian  Brigade),  the  42nd  Division 
(one  brigade  of  which,  the  East  Lancashire,  was 
split  up  to  gain  experience  with  the  29th  Division),^ 
the  Royal  Naval  Division,  and  the  French  Expedi- 
tionary Corps,  now  counting  two  divisions.  In  the 
middle  of  May  (the  14th)  the  French  Commandant, 
General  d'Amade,  a  soldier  with  unusual  knowledge 
of    foreign    affairs,    who    knew    the    Far    East    well, 

^  Ibid.,  p.  112. 


i6o  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

was  French  Attach^  in  the  South  African  War,  and 
served  with  distinction  in  Morocco,  retired  from  the 
Peninsula,  having  found  the  prolonged  strain  too  great 
for  nerves  impoverished  by  illness.  He  was  sent  on 
a  special  mission  to  Russia,  and  was  succeeded  by 
General  Gouraud,  a  cool,  solid,  and  imperturbable 
soldier  of  the  best  French  type,  who  had  won  high 
reputation  in  the  Argonne. 

At  Anzac,  although  deprived  for  a  few  days  (till 
May  15)  of  the  two  brigades  withdrawn  to  Helles, 
the  Australasians  continued  to  strengthen  their  hold 
upon  the  perilous  edges  of  their  rough  triangle.  But 
in  the  middle  of  the  month  (May  15),  just  as  the  two 
brigades  were  returning,  General  Bridges,  command- 
ing the  ist  Australian  Division,  was  mortally  wounded. 
In  crossing  the  mouth  of  Shrapnel  Valley,  where  the 
protecting  parapets  had  not  yet  been  completed,  he 
was  struck  in  the  thigh  by  a  sniper  hidden  somewhere 
in  the  bushes  beyond  Pope's  Hill.  His  last  words 
on  leaving  Anzac  in  a  hospital  ship  were,  "Anyhow, 
I  have  commanded  an  Australian  Division  for  nine 
months."^  Before  Alexandria  was  reached,  he  died  : 
a  stern,  outwardly  cold,  and  lonely  man,  pitiless  to 
apathy,  capable  of  organisation,  and  inspiring  the 
confidence  always  felt  in  unyielding  and  unselfish 
capacity.  The  command  of  the  ist  Division  was  at 
once  taken  over  by  Major-General  H.  B.  Walker,  a 
resolute  and  gallant  leader,  who  had  served  in  the 
British  Army  in  the  Soudan  campaigns,  the  N.-W. 
Frontier,  and  South  Africa.  He  was  among  the 
most  determined  opponents  of  evacuation  on  the 
night  after  the   Anzac    landing.       His   headquarters 

^  Australia  in  Anns,  p.  158. 


MAY  19  AT  ANZAC  i6i 

were  fixed  at  the  top  of  the  "White  Valley,"  close 
to  the  region  afterwards  famous  as  Lone  Pine. 

On  May  19,  three  days  after  the  loss  of  their  own 
General,  the  Australians,  together  with  the  rest  of 
Anzac,  were  called  upon  to  resist  the  most  violent 
attempt  that  the  Turks  ever  made  to  drive  them  off 
the  cliffs.  The  enemy  had  now  largely  increased 
their  artillery,  which  included  at  least  one  11 -inch 
gun,  some  8-inch,  and  several  47-inch,  all  well  posted 
and  concealed.  Liman  von  Sanders  had  also  brought 
up  forces  amounting  to  30,000  men,  believed  to 
include  five  fresh  regiments,  and  he  took  command 
in  person.  Directly  the  moon  set  on  the  night  of 
the  i8th-i9th,  a  tremendous  fire  of  guns  and  rifles 
burst  from  the  surrounding  Turkish  lines.  This 
often  happened  at  Anzac,  and  now,  as  usual,  the 
noise  died  down  after  about  an  hour.  But  at  3.30, 
crowds  of  silent  figures  were  detected  in  the  darkness 
creeping  close  up  to  the  centre  of  the  Australian 
trenches.  Directly  the  sentries  fired,  masses  of  the 
enemy  in  thick  lines  came  rushing  forward,  yelling 
their  battle-cry  to  the  Prophet's  God.  Though 
most  severe  along  the  ridge  between  Quinn's  and 
Courtney's  Posts,  the  assault  extended  over  the 
whole  front,  with  great  violence  at  the  dangerously 
exposed  apex  of  the  triangle.  The  assailants  came 
on  so  thick,  the  ground  to  be  covered  was  so  narrow 
— in  places  only  a  few  yards  across  between  the 
confronting  trenches — that  the  Anzacs  had  but  to 
fire  point-blank  into  the  half-visible  darkness  before 
them,  and  at  every  shot  an  enemy  fell.  Many 
Australians  mounted  the  parapet,  and,  sitting  astride 
upon  it,  fired  continuously,  as  in  an  enormous  drive 


i62  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

of  game.  Morning  broke,  the  sun  rose  behind  the 
teaming  assailants,  machine-guns  and  rifles  mowed 
them  down  in  rows,  and  piled  them  up  into  barriers 
and  parapets  of  the  dead  and  scarcely  living.  Still 
the  peasants  of  Islam,  summoned  from  quiet  villages 
of  Thrace  and  Asia,  unconscious  of  the  cause  for 
which  they  died,  except  that  it  was  the  cause  of 
Islam — still  they  came  on,  shouting  their  battle-cry. 
Emptying  their  rifles  into  trenches  manned  with 
equal  constancy,  rushing  wildly  up  to  the  sandbag 
lines,  they  scrambled  over  them,  only  to  die  of  rifles 
which  scorched  their  skin,  or  of  bayonets  dripping 
blood. 

From  3.30  till  nearly  11  the  conflict  raged;  but 
before  the  sun  was  at  its  height  the  noise  and  shouting 
gradually  died  away.  The  great  assault  was  finished, 
and  had  failed.  In  heaps  and  lines,  more  than  3000 
Turks  lay  dying  or  already  dead.  The  defence  lost 
only  100  killed,  and  about  500  wounded.  Not 
a  yard  of  Anzac  had  been  yielded  up.  The  enemy 
never  again  attempted  an  attack  upon  that  scale. 

So  appalling  had  the  thin  strip  of  neutral  ground 
now  become  owing  to  the  ghastly  heaps  of  swollen 
or  shrinking  bodies  piled  upon  it,  so  overpowering 
was  the  stink  of  rotting  men,  that  the  Turks,  waving 
white  flags  and  red  crescents,  requested  an  armistice 
for  burial.  After  some  naturally  suspicious  hesitation 
(for  the  enemy  mustered  in  thick  lines,  and  fighting 
was  frequently  renewed)  a  Turkish  officer  was 
brought  blindfold  into  Anzac  Cove,  four  Australian 
officers  carrying  him  through  the  sea  round  the  end 
of  the  entanglement  beyond  Hell  Spit.  Major- 
General    Braithwaite,   Chief  of  Sir   lan's  Stafl",  met 


ARMISTICE  AT  ANZAC  163 

him  at  General  Birdwood's  headquarters,  close  beside 
the  beach  opposite  the  chief  landing-place,  called 
"Watson's  Pier,"  because  built  by  Anzac  signallers 
under  Captain  Watson.  An  armistice  for  May  24 
was  arranged,  and  duly  carried  out.  It  lasted  from 
early  morning  till  late  afternoon,  and  was  attended 
with  the  usual  ironic  circumstances.  Within  certain 
limits  marked  by  white  flags,  Australians  freely 
conversed  with  Turkish  officers  who  spoke  faultless 
English,  and  were  lavish  in  politeness  and  cigarettes. 
It  is  said  that  General  Liman  von  Sanders  himself, 
disguised  as  a  Red  Crescent  sergeant,  mixed  unde- 
tected with  the  crowd  upon  that  wet  and  misty 
morning.^ 

It  may  have  been  so,  nor  was  there  cause  for 
disguise.  It  was  by  his  authority  as  Commandant 
of  the  5th  Ottoman  Army  that  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Fahreddin  concluded  the  armistice,  as  narrated.  The 
note  in  which  Sir  Ian  was  informed  of  this  authorisa- 
tion concluded  with  the  words  :  "  J'ai  I'honneur  d'etre 
avec  I'assurance  de  ma  plus  haute  consideration, 
Liman  von  Sanders."  So  the  courteous  amenities 
of  slaughter  were  maintained,  and  the  Turks  buried 
3000  corpses,  all  killed  since  May  18. 

Formidable  as  the  Turkish  onset  had  been,  a 
still  more  serious  peril  now  threatened  the  expedi- 
tion. For  some  days  past,  rumours  of  two  hostile 
submarines  had  reached  the  Staff  Since  all  com- 
munication was  by  sea,  since  the  guns  were  largely 
furnished  by  the  fleet,  and  even  General  Head- 
quarters were  afloat,  no  news  more  ominous  could 
have  arrived.     A  foretaste  of  danger  was  given  on 

^  Australia  in  Arms,  p.  166. 


1 64  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

May  13,  when,  in  the  darkness,  a  Turkish  destroyer 
slid  silently  down  the  strait  and  torpedoed  the  battle- 
ship Goliath,  lying  at  anchor  off  Morto  Bay  to 
support  the  French  flank.  She  was  a  fifteen-year- 
old  ship  (12,950  tons),  and  she  sank  at  once,  carrying 
down  her  captain,  Thomas  Shelford,  19  officers,  and 
over  500  men.  As  they  drowned,  they  were  swept  by 
the  current  past  the  Cornwallis,  lying  nearly  a  mile 
astern,  and  their  cries  for  help  were  pitiful.  The  Corn- 
wallis  boats  saved  56,  but  only  183  were  saved  in  all.^ 
Nearly  a  fortnight  later  (May  25  and  27),  a 
large  German  submarine,  U51,  which  had  come 
round  by  Gibraltar  (others  perhaps  hailed  from  the 
Austrian  naval  base  at  Pola),  struck  two  heavy 
blows  in  succession.  Off  Anzac,  the  Triumph 
(11,800  tons,  completed  1904)  lay  at  anchor,  with  nets 
out.  Suddenly  she  was  struck  by  a  torpedo,  which 
cut  through  her  nets  like  thread.  In  ten  minutes  she 
sank,  carrying  down  three  officers  and  sixty-eight 
men,  within  sight  of  the  Anzac  forces,  which  she  had 
so  finely  served.  All  of  the  Anzacs  volunteered  a 
month's  pay  toward  the  expense  of  salving  her,  but 
that  was  impossible.  The  next  morning  but  one, 
the  Majestic  (Captain  Talbot),  1895,  i4>900  tons, 
Rear-Admiral  Stuart  Nicholson's  flagship,  lying  at 
anchor  close  off  Helles,  her  nets  out,  and  surrounded 


1  The  Imtnortal  Gamble,  pp.  167-174.  Lieutenant  Gather,  R.N., 
went  down  with  the  Goliath,  but  was  kept  afloat  by  a  safety  waistcoat. 
This  he  gave  to  a  sailor  much  exhausted.  Ultimately  he  was  himself 
rescued,  and  for  some  months  commanded  on  the  River  Clyde.  It  is 
impossible  to  mention  all  such  heroic  actions,  but  hard  to  omit  the  deeds 
of  personal  friends.  One  midshipman,  also  protected  by  a  safety  waist- 
coat, was  found  floating  about  two  days  and  nights  after  the  disaster, 
but  was  too  exhausted  to  live. 


ARRIVAL  OF  HOSTILE  SUBMARINES         165 

by  small  craft  of  all  kinds,  met  the  same  fate.  The 
submarine  picked  her  out  as  a  good  sportsman  picks 
out  the  king  of  a  herd.  Fortunately,  she  was  pre- 
pared for  the  stroke,  and  only  forty-eight  men  were 
lost.  She  sank  in  six  fathoms,  listing  heavily  to 
starboard,  and  then  turning  completely  over,  so  that 
her  keel  remained  visible,  like  the  back  of  a  huge 
whale,  above  the  surface  till  near  the  end  of  the 
campaign,  when  she  was  blown  up  as  an  obstruction. 
On  the  same  day  as  the  disaster  to  the  Triumph, 
a  submarine  also  aimed  at  the  Vengeance,  the  Lord 
Nelson  (Admiral  de  Robeck's  flagship),  and  three 
of  the  French  battleships.  It  was  evident  that  the 
whole  system  of  naval  action,  anchorage,  and  supply 
must  be  changed. 

Warships  and  transports  were  rapidly  withdrawn, 
for  the  most  part  to  Mudros  harbour.  The  Queen 
Elizabeth  had  been  sent  home  at  the  first  rumour  of 
the  peril,  as  being  too  valuable  to  risk  upon  a  distant 
and  secondary  purpose.  For  the  rest,  the  neighbour- 
ing island  of  Imbros,  lying  only  from  ten  to  twelve 
miles  west  and  south-west  from  the  landing-places  on 
the  Peninsula,  afforded  an  open  bay  as  roadstead, 
sandy,  shallow,  and  fully  exposed  to  the  north  wind. 
On  the  east  side,  the  bay  or  inlet  is  protected  by  a 
long  promontory  of  sand  dunes  and  sandstone  cliff, 
known  as  Cape  Kephalos.  On  the  west  rise  the 
mountains  of  Imbros,  perhaps  the  most  beautiful 
even  of  y^gean  islands.  On  this  part  of  the  island 
only  three  small  hamlets  stand,  squalid  with  poverty. 
But  a  mountain  track  over  a  pass  in  the  central  range 
leads  to  the  chief  village  of  Panaghia,  and  two  other 
large   villages,   rich,    as  Greek  islands  go,  in  maize. 


1 66  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

vines,  fig  trees,  and  olives.  About  two^miles"  beyond 
Panaghia  lies  the  crumbling  little  port  of  Kastro, 
dominated  by  an  ancient  ruined  castle,  Byzantine, 
Venetian,  or  Turkish,  into  which  slabs  of  white 
marble  have  been  built,  remnants  of  some  Greek 
temple.  The  island  appears  to  have  small  place  in 
Greek  history  and  literature,  though  an  unknown 
staff  officer,  meeting  me  in  one  of  the  valleys,  un- 
expectedly quoted  perhaps  from  Sappho  a  passage 
about  it  or  Lemnos.  And,  indeed,  it  is  a  haunt  fit 
for  rugged  and  pastoral  gods  rather  than  for  polite 
literature,  civilisation,  and  war.  From  the  top  of  the 
pass  the  whole  of  the  Peninsula  is  seen  ;  the  Straits 
and  the  plain  of  Troy  beyond  ;  and  far  in  the  distance 
the  grey  heights  of  Ida,  and  dim  mountains  of 
Mitylene.  Looking  west  across  a  narrow  water, 
one  sees  near  at  hand  the  vast  red  peaks  of  Samo- 
thrace,  a  natural  home  of  savage  mysteries. 

The  arrival  of  hostile  submarines  caused  the  dis- 
persal of  the  fleet  and  transports,  leaving  the  main 
supply  of  the  army  to  indefatigable  trawlers,  fleet- 
sweepers,  and  other  small  craft,  and  involving  the 
removal  of  General  Headquarters  from  sea  to  land. 
For  some  days  the  Arcadian  had  a  merchant  ship 
lashed  each  side  of  her  for  protection,  but  the  navy 
refused  further  responsibility,  and  at  the  end  of  May 
Sir  Ian  and  his  Staff  put  ashore  on  Imbros.  There 
was  no  choice,  for  Tenedos  was  largely  occupied  by 
the  French ;  Mudros  was  too  distant  ;  and  on  the 
Peninsula  no  place  could  be  found  for  General  Head- 
quarters without  entanglement  in  the  headquarters 
of  divisions  or  the  Anzac  Corps.  Kephalos  Bay 
was    nearly    equidistant    from    both   landings   (about 


G.H.Q.  AT  IMBROS  167 

twelve  miles  from  Anzac,  and  ten  from  Helles),  with 
both  of  which  it  was  rapidly  connected  by  telephone 
and  telegraph.  Accordingly,  the  camp  was  pitched 
among  the  sand  dunes  at  the  base  of  the  Kephalos 
promontory,  looking  over  the  bay  to  jagged  mount- 
ains beyond.  A  small  stone  pier  was  built,  for 
Headquarter  use  only,  whence  Sir  Ian  visited  the 
Peninsula  on  a  torpedo  boat  three  or  four  times  every 
week.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  bay  the  navy 
constructed  a  similar  but  longer  pier,  and  sank  a 
collier  and  two  smaller  Italian  vessels  to  form  a 
breakwater  against  the  north.  Thus  a  fairly 
sheltered  port  was  made  for  the  trawlers  running 
daily  to  the  Peninsula  with  drafts  and  supplies,  and 
for  those  which  returned  to  Mudros  for  more.  Level 
ground,  stretching  over  a  mile  south-west,  was  used 
as  a  store-depot,  a  rest-camp,  and  a  training-place  for 
reinforcements.  Up  in  the  hills  a  camp  was  laid  out 
for  Turkish  prisoners,  who  worked  at  road-making. 
Two  or  three  miles  away,  above  a  salt  marsh,  and 
upon  the  south  coast,  were  stations  for  R.N.A.S. 
aeroplanes,  which  numbered  about  60  in  all,  but 
never  counted  more  than  25  or  30  in  action.  In  the 
later  months  of  the  expedition.  General  Headquarters 
were  removed  to  the  entrance  of  the  deep  valley  lead- 
ing up  to  the  pass,  because  gales,  dust  storms,  hostile 
aeroplanes,  and  want  of  water  and  shade  upon  the 
sand  dunes  added,  as  might  have  been  foreseen,  to 
the  inevitable  discomforts  of  war. 

On  May  25  (one  month  after  the  landing)  Sir  Ian 
issued  a  special  order  "to  explain  to  officers,  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  men  the  real  significance 
of  the  calls   made   upon   them    to    risk    their   lives, 


i68  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

apparently  for  nothing  better  than  to  gain  a  few 
yards  of  uncultivated  land."  He  pointed  out  that 
"  a  comparatively  small  body  of  the  finest  troops  in 
the  world,  French  and  British,  had  effected  a  lodg- 
ment close  to  the  heart  of  a  great  Continental 
Empire,  still  formidable  even  in  its  decadence." 
Owing  to  their  attacks,  the  Government  at  Constan- 
tinople was  gradually  wearing  itself  out.  Under- 
stating the  estimates  received  from  the  agents  of 
neutral  Powers,  he  showed  that,  at  the  beginning,  the 
Peninsula  had  been  defended  by  34,000  Nizam  (first 
line)  troops  and  100  guns,  with  41,000  half-Nizam, 
half-Redif  (second  line)  on  the  Asiatic  side.  By 
May  12  these  had  been  reinforced  by  20,000  infantry 
and  2 1  batteries  of  field  artillery.  Since  then  at  least 
24,000  had  been  added  from  Constantinople  and 
Smyrna.  Our  small  expeditionary  force,  though  so 
much  reduced,^  had  during  the  month  held  in  check 
nearly  130,000  of  the  enemy,  and,  at  a  low  estimate, 
had  inflicted  on  him  the  loss  of  55,000,  thus  diminish- 
ing the  fully  trained  men  at  his  disposal.  The  order 
concluded  with  the  words  : 

"  Daily  we  make  progress,  and  whenever  the 
reinforcements  close  at  hand  begin  to  put  in  an 
appearance,  the  Mediterranean  Expeditionary  Force 
will  press  forward  with  a  fresh  impulse  to  accomplish 
the  greatest  Imperial  task  ever  entrusted  to  an 
army." 

The  task  was  indeed  great,  if  not  the  greatest ; 
but  in  London  and  on  the  fronts  of  war  events  com- 
bined to  increase  its  difficulty.  So  far  as  the 
expedition  was  concerned,  the  collapse  of  the  Russian 

^  Our  casualties  by  the  end  of  May  were  38,600. 


HOPE  OF  RUSSIAN  SUPPORT  FADES         169 

armies  under  General  von  Hindenburg's  violent 
attacks  in  Courland,  Poland,  and  Galicia  was  the 
event  of  most  vital  importance.  In  this  month  of 
May  the  enemy  seized  the  port  of  Libau,  approached 
Przemysl,  threatened  Warsaw,  and  drove  the 
Russians  back  from  the  Carpathians  into  the  basin 
of  the  Dniester.  In  consequence  of  these  successive 
blows,  it  became  certain  that  the  Russian  Army 
Corps  of  43,000  men  under  General  Istomine,  which 
was  to  advance  upon  Constantinople  from  the  eastern 
side  as  soon  as  our  fleet  and  army  dominated  the 
Dardanelles,  would  be  withdrawn,  and  the  expecta- 
tion of  Russian  assistance  was  abandoned.  No 
longer  threatened  from  the  Black  Sea,  Turkey  could 
now  divert  an  equivalent  force  to  the  defence  of  the 
Peninsula,  and  did,  in  fact,  divert  four  or  five  Divisions. 
What  was  worse,  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  long  hesi- 
tating on  which  side  his  interests  lay,  was  encouraged 
by  the  Russian  defeats  to  put  his  calculating  trust 
upon  the  German  alliance.  Yet  our  diplomatists, 
apparently  unpractised  in  deception  and  ingratitude, 
had  fondly  supposed  that  Bulgaria  would  never  take 
arms  against  her  Russian  deliverer,  and  were  even 
counting  upon  her  co-operation  in  the  Near  East. 
In  spite  of  such  errors,  it  is  currently  believed  that 
aristocratic  diplomatists  and  Foreign  Ministers  are 
endowed  with  an  ancestral  instinct  for  diplomacy 
beyond  the  possible  possession  of  people  less  nobly 
born,  and  for  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  we  must 
indeed  be  thankful  that  our  aristocracy  has  survived 
to  protect  us  from  blunders  even  more  disastrous 
than  their  own. 

In    the   middle   of    May    the    Salandra-Sonnino 


i;o  THE  BATTLES  OF  MAY 

Ministry,  urged  on  by  the  poet  D'Annunzio  and  the 
Futurist  Marinetti,  declared  war  upon  Austria  ;  but 
Italy's  intervention  had  small  influence  on  the  position 
in  the  Dardanelles.  Mr.  Asquith's  deliberate  over- 
throw of  his  own  Cabinet,  and  his  attempt  to  promote 
the  national  cause  by  a  large  Coalition  Ministry,  in 
which  he  might  well  have  anticipated  a  hostility  fatal 
to  his  leadership,  had  greater  effect,  and  the  effect 
was  maliorn.  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  who  could  be 
counted  upon  to  promote  the  interests  of  the  ex- 
pedition as  his  own  particular  child,  retired  to  the 
Duchy  of  Lancaster,  resigning  the  Admiralty  to  Mr. 
Balfour's  charge.  Just  before  his  resignation  his 
trusted  adviser  and  opponent,  Lord  Fisher,  had 
himself  resigned,  and  refused  to  return,  though  called 
upon  by  the  appeal  of  the  whole  nation,  outside  the 
industrious  promoters  of  panic.  His  place  as  First 
Sea  Lord  was  taken  by  Sir  Henry  Jackson  ;  but  the 
country  deplored  the  loss  to  her  service  of  a  great 
personality.  That  element  of  luck  which  forms  part 
of  a  successful  General's  endowment  was  already 
turning  against  the  expedition,  and  critics  were 
beginning  to  advise  retreat,  foretelling  disasters  which 
the  prophecy  of  evil  often  contributes  to  promote.^ 

^  "  We  went  on  board  the  Implacable  on  the  way  back,  where  I  met 
Ashmead  Bartlett,  the  official  newspaper  correspondent,  who  was  most 
pessimistic.  '  The  best  thing  we  could  do  was  to  evacuate  the  place. 
This  was  developing  into  a  major  operation,  and  we  had  not  the  troops 
for  it.  Achi  Baba  was  untakable,  except  after  months  of  siege  war- 
fare'" (Diary  for  May  13,  by  the  Rev.  O.  Creighton,  With  the 
Twenty -ninth  Division  in  Gallipoli,  p.  90).  After  his  fortunate  escape 
from  the  Majestic  as  she  sank,  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett  returned  to 
London  for  a  short  time,  and  the  expression  of  views  similar  to  the 
above  by  a  man  of  his  ability  may  have  increased  the  disfavour  with 
which  many  had  throughout  regarded  the  expedition. 


CHAPTER   VIII 
THE    BATTLES   OF   JUNE 

THUS,  within  five  or  six  weeks  of  the  first 
landing,  the  situation  had  become  serious. 
At  home,  the  originator  of  the  campaign 
had  ceased  to  hold  important  office ;  its  opponents 
were  encouraged  by  despondent  criticism  ;  and  the 
Government,  which  had  hithterto  controlled  it,  was 
transformed.  On  the  Continent,  the  retirement  of 
the  Russian  armies  in  Galicia  and  Poland  cancelled 
the  expectation  of  a  Russian  force  to  co-operate  from 
the  Black  Sea,  and  rendered  the  position  of  Bulgaria 
dubious.  On  the  Peninsula,  the  only  lines  of  com- 
munication were  threatened  by  submarines ;  such 
assistance  as  naval  guns  could  supply  to  the  flanks 
was  greatly  diminished  ;  the  lack  of  guns  and  am- 
munition, specially  of  howitzers  and  H.E.  shells,  was 
severely  felt ;  the  new  drafts  were  unacquainted  with 
their  officers,  and  the  officers  with  each  other ;  at 
Helles  and  Anzac  the  positions  were  fairly  secured, 
but  the  men  were  much  worn  by  almost  continuous 
struggle,  and  harassed  by  repeated  and  random  shell- 
ing. From  this,  indeed,  the  dead  ground  below  the 
cliffs  at  Anzac  off'ered  protection,  but  hardly  any  point 
at  Helles  was  safe,  or  even  sheltered,  whether  the 
enemy's  guns  fired  from  Achi  Baba  or  the  Asiatic 
coast.     As  reinforcement.   Sir  Ian  had  received  the 


in  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

42nd  Division  and  already  had  been  promised  the  52nd 
(Lowland  Territorial) ;  but  this  did  not  begin  to  arrive 
till  the  middle  of  June,  and  he  was  now  compelled  to 
ask  Lord  Kitchener  for  two  complete  army  corps  in 
addition.  Yet  the  expedition  had  justified  itself  in 
that,  but  for  its  presence  in  the  Dardanelles,  the 
whole  of  the  Near  East  would  have  fallen  to  the 
enemy's  influence,  the  Russian  left  flank  would  have 
hung  in  air  without  hope  of  succour,  and  an  over- 
whelming attack  upon  the  Suez  Canal  would  almost 
certainly  have  been  attempted. 

It  was  now  essential  to  gain  more  room  at  Helles, 
and  by  repeated  assaults  to  push  the  enemy's  lines 
farther  away  from  the  landing  beaches.  Accordingly, 
Sir  Ian  issued  orders  for  another  general  attack  on 
June  4.  It  was  a  Friday,  the  day  after  Przemysl 
had  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands  once  more.  At 
early  morning  Sir  Ian  and  the  Headquarter  Staff 
crossed  to  Helles,  and  were  there  joined  by  General 
Gouraud.  They  stationed  themselves  on  the  high 
ground  of  the  command-post  above  Cape  Tekke, 
whence  a  prospect  of  the  slightly  hollow  plain  and 
opposite  slopes  of  Krithia  and  Achi  Baba  could  be 
obtained,  although,  under  the  northerly  breeze,  a 
violent  dust  storm  blew.  As  before,  the  British  VI I  Ith 
Corps  (consisting  of  the  remains  of  the  29th  Division, 
together  with  Sikhs  and  Gurkhas  of  the  Indian 
Brigade,  the  42nd  Division,  and  the  R.  N.D., 
in  that  order  from  left  to  right)  held  the  left  and 
centre  of  the  line,  while  the  French  and  Colonial 
Corps  of  two  Divisions  held  the  right.  The  yEgean 
and  the  Straits  protected  either  flank,  but,  as  was 
inevitable    on   the    Peninsula,    this   very   protection 


JUNE  4  AT  HELLES  173 

rendered  flank  movements  in  attack  impossible,  and 
every  advance  was  necessarily  made  straight  against 
the  enemy's  front.  The  British  front  of  about  three 
and  a  half  miles  was  occupied  by  17,000  infantry, 
with  7000  in  reserve. 

The  attack  was  preceded  by  a  longer  bombard- 
ment than  usual,  probably  because  the  French  General 
had  generously  lent  the  British  two  groups  of  "  75's  " 
(six  batteries  of  four  guns  apiece)  with  H.E.  shell. 
The  guns  from  sea  and  land  opened  fire  at  8  a.m.  and 
continued  till  midday,  with  short  intervals.  During 
the  latest  interval  a  feint  was  practised  in  the  hope  of 
inducing  the  Turks  to  fill  up  their  first  line  of  trenches, 
which  were  thinly  held.  Our  men  fixed  bayonets, 
and  waved  them  above  the  parapets,  as  though  about 
to  advance.  The  Turks  swarmed  down  the  com- 
munication trenches  to  their  front  line,  and  were 
caught  by  a  sudden  renewal  of  our  bombardment. 
At  noon  the  guns  lengthened  their  range,  and,  pro- 
tected by  their  "barrage,"  as  the  manoeuvre  came  to 
be  called  later  in  the  war,  the  infantry  advanced  in 
earnest.  For  the  first  half-hour  the  advance  was 
rapid,  especially  in  the  centre,  and  hope  of  decisive 
victory  rose  high. 

This  success  was  chiefly  due  to  the  extraordinary 
dash  of  the  Manchester  (42nd  Division)  and  the  2nd 
Naval  (R.N.D.)  Brigades.  Under  young  and  high- 
spirited  leaders  such  as  few  troops  possessed,^  the  so- 
called  "amateurs  "of  the  Anson,  Hood,  and  Howe 
Battalions  rushed  forward  through  the  bushes  and 
small  ravines  of  the  neutral  ground,  stormed  the  first 

^  Such  as  Col.  Crauford  Stewart  of  the  Hood  (wounded)  and  Col. 
Roberts,  R.A.  (Egyptian  Army),  of  the  Anson  (killed). 


174  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

trench,  and  captured  the  southern  face  of  a  projecting 
Turkish  redoubt.  It  was  done  in  a  quarter  of  an 
hour,  and  in  five-and-twenty  minutes  their  consoHdat- 
ing  parties  were  at  work  upon  the  positions  gained. 
The  Manchester  Brigade  (always  a  model  of  what 
Lord  Haldane's  Territorials  could  become)  swept 
forward  with  even  greater  success.  In  five  minutes 
they  were  over  the  first  line  ;  in  half  an  hour  they 
had  captured  the  second,  and  it  was  believed  that  no 
defences  lay  between  them  and  Achi  Baba.  The 
belief  was  probably  too  sanguine,  but  at  all  events 
they  had  won  a  third  of  a  mile,  and  the  working 
parties  began  reversing  the  aspect  of  the  excellently 
constructed  Turkish  trenches. 

Farther  to  the  left,  the  88th  Brigade  (29th 
Division),  though  exposed  to  heavy  fire  from  front 
and  left  flank,  and  met  with  the  bayonet  by  Turks 
who  courageously  awaited  their  assault,  succeeded  in 
capturing  the  first  line  of  trenches,  the  Worcesters 
especially  distinguishing  themselves.  But  the  farther 
advance  of  the  division  was  checked  because  the  14th 
Sikhs  on  their  left  were  held  up  by  barbed  wire  at 
the  first  trench,  remaining  undamaged  by  the  bom- 
bardment. For  the  same  reason,  the  6th  Gurkhas, 
who  had  skilfully  advanced  along  the  extreme  edge 
of  the  cliffs,  were  compelled  to  withdraw,  and  rein- 
forcements were  hurried  up  from  the  reserve.  But 
even  the  new  battalions  were  unable  to  advance 
against  the  heavy  rifle-fire,  and  the  left  of  the  British 
line  was  thus  kept  in  check,  unable  to  conform  with 
the  victorious  advance  in  the  centre. 

With  the  French  upon  our  right,  all  seemed  at 
first  to  go  well.     The   ist  Division  carried  the  first 


FAILURE  OF  FRENCH  COLONIAL  TROOPS    175 

trenches.  The  2nd  or  new  Division,  with  character- 
istic dan,  at  last  rushed  the  formidable  redoubt  which 
commanded  the  approach  to  the  southern  slope  leading 
up  to  the  crest  above  Kereves  Dere,  and  had  barred 
the  French  advance  almost  since  the  first  advance. 
From  its  bulging  crescent  shape,  the  French  called  it 
the  "  Haricot."  Unfortunately,  here  again,  as  before, 
the  Senegalese  and  Colonial  troops  were  found  un- 
able to  retain  positions  which  they  had  won.  With- 
in an  hour  of  the  first  infantry  advance,  the  Turks 
projected  an  overwhelming  counter-attack  upon  the 
"  Haricot,"  shelling  it  heavily  and  pouring  masses  of 
reinforcements  down  the  deep  communication  trenches. 
A  fatal  gap  was  thus  opened  between  the  French 
and  British  lines.  The  right  flank  of  the  2nd  Naval 
Brigade  became  dangerously  exposed.  The  fortune 
of  the  battle  turned. 

In  less  than  half  an  hour  from  their  great  success, 
the  Howe,  Hood,  and  Anson  Battalions  were  thus 
subjected  to  intense  enfilading  fire.  The  lately 
arrived  Collingwood  Battalion  came  to  their  support, 
but  in  this  their  first  battle  they  were  almost  extermi- 
nated, losing  over  600  men  and  their  commanding 
officer.  Commander  Spearman,  R.N.,  killed.^  Com- 
pelled to  retire  across  the  open  ground  over  which  they 

^  The  original  Collingwood,  with  the  Hawke  and  Benbow  Battalions, 
crossed  the  Dutch  frontier  in  retiring  from  Antwerp,  and  were  interned. 
The  new  battalions  were  left  to  complete  their  training  in  England, 
when  the  R.N.D.  sailed.  Thus  the  Collingwood  (Commander  Spearman, 
R.N.)  was  now  for  the  first  time  under  fire.  The  brother  of  Lieut.- 
Commander  Freyberg  (see  p.  120)  was  killed  on  this  occasion.  The 
Collingwood  relics  and  the  Benbow  were  incorporated  soon  after  this 
battle  with  the  Hood,  Howe,  and  Anson  Battalions  as  the  2nd  Naval 
Brigade — an  arrangement  resented  on  both  sides,  but  inevitable  owing 
to  reduction  of  men. 


176  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

had  charged,  and  exposed  to  a  torrential  rain  of  bullets 
from  machine-guns  and  rifles,  this  brigade  of  the 
unfortunate  but  invariably  noble  division  suffered 
the  losses  of  massacre.  Even  worse  followed.  The 
retirement  and  partial  destruction  of  the  Naval 
Brigade  left  the  right  flank  of  the  Manchesters  "  in 
air  "  upon  a  very  advanced  position.  Their  Brigadier, 
General  Noel  Lee,  an  excellent  leader  of  men,  and 
in  civil  life  partner  in  a  well-known  Lancashire  ship- 
ing  and  cotton  firm,  was  wounded ;  many  of  their 
officers  killed.  Yet  the  men  declared  they  would  for 
ever  hold  the  ground  they  had  so  rapidly  won  ;  they 
only  asked  for  help  upon  their  right.  To  check  the 
enfilading  fire  their  right  flank  was  thrown  back  to 
face  it,  and  in  the  midst  of  tangled  scrub  and  enemy 
trenches  the  brigade  fought  on  two  fronts  at  right 
angles  to  each  other.  It  was  an  impossible  position, 
but  still  the  men  clung  on.  Our  reinforcements  had 
already  been  almost  exhausted  in  drafts  to  the  extreme 
left,  where  the  advance  was  held  up,  as  described. 

At  6.30,  General  Hunter- Weston,  commanding 
the  Vlllth  Corps,  after  consultation  with  Sir  Ian,  was 
constrained  to  "pull  out"  the  Manchesters  from 
their  exposed  and  untenable  salient.  With  almost 
mutinous  reluctance  the  troops  withdrew  into  the 
first  line  of  Turkish  trenches,  taken  in  the  first  rush, 
and  the  remainder  of  the  Division  conformed.  In 
spite  of  an  endeavour  made  by  the  Royal  Fusiliers 
at  4  p.m.  to  establish  themselves  beyond  this  first 
line,  the  29th  Division  and  the  Indians  had  been 
unable  to  advance  farther  upon  the  left,  and  the 
gain  so  confidently  expected,  especially  in  the  centre, 
was  now  reduced  to  an  advance  of  200  yards  in  some 


INSUFFICIENT  RESULTS  177 

places  and  400  yards  in  others.  The  prisoners 
amounted  to  400,  including  1 1  officers,  among  whom 
were  5  Germans,  the  relics  of  a  machine-gun  de- 
tachment from  the  Goeben} 

During  the  night  an  excellent  piece  of  work 
was  accomplished  by  the  Nelson  Battalion,  R.N.D. 
(Colonel  Evelegh).^  They  were  sent  up  to  establish 
touch  between  the  right  of  the  42nd  Division  and 
the  left  of  the  R.N.D.  This  task  involved  digging 
forward  a  "switch  trench"  under  very  heavy  fire, 
but  the  connection  between  the  exposed  flanks  was 
thus  made  good. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  battle,  Major-General 
De  Lisle,  famous  as  a  dashing  leader  of  mounted 
troops  in  the  South  African  War,  and  now  coming 
fresh  from  command  of  the  ist  Cavalry  Division  in 
France,  arrived  at  Helles  to  take  over  the  command 
of  the  29th  Division.  The  news  that  met  him  there, 
illustrated  by  the  streams  of  wounded  passing  down 
to  W  Beach,  was  not  encouraging.  As  had  happened 
before  in  this  campaign,  and  was  to  happen  more  than 
once  in  the  future,  the  hope  of  victory  had  been  dashed 
at  the  moment  when  victory  appeared  most  certain,  and 
it  had  been  frustrated  by  failure  at  one  single  point. 
The  losses  were  unusually  heavy — estimated  at  5000 
at  the  time — and  large  numbers  of  the  best  remaining 
officers  in  the  29th  Division  and  the  R.N.D.,  not  to 
mention  the  Manchester  Brigade,  had  fallen.^  Owing 
to  the  retirement  of  the  line  from  the  positions  they 

^  Notes  of  the  battle  from  hour  to  hour  were  taken  by  a  French 
medical  officer  {Unce?tsored  Letters  from  the  Dardanelles^  pp.  121-125). 
^  This  fine  officer  was  killed  in  the  battle  of  July  13. 
^  One  brigade  of  the  R.N.D.  alone  lost  60  officers. 
12 


t;8  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

had  taken,  some  of  the  wounded  were  of  necessity 
left  on  the  neutral  ground  together  with  the  dead, 
and  uniforms,  hanging  loosely  upon  the  shrunken 
corpses,  were  long  visible  at  exposed  points,  whence 
nothing  could  be  reclaimed.  By  Sir  lan's  personal 
orders  attempts  were  made  to  recover  the  dead  and 
wounded  under  the  white  flag,  but  they  failed/  The 
fact  was  that  when  small  parties  went  out  under  a 
white  flag  they  were  fired  upon.  This  frequently 
happened  at  the  termination  of  a  severe  battle, 
though  the  Turks  appear  to  have  fired  rather  as  a 
warning  than  with  immediate  intent  to  kill.  But  for 
this  hostile  attitude  it  is  possible  that  a  formal  armistice 
might  have  been  arranged,  such  as  Sir  Ian  tacitly 
granted  to  the  Turks  at  Helles  on  May  2,  and  by 
negotiation  at  Anzac  on  May  24. 

Heavy  fighting  was  renewed  before  dawn  on 
the  6th,  and  continued  at  intervals  for  two  days  and 
nights,  the  Turks  repeating  their  counter-attacks, 
especially  down  the  upper  reach  of  the  Gully  Ravine. 
Here  the  Royal  Fusiliers  (86th  Brigade)  suffered 
terrible  loss.  Major  Brandreth,  a  singularly  fine 
officer,  then  in  command  of  the  battalion,  wounded 
on  the  day  of  landing,  was  now  killed.  Many  of 
the  new  officers  who  had  lately  arrived  with  the 
drafts  were  killed  also,  including  Captain  Jenkinsbn 

1  "  The  worst  was  that  the  wounded  had  not  been  got  back,  but  lay 
between  ours  and  the  Turks'  firing  hne.  It  was  impossible  to  get  at 
some  of  them.  The  men  said  they  could  see  them  move.  The  firing 
went  on  without  ceasing.  .  .  .  The  General  had  suggested  putting  up  a 
white  flag,  and  some  one  going  out  to  the  wounded.  They  tried  this 
later,  but  it  failed"  {With  the  Twenty-nirith  Divisw?i,  pp.  122,  123). 
Who  the  General  was  is  left  uncertain.  The  passage  is  from  a  diary  of 
June  5. 


SERIOUS  LOSSES  179 

of  Oxford,  one  of  the  greatest  authorities  on  embry- 
ology. By  June  8  only  one  officer,  the  former 
Sergeant-Major,  was  left  of  those  who  had  originally 
come  out,  besides  the  Quartermaster.  Of  the 
original  regiment  only  140  remained.  All  the  ten 
officers  who  had  recently  joined  were  lost.  Their 
places  were  taken  by  a  new  Captain  from  the  Dublins, 
in  command,  and  about  fifteen  other  officers,  collected 
from  various  regiments,  and  all  strange  to  each  other 
and  the  men.  The  Hampshires  (88th  Brigade)  had 
fared  still  worse,  having  only  about  100  of  the 
original  men  left,  and  no  officers  at  all.^  Thus, 
under  the  stress  of  frontal  attacks  upon  entrenched 
and  commanding  positions,  manned  by  Turks,  and 
assaulted  without  suitable  or  adequate  artillery, 
battalions  dwindled  to  companies,  brigades  to 
battalions,  divisions  to  brigades,  and  an  army  corps 
to  a  division.  Amid  losses  so  overwhelming  it 
seemed  impossible  to  retain  a  regimental  spirit. 
Yet  such  is  the  power  of  a  name  endowed  with 
traditional  honour  that  in  a  week  or  two  the  new 
arrivals,  both  of  officers  and  men,  as  they  came 
drifting  in,  became  inspired  with  a  resolve  to  carry 
forward  the  inherited  reputation  maintained  by  so 
many  deaths. 

For  the  next  fortnight  repeated  small  assaults  and 
counter-attacks  continued  to  reduce  the  numbers, 
while  holding  the  Turks  in  check  and  preserving 
the  activity  and  confidence  of  the  men.  On  June 
21   the    French    Divisions   captured   the    "Haricot" 

^  With  the  Twenty-ninth  Division,  pp.  122-129.  Of  original  officers 
in  this  famous  division,  the  South  Wales  Borderers  now  had  the  most  left. 
They  had  eight. 


i8o  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

Redoubt.  The  attack  began  at  dawn,  and  by  noon 
the  2nd  Division  had  occupied  the  position.  But 
the  I  St  Division,  after  taking  a  Hne  of  trenches, 
was  driven  out  in  a  counter-attack,  and  exposed  to 
victorious  troops  on  their  left,  as  so  often  happened 
in  the  French  engagements  at  Helles.  In  the  after- 
noon General  Gouraud  called  upon  his  right  flank 
for  a  renewed  effort,  and  at  6  p.m.  the  lines  were 
taken  again  and  held.  The  possession  of  these  lines 
and  the  "  Haricot "  gave  the  French  a  partial  com- 
mand of  the  Kereves  Dere,  reduced  the  salient  of 
our  centre  by  bringing  up  their  forces  on  the  right, 
and  generally  shortened  and  straightened  out  our 
line  across  the  Peninsula.  The  French  loss  was 
estimated  at  2500,^  the  Turkish  at  nearly  three  times 
that  amount.  But  this  estimate  of  "over  7000"  is 
probably  an  exaggeration,  though  one  of  the  Turkish 
trenches,  200  yards  long  and  10  feet  deep,  was  de- 
scribed as  brimming  over  with  the  dead,^  and  50 
prisoners  were  taken. 

By  this  time  two  brigades  of  the  52nd  Division 
had  arrived,  and  the  third  was  nearly  due.  It  was 
a  Territorial  Division  (the  "Lowland"),  commanded 

1  The  loss,  unhappily,  included  Colonel  Giraudon,  Chief  of  the  Staflf, 
who  had  been  rashly  put  to  command  the  2nd  Colonial  Brigade  of  the 
ist  Division  on  this  occasion — a  serious,  brave,  and  intellectual  soldier. 
He  was  dangerously  wounded,  as  was  Colonel  Nogues,  commanding  the 
6th  Colonial  Regiment  in  that  brigade,  who  with  his  regiment  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  greatly  in  the  attack  upon  Kum  Kali  and  else- 
where (see  Uncensored  Letters  from  the  Dardanelles,  p.  137).  Colonel 
Giraudon  returned  to  his  position  in  the  Dardanelles,  and  survived  to 
do  excellent  work  in  France,  where  he  was,  however,  ultimately  killed 
in  action. 

2  Account  by  Mr.  Compton  Mackenzie,  who  acted  as  authorised 
correspondent  for  the  London  papers  during  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett's 
temporary  absence. 


SHORTAGE  OF  ARTILLERY  i8i 

for  the  first  few  weeks  by  Major-General  G.  G.  A. 
Egerton,  who  collapsed  from  nervous  overstrain  in 
the  middle  of  July,  and,  though  reinstated  for  a  time 
by  General  Hunter- Weston,  was  ultimately  succeeded 
in  command  by  Major-General  H.  A.  Lawrence,  son 
of  the  great  Lord  Lawrence  of  the  Indian  Mutiny.-^ 
It  was  a  fairly  homogeneous  and  steady  division, 
and,  though  rapidly  reduced  in  strength,  its  improve- 
ment after  the  first  month  or  six  weeks  was  much 
remarked. 

It  was  not  long  before  one  of  the  newly  arrived 
brigades  was  called  into  action.  The  artillery,  even 
with  French  help,  was  now  insufficient  for  another 
general  advance.  The  shells  were  running  out ;  few 
H.E.  shells  were  left  ;  the  howitzers  numbered  eight, 
or  two  to  a  division  (four  others  which  arrived  later 
had  seen  service  at  Omdurman  in  1898);  whereas, 
even  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  eighteen  howitzers 
went  to  each  division  in  France.  Among  the  field- 
guns  were  batteries  of  old  15-pounders,  which  had 
established  their  futility  in  the  Boer  War  (one 
Vickers  gun  was  reported  to  have  come  from  a  well- 
known  museum) ;  but  such  things  were  thought  good 
enough  for  the  Dardanelles.  Except  the  29th  and 
the  Anzacs,  the   Divisions  had   no  other  field-guns, 

^  The  division  consisted  of  the  155th  Brigade  (Brig. -General  J.  F. 
Erskine,  succeeded  by  Lieut.-Colonel  Pollok-M'Call),  containing  the 
4th  and  5th  Battalions  Royal  Scottish  Fusiliers,  and  the  4th  and  5th 
Battalions  K.O.S.B.;  the  156th  Brigade  (Brig.-General  Scott-Moncrieff, 
killed  on  June  28  ;  then  Brig.-General  H.  G.  Casson,  succeeded  by 
Brig.-General  L.  C.  Koe),  containing  the  4th  and  7th  Royal  Scots,  and 
the  7th  and  8th  Scottish  Rifles  ;  and  the  157th  Brigade  (Brig.-General 
R.  W.  Hendry,  succeeded  by  Brig.-General  H.  G.  Casson),  containing 
the  5th,  6th,  and  7th  Highland  Light  Infantry,  and  the  5th  Argyll  and 
Sutherland  Highlanders. 


1 82  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

and  the  R.N.D.  had  no  guns  at  all.  It  was,  therefore, 
essential  to  limit  the  thrust,  and  General  Hunter- 
Weston  formed  a  scheme  for  pushing  forward  on  the 
left,  so  as  to  clear  the  obstacles  which  had  hitherto 
checked  our  advance  along  the  coast,  and  to  reduce 
the  salient  in  the  centre,  as  the  French  had  reduced 
it  by  seizing  the  "  Haricot."  While  the  centre 
remained  steady  about  a  mile  from  the  sea,  the  left 
was  to  swing  forward  upon  it  as  upon  a  pivot,  cover- 
ing less  ground  as  the  pivotal  point  was  approached. 
Thus  five  Turkish  lines  had  to  be  captured  by  the 
29th  Division  on  the  extreme  left,  and  two  by  the 
156th  Brigade  (52nd  Division),  which  had  been 
inserted  on  their  right. 

The  battle  began  on  June  28  with  a  severe  but 
brief  bombardment,  limited  to  the  Turkish  trenches 
on  our  front  nearest  the  coast.  The  batteries  were 
assisted  from  the  sea  by  the  light  cruiser  Talbot 
(5600  tons,  1896)  and  the  destroyers  Wolverine  and 
Scorpion^  which  were  able  to  enfilade  such  positions 
as  remained  visible.  But,  for  want  of  ammunition, 
the  land  bombardment  was  limited  in  extent,  and 
lasted  only  twenty  minutes.  The  87th  Brigade 
(Major-General  W.  R.  Marshall),^  supplied  with  the 
new  drafts  which  had  been  gradually  coming  in,  at 
once  advanced  on  both  sides  of  the  Gully  Ravine 
(Saghir  Dere).  Their  part  in  the  attack  was  to  clear 
a  further  lap  of  this  long  and  deep  ravine  or  canon, 
which  forms  one  of  the  most  surprising  features  of 
the  southern  Peninsula.     Advance  alone  the  bottom 

1  Now  (spring,  191 8)  Commander-in-Chief  in  Mesopotamia  in  suc- 
cession to  Sir  Stanley  Maude,  who  commanded  the  13th  Division 
during  the  later  part  of  the  Dardanelles  campaign. 


THE  GULLY  RAVINE  183 

was  impossible.  Near  the  entrance  from  the  sea  the 
cliffs  on  both  sides  rise  200  feet.  The  slope  upwards 
along  the  Gully  is  very  gradual,  and  the  sides  nearly 
up  to  the  very  end  remain  steep,  in  parts  bare  sandy 
cliff,  in  parts  covered  with  bush.  The  ravine  curves 
frequently,  twice  turning  for  a  short  distance  almost 
at  rio^ht  ano-les.  Here  and  there,  alons:  the  middle 
and  upper  reaches,  the  bottom  was  dangerously 
exposed  to  snipers  creeping  down  and  hiding  among 
the  bushes.  Up  to  the  last,  even  after  it  became  the 
main  line  of  communication  with  our  positions  on  the 
left,  it  was  constantly  shelled,  and  beyond  a  point 
about  two-thirds  up  its  length  no  horses  were  allowed 
to  proceed.  In  spite  of  screens  and  sandbag  barriers, 
shrapnel  and  unaimed  or  dropping  rifle-fire  frequently 
inflicted  loss  upon  the  drafts,  reliefs,  and  supply 
parties  continually  passing  to  and  fro.  There  was 
the  greater  danger  because,  under  the  stress  of  thirst 
and  extreme  heat,  men  and  animals  gathered  round 
the  water  which  was  in  places  discovered,  especially 
at  one  clear  and  cold  spring  rising  from  the  foot  of  a 
precipitous  cliff  upon  the  right.  About  half-way  up, 
the  Turks  had  barred  the  valley  with  a  complicated 
entanglement  reaching  from  side  to  side,  and  other 
entanglements  existed  farther  on.  The  only  possi- 
bility of  clearing  such  a  ravine  was  to  clear  the  rough 
and  bush-covered  plateau  on  both  sides. 

Upon  the  left,  after  the  brief  bombardment,  three 
battalions  of  the  87th  Brigade  (South  Wales  Borderers, 
K.O.S.B.,  and  Inniskilling  Fusiliers)  advanced  along 
the  strip  of  land  between  the  sea  and  the  ravine, 
already  the  scene  of  gallantry  and  loss.  By  eleven 
o'clock,  forty  minutes  after  the  opening  of  the  gun- 


1 84  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

fire,  they  had  rushed  the  first  three  trenches.  They 
were  at  once  followed  by  the  86th  Brigade,  which 
pushed  right  through  them,  over  the  three  captured 
trenches.  Led  by  the  2nd  Royal  Fusiliers,  and 
keeping  their  formations  in  spite  of  the  scrub  and 
a  searching  rifle-fire,  this  renowned  Fusilier  Brigade 
stormed  onward  till  two  more  trenches  were  taken, 
and  the  task  of  the  29th  Division  completed.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Gurkhas  had  worked  forward  along 
the  edge  of  the  sea  cliffs,  and  secured  a  green  knoll 
projecting  from  the  end  of  a  spur  which  marked  our 
farthest  advance.  A  few  nights  after  (July  2),  the 
Gurkhas  were  driven  out  here,  but  the  position  was 
retaken  by  the  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  though  with 
great  loss,  only  two  officers  being  left.  On  the  sea- 
coast  west  of  the  ravine  our  objective  was  gained, 
and  in  honour  of  the  achievement  the  extreme  point 
won  was  always  known  as  Fusilier  Bluff 

On  the  right  of  the  Gully  the  remaining  battalion 
of  the  87th  Brigade  (ist  Borderers)  within  five 
minutes  stormed  a  redoubt  overhanging  the  ravine, 
and  called  the  Boomerang  from  its  curved  shape. 
Advancing  rapidly,  they  next  carried  a  stronger  re- 
doubt, known  as  the  Turkey  Trot,  perhaps  from  the 
speed  of  the  enemy  in  abandoning  it,  though  the 
trenches  right  up  to  the  redoubt  remained  in  Turkish 
possession,  separated  by  a  sandbag  wall.  These  rapid 
successes  were  mainly  due  to  two  trench-mortars, 
lent  by  General  Gouraud  and  dropping  bombs  contain- 
ing some  2,0  lb.,  some  yo  lb.,  of  melinite,  vertically 
into  the  trenches  at  short  range.  The  British  force 
at  this  time  possessed  a  few  Japanese  trench-mortars 
— very  effective,  but  numbering  only  six,  and  these 


JUNE  28  AT  HELLES  185 

short  of  ammunition.  We  had  no  others  of  any  kind. 
Yet,  in  the  scarcity  of  howitzers,  trench-mortars  were 
more  needed  than  any  gun.  Our  hand-grenades 
were  improvised  out  of  jam-pots. 

To  the  right  of  the  Borderers,  the  156th  Brigade 
of  the  newly  arrived  52nd  Division  came  into  action 
for  the  first  time.  The  4th  and  7th  Royal  Scots 
quickly  gained  the  two  trenches  allotted  to  them,  but 
the  rest  of  the  brigade  (7th  and  8th  Scottish  Rifles), 
though  nearest  to  the  pivotal  point,  entirely  failed  to 
advance,  and  a  later  attempt  upon  the  trenches  in 
front  of  Krithia  that  afternoon  also  failed.  Neverthe- 
less, the  morning's  work  was  a  victory.  It  marked 
the  most  decisive  advance  upon  the  Peninsula  hitherto. 
Three-quarters  of  a  mile  along  the  coast,  and  about 
half  a  mile  up  the  Gully  Ravine  were  won,  and  the 
Gully's  lower  reaches  and  beach  rendered  more  secure. 
Large  quantities  of  stores  and  ammunition  were  taken, 
together  with  about  100  prisoners.  The  Gully  was 
for  some  distance  cleaned  of  the  dangerous  filth  and 
rubbish  characteristic  of  Turkish  lines — the  more 
dangerous  owing  to  the  unimaginable  hosts  of  flies 
which  now  added  to  the  discomfort  of  life  on  the 
Peninsula,  and  probably  diffused  the  malignant  type 
of  diarrhoea  with  which  almost  every  one  was  afflicted. 
Our  casualties  for  the  day  were  1750,  the  Royal, 
Lancashire,  and  Dublin  Fusiliers  suffering  most. 
The  losses  of  the  156th  Brigade  included  their 
Brigadier,  General  Scott-MoncriefT,  who  was  killed 
on  "Worcester  Flat." 

The  Turks  lost  more  heavily,  especially  in  their 
determined  counter-attacks  during  the  next  few  nights, 
when  they  attempted  to  recover  the  lost  trenches  by 


1 86  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

rushing  upon  them  with  bayonet  and  bombs,  their 
supply  of  which  was  plentiful.  All  these  attempts 
were  vain,  and  the  useless  loss  of  life  severe/  They 
seem  to  have  been  prompted  by  Enver  Pasha,  in 
opposition  to  his  German  advisers,  and  the  Turkish 
troops  were  specially  stimulated  to  the  sacrifice  by  the 
following  divisional  order,  discovered  upon  a  wounded 
officer.  The  trenches  referred  to  were  the  five 
captured  by  the  29th  Division  on  June  28  : 

"There  is  nothing  causes  us  more  sorrow,  in- 
creases the  courage  of  the  enemy,  and  encourages  him 
to  attack  more  freely,  causing  us  great  losses,  than 
the  losing  of  these  trenches.  Henceforth  commanders 
who  surrender  trenches,  from  whatever  side  the 
attack  may  come,  before  the  last  man  is  killed,  will 
be  punished  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  had  run 
away.  Especially  will  the  commanders  of  units  told 
off  to  guard  a  certain  front  be  punished  if,  instead  of 
thinking  about  their  work,  supporting  their  units,  and 
giving  information  to  the  Higher  Command,  they  only 
take  action  after  a  regrettable  incident  has  occurred. 

"  I  hope  that  this  will  not  happen  again.  I  give 
notice  that  if  it  does  I  shall  carry  out  the  punishment. 
I  do  not  desire  to  see  a  blot  made  on  the  courage  of 

^  "  Scenes  of  desperate  fighting  are  plainly  visible  all  around  our 
front  line.  On  a  small  rise  a  little  to  the  left  {i.e.  of  our  advanced 
position  up  the  Gully)  lie  half  a  dozen  of  our  men  killed  in  the  final 
advance,  whom  it  had  been  impossible  to  get  at  and  bury.  Right  in 
front  a  line  of  khaki  figures  lie  in  perfect  order  only  a  few  yards  away, 
yet  the  sniping  is  so  heavy  that  even  at  night  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
bring  them  in.  Farther  up  the  ravine  are  heaps  of  Turkish  dead,  piled 
together,  who  have  fallen  in  the  big  counter-attack.  In  a  gorse  patch 
farther  to  the  left  lie  a  further  large  number  of  the  enemy,  mixed  up 
with  some  of  our  men,  for  there  seems  to  have  been  a  general  melee  in 
the  open  at  dawn  on  the  29th,  when  our  men  issued  from  their  trenches 
and  hunted  the  enemy  out  of  the  gorse,  killing  large  numbers  of  them." 
— Dispatches  from   the  Dardanelles^  by  E.   Ashmead  Bartlett,  p.    152 

(July  4). 


TURKISH  PROCLAMATIONS  187 

our  men  by  those  who  escape  from  the  trenches  to 
avoid  the  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  of  the  enemy. 
Henceforth  I  shall  hold  responsible  all  officers  who 
do  not  shoot  with  their  revolvers  all  privates  trying 
to  escape  from  the  trenches  on  any  pretext. 

"Colonel  Rifaat,  CO.,   nth  Division." 

To  this  order  a  regimental  commander  added  the 
following  note : 

"  To  the  CO.  of  ist  Battalion. 

"  The  contents  will  be  communicated  to  the  officers, 
and  I  promise  to  carry  out  the  orders  till  the  last  drop 
of  our  blood  has  been  shed.     Sign  and  return. 

"  Hassan,  CO.,  127th  Regiment." 

Two  days  before  the  battle,  a  Turkish  aeroplane 
scattered  copies  of  a  long  proclamation  intended  to 
shake  the  discipline  of  the  Mohammedan  Indian 
troops.  It  called  upon  Mussulmans  to  ask  them- 
selves why  they  were  sacrificing  their  lives  for 
English  people,  who  had  grabbed  their  country, 
made  them  slaves,  and  now  ruled  them  by  tyranny, 
sucking  their  blood  by  taxes,  taking  their  wealth  to 
London,  and  regarding  them  as  more  contemptible 
than  English  dogs.  It  further  dwelt  upon  the 
desperate  position  of  the  Allies,  the  triumphs  of 
Germany  in  Belgium,  France,  Russia,  and  by 
submarines  on  the  sea.  It  said  that  in  Singapore 
and  Ceylon  the  native  armies  had  killed  all  the 
English  and  occupied  the  forts.  It  asserted  that 
many  more  submarines  were  coming,  and  the  British 
communications  on  the  Peninsula  would  be  entirely 
cut  off.  Therefore,  it  called  upon  the  Indian  soldiers 
to  slay  their  tyrant  enemies,  or  at  least  to  join  their 


1 88  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

fellow- Moslems  in  the  Turkish  army,  where  they 
would  be  treated  as  brothers.  It  concluded  by 
offering  a  grim  dilemma  : 

"You  are  at  liberty  either  to  desert  to  us,  and 
save  your  lives,  or  to  have  your  heads  cut  off,  to  no 
purpose,  along  with  the  English." 

The  Sikh  and  Gurkha  troops,  however,  preferred 
to  risk  the  latter  alternative.^ 

To  both  the  main  battles  at  Helles  during  this 
month  (June  4  and  28)  the  Anzac  corps  rendered 
valuable  support.  Their  task  was  to  retain  in 
position  the  large  Turkish  forces  which  hemmed 
them  round  in  their  triangle  of  cliff  and  ravine.  By 
repeated  threatenings  and  attacks  they  continually 
remained  "a  thorn  in  the  side"  of  the  enemy's 
defence,  always  endangering  his  communications  and 
delaying  his  reinforcement.  The  chief  share  of  the 
service  naturally  fell  to  the  troops  allotted  in  "  shifts  " 
to  maintain  the  apex  of  the  triangle  at  the  farthest 
end  of  Monash  Gully,  the  continuation  of  the  main 
ravine  or  valley  called  "Shrapnel."  This  position 
was  mainly  guarded  by  Pope's  Hill,  throughout 
commanded  by  Lieut. -Colonel  Harold  Pope,  i6th 
Battalion  (South  and  Western  Australia),  and  by 
Quinn's,  Courtney's,  and  Steel's  Posts,  stationed  at 
short  intervals  along  the  edge  of  the  steep  ridge  on 
the  right,  slightly  in  advance  of  "  Pope's."  By  the 
digging  of  narrow  and  complicated  trenches  and 
subterranean  passages,  all  these  points  had  been 
converted  into  small  forts  ;  but  the  proximity  of  the 
enemy's  counterworks  exposed  them  to  continuous 
danger ;    for  the    lines    of    trench    approached    each 

^  UnceTtsored  Letters,  pp.  144-146. 


QUINN'S  POST  AT  ANZAC  189 

other  in  places  within  15  yards,  and  even  within 
five.  It  was  easy  to  lob  bombs  and  grenades  over 
from  one  side  to  the  other,  and  to  converse  with 
taunts  or  ironic  compliments  in  such  languages  as 
Colonials  and  Turks  could  master  in  common. 

But  perilous  as  the  whole  position  was,  "Quinn's," 
hanging  on  the  summit  of  its  almost  precipitous 
ascent,  was  regarded  as  the  point  of  greatest  danger 
and  highest  honour.  Here  Major  Quinn,  15th 
(Queensland  and  Tasmania)  Battalion,  was  killed  on 
May  29  in  repelling  a  violent  and  almost  successful 
Turkish  assault,  preceded  by  a  mine  explosion,  which 
obliterated  part  of  his  carefully  dug  defences.  After 
this  severe  loss,  the  position  was  commanded  by 
Lieut.-Colonel  Malone,  Wellington  (New  Zealand) 
Battalion,  for  a  little  over  two  months,  until  he  fell 
in  the  great  assault  upon  Sari  Bair  in  August. 
Though  not  a  professional  soldier,  being  a  solicitor 
in  civil  life,  he  was,  none  the  less,  an  Irish  officer  of 
the  finest  type.  Never  tired  of  impressing  upon 
myself  and  other  friends  the  true  and  serviceable 
paradox  that  "the  whole  art  of  war  lies  in  the 
exercise  of  the  domestic  virtues,"  he  maintained  his 
exposed  position  by  the  unflinching  practice  of  the 
cleanliness,  punctuality,  courage,  and  humorous 
endurance  of  perpetual  provocation  in  which  the 
domestic  virtues  consist. 

From  this  Post  a  sortie  was  made  on  the  night 
of  June  4  to  destroy  an  enemy's  trench  close  in  front. 
The  trench  was  taken,  but  the  small  party  was 
bombed  out  of  it  in  the  early  morning.  Next  night 
a  somewhat  larger  party  (100  men  and  2  officers, 
I  St  Australian  Infantry  Brigade)  assaulted  the  strong 


I90  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

position  to  the  right  from  Quinn's,  known  as 
"German  Officers'  Trenches"  from  the  appearance 
of  German  officers  there  during  the  armistice. 
Here  a  special  party  of  ten  men,  under  Lieutenant 
E.  E.  L.  Lloyd,  ist  Battalion  (New  South  Wales), 
was  told  off  to  destroy  a  dangerous  machine-gun.  It 
was  a  difficult  task,  for,  like  most  Turkish  trenches  in 
this  quarter,  the  trench  was  protected  by  heavy 
overhead  beams.  But  one  of  the  ten  discharged  a 
few  rounds  into  the  gun  through  holes  at  5 -foot  range, 
and  the  remainder  of  the  sortie  party  destroyed  some 
of  the  trench.  These  sorties  cost  116  casualties — a 
heavy  loss  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged  ; 
but  the  Turkish  loss  was  reported  considerably 
greater. 

Fighting  of  some  sort  was  continuous  day  and 
night  along  that  ridge  of  Posts.  Bombs,  rifles, 
machine-guns,  and  artillery  were  incessantly  at  work. 
At  night  especially  the  Turks  would  sometimes  be 
seized  with  a  kind  of  frenzy,  and  pour  out  streams  of 
bullets,  most  of  which  went  wailing  and  whining 
overhead  to  fall  in  showers  upon  the  sea.  But  on  the 
29th  they  made  another  genuine  night  attack  under 
orders  from  Enver,  who  again  called  upon  them  to 
chase  the  Infidel  from  the  soil  of  Islam.  It  was 
further  provoked  by  a  sortie  the  previous  afternoon 
from  the  southern  end  of  the  Anzac  position.  About 
half  a  battalion  of  Queenslanders  (ist  Australian 
Light  Horse  Brigade,  of  course  unmounted)  and 
some  of  the  Queensland  Infantry  (9th  Battalion,  3rd 
Australian  Brigade),  led  by  Lieut. -Colonel  H.  Harris, 
rushed  from  the  trenches  near  the  so-called  "Wheat 
Field,"  where  the  farthest  Anzac  ridge  falls  gradually 


JUNE  29  AT  ANZAC  191 

towards  the  coast,  and  dashed  upon  a  strongly  held 
Turkish  position  opposite.  The  object  seems  to 
have  been  to  divert  Turkish  reinforcements  making 
for  Krithia,  and  in  this  the  movement  was  successful. 
Large  numbers  of  Turks  were  seen  coming  up  from 
Eski  Keui,  supposing  the  Australian  outburst  to  be 
a  serious  assault,  and  when  they  were  entangled  in 
the  scrub  and  gullies,  exposed  to  various  fire  from 
Anzac  and  from  destroyers  close  off  shore,  the 
Queenslanders  withdrew. 

Next  day  was  fairly  quiet  until  afternoon,  when 
the  Turks  were  seized  by  one  of  the  frenzies  above 
mentioned.  It  died  away,  but  at  midnight,  after 
various  feints,  they  made  a  violent  assault  up  the 
Nek,  or  apex  of  the  triangle.  It  began  with  heavy 
firing  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  and  then  in  the 
moonlight  swarms  of  Turks  were  seen  trotting 
forward  across  the  narrow  Nek  against  our  trenches, 
hardly  more  than  100  yards  away,  and  shouting 
"  Allah !  Allah ! "  as  their  religious  manner  was. 
They  were  Nizam  troops — i8th  Regiment,  6th 
Division — fresh  arrivals  from  Asia.  As  they  came  on, 
they  encountered  an  overwhelming  fire  from  the  New 
Zealand  Mounted  Rifle  Brigade  (Brigadier-General 
Russell,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  N.Z.  officers), 
together  with  some  South  Australian  Light  Horse 
under  Brigadier -General  F.  G.  Hughes,  destined 
to  win  still  higher  reputation  upon  the  same  scene. 
These  were  stationed  on  Russell  Top,  commanding 
the  Nek  and  the  complicated  Turkish  position  known 
as  the  Chessboard,  close  beyond  it.  Three  times 
the  Turks  ran  forward,  but  rifles  and  machine-guns 
shattered  them  as  they  came,  and  the  shadowy  forms 


192  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

ceased  to  move.  Others  tried  to  work  round  the 
Nek  on  each  side,  down  Monash  Gully  on  their  left, 
and  by  the  precipitous  front  of  Walker's  Ridge  on 
their  right.  Both  attempts  failed.  Few  survived. 
Next  morning  the  Nek  and  defiles  were  littered  with 
the  dead.  At  least  600  were  counted.  It  was  the 
last  Turkish  attack  upon  the  heights  of  Anzac.^ 

So  the  midsummer  month  drew  to  an  end.     There 
was  a  sense  of  victory  in  the  air.     Officers  and  men 
grew  elated  by  confidence  in  superiority.     All  felt  the 
Turks  were  beaten,  if  only  Helles  and  Anzac  could 
maintain  the  pressure.      Drafts  came  dribbling  in,  a 
hundred  or  so  at  a  time.      But,  though  nominally  in 
sufficient  numbers  to  fill  up  the  gaps  reported  when 
they  left  England  or  Egypt,  they  arrived  only  to  find 
the  gaps  had  meantime  increased,  and  their  numbers 
never  filled  them.     Since  the  landing,  two  Divisions 
(Territorials)  had   now  arrived.     Three  more  (New 
Army  or  "  Kitchener's  ")  had  been  promised,  but  were 
delayed    for    another   month,    and   few    soldiers   can 
retain  the  elation  of  victory  at  high  pitch  through 
weeks  of  inaction.      "  You  cannot  bottle  up  enthusiasm 
for   future   use,    as    you   do   pickled   herrings,"    said 
Goethe.     Guns  were  short ;   ammunition  was  worse 
than    short ;    the    lack   of    it    was   perilous ;    trench- 
mortars   and   hand-grenades   hardly  existed.      Heat, 
dust,  flies,  want  of  water,  and  the  restriction  of  large 
forces  to  narrow  limits  of  ground  increased  sickness 
and  wastage   in   the  trenches  and  dug-outs   of  both 
Helles    and    Anzac    landings.     On    the    whole,    the 
French  retained  health  and  vigour  best,  their  rations 
being  less  monotonous,  and  themselves  more  fastidious 

^  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  205-210. 


GENERAL  GOURAUD  WOUNDED     193 

in  cookery.  But  on  the  last  day  of  the  month  the 
French,  and,  indeed,  the  whole  army,  suffered  an 
almost  irreparable  blow.  General  Gouraud,  command- 
ing the  French  Army  Corps,  was  visiting  the  wounded 
on  V  Beach  when  an  8-inch  shell  from  Asia 
burst  within  six  yards.  As  though  by  miracle,  the 
fragments  missed  him,  but  the  explosive  force  flung 
him  over  a  six-foot  wall  and  into  a  fig  tree,  which 
perhaps  lessened  the  shock.  His  thigh,  ankle,  and 
arm  were  broken,  and  he  was  compelled  to  surrender 
the  command,  though  ultimately  he  recovered,  and 
won  further  fame  at  Chalons  and  in  command  at 
Rheims.  General  Bailloud,  that  volatile  and  high- 
spirited  veteran,  succeeded  to  the  command  till  he  was 
transferred  to  Salonika  in  October,  and  was  succeeded 
by  General  Brulard,  of  the  ist  Division. 

Upon  the  Russian  front,  of  which  the  Dardanelles 
should  always  have  been  regarded  as  an  essential 
strategic  part,  the  course  of  war  continued  disastrous 
for  the  Allies.  As  noticed  above,  Przemysl  was 
retaken  by  German-Austrian  armies  on  June  3.  The 
fall  of  Lemberg  followed  on  June  22  ;  nearly  the 
whole  of  Galicia  was  reoccupied ;  Warsaw  was 
threatened  ;  and  at  various  points,  north  and  south, 
the  Russian  frontier  was  crossed.  So  far  as  Turkey 
was  concerned,  the  Russian  armies  were  withdrawn 
from  the  war,  and  Sir  lan's  mixed  and  mainly  in- 
experienced forces,  insufficient  in  numbers,  ill  supplied 
with  guns,  worse  supplied  with  ammunition,  dependent 
upon  long  and  hazardous  communications,  were  left  to 
confront  the  full  strength  of  the  Turkish  Empire  alone.^ 

^  "  A  rough  estimate  of  their  number  (Turkish  troops)  since  mobilisa- 
tion is  as  follows  :  At  the  Dardanelles,  130,000;  in  Thrace,  30,000;  at 

13 


194  THE  BATTLES  OF  JUNE 

During  the  month,  the  Italians  crossed  the  Isonzo, 
but  against  Turkey  no  declaration  of  war  had  yet 
been  made.  Both  sides  in  the  European  struggle 
still  looked  to  Bulgaria  as  a  vital  point.  Each  was 
still  trying  to  outbid  the  other  by  offers  of  territorial 
advantage,  and  both  were  equally  confident  of  a 
successful  bargain  with  that  tough  and  secretive,  but, 
in  point  of  territorial  ambitions,  typically  Balkan  race. 

Constantinople  and  Chitaldja,  20,000  ;  on  the  Bosphorus,  20,000  ;  in 
the  Caucasus,  60,000 ;  at  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  20,000  ; 
Syria,  30,000  ;  Aleppo  and  Mersine,  30,000 ;  Smyrna  district,  30,000  ; 
gendarmerie,  30,000  ;  at  the  depots,  50,000  ;  scattered,  30,000"  {Inside 
Constantinople,  p.  125).  This  makes  a  total  of  480,000,  and  the  writer 
estimates  that  Turkey  had  by  that  time  (June  18,  191 5)  lost  260,000, 
including  100,000  on  Gallipoli,  But  these  statistics  are  probably  of  little 
more  than  Turkish  value. 

As  to  the  neglect  to  supply  the  Dardanelles  Expedition  with  guns 
and  shells,  it  must,  of  course,  be  remembered  that  they  were  then  short 
on  all  fronts,  and  it  was  only  in  the  beginning  of  June  that  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  was  appointed  to  a  Ministry  of  Munitions. 


GENERAL   GOURAUD   STANDING   WITH    GENERAL   BAILLOUD 


CHAPTER   IX 
THE    PAUSE    IN    JULY 

UTHILE  dwelling  upon  prominent  actions  in 
/  our  efforts  to  advance,  such  as  those  of 
June  4,  June  21,  and  June  28  and  the 
following  days,  one  must  always  realise  that  the 
fighting  in  various  parts  of  the  front  lines  was  in  fact 
continuous  by  day  and  night.  On  both  sides  local 
attempts  were  repeatedly  made  to  capture  or  destroy 
some  section  of  the  opposing  trenches.  It  frequently 
happened  that  different  parts  of  the  same  trench 
would  be  held  by  the  enemy  and  our  companies.  At 
the  turn  of  an  angle,  or  the  mouth  of  a  communica- 
tion trench,  the  men  on  either  side  would  suddenly 
find  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  and  a 
combat,  waged  for  bare  life  with  bombs,  bayonets, 
and  revolvers,  ensued.  Sandbag  barriers  were  quickly 
erected  across  entrances,  but  sometimes,  while  one 
section  was  at  rest  or  engaged  in  cooking,  a  sentry 
would  give  warning  that  a  party  of  about  fifty  men 
in  blue-grey  uniforms  had  crept  over  the  parapets 
to  right  or  left,  cleared  out  the  section  there,  and 
threatened  to  enfilade.  At  such  moments  the  safety 
of  a  line  depended  upon  the  alert  resource  of  some 
junior  officer  and  the  steady  nerves  of  the  platoon 
under  his  command.  No  history  will  ever  record  the 
deeds   of  silent   self-sacrifice  which    ennobled   these 


196  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

daily  struggles,  and  passed  almost  unnoticed  at  the 
time,  except  by  the  men  who  witnessed  them  and 
were  themselves  too  often  afterwards  obliterated  with 
their  memories. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  the  Turkish 
bombardment  was  daily  repeated  at  intervals  in  so- 
called  "hates."  Though  the  front  lines  both  at 
Helles  and  Anzac  were  too  close  together  to  be 
shelled  with  safety  to  their  own  men,  all  the  beaches, 
except  Gully  Beach,  were  exposed  ;  and  though  the 
effect  of  the  fire  could  not  be  seen  on  Anzac  Cove 
and  Lancashire  Landing,  the  range  on  both  was 
accurately  registered,  and  no  one  there  was  safe, 
whether  disembarking  stores,  or  dressing  wounds,  or 
just  coming  to  land,  or  at  rest,  or  bathing,  or  engaged 
in  workshops  and  signalling  offices,  plump  into  which 
at  Helles  I  saw  a  large  shell  fall  on  August  i  with 
terrible  results  in  deaths  and  wounds.^  But,  certainly, 
V  Beach,  beside  the  River  Clyde,  was  most  openly 
exposed.  The  French  depot  there  constantly  suffered, 
especially  after  the  Turks  late  in  June  placed  four 
heavy  batteries  on  the  opposite  shore  in  a  hidden 
position  between  Erenkeui  and  the  Trojan  plain. 
Nor  were  communications  safe.  On  July  4  a  large 
transport,  the  Carthage,  a  British  ship  but  used  by 
the  French,  was  torpedoed  by  a  submarine  just  off 
W  Beach.     Fortunately,  she  was  empty. 

^  This  destruction  of  a  signal  and  telegraph  station  was  probably  the 
incident  referred  to  at  the  end  of  Sir  lan's  second  dispatch.  He  tells 
how  Corporal  G.  A.  Walker,  R.E.,  although  much  shaken,  repaired  the 
damage,  collected  men,  and  within  39  minutes  reopened  communi- 
cation by  apologising  for  the  incident  and  saying  he  required  no 
assistance.  Twelve  were  killed  or  wounded,  beside  the  officer  on  duty, 
killed. 


TURKISH  ATTACKS  197 

Every  day  and  night  at  the  end  of  June  and 
beginning  of  July  was  marked  by  minor  attacks  from 
the  Turkish  Hnes.  But  the  attack  on  July  2  was 
evidently  intended  to  be  more  than  minor.  It  began 
with  a  violent  bombardment  of  our  extreme  left,  to 
which  our  guns,  for  mere  want  of  anmiunition,  could 
make  no  efficient  reply.  At  6  p.m.  the  Turks  came 
swarming  down  from  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Gully 
Ravine.  Checked  by  machine-guns  and  the  fire  of 
the  destroyer  Scorpion,  they  renewed  the  bombard- 
ment, and  immediately  afterwards  two  battalions  were 
seen  advancing^  in  re^^ular  order,  shoulder  to  shoulder, 
across  the  open,  their  officers  waving  their  swords, 
and  running  bravely  forward  to  encourage  their  men. 
To  machine-guns  the  shrapnel  of  the  loth  Battery, 
R.F.A.,  was  now  added,  and  the  Gurkhas  were  sent 
up  to  reinforce.  No  one  could  stand  against  our 
fire.  The  surviving  Turks  ran  back  into  the  ravine 
in  disorder.  Two  clearly  marked  lines  of  dead 
showed  the  limit  of  the  advance. 

A  similar  attack  on  a  grand  scale  was  tried  only 
two  days  later  (the  night  of  July  4-5).  Anzac  was 
heavily  bombarded,  a  Turkish  battleship  in  the 
Narrows  near  Chanak  throwing  at  least  twenty 
1 1 '2-inch  shells  into  the  lines  there,  right  across  the 
Peninsula,  to  say  nothing  of  the  guns  in  the  Olive 
Grove  and  on  the  Anafarta  Hills.  At  Helles,  every 
gun  on  Achi  Baba  and  the  Asiatic  shore  was  brought 
to  bear.  On  W  Beach  alone,  700  big  shells  from 
Asia  fell.  At  least  5000  shells  exploded  on  our  lines 
and  beaches.  At  7.30  a.m.  the  Turkish  infantry 
attempted  to  storm,  rightly  choosing  the  junction  of 
the    Royal  Naval  Division  with    the  French  as  our 


198  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

weakest  point.  A  few  yards  of  front  line  were 
entered,  but  in  fifteen  minutes  cleared  again.  A 
similar  attempt  to  cut  in  between  the  42nd  Division 
and  the  29th  entirely  failed,  and  again  the  Turks 
were  driven  to  the  shelter  of  the  upper  Ravine.  The 
General  Staff  estimated  the  enemy's  losses  during 
the  preceding  week  at  over  5000  killed  and  15,000 
wounded.  So  encumbered  was  their  position  with 
the  dead  rotting  in  the  intense  heat  that  on  July  10  a 
request  for  five  hours'  armistice  to  bury  them  came 
from  the  German  Commandant,  signing  himself 
"Weber  Pasha." ^  Unwillingly,  and  only  in  justice 
to  his  own  men,  Sir  Ian  refused.  For  it  was  known 
that  Turks,  even  more  than  most  troops,  were  re- 
luctant to  charge  over  their  dead  comrades,  whose 
bodies  thus  became  for  us  an  extra  barrier  of  defence, 
equal  to  a  barbed-wire  hedge. 

As  the  enemy's  loss  was  so  heavy,  the  advantage 
in  their  repeated  counter-attacks  would  have  rested 
with  us,  had  it  not  become  evident  that  they  could 
draw  upon  large  reinforcements.  Early  in  July  five 
fresh  Nizam  divisions  arrived  on  the  Peninsula. 
They  were  perhaps  partly  released  by  the  disappear- 
ance of  danger  from  Russia ;  but,  as  most  of  them 
came  from  Adrianople,  their  presence  was  more  prob- 
ably due  to  the  growing  understanding  between  the 
Central     Powers    and     Bulgaria — an    understanding 

^  This  was  the  German  General  Weber,  commanding  the  "  Southern 
Group"  on  the  Peninsula.  He  was  superseded  by  Vehib  Pasha,  "a 
grim  and  fanatical  Turk,"  the  change  causing  great  discontent  among 
the  Germans.  "  In  this  case,  the  Turkish  point  of  view  prevailed, 
for  General  Liman  von  Sanders,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Gallipoli 
Army,  was  determined  not  to  lose  his  post,  and  agreed  slavishly  with  all 
that  Enver  Pasha  ordained"  (Ta/^?  War  Years  in  Constantinople,  p.  46). 


OUR  ATTACKS  ON  JULY  12  AND  13    199 

believed   to    have    developed   into   a   secret   Treaty 
about  the  middle  of  July.     The  arrival  of  these  fresh 
troops  rendered  the  enemy's  attacks  more  serious  and 
more  frequent.     Only  by  strong  counter-attack  could 
our  position  at  Helles  be  maintained  and  the  initia- 
tive remain  with  us.     Accordingly,  a  formal  assault, 
similar   to  those  in    June,  was  ordered  for  July   12. 
This  time  the  main  attack  devolved  upon  our  right 
and  right-centre,  the  French  and  the  52nd  (Lowland) 
Division  being  chiefly  engaged.     After  the  customary 
bombardment,   supported  by  heavy  naval  guns,   the 
infantry  rushed  forward  and  gained  the  first  two  lines, 
but  the  French  and  Scots  (155th  Brigade)  lost  touch, 
the  4th  K.O.S.B.,  parties  of  whom  actually  reached 
the  slopes  of  Achi  Baba,  came  under  gun-fire,  and 
nothing  further  was  possible  till  the  afternoon.     Then, 
after  another  bombardment,  the  157th  Brigade  pushed 
on  and  captured  a  strong  redoubt  on  the  edge  of  the 
Kereves     Dere.      During    the    night,    however,    two 
Scottish  brigades  in  the  right-centre  came  back  over 
two   lines   of  trenches.     The   Royal   Naval  Division 
was    called    up    (the     Nelson     Battalion     especially 
distinguishing  itself),  and    next   afternoon    (July   13) 
succeeded  in  recapturing  these  trenches.     A  certain 
advance  was  also   made   on  their  left,  while  on  the 
extreme  rio-ht  the  French  succeeded  in  reachino-  the 
mouth    of    the    Kereves    Dere    itself.     Nearly    500 
prisoners  were  taken,  and  but  for  inefficient  Staff  work, 
considerable   advantage    might    have    been    secured. 
But   little   advance    was   thus    effected    towards    the 
summit  of  the  elaborately  entrenched   and   fortified 
hill,  the  base  of  which  was  protected  by  great  redoubts 
and  sprinkled  with  concealed  guns  beyond  the  maze 


200  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

of  trenches.  After  this  action  our  supply  of  shell 
was  so  much  reduced,  the  reserve  so  dangerously- 
encroached  upon,  that  further  attack  became  for  the 
present  impossible  without  heavy  risk.  Even  such 
bombardment  as  was  sanctioned  for  those  two  days 
could  only  be  effected  by  borrowing  French  guns — 
about  six  batteries  of  "  75's  "  and  a  few  howitzers. 

Under  the  strain  of  these  successive  days  and 
nights  of  fighting  Major- General  G.  G.  A.  Egerton, 
as  already  mentioned,  suffered  nervous  collapse,  and 
the  command  of  the  52nd  Division  was  temporarily 
entrusted  to  Major-General  F.  C.  Shaw,  recently 
arrived  to  command  the  13th  Division  ("  Kitchener's  " 
or  New  Army)  now  coming  in.  Though  General 
Egerton  returned  to  his  command  for  a  short  time, 
his  place  was  ultimately  taken  by  Major-General 
H.  R.  Lawrence.  But,  naturally,  a  still  more  serious 
matter  was  the  loss  of  Major-General  Hunter- 
Weston,  the  tough  and  experienced  Officer  Com- 
manding the  famous  29th  Division  in  the  earlier 
battles,  and  subsequently  commanding  the  Vlllth 
Army  Corps.  For  three  months,  without  cessation 
by  day  or  night,  this  General,  who  certainly  never 
spared  his  troops,  had  himself  endured  all  the  perils, 
anxieties,  and  sorrows  of  an  officer  directing  a  series 
of  desperate  actions,  or  rather  one  continuous  des- 
perate action,  which,  as  the  price  of  an  unparalleled 
achievement,  had  deprived  him  of  nearly  all  his  most 
trusted  subordinates,  devastated  devoted  troops  with 
irreparable  loss,  and  stretched  his  mind  on  the  rack 
of  ceaseless  apprehension  how  best  to  encounter 
imminent  dangers  with  insufficient  means.  Burning 
sun,  dust  storms,  and  repeated  incalculable  crises  of 


CHANGES  IN  COMMANDS  201 

peril  may  wear  down  the  bravest  physical  nature, 
and  in  high  fever  he  was  compelled  to  seek  refuge 
first  in  the  Admiral's  Triad,  and  then  in  a  hospital 
ship  leaving  the  scene  of  his  great  exploits.  Such 
consolation  as  is  possible  for  a  man  so  placed  he 
might  derive  from  the  eulogy  justly  bestowed  upon 
"the  incomparable  29th  Division"  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief when  the  brigades  were  withdrawn 
in  turn  for  a  brief  rest  at  Imbros  after  the  battle  of 
late  June.  For,  after  speaking  of  their  recent  deeds, 
Sir  Ian  concluded : 

"Therefore  it  is  that  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  is  con- 
fident he  carries  with  him  all  ranks  of  his  force  when 
he  congratulates  Generals  Hunter- Weston  and  De 
Lisle,  the  Staff,  and  each  officer,  N.C.O.,  and  man  in 
this  Division,  whose  sustained  efforts  have  added  fresh 
lustre  to  British  arms  all  the  world  over." 

The  command  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  was 
temporarily  taken  over  by  Lieut. -General  Sir 
Frederick  Stop  ford,  who  had  arrived  at  Imbros  with 
his  Staff  on  July  11.  He  was  thus  given  an  oppor- 
tunity of  experience  in  the  kind  of  fighting  required 
of  his  forces  when  he  commanded  the  IXth  Army 
Corps,  then  gradually  concentrating  for  a  new  enter- 
prise. Major-General  Douglas  (42nd  Division)  next 
took  command  for  a  time.  For  the  permanent  com- 
mand, perhaps.  Sir  Bruce  Hamilton  might  have  been 
appointed  but  for  his  deafness.  Ultimately  Lieut. - 
General  Sir  F.  J.  Davies,  who  had  seen  much  service 
of  every  kind  since  entering  the  Grenadier  Guards  in 
1884,  was  sent  out.  He  arrived  from  France  on 
August  5,  took  over  the  command  on  August  8,  and 
commanded  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  to  the  end. 


202  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

On  the  part  of  the  French,  the  losses  during  the 
first  half  of  July  were  also  heavy.  Of  individual 
losses,  the  most  serious  were  caused  in  the  early 
morning  of  July  12  by  a  heavy  shell  which  destroyed 
the  ist  Division  command  -  post,  killing  Major 
Romieux,  Chief  of  Staff,  and  mortally  wounding 
General  Masnou,  commanding  the  ist  Division.  He 
was  succeeded  by  General  Brulard,  who  had  seen 
much  service  in  Morocco.  Lieut.-Colonel  Vernhol 
was  his  Chief  of  Staff. 

Some  idea  of  the  habitual  life  in  the  fighting  lines 
during  the  next  two  or  three  weeks  of  comparative 
quiet  may  be  gathered  from  notes  which  I  wrote 
hurriedly  at  the  time.  Towards  the  end  of  July  I 
was  staying  on  the  wreck  of  the  River  Clyde,  daily 
visiting  one  section  or  other  of  the  British  lines  (the 
French  being  "  out  of  bounds,"  though  in  later  months 
I  found  all  French  officers  and  men  anxious  to  wel- 
come us).  One  day  when  I  had  been  chiefly  with 
the  42nd  Division  and  the  38th  Brigade  (13th  Divi- 
sion) temporarily  attached  to  them  for  training,  1 
made  the  following  notes  among  others  : 

"  Starting  from  W  Beach,  you  struggle  through 
dust  clouds,  'left  shoulder  up,'  till  you  find  one  of  the 
dusty  white  tracks  by  which  Krithia  villagers  used  to 
visit  the  town  of  Seddel  Bahr.  One  passes  through 
what  was  lately  a  garden  of  wild  flowers,  fields,  vine- 
yards, and  scattered  olive  trees,  but  is  now  the  desola- 
tion which  people  make  and  call  war.  It  is  a  wilder- 
ness of  mounds  and  pits  and  trenches,  of  heaped-up 
stores  and  rows  of  horses  stabled  in  the  open,  of 
tarpaulin  dressing-stations  behind  embankments,  of 
carts  and  wagons  continually  on  the  move,  of  Indian 
muleteers   continually   striving    to    inculcate   human 


DESCRIPTION  OF  HELLES  203 

reason  into  mules.  Except  for  a  few  surviving  trees, 
hardly  a  green  thing  remains.  Over  all  this  wilder- 
ness a  cloud  of  dust  sweeps  perpetually,  and  on  the 
results  of  war  flies  multiply  with  a  prosperity  unknown 
to  them  before. 

"  Shaded  by  the  largest  remaining  trees  lay  the 
headquarters  of  the  Royal  Naval  Division,  always  near 
the  front,  always  engaged,  and  hardly  enough  recog- 
nised. Being  neither  army  nor  navy,  they  share  the 
common  danger  of  nondescripts,  and  people  at  home 
do  not  forget  the  untrained  condition  in  which  they 
were  rushed  out  to  Antwerp.  Now  war  has  given 
them  the  sternest  training,  and  here  they  stand, 
always  ready  to  take  a  foremost  place  in  the  fighting 
line,  singularly  clean  in  dug-out  and  trench,  singularly 
free  from  all  the  common  ailments  of  a  war  in  sun  and 
flying  dirt. 

"  I  went  on  to  the  42nd  Division,  and  passing  the 
Divisional  Headquarters  entered  a  shallow  nullah, 
rather  safer  than  the  track  ;  for  the  whole  of  the  open 
ground  right  away  from  Cape  Helles  is  exposed  to 
shell-fire.  The  peculiarity  of  this  watercourse  is  that 
there  is  visible  water  in  it — a  trickle  of  filthy  greenish 
water  unfit  for  washing  or  drinking ;  but  still  the  men 
wash  where  it  has  settled  down  in  the  large  holes 
made  by  'Jack  Johnsons'  or  'Black  Marias'  which 
have  pitched  in  its  bed. 

"One  point  where  the  watercourse  divides  is  in- 
evitably called  '  Clapham  Junction.'  But  Lancashire 
names  have  been  given  to  the  main  trenches  and 
'dumps.'  Burnley,  Warrington,  and  Accrington 
have  given  names  to  the  narrow  clefts  which  are 
the  homes  of  the  Lancashire  men,  and  a  long  com- 
munication trench,  constructed  by  the  Turks  with 
extraordinary  ingenuity,  has  now  become  Wigan 
Road.  Like  all  this  part  of  our  position,  that  trench 
was  captured  in  the  fighting  of  June  4-6,  relics  of 
which,  in  the  shape  of  the  dead  who  cannot  be  reached 


204  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

for  burial,  still  lie  exposed  in  certain  places  among  our 
own  lines,  so  keen  is  the  watch  of  the  Turkish 
sniper. 

"The  38th  Brigade  is  all  Lancastrian  too.  In 
its  headquarters,  General  Baldwin  was  giving  a 
discourse  to  his  officers.  A  young  Captain  Chad- 
wick,  of  the  machine-guns,  showed  the  way  round 
the  trenches.  Through  periscopes,  or  by  raising  the 
eyes  for  a  few  seconds  above  the  parapet  (for  I  found 
it  hard  to  judge  distances  through  a  periscope),  one 
could  see  the  Turkish  black  and  white  sandbags  only 
forty  or  fifty  yards  from  our  front,  and  follow  the  long 
lines  and  mazes  of  trenchwork  round  the  base  of  Achi 
Baba.  Holes  through  the  tops  of  the  periscopes 
proved  the  vigilance  of  the  Turkish  outlook,  and  in 
passing  certain  points  everybody  has  to  run. 

"  The  rifle-fire  was  not  very  frequent.  Shells 
kept  flying  over  our  heads,  but  only  to  burst  far  away 
upon  the  wilderness,  or  on  W  Beach.  Except  during 
an  attack,  the  firing  line  is  not  the  most  dangerous  part 
of  the  Peninsula.  In  the  midday  heat,  the  men  who 
were  not  'standing  to,'  were  quietly  engaged  in  cook- 
ing or  eating  their  dinner.  They  cooked  on  little 
wood  fires  lighted  in  holes  scooped  out  in  the  trench 
side,  and  their  tin  '  canteens '  served  for  cooking  pots 
and  plates. 

"  So  there  these  sons  of  Lancashire  stood,  almost 
naked  in  the  blaze  of  sun,  jammed  between  high  walls 
of  white  and  parching  marl ;  some  were  cooking,  some 
having  their  dinner  from  the  pans,  some  crouching 
in  any  corner  of  shade  that  could  be  found,  some 
engaged  upon  war's  invariable  occupation  of  picking 
lice  off  the  inside  of  their  clothes.  I  don't  know 
what  work  they  had  done  before — weaving,  spinning, 
mining,  smelting,  I  don't  know  what — but  they  were 
at  an  unaccustomed  sort  of  work  now,  and  yet  how 
quickly  they  have  adapted  themselves  to  so  strange  a 
life  in  so  strange  a  land  !  " 


MONOTONOUS  FOOD  205 

The  food  thus  cooked  was  abundant  but  monoton- 
ous. The  chief  luxury  was  the  ration  of  apricot  jam 
— welcome  for  a  time,  but  always  apricot.  Officials 
naturally  find  monotony  the  easiest  form  of  supply, 
and  forget  that  variety  is  essential  in  human  food. 
The  case  of  "bully  beef"  was  worse.  Certain  kinds 
of  it  (South  American)  were  so  salt  that  it  ought  to 
have  been  stewed  or  boiled  before  issued.  Salt  meat, 
unvaried  week  after  week  under  a  burning  sun  and  in 
stifling  trenches  where  water  is  limited  to  teacupfuls, 
is  not  attractive.  To  troops  afflicted  with  violent 
diarrhoea  it  is  uneatable  and  dangerous.  When  the 
Anzac  men  threw  over  tins  of  meat  to  the  Turks  in 
exchange  for  packets  of  cigarettes,  it  was  a  cheap  gift, 
and  the  enemy  returned  the  message,  "  Bully  Beef 
Non.  Envoyez  milk."  Salt,  hard  and  distasteful 
food,  in  persistent  monotony,  increased  the  prevalent 
disease  until  the  demand  for  castor  oil  (which  was 
considered  the  most  soothing  remedy)  far  exceeded 
the  calculated  supply,  and  at  Anzac  General  Bird- 
wood  was  obliged  to  issue  orders  against  excessive 
indulgence,  lest  castor  oil  should  become  Australia's 
national  drink.  Appeals  for  a  canteen  where  variety 
could  be  purchased  remained  unheeded  till  much 
later  in  the  campaign.  At  Imbros,  a  few  Greeks 
were  licensed  to  erect  stalls  where  fruit,  cigarettes, 
"Turkish  Delight"  (lakoumi),  candles,  and  various 
tinned  goods  could  be  purchased  by  the  brigades 
mustering  there,  or  withdrawn  there  for  rest.  Greek 
sailing-boats  anchored  along  K  Beach,  the  main 
landing-place  on  that  island,  also  did  a  similar  trade, 
especially  in  fruit.  At  Helles,  on  W  Beach,  stood  a 
canteen  shed,  nearly  always  empty.     Late  in  August 


2o6  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

or  in  September  a  canteen  ship  at  last  reached  Anzac, 
but  the  supply  was  so  small  that  the  representative 
purchaser  from  each  battalion  was  not  allowed  more 
than  a  sixth  of  what  he  asked  and  had  money  to  pay 
for.  Yet  whenever  the  simplest  alteration  in  rations 
was  possible,  such  as  the  issue  of  rice,  cocoa,  raisins,  or 
even  a  different  jam,  the  health  of  the  men  improved. 
The  water  supply  was  a  perpetual  anxiety,  especi- 
ally at  Anzac.  Water  could  be  found  in  a  few  places 
by  digging,  especially  near  the  shore,  where,  however, 
it  soon  became  brackish.  At  Helles  there  were  a  few 
springs  and  a  few  old  wells.  At  the  extreme  left  or 
north  of  the  Anzac  position  (near  the  hill  known  as 
Fort  3),  Colonel  Bauchop,  then  in  command  there, 
showed  me  in  July  an  excellent  spring  of  pure  water, 
said  to  have  been  discovered  by  a  "diviner,"  Sapper 
Stephen  Kelly,  of  Melbourne,  with  a  hazel  twig.  As 
it  was  close  to  the  sea,  at  the  mouth  of  one  of  the 
largest  watercourses  that  drain  the  range  of  Sari 
Bair,  though  dry  on  the  surface  in  summer,  it  might 
have  been  possible  to  divine  the  presence  of  water 
beneath  the  surface  without  supernatural  aid ;  but  the 
source  was  soon  fitted  up  with  pumps  and  cisterns, 
supplying  that  district  well.  For  the  centre  of  Anzac 
and  the  outlying  trenches  along  the  heights,  most  of 
the  water  was  brought  from  the  Nile  in  lighters  and 
pumped  into  iron  reservoirs  upon  the  Cove  beach  in 
front  of  General  Headquarters.  A  larger  one  con- 
taining 30,000  gallons  was  also  constructed  on  a  plat- 
form up  the  cliff,  but  without  great  success,  owing  to  the 
breakdown  of  the  pumping-engine.  The  water  was 
carefully  rationed  out  into  water-bottles  or  tins — so 
carefully  tliat  a  man  was  fortunate  to  get  a  mugful  for 


m 


WATER-CARRIERS   AT   ANZAC 


DAILY  LIFE  AT  ANZAC  207 

washing  and  shaving.  "  Having  a  good  clean  up?" 
said  General  Birdwood,  in  his  friendly  way,  to  an 
Australian  thus  engaged.  "  Yes,  sir,"  the  man  replied, 
"and  I  only  wish  I  was  a  bloody  canary  ! " 

From  notes  written  down  by  myself  in  the  middle 
of  that  July,  I  take  the  following  description  : 

"  So  here  the  Anzacs  live,  practising  the  whole 
art  of  war.  Amid  dust  and  innumerable  flies,  from 
the  mouths  of  little  caves  cut  in  the  face  of  the  cliffs, 
they  look  over  miles  of  sea  to  the  precipitous  peaks  of 
Samothrace  and  the  grey  mountains  of  Imbros.  Up 
and  down  the  steep  and  narrow  paths,  the  Colonials 
arduously  toil,  like  ants  which  bear  the  burdens  of 
their  race.  Uniforms  are  seldom  of  the  regulation 
type.  Usually  they  consist  of  bare  skin  dyed  to  a 
deep  reddish  copper  by  the  sun,  tattooed  decorations 
(a  girl,  a  ship,  a  dragon),  and  a  covering  that  can 
hardly  be  described  even  as  'shorts,'  being  much 
shorter.  Every  kind  of  store  and  arm  has  to  be 
dragged  or  'humped'  up  these  ant-hills  of  cliff,  and 
deposited  at  the  proper  hole  or  gallery.  Food,  water, 
cartridges,  shells,  building  timber,  guns,  medical  stores 
— up  the  tracks  all  must  go,  and  down  them  the 
wounded  come. 

"  So  the  practice  of  the  simple  life  proceeds,  with 
greater  simplicity  than  any  Garden  Suburb  can  boast, 
and  the  domestic  virtues  which  constitute  the  whole 
art  of  war  are  exercised  with  a  fortitude  rarely  main- 
tained upon  the  domestic  hearth." 

July  23  was  the  anniversary  of  the  "constitution  " 
proclaimed  by  the  Young  Turks  in  1908,  and  it  was 
expected  that  the  enemy  would  celebrate  the  dawn  by 
another  attack.  Being  then  at  Anzac,  I  made  the 
following  notes,  which  are  here  included  as  giving 
some  idea  of  usual  daily  life  upon  the  outer  lines  ; 


2o8  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

**  Reinforcements  were  known  to  be  arriving,  or 
perhaps  arrived,  across  the  Narrows — 100,000  men, 
as  reported.  It  was  Ramazan,  and  the  sacred  moon, 
three-quarters  full,  gave  light  for  climbing  the  pre- 
cipitous yellow  cliffs.  By  eleven  I  was  at  the  highest 
point.  Through  deeply  cut  saps  and  '  communica- 
tions,' the  work  of  Australian  miners,  the  way  runs  in 
winding  labyrinth.  Though  the  depth  of  our  three- 
mile  position  measures  no  more  than  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  from  the  shore  to  the  farthest  point  inland  (not 
counting  by  the  measurement  of  cliff  and  valley  sur- 
face, but  straight  through  the  air),  the  length  of  sap 
and  trench  runs  to  much  over  a  hundred  miles.  The 
point  I  reached  had  served  as  a  machine-gun  emplace- 
ment, but  that  evening  it  was  watched  by  a  Sikh 
sentry  who  stood  in  the  shadow,  silent  as  the  shadow. 
Mounted  on  the  firing-step  I  looked  over  the  sandbag 
parapet  upon  a  peculiar  scene. 

"  Far  on  my  right  lay  the  sea,  white  with  the 
pathway  of  the  setting  moon.  Up  from  the  shore 
ran  the  lines  of  our  position.  Close  outside  the  lines, 
north,  south,  and  east,  the  Turks  stood  hidden  in  their 
trenches — 25,000  to  35,000  of  them,  as  estimates  say. 
All  the  time  they  kept  up  a  casual  rifle-fire.  Some 
six  miles  away,  in  the  centre  of  the  Peninsula  south,  I 
could  see  the  long  and  steep  position  of  Kilid  Bahr 
plateau,  where  the  Turks  drill  new  troops  daily,  and 
three  or  four  miles  farther  still  away  rose  the  danger- 
ously gentle  slopes  and  low,  flat  summit  of  Achi  Baba. 
Beyond  it  gleamed  the  sudden  flashes  of  Turkish  and 
British  gruns  defending  or  assaulting  the  sand-blown 
point  of  land  between  Krithia  and  Cape  Helles. 
Sometimes,  too,  a  warship's  searchlight  shot  a 
brilliant  ray  across  the  view. 

"  At  one  o'clock  the  moon  set  in  a  deep  red  haze 
over  the  sea.  But  nothing  happened.  The  enemy 
merely  kept  up  a  casual  fire  upon  our  sandbags, 
shaking  the  sand  down  upon  my  face  as   I  lay  on  a 


A  TURKISH  OUTBURST  209 

kind  of  shelf  beside  the  parapet.  Then  suddenly,  just 
on  the  stroke  of  two  (about  midnight  in  London),  an 
amazing  disturbance  arose. 

"  Every  Turk  who  held  a  rifle  or  commanded  a 
machine-gun  began  to  fire  as  fast  as  he  could.  From 
every  point  in  their  lines  arose  such  a  din  of  rifle- 
fire  as  I  have  seldom  heard  even  at  the  crisis  of  a 
great  engagement.  It  was  one  continuous  blaze  and 
rattle.  From  a  gap  in  the  parapet  I  could  see  the 
sharp  tongues  of  flame  flashing  all  along  the  edges, 
like  a  belt  of  jewels.  Minute  followed  minute,  and 
still  the  incalculable  din  continued.  Now  and  again 
one  of  our  guns  flung  up  a  shell  which  burst  like  a 
firework  into  brilliant  stars,  as  though  to  ask,  *  What 
on  earth  is  the  matter  with  you  ? '  Now  and  again 
another  gun  threw  a  larger  shell  which  came  lumber- 
ing up  Shrapnel  Gully  with  a  leisurely  note,  to  burst 
crashing  among  the  enemy's  trenches.  And  still  the 
roar  of  rifles  and  machine-guns  went  on  incessantly, 
and  still  nothing  occurred.  Suddenly,  after  just  a 
quarter  of  an  hour,  the  tumult  ceased,  with  as  little 
reason  as  it  had  begun. 

"  What  was  the  origin  of  it  all,  no  one  who  knows 
the  Turk  would  guess.  A  salutation  to  the  dawn  of 
Constitution  Day  ;  panic  at  the  imaginary  appear- 
ance of  ghostly  bayonets  fixed  for  the  charge  ;  the 
instinct  which  impels  a  man  to  fire  a  rifle  when 
another  fires  ?  In  lately  captured  orders,  the  Turks 
were  seriously  warned  against  wasting  ammunition, 
and  now,  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  they  had  expended 
thousands  of  rounds  upon  sandbags ;  one  man  killed 
and  two  slightly  wounded.  I  afterwards  learnt  that 
the  Anzacs  fired  off  only  two  belts  (500  rounds)  of 
machine-gun,  and  74  rounds  of  rifle. 

"When  the  storm  subsided,  we  and   the  Turkish 

snipers  settled  down  again  to  normal  relations,  and 

all  was  star-lit  peace.     At  half-past  three  the  phantom 

of  false  dawn  died  into  daylight,  and  the  men  who 

14 


2IO  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

had  been  'standing  to'  all  night  sank  to  sleep 
at  the  bottom  of  the  trenches.  Picking  my  way 
over  their  splendid  forms,  I  climbed  down  the 
cliffs  again  to  my  cavern  beside  the  sea.  I  was 
told  that,  as  an  attack  was  expected  that  night 
(spies  so  reported),  not  a  single  man  in  the  Anzac 
force  had  gone  sick." 

That  was  a  special  occasion,  but  no  matter  where 
one  slept  at  Anzac,  the  air  overhead  wailed  ceaselessly 
with  bullets,  and  from  time  to  time  shrapnel  burst  or 
heavy  shell  exploded,  especially  around  headquarters 
close  to  the  beach  in  the  centre  of  Anzac  Cove. 
There,  up  a  short  flight  of  steps,  General  Birdwood 
had  his  dug-out,  and  there  during  the  night  of 
July  27,  Lieutenant  B.  W.  Onslow  (nth  K.E.O. 
Lancers),  the  General's  A.D.C.,  an  excellent  soldier, 
sleeping  on  the  top  of  his  dug-out  owing  to  the  intense 
heat,  was  killed  instantly  as  he  slept. 

At  the  advanced  base  in  Mudros  harbour  (the 
third  vital  point  in  the  expedition  at  this  time),  an 
important  change  in  command  was  effected  in  the 
middle  of  this  month.  Throughout  the  first  weeks 
of  fighting  and  organisation,  this  base  was  left 
destitute  of  an  Inspector-General  of  Communications. 
The  heavy  and  complicated  work  involved,  especially 
in  the  transhipment  of  all  drafts  and  supplies  and 
ammunition  from  the  ordinary  transports  to  trawlers 
and  small  craft  after  the  danger  of  submarines  was 
reported,  fell  upon  the  Principal  Naval  Transport 
Officer  (Admiral  Phillimore)  and  the  Quartermaster- 
General  (Brigadier-General  S.  H.  Winter).  In  June, 
Major- General  Wallace  was  appointed  to  the  office, 
but  his   long   experience   as  an  executive  officer  in 


THE  A R AGON  211 

India  had  not  specially  qualified  him  for  a  peculiarly 
difficult  piece  of  administrative  work,  and  complaints 
arose  of  the  confusion  and  delay  on  board  the  s.s. 
Aragon,  assigned  to  him  as  headquarters.  Hitherto 
this  liner  (hired  at  great  cost  from  the  Royal  Mail 
Steam  Packet  Company)  had  served  as  offices  for  the 
Principal  Naval  Transport  Officer,  and  as  the  General 
Post  Office.  The  new  Staff  of  enormous  size  was 
now  added,  and  the  ship  also  became  a  kind  of 
clearing-house  or  depot  for  officers  passing  to  and 
fro.  She  acquired  an  evil  name  owing  to  frequent  loss 
of  parcels  from  home  for  officers  and  men  upon  the 
Peninsula.  Unhappily,  there  was  no  question  about 
the  losses ;  but  this  unpardonable  crime  against  the 
fighting  men,  who  were  literally  dying  for  want  of 
variety  and  small  pleasures  in  food,  may  have  been 
committed  at  other  points  of  the  postal  service.  More 
definite,  though  less  serious,  was  the  charge  of  luxury 
on  board.  Certainly,  to  any  one  coming  fresh  from 
the  dug-outs,  dust  storms,  monotonous  rations,  and 
perpetual  risks  of  the  Peninsula,  the  Aragon  was  like 
an  Enchanted  Isle.  All  who  have  campaigned  in  a 
desert  land  know  the  first  physical  delight  of  getting 
on  board  a  well-equipped  vessel — the  plenty  and 
variety  of  food,  the  clean  cooking,  the  iced  drinks, 
tablecloths  for  dinner,  sheets  in  the  bunks,  a  good 
chance  of  washing,  and  baths.  To  the  campaigning 
soldier,  those  are  comforts  beyond  the  dreams  of 
luxury,  but  in  ordinary  life  the  most  ascetic  of  saints 
does  not  renounce  them  all  as  necessarily  sinful. 
Perhaps  it  was  the  arbitrary  exclusion  of  many  passing 
officers  from  the  delights  of  a  real  dinner  and  other 
pleasurable  contrasts  to  life  at  the  front  which  made 


212  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

the  A r agon  a  byword,  as  though  she  were  '*a 
sink  of  iniquity " ;  and  from  the  same  contrasts 
arose  the  report  that  at  the  end  of  the  campaign 
she  was  discovered  to  be  aground  upon  empty 
bottles,  as  upon  a  coral  reef.  This  appears  un- 
likely, since  the  harbour  took  battleships  with  ease, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  Aquitania  and  the  largest 
liners  afloat.^ 

In  the  first  half  of  July,  Major-General  Altham 
(Royal  Scots),  a  Christ  Church,  Oxford,  man,  who 
served  as  Chief  Intelligence  Officer  under  Sir  George 
White  in  Ladysmith,  succeeded  as  Inspector-General 
of  Communications,  and  he  also  made  his  head- 
quarters in  the  Aragon.  The  expense  of  maintaining 
the  ship  was  estimated  at  /300  a  day,  and  proposals 
were  made  for  removing  the  headquarters  to  land  in 
order  to  save  money.  But  on  the  east  side  of  the 
harbour  stood  the  dusty  and  unwholesome  town  or 
village  of  Mudros,  together  with  various  camps,  and 
the  western  shore  and  rising  slopes  behind  it  were 
covered  with  hospitals,  Australian,  Irish-Canadian 
(run  by  women),  and  others,  besides  rest-camps 
beyond.  It  was  also  thought  necessary  to  remain  on 
the  water  in  order  to  keep  touch  with  the  naval 
organisation  under  direction  of  the  flagship  Europa 
(Admiral  Wemyss),  and  this,  together  with  the 
absence  of  deep-water  piers  and  wharves,  was  prob- 
ably the  decisive  reason.  And  as  to  expense,  the 
saving  of  some  ^9000  a  month  has,  unfortunately, 
never  been  regarded  as  particularly  praiseworthy  in 
this  war.  The  Minnetonka  (Atlantic  Transport 
Company)  served  as  headquarters  of  the  Ordnance 
^  The  Aragon  was  torpedoed  in  the  Mediterranean,  January  1918. 


THE  SATURNIA  213 

Services  and  depot  for  the  supply  of  engineering 
implements,  tools,  and  ammunition,  which,  however, 
was  not  usually  unloaded  from  the  smaller  craft. 
Brigadier-General  R.  W.  M.  Jackson,  Director  of 
Ordnance  Services,  worked  sometimes  at  Mudros, 
sometimes  at  the  base  in  Alexandria.  Brigadier- 
General  F.  W.  B.  Koe,  Director  of  Supplies  and 
Transports,  did  the  same. 

In  spite  of  the  lamentable  experiences  at  the  first 
landings,   the  arrangements  for    the   removal  of   the 
wounded  from    the   Peninsula   were  still   inadequate. 
The  four  original  hospital   ships  were  present — two 
military  and  two  lent  by  the  navy — each  adapted  to 
receive    about    500    men.     The    remainder    of  the 
wounded  had  to  be    put  on  transports  not  specially 
prepared,  and  not  protected  by  The  Hague  Conven- 
tion from  attack.     Before  new  hospital  ships  arrived 
(about  fifty  at  the  end),  this  lack  of  accommodation 
caused  many  deaths  and  much  suffering  after  a  battle 
on    the     Peninsula.       A    particular    instance,    much 
spoken  of  and  strongly  condemned  at  the  time,  was 
the  case  of  the  transport  Saturnia,  which  appeared  at 
Mudros  after  the  attack  of  June  28  with  about  700  on 
board,  crowded  haphazard  into  any  corner,  in  much 
confusion,  and  so  neglected  that  their  wounds  were 
in  many  cases  putrefying  and  full  of  maggots.     The 
transport,  having  been  used   for  horses  and  mules, 
was  also  in  a  filthy  and  stinking  condition.     Naval 
and  military  surgeons  were  ordered  to  assist.     Among 
the  foremost  was  Staff- Surgeon  Levick  of  the  cruiser 
Bacchante   (Captain    Boyle),    who   had    accompanied 
Captain  Scott  on  the  Antarctic  expedition,  and  was 
the   author  of  an  excellent  scientific    monograph  on 


214  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

penguins.  Supported  by  Surgeon  Lorrimer  of  the 
same  ship,  and  a  Catholic  priest,  he  remained  on 
board  four  days  and  nights,  constantly  operating. 
But,  for  want  of  adequate  assistance,  and  owing  to 
the  lack  of  bandages,  dressings,  and  instruments, 
comparatively  little  could  be  effected,  and  many  died 
who  might  have  recovered  with  proper  care. 

Such  incidents  were  but  further  evidences  of  the 
general  confusion  due  to  an  unexpected  war,  and  of 
the  secondary  position  assigned  to  the  Dardanelles 
in  the  Cabinet's  strategy.  Prompted,  perhaps,  by 
the  depressing  reports  which  had  lately  reached  them, 
the  "Dardanelles  Committee"  of  the  Cabinet,  as  the 
former  "  War  Council  "  was  called  after  June,^  resolved 
to  institute  an  inquiry  for  themselves.  On  the 
Peninsula  it  was  widely  rumoured  that  Mr.  Winston 
Churchill  was  coming,  and  variegated  opinions  were 
expressed.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  well  if  he 
had  come ;  for  he,  at  all  events,  realised  the  vital 
importance  of  the  expedition  in  relation  to  the  war 
as  a  whole.  Ultimately,  Colonel  Maurice  Hankey, 
Secretary  to  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  since 
191 2,  came  alone — a  man  of  high  reputation  for 
intelligence  and  capacity.  He  arrived  in  the  last 
week  of  July,  and  stayed  till  August  20,  but  before  his 
arrival  the  Cabinet  had  already  resolved  upon  sending 
out  such  reinforcements  as  they  considered  sufficient 
to  comply  with  Sir  lan's  demands. 

On  July  13  a  new  and  strange  type  of  warship, 
called  a  "  Monitor,"  arrived  at  Kephalos,  and  next 

^  First  Dardanelles  Commission  Report,  par.  14,  note.  It  seems  to 
have  been  a  section  of  the  "War  Committee"  established  by  the 
Coalition  Government  of  May  19. 


V. 


MONITORS,  "BLISTER  SHIPS,"  &  "BEETLES"     215 

day  began  bombarding  the  guns  on  the  Asiatic  coast. 
The  monitors  were  originally  constructed  for  opera- 
tions in  another  sphere.      They  were,  in  fact,  large 
floating  platforms  or  flat-bottomed  forts,  supporting, 
some  two  12-inch,  and  others  two  14-inch,  guns  of 
.  American  make,  without  further  armament.      Their 
tonnage  was  about  6000,  and  their  chief  peculiarity 
a  broad,  flat  shelf  or   platform  extending  from   the 
hull  just  below  the  water-line  ;  so  broad  and  flat  that 
numbers  of  men  could  walk  upon  it  while  bathing, 
so  that  they  appeared  to  be  walking  upon  the  water. 
The  shape  of  the  vessels  rendered  them  difficult  to 
steer,    and   so    slow    in    motion    that    their   progress 
against  such  a  current  as  ran  In  the  Narrows  would  have 
been  very  gradual.      About  the  same  time,  smaller 
"monitors"  arrived.     They  were  nicknamed  "Whip- 
pets," and    were    marked    by   numbers    only.       Four 
"blister  ships"  (cruisers  protected  against  torpedoes 
by  bulging  protuberances  along  both  sides)  also  came. 
The  "  blisters "  reduced  their  speed  by  about  three 
knots,  but,  being  safe  at  anchor,  they  served  especially 
as  marking  points  for  survey  and  "registration."     All 
these  ships  played  an  important  part  in  the  coming 
operations  ;  and  in  the  later  months  of  the  campaign, 
when  cross-observation  from  De  Tott's  Battery  point 
and   Cape    Helles   had  been   established,   the   large 
"  monitors"  stationed  off  Rabbit  Island  did  invaluable 
service  by  suppressing  the  heavy  guns  on  the  Asiatic 
side. 

Almost  equally  surprising  was  the  appearance  of 
several  motor-lighters,  Inevitably  called  "  Beetles." 
Originally  constructed  for  the  same  proposal  as  the 
monitors,  they  were  long,  iron  barges  moving  under 


2i6  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

their  own  oil  power,  and  built  to  transport  500  men 
or  50  horses  apiece.  From  the  prow  projected 
a  swinging  platform  or  drawbridge,  which,  hanging 
elevated  as  the  lighter  moved,  had  the  look  of  a 
beetle's  forceps  and  antennae.  The  iron  deck  and 
sides  gave  absolute  protection  against  rifle-fire  or 
shrapnel,  and  if  only  the  lighters  had  been  sent 
out  for  the  first  landings,  hundreds  of  lives  might 
have  been  saved  and  the  history  of  the  war  trans- 
formed. 

As  to  military  reinforcement,  its  necessity  was 
obvious,  since  by  the  end  of  July  the  casualties 
amounted  to  nearly  50,000 ;  in  round  numbers,  8000 
killed,  30,000  wounded  (many,  of  course,  returned  to 
service),  and  11,000  missing  (many  killed).^  The 
29th  Division  was  the  best  supplied  with  drafts,  but 
on  the  last  day  of  July  it  counted  only  219  officers 
and  8424  men.  As  we  have  seen,  the  brigades  of  the 
13th  (Western)  Division,  under  Major-General 
F.  C.  Shaw,  began  to  arrive  in  the  first  half  of  July, 
and  were  stationed  with  the  divisions  at  Helles  to 
gain    experience,    which    served    them   well.^      The 

^  This  estimate  does  not  include  the  French  casualties,  which  are 
not  published. 

'  The  13th  Division  consisted  of  the  following  brigades  : 
38th  (Brigadier-General  Baldwin) — 

6th    Royal   Lancashire,   6th    East   Lancashire,   6th    South 
Lancashire,  and  6th  North  Lancashire. 

39th  (Brigadier-General  W.  de  S.  Cayley) — 

9th  Royal  Warwick,  7th  Gloucester,  9th  Worcester,  and 
7th  North  Stafford. 

40th  (Brigadier-General  J.  H.  du  B.  Travers) — 

4th  South  Wales    Borderers,  8th  Royal  Welsh   Fusiliers, 
8th  Cheshire,  and  5th  Wilts. 
The  8th  Welsh  Regiment  were  Divisional  Pioneers 


THE  10th,  11th,  AND  13th  DIVISIONS  217 

nth  (Northern)  Division,  under  Major-General 
Frederick  Hammersley,  began  to  arrive  early  in  the 
second  half  of  July,  two  brigades  being  stationed  at 
Imbros,  and  one  (the  33rd)  sent  to  Helles  for  a  brief 
experience/  The  loth  (Irish)  Division,  under  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Sir  Bryan  Mahon,  arrived  towards  the 
end  of  July,  and  half  of  it  was  stationed  at  Mitylene 
(Lesbos)  on  the  inlet  of  lero  (about  6  miles  from  the 
town  of  Mitylene),  guarded  by  the  old  battleship 
Canopus  (Captain  Grant).^  These  three  Divisions 
belonged  to  the  New  (so-called  Kitchener's)  Army. 

^  The  nth  Division  consisted  of  the  following  brigades  : 
32nd  (Brigadier-General  H.  Haggard) — 

9th  West  York,  6th  Yorkshire,  8th  West  Riding,  and  6th 
York  and  Lancaster. 

33rd  (Brigadier-General  R.  P.  Maxwell) — 

6th  Lincolnshire,  6th  Border,  7th  South  Stafford,  and  9th 
Sherwood  Foresters. 

34th  (Brigadier-General  W.  H.  Sitwell)— 

8th    Northumberland   Fusiliers,  9th    Lancashire    Fusiliers, 
5th  Dorset,  and  nth  Manchester. 
The  6th  East  Yorkshire  were  Divisional  Pioneers. 

^  The  loth  Division  consisted  of  the  following  brigades  : 
29th  (Brigadier-General  R.  J.  Cooper) — 

loth   Hampshire,  6th    Royal   Irish  Rifles,   5th  Connaught 
Rangers,  and  6th  Leinster. 

30th  (Brigadier-General  L.  L.  Nicol) — 

6th  and  7th  Royal  Munster  Fusiliers,  6th  and  7th  Royal 
Dublin  Fusiliers. 

31st  (Brigadier-General  F.  F.  Hill) — 

5th  and  6th  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  5th  and  6th  Royal  Irish 
Fusiliers. 

The  5th  Royal  Irish  Regiment  were  Divisional  Pioneers.  Only 
about  60  per  cent,  of  the  men  in  these  battalions  were  Irish,  the  rest 
being  chiefly  North-country  miners  and  Somerset.  For  the  complete 
list  of  the  battalions  in  this  Division,  the  Artillery,  Engineers,  etc.,  see 
The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  in  Gallipoli,  by  Major  Bryan  Cooper,  pp. 
2  and  3. 


2i8  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

The  infantry  of  two  Territorial  Divisions  were  also 
promised— the  53rd  (Welsh)  and  54th  (East  Anglian) 
— but  they  did  not  begin  to  arrive  till  August  10. 
They  were  about  half  below  their  nominal  strength, 
and  had  no  guns/ 

As  to  aeroplanes,  compared  with  subsequent 
developments  the  service  was  necessarily  rather 
primitive.  The  six  or  eight  seaplanes  attached  to 
the  Ark  Royal  were  unable  to  rise  to  any  great 
heigfht — not  over  2000  feet.  Commander  Charles 
Samson  established  an  aerodrome  at  Tenedos  early 
in  the  campaign  for  British  and  French  planes,^  and 
there  was  an  emergency  landing-place  at  Helles.  In 
June,  Tenedos  was  left  to  the  French,  and  Colonel 

1  I  am  unable  to  give  the  exact  formations  of  these  Divisions.  The 
battalions  w^ere  changed  shortly  before  they  left  England.  From 
dispatches  and  other  sources,  however,  one  can  make  the  following 
list: 

lyd {Welsh)  Division  : 

158th  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  E.  A.  Cowans) — 
4th,  5th,  and  7th  Cheshires,  and  the  4th  Welsh. 

159th  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  F.  C.  Lloyd) — 

5th,  6th,  and  7th  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers,  and  the  i/ist 
Herefordshire. 

1 60th  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  J.  J.  F.  Hume)— 

4th  Queen's  (Royal  West  Surrey),  4th  Royal  Sussex,  a 
composite  Kent  Battahon,  and  the  loth  Middlesex. 

S^fh  {East  Anglian)  Division  : 

i6ist  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  C.  M.  Brunton),  and 
162nd  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  C.  de  Winton). 

The  5th,  6th,  and  7th  Essex,  loth  and  nth  London,  5th 
Suffolk,  and  8th  Hants  are  mentioned  as  belonging  to 
these  two  brigades. 

163rd  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  F.  F.  W.  Daniell)— 
4th  and  5th  Norfolks,  5th  and  loth  Bedfordshire. 

^  Uncensored  Leiiers,  p.  170.    There  were  10  French  planes, 


AEROPLANES  AND  REINFORCEMENTS       219 

Frederick  Sykes,  R.N.A.S.,  took  command  over  the 
two  British  wings  (Commander  Samson  and  Lieut- 
Colonel  Gerard)  stationed  at  Imbros.  At  the  end  of 
July  about  30  planes  of  different  types  were  in  action, 
doing  excellent  service  in  observation  and  photography. 
But  none  of  them  were  "fighting  machines,"  and,  as 
no  anti-aircraft  guns  were  supplied  till  just  at  the  end 
of  the  campaign,  the  Turkish  "  Fokker"  planes  from 
Chanak  were  able  to  continue  bombing  our  lines  on 
the  Peninsula  and  the  General  Headquarters  at 
Imbros.  On  the  sandy  cliff  beside  the  head- 
quarters a  large  shed  was  erected  for  a  few  small 
airships,  cigar  -  shaped,  with  silvery  balloons  (they 
were  known  as  "Silver  Babies"),  which  were  used 
to  scout  over  the  channel  between  Imbros  and  the 
Peninsula  on  the  watch  for  submarines.  The  late 
autumn  gales  tore  the  green  canvas  covering  off  the 
shed,  and  ultimately  it  was  removed  to  Mudros. 

By  the  beginning  of  August,  Sir  Ian  Hamilton 
had  the  following  military  forces  under  his  command  : 
Vlllth  Army  Corps  (29th,  42nd,  and  52nd  Divisions); 
IXth  Army  Corps  (10th,  nth,  and  13th  Divisions); 
Anzac  Army  Corps  (Australian  and  New-Zealand- 
and-Australian  Divisions) ;  French  Corps  Exp^di- 
tionnaire  d'Orient  (ist  and  2nd  Divisions);  General 
Headquarter  Troops  (Royal  Naval  Division),  together 
with  the  infantry  of  the  53rd  and  54th  Divisions  then 
on  their  way  out.  Eleven  divisions  present  and  two 
more  coming  represented  a  nominal  force  of  about 
240,000  to  250,000.  The  actually  available  forces 
amounted  to  less  than  half  those  numbers  (about 
120,000  rifles),  always  short  of  howitzers,  guns,  shells, 
trench-mortars,  and  bombs.     The  Turkish  forces  on 


220 


THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 


the   Peninsula  at  the  same  time  were  estimated  at 
about  61,000,  with  39,000  in  reserve.^ 

The  reinforcements  by  land  and  sea  rendered  a 

change    of  strategy    possible.      They   were,   in   fact, 

supplied    for    this    purpose.       It    had    now   become 

evident  that  the    Achi   Baba   lines  were   too  strong 

for  direct  assault.      Its  gradual  slopes,  free  from  dead 

ground,  made  the  hill  an  ideal  position   for  defence, 

and  this  natural  advantage  had  been  so  increased  by 

a  complicated  system  of  frontal   and  communication 

trenches,    by   barbed    wire,    machine-guns,    scattered 

batteries,  and  a  series  of  powerful  redoubts,  that  an 

almost    impregnable   fortress  by    this    time    checked 

further  advance.       In   fact,  the  army  at  Helles  was 

like  a  besieged  garrison,  being  continually  threatened 

with  assault  from  the  front,  and  by  the  Asiatic  guns 

on  its  right  flank  and  rear.     The  sea  remained  open, 

but  that  outlet  for  communication,  already  exposed 

to  the  enemy's  submarines  and  heavy  artillery,  would 

soon  be  imperilled  by  autumnal  storms.     The  Army 

Corps  at  Anzac  was  similarly  besieged,  except  that 

the  dead  ground  sheltered  by  precipitous  cliffs  reduced 

^  Our  estimates  of  the  enemy's  forces  for  the  days  of  fighting  in 
August  were  : 


Date. 

Suvla. 

Anzac. 

Helles. 

Reserve. 

August  6-7 

3,000 

25,000 

33,000 

39,000 

„       8     .       . 

5,000 

31,000 

33,000 

20,000  ^ 

»       9     •      • 

7,000 

38,000 

33,000 

20,000  ^ 

„      10    . 

9,000 

38,000 

33,000 

25,000 

„      II     . 

13,000 

38,000 

33,000 

25,000 

»      15     •       • 

20,000 

47,000 

15,000 

12,000 

„      22     . 

26,000 

41,000 

15,000 

12,000 

^  11,000  marching  south. 


2000  marching  south. 


REJECTED  SCHEMES  FOR  FRESH  ADVANCE     221 

the  danger  to  life  in  rear  of  the  firing  trenches.  To 
break  down  the  siege  a  sortie  in  force  had  become 
essential.  The  only  alternative  was  to  cling  to  the 
positions  in  the  hope  of  a  diversion  from  Russia  or 
Bulgaria.  But  during  July  the  great  Russian  retreat 
from  Galicia  and  Poland  continued  almost  uninter- 
rupted, and  on  August  4,  Warsaw  fell.  As  to 
Bulgaria,  the  Russian  disasters  confirmed  Tsar 
Ferdinand's  confidence  in  the  ultimate  victory  of  his 
German  compatriots,  and  a  resolute  people's  ancestral 
detestation  of  the  Serbs  gave  him  the  support  of  their 
passionate  desire  to  recover  the  lands  lost  to  them 
in  the  second  Balkan  War. 

The  design  of  breaking  down  the  siege  and  freeing 
the  Narrows  for  the  fleet,  by  cutting  the  neck  of  the 
Peninsula  at  Bulair,  by  a  landing  at  Enos,  or  by  a 
direct  attack,  was  obvious  and  tempting.  As  before, 
its  weakness  was  that  the  occupation  of  Bulair  would 
neither  have  cut  the  enemy's  communications  nor 
freed  the  Narrows.  In  spite  of  the  daring  resource 
of  our  submarines  in  penetrating  into  the  Sea  of 
Marmora,  and  even  shelling  the  trains  and  destroying 
the  culverts  on  the  railway  which  runs  from  Scutari 
along  the  north  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Ismid,  the  main 
Turkish  supplies  and  drafts  still  came  to  the  Peninsula 
by  sea.  Some  crossed  to  the  Asiatic  side  from  Con- 
stantinople ;  some  came  up  by  train  from  Smyrna  to 
Panderma  ;  in  either  case,  the  transports  edged  along 
the  coast  by  stages  at  night  till  they  reached  the 
Straits  and  crossed  at  Gallipoli,  Galata,  or  Maidos, 
always  keeping  beyond  the  range  or  vision  of  any 
guns  on  Bulair.  A  landing  at  Enos  would  have 
lengthened    the    journey   from     Mudros    by    about 


222  THE  PAUSE  IN  JULY 

50  miles.  An  attempt  at  Bulair  would  have  implied 
a  landing  against  lines  long  reputed  impregnable, 
and  lately  developed  even  more  carefully  than  the 
April  defences  at  Helles.  The  attempt  also  would 
have  contained  no  element  of  surprise ;  for  an  attack 
at  that  point  would  be  the  merest  amateur's  first 
expectation. 

An  advance  in  Asia,  as  from  Adramyti  Bay 
opposite  Mitylene,  with  a  view  to  reaching  the 
Smyrna- Panderma  railway,  might  have  looked  more 
promising.  It  was  much  favoured  by  British  au- 
thorities in  Mitylene.  The  arrival  of  half  the  loth 
Division  appeared  to  point  that  way,  and  Mr.  Compton 
Mackenzie  was  sent  there  to  encourage  the  false 
report,  for  the  benefit  of  Turkish  spies.  The  French, 
harassed  by  the  Asiatic  guns,  were  probably  anxious 
for  some  movement  along  that  coast.  But  Sir  Ian 
was  perhaps  still  bound  by  Lord  Kitchener's  express 
orders  not  to  entangle  himself  in  Asia.  At  all 
events,  he  refused  to  dissipate  his  comparatively 
small  forces  at  such  distances  apart.  Committed  to 
the  Peninsula,  he  felt  that  there  or  nowhere  lay  his 
hope  of  victory.  Already  in  June,  with  the  full  con- 
currence of  Generals  Gouraud  and  Birdwood,  he 
had  laid  his  plan.  Anzac,  instead  of  remaining  sub- 
sidiary as  "a  thorn  in  the  side,"  was  now  to  become 
the  main  base  of  attack.  The  first  objective  was 
to  be  the  Sari  Bair  range ;  the  ultimate  object  an 
advance  across  the  five  miles  to  Maidos.  A  new 
frontal  attack  was  to  detain  the  enemy  at  Achi  Baba. 
A  surprise  landing  at  Suvla  Bay  was  to  protect  the 
Anzac  left  flank,  occupy  the  heights  threatening  that 
flank  with  artillery,  and  assist  the  assault  upon  the 


SIR  lAN'S  DESIGN  223 

central  mountains  of  Sari  Bair  range — Koja  Chemen 
Tepe  (Hill  971)  and  Chunuk  Bair.  When  once 
those  heights  were  gained,  the  Turkish  communica- 
tions would  indeed  be  cut  in  two  ;  the  positions  on 
Achi  Baba  and  Kilid  Bahr  plateau  would  be  turned 
and  taken  in  rear ;  the  very  gate  of  the  Narrows 
would  be  exposed  to  our  guns.  It  was  a  high  hope. 
The  battle  for  its  realisation  is  generally  known  as 
Suvla,  but  more  accurately  as  Sari  Bair.  In  the 
first  week  of  August  it  began. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND 
THE  NEK 

FRIDAY,  August  6,  was  the  day  fixed  for  the 
new  attempt.  The  waning  moon  was  due 
to  rise  at  2  a.m.  of  the  7th.  To  have  waited 
longer  would  have  meant  a  month's  delay,  until 
moonless  nights  returned.  A  month's  experience 
would  have  increased  the  fighting  value  of  the  new 
Divisions,  as  was  seen  in  the  case  of  the  13th  Division 
at  Helles;  but  the  collapse  of  Russia  in  Poland,  and 
the  growing  danger  of  Bulgaria's  attitude,  would  have 
given  the  greater  advantage  to  the  enemy ;  and 
the  approach  of  autumn  had  to  be  considered. 
Accordingly,  utterly  untried  as  four  of  his  five  new 
Divisions  were.  Sir  Ian  resolved  to  strike  at  once, 
even  before  two  of  them  had  arrived,  chiefly  in  hope 
of  gaining  the  incalculable  advantage  of  surprise. 
To  distract  the  enemy's  attention,  he  had  arranged 
a  scare  at  Mitylene  by  sending  a  brigade  and  a 
half  (31st  and  30th)  of  the  loth  Division  there,  as 
we  have  seen ;  by  visiting  the  island  himself  on 
August  2  ;  by  causing  maps  of  the  Asiatic  coast  to 
be  distributed  with  surreptitious  freedom  ;  and  by 
deputing  Mr.  Compton  Mackenzie  and  others  to 
spread  indiscreet  rumours  among  the  gossips  and 
spies    there    under     pledge    of     deathlike     secrecy. 


ARRANGEMENT  OF  FORCES  225 

Beyond  the  extreme  left  of  his  new  Hne,  of  which 
Anzac  had  now  become  the  centre,  he  also  arranged 
a  smaller  but  more  violent  scare  by  dispatching  a 
party  of  about  300  men  (chiefly  Greek  and  Cretan 
**  Andarti,"  under  command  of  a  Levantine,  Captain 
Binns)  to  Karachali,  on  the  northern  shore  of  the  Gulf 
of  Xeros,  as  though  an  attack  on  the  Bulair  lines 
were  contemplated/  But  the  two  chief  "  containing  " 
movements  to  distract  the  enemy's  notice  from  the 
main  attack,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  any 
possible  local  advance,  were  directed  against  the 
enemy  opposite  the  centre  of  our  line  at  Helles,  and 
opposite  the  right  at  Anzac. 

At  noon  on  August  6  the  forces  were  thus 
situated :  At  Anzac  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Army  Corps,  together  with  the  13th  Division, 
the  Indian  Brigade,  and  the  29th  Brigade  of  the 
loth  Division,  all  of  which  had  been  secretly  and 
with  great  skill  added  to  the  Anzac  force  in  the 
darkness  of  the  two  preceding  nights,  and  stowed 
away  in  prepared  dug-outs  among  the  most  hidden 
ravines;  at  Helles,  the  29th,  the  42nd,  the  52nd, 
the  R.N.D.,  and  the  two  French  Divisions;  at 
Mitylene,  the  31st  Brigade  and  half  the  30th  of  the 
loth  Division ;  at  Mudros,  the  other  half  of  the 
30th  Brigade;  and  at  Imbros,  the  nth  Division. 
The  infantry  of  the  53rd  and  54th  Divisions,  to 
be  kept  as  general  reserve,  were  on  the  sea,  approach- 
ing Mudros,  whence  they  were  ultimately  hurried 
to  Suvla  without  disembarking. 

^  Part  of  this  small  and  undisciplined  body  actually  landed,   but 
meeting  with  opposition  rapidly  withdrew  to  the  ship  in  characteristic 
disorder,  assuming  their  object  to  be  accomplished. 
15 


226     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

The  day  was  fine;  the  water  perfectly  calm  ;  and 
at  Imbros  the  nth  Division  spent  the  hot  and  sunny 
hours  in  practising  disembarkation  from  the  unac- 
customed "beetles,"  or  playing  in  naked  crowds 
among  the  shallows  of  Kephalos  beach.  The  first 
anniversary  of  the  war  had  only  just  passed  ;  most 
of  the  men  had  volunteered  at  the  very  beginning  ; 
the  Division  had  been  organised  for  nine  or  ten 
months,  and  held  a  high  reputation  in  the  New  Army. 
Nevertheless,  the  physique  and  bearing  were  not 
exceptionally  fine,  and,  though  the  men  displayed 
the  cheerful  and  ironic  stoicism  usual  among  English 
working  -  people,  observers  noticed  an  absence  of 
eager  enthusiasm — of  that  excitement  straining  for 
adventure  which  had  illuminated  the  departure  from 
Mudros  three  months  before.  Hope  was  not  so 
high  ;  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  power,  or  the  de- 
pressing criticism  which  had  permeated  the  nation  at 
home,  increased  the  common  apprehensions  of  war ; 
and  it  may  be  that  the  unconscious  paralysis  of 
cautious  and  uninspiring  age  had  crept  downwards 
from  the  higher  commands,  through  that  infection 
of  personality  which  acts  as  by  magic  for  good  or 
evil. 

As  though  perceiving  this  absence  of  devoted 
enthusiasm.  Sir  Ian  issued  a  characteristic  Order, 
calculated    to    stir    the    spirits    of   the   troops.^      As 

^  "  special  Order. 

"General  Headquarters, 

Mediterranean  Expeditionary  Force, 

August  5,  1915. 

"Soldiers  of  ihe  Old  Army  and  the  New.— Some  of  you 
have  already  won  imperishable  renown  at  our  first  landing,  or  have  since 
built  up  our  footholds  upon  the  Peninsula,  yard  by  yard,  with  deeds  of 


AUGUST  6  AT  HELLES  227 

Commander-in-Chief,  he  was  himself  compelled  to 
remain  at  Imbros,  so  as  to  retain  communication 
with  the  three  principal  scenes  of  action,  and,  in  case 
of  emergency,  to  visit  one  or  other  point ;  Suvla, 
the  most  distant,  being  fifty  minutes,  and  Helles, 
the  nearest,  only  forty  minutes  away  by  torpedo- 
boat.  So  narrow  is  the  dividing  sea  that  all  that 
afternoon  of  August  6  the  booming  of  the  guns, 
and  even  the  incessant  rattle  of  rifle-fire  at  Helles 
and  Anzac,  could  be  plainly  heard  in  the  head- 
quarters at  Imbros,  and  by  the  newcomers  en- 
joying their  last  security  upon  the  beach.  For 
that  afternoon  the  two  main  blows  desig-ned  as 
feints  to  deceive  the  enemy  regarding  our  real  ob- 
jective, and  to  hold  him  to  his  positions,  were 
struck,  the  one  at  Helles,  the  other  at  Anzac,  as  far 
away  as  was  possible  from  our  intended  advance  on 
the  left. 

At  Helles  the  main  attack  covered  about  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  along  the  right  centre  of  the  British 
lines,  and  was  carried  out  by  the  88th  Brigade  of 
the  29th  Division,  and  the  42nd  (East  Lancashire) 
Division.  The  advance  across  open  ground  began 
just   before    4    p.m.,    the    brigades    pushing   forward 

heroism  and  endurance.  Others  have  arrived  just  in  time  to  take  part 
in  our  next  great  fight  against  Germany  and  Turkey,  the  would-be 
oppressors  of  the  rest  of  the  human  race. 

"  You,  veterans,  are  about  to  add  fresh  lustre  to  your  arms.  Happen 
what  may,  so  much  at  least  is  certain. 

"  As  to  you,  soldiers  of  the  new  formations,  you  are  privileged  indeed 
to  have  the  chance  vouchsafed  you  of  playing  a  decisive  part  in  events 
which  may  herald  the  birth  of  a  new  and  happier  world.  You  stand  for 
the  great  cause  of  freedom.  In  the  hour  of  trial  remember  this,  and 
the  faith  that  is  in  you  will  bring  you  victoriously  through. 

"  Ian  Hamilton,  General." 


228     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

resolutely  against  massed  fire  from  crowded  Turkish 
trenches,  which  our  want  of  howitzers  and  trench- 
mortars  prevented  us  from  suppressing.  The  Essex 
Battalion  of  the  88th  Brigade  especially  distinguished 
itself  by  plunging  into  a  trench  crammed  with  the 
enemy ;  but,  exposed  to  rifle-fire  on  both  flanks  and 
to  showers  of  bombs,  the  men  were  shattered.  Nor 
could  the  42nd  Division  make  headway  against  the 
withering  fire.  It  was  evident  that  in  the  pause  of 
the  last  three  weeks  the  Turks  had  gained  in  con- 
fidence owing  to  the  success  of  their  Allies  in  Galicia 
and  Poland,  their  reinforcement  by  two  fresh  Divisions, 
and  the  fast  of  Ramazan  or  its  termination.  Officers' 
night  patrols  discovered  that  they  had  even  designed 
an  attack  on  our  lines  that  very  evening,  which  was 
the  reason  why  their  trenches  were  so  crowded  with 
men.  Better  intelligence,  either  by  aeroplane  or  the 
investigation  of  spies  and  prisoners,  might  have 
warned  us  of  this  intention,  and  our  object  in  holding 
the  Turks  to  their  position  would  in  that  case  have 
been  gained  with  greater  loss  to  them  and  less  terrible 
loss  to  ourselves. 

Nevertheless,  Sir  Ian  resolved  to  renew  the 
attack  the  following  morning.  It  was  August  7, 
the  first  and  critical  day  at  Anzac  and  Suvla — the 
day  which  was  expected  to  be  decisive.  At  all 
costs  the  Turks  at  Helles  were  to  be  prevented  from 
reinforcing  their  vitally  threatened  positions,  and  as 
long  as  possible  to  be  kept  ignorant  of  the  threats. 
In  the  early  morning  they  appear  to  have  remained 
ignorant,  for  they  were  preparing  a  counter-attack 
upon  our  centre  when  they  were  confronted  by  our 
renewed   onset   along   a   half-mile   front.      Why  an 


/.  Russell  &'  So>is\ 


GENERAL   SIR    IAN    HAMILTON   (1918) 


FIGHT  FOR  THE  VINEYARD  229 

advance  was  not  then  attempted  by  all  the  Divisions 
upon  our  lines  from  sea  to  sea  has  not  been  stated. 
Guns  and  gun-ammunition  were  short,  but  that  was 
an  invariable  condition  on  the  Peninsula,  and  biof 
attacks  had  been  made  in  spite  of  helpless  deficiency. 
Probably  the  higher  command  had  now  concluded 
that  frontal  attacks  against  the  complicated  works  on 
Krithia  and  Achi  Baba  only  implied  fruitless  loss ; 
but  now  if  ever,  when  the  enemy's  rear  and  com- 
munications were  threatened,  an  opportunity  might 
have  offered  itself. 

Yet   the   attack   was   made   only   in   the   centre, 
chiefly  by  two    brigades  of  the  42nd   Division  (the 
125th   and    127th — Lancashire    Fusiliers    and    Man- 
chesters).      A  few    yards  of  ground   were  won,  but 
lost  again.     Only  exactly  in  the  centre  of  our  lines 
the  fighting  continued  all  that  day,  and  indeed,  with 
short    intervals,    for   six   days   longer.       Here    there 
was  an  oblong  vineyard,  running  for  about  200  yards 
beside  the  left  of  the   straight   Krithia   road,  about 
250   yards  from    the  junction   of  the    East    Krithia 
nullah  with  the  West  Krithia  nullah  still  farther  to 
the  left.     The  vineyard  had  hitherto  lain  just  outside 
our  firing  line,  but  now  the  East  Lancashire  Brigades 
seized  and   clung   to  it.     All   that  day  and  through 
the    night    they   clung    to    it,   in    spite    of  a   massed 
counter-attack  at  night,  the  6th  and  7th   Battalions, 
Lancashire   Fusiliers,   showing  the   finest  endurance. 
The  next  day  (Sunday,  8th),  when  the  chances  of  our 
main  strategy  were  just  hanging  in  the  balance,  two 
more   counter-attacks    were    delivered,    before    dawn 
and  after  sunset,  but  still  the  Lancastrians  held,  the 
4th    East    Lancashire    Battalion    now   coming   into 


230     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

action,^  On  the  Monday  the  position  seemed  com- 
paratively secure,  and  these  battalions  were  relieved, 
though  fighting  continued.  But  three  days  later  the 
enemy  attacked  in  mass  again  at  night,  and  captured 
the  vineyard.  Next  day  (the  13th)  they  were  bombed 
out  of  it,  and  a  line  across  the  oblong,  nearly  up  to 
the  farther  end,  was  finally  wired,  loopholed,  and 
consolidated.  The  actual  territory  gained  was  not 
much — barely  200  yards — but  "The  Vineyard"  will 
always  remain  a  memory  in  Lancastrian  annals.  The 
42nd  Division's  own  CO.,  Major-General  Douglas, 
who  had  taken  over  the  command  of  the  VII  Ith  Army 
Corps  at  Helles  after  Hunter- Weston's  departure, 
shared  the  almost  ruinous  honour.  For  on  August  8, 
Lieut. -General  Davies  had  assumed  command  of  the 
Army  Corps  himself,  and  Major-General  Douglas 
had  returned  to  his  Division. 

Though  the  feint  at  Helles  did  not  gain  much 
local  advantage,  its  service  to  the  general  strategic 
plan  must  not  be  overlooked ;   for  the  violence  and 

^  Here,  as  in  other  places,  it  is  impossible  to  record  individual  acts 
of  courage,  but  the  service  of  Lieut.  W.  T.  Forshaw  (9th  Manchesters) 
became  almost  a  legend  on  the  Peninsula.  On  the  night  7th-8th,  he 
was  holding  a  northern  corner  of  the  vineyard  with  half  a  company  when 
he  was  attacked  by  a  swarm  of  Turks  converging  down  three  trenches. 
"  He  held  his  own,  not  only  directing  his  men  and  encouraging  them 
by  exposing  himself  with  the  utmost  disregard  of  danger,  but  personally 
throwing  bombs  continuously  for  forty-one  hours.  When  his  detach- 
ment was  relieved,  after  twenty-four  hours,  he  volunteered  to  continue 
the  direction  of  operations.  Three  times  during  the  night  of  August 
8-9  he  was  again  heavily  attacked,  and  once  the  Turks  got  over  the 
barricade  ;  but  after  shooting  three  with  his  revolver  he  led  his  men 
forward  and  recaptured  it.  When  he  rejoined  his  battalion  he  was 
choked  and  sickened  by  bomb  fumes,  badly  bruised  by  a  fragment 
of  shrapnel,  and  could  barely  lift  his  arm  from  continuous  bomb 
throwing." — Official  Report  for  his  V.C. 


LEANE'S  TRENCHES  AT  ANZAC  231 

partial  success  of  the  attack  retained  the  new  Turkish 
divisions,  which  otherwise  would  have  reinforced  the 
enemy  on  Sari  Bair  and  at  Suvla.  The  second  great 
feint,  from  our  right  at  Anzac,  was  even  more  violent 
and  more  successful.  It  began  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
later  on  the  same  afternoon  (August  6),  and  its  scene  was 
the  section  of  Turkish  trenches  known  as  Lone  Pine. 

Just  a  week  before  the  action  (on  the  night  of 
July  31),  the  extreme  right  of  the  Anzac  position, 
close  to  Chatham's  Post  where  that  side  of  the 
triangle  ended  at  the  centre  of  "  Brighton  Beach," 
was  further  strengthened  by  a  dashing  sortie  to  de- 
stroy a  hundred  yards  of  trench  which  the  Turks, 
working  through  a  tunnel,  had  constructed  within 
bombing  distance  of  the  so-called  Tasmania  Post. 
After  two  rapidly  excavated  mines  had  been  ex- 
ploded at  the  ends  of  the  trench,  four  parties  of 
fifty  men  each  (iith  West  Australian  Battalion, 
3rd  Australian  Brigade)  crossed  our  wire  entangle- 
ments on  planks  placed  in  position  by  the  sappers, 
and  plunged  straight  into  the  midst  of  the  confused 
and  chattering  Turks,  almost  before  the  explosions 
were  over.  After  severe  fighting,  in  which  the 
Australians  were  heavily  bombed  from  the  Turkish 
communication  trenches,  they  succeeded  in  barricad- 
ing the  entrances,  transferring  the  Turkish  parapets 
to  the  other  sides  of  the  trenches,  and  including  the 
position  within  the  Anzac  lines.  The  Anzac  loss 
was  comparatively  small — 1 1  killed  and  74  wounded, 
against  100  Turks  killed  ;  but  Major  Leane,  who  com- 
manded the  storming  party,  was  mortally  wounded, 
and  the  trenches  afterwards  bore  his  name.-^ 

^  Sir  lan's  Suvla  dispatch  ;  and  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  221-223. 


232     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

This  enterprise  had  strengthened  the  Anzac  right 
at  the  extreme  end,  securing  that  flank  from  attack 
across  the  comparatively  flat  and  low-lying  ground 
between  our  lines  and  Gaba  Tepe.  The  "containing 
attack"  or  feint  from  Anzac  was  now  to  be  delivered 
about  half  a  mile  farther  up  the  same  right  flank  or 
side  of  the  Anzac  triangle. 

From  the  beach  past  Chatham's  Post  and  along 
the  Tasmanian  trenches,  the  Anzac  lines  rose  steeply 
to  a  height  of  some  400  feet  until  they  crossed  a 
small  plateau,  known  as  Lone  Pine.  The  name 
was  due  to  a  solitary  tree  which  the  Turks  had 
left  standing  alone  out  of  a  small  wood  or  fringe  of 
firs  lining  their  side  of  the  ground.  They  had  cut 
down  the  rest  for  their  dug-outs  or  head-cover,  and 
in  fact  the  solitary  pine  itself  was  felled  just  before 
the  attack,  or  even  on  the  very  morning ;  but  the 
place  kept  its  name,  to  be  remembered  in  all  records 
of  the  war.  Upon  the  plateau,  which  measured 
little  over  300  yards  across  and  was  covered  with 
heath  and  low  bushes,  our  lines  bulged  slightly  into 
a  salient,  called  the  Pimple,  separated  from  the 
Turkish  lines  by  an  open  space,  in  some  points  a 
little  over  100  yards  broad,  in  others  only  60  yards. 
Opposite  this  slight  salient,  over  the  southern  portion 
of  the  plateau,  the  Turks  had  been  long  and  busily 
engaged  in  constructing  complicated  lines  and 
trenches  to  the  streno^th  of  an  undergfround  fortress. 
Always  apprehensive  of  attack  at  this  point,  as  com- 
manding a  deep  gully  (known  to  Anzac  as  "  Surprise 
Gully "),  up  which  they  brought  their  water  and 
supplies  for  the  front  in  this  section,  they  had 
further  covered   the   position   and  the   open  ground 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  LONE  PINE  233 

between  the  lines  by  strongly  fortifying  another 
small  plateau  across  a  shallow  gully  on  their  right, 
to  the  north.  This  fortress  was  known  in  Anzac 
as  "Johnston's  Jolly,"  and  the  two  fortresses  com- 
bined to  subject  any  attack  to  a  cross-fire  of  field- 
guns,  machine-guns,  and  rifles.^ 

The  chief  feint  from  Anzac  was  directed  against 
the  Lone  Pine  fortress ;  and  it  was  not  merely  a 
feint,  for  the  position  itself  was  of  value  in  covering 
the  approach  of  the  main  army  to  Maidos.  For  the 
attack,  the  ist  New  South  Wales  Brigade  (Brigadier- 
General  N.  M.  Smyth)  of  the  Australian  Division, 
commanded  now  by  that  resolute  British  officer, 
Major-General  H.  B.  Walker,  was  selected,  and  it 
was  soon  to  rival  the  exploits  of  the  3rd  Brigade  at 
the  landing,  and  of  the  2nd  Brigade  on  May  7  at 
Helles.  It  numbered  barely  2000  strong  as  it  came 
up  White  Gully  and  mustered  round  Brown's  Dip,  a 
depression  behind  the  firing  lines  of  the  Pimple. 
The  men  wore  white  armlets  and  a  square  white 
patch  on  the  back,  to  distinguish  them  from  the 
enemy  in  the  dust  and  confusion  of  such  fighting. 
They  carried  their  packs  and  full  equipment.  The 
2nd  (Colonel  Scobie,  killed),  the  3rd  (Colonel  Brown, 
killed),  and  the  4th  (Colonel  Macnaghton)  Battalions 
were  to  lead  the  attack,  the  ist  Battalion  (Colonel 
Dobbin)  being  held  in  reserve.  The  three  battalions 
took  up  their  positions,  crouching  below  the  parapets, 
from    which  the    barbed    wire    had    been    cautiously 

^  The  name  was  due  to  a  repeated  saying  of  Colonel  J.  L.  Johnston 
(nth  West  Australian  Battalion),  that  if  only  he  could  bring  howitzers 
instead  of  field-guns  to  bear  on  it,  he  would  have  "  a  jolly  good  time 
there." — Australia  in  Arms,  p.  188. 


234     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

removed,  A  small  party  was  stationed  along  an 
advanced  subterranean  trench  or  corridor,  connected 
with  the  main  firing  trench  by  tunnels,  which  the 
miners  had  elaborately  constructed.  Thence  it 
was  to  burst  out  through  the  thin  coating  of  earth 
overhead,  and  join  in  the  charge/ 

The  attack  was  timed  for  5.30  in  the  afternoon. 
A  casual  bombardment  of  the  Turkish  guns  in  the 
olive  grove  behind  Gaba  Tepe  had  been  carried  on 
all  day  by  the  monitor  Humber,  but  at  4  o'clock 
the  cruiser  Bacchante  appeared,  and  began  shelling 
the  Turkish  lines  in  earnest.  At  4.30  the  land 
batteries  joined  in,  but  the  bombardment  was  not 
more  severe  than  usual,  so  that  the  Turks  continued 
uncertain  of  the  approaching  event.  Slowly  the 
minutes  passed,  the  officers  standing  watch  in  hand, 
as  time  ticked  out  for  so  many  the  remaining  seconds 
of  life.  Only  fifty  from  each  of  the  three  battalions 
were  to  spring  over  the  parapet  first,  but  so  thickly 
did  the  men  press  up  against  the  fire-step  to  get  a 
good  start  that  there  was  hardly  room  along  the  200 
yards  of  front. ^ 

Just  before  5.30  the  guns  suddenly  stopped. 
The  officers  passed  the  word,  "  Prepare  to  go  over." 

^  Australia  in  Arms,  p.  225.  The  author,  PhiUip  Schuler,  was 
present,  but  it  is  noticeable  that  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean,  who  was  also 
present,  does  not  directly  mention  this  underground  line. 

^  Of  this  eagerness,  Capt.  Bean,  the  Australian  correspondent,  gives 
an  example :  " '  Is  there  any  room  up  there  ? '  I  heard  a  man  in  the 
trench  ask  of  those  who  were  crouching  under  the  parapet.  One  of  the 
men  on  the  fire-step  looked  down.  '  I  dare  say  we  could  make  room 
for  one,'  he  said.  '  Shift  along,  you  blokes — we  can  squeeze  in  a  little 
one.'  The  man  in  the  trench  was  clearly  relieved.  '  I  want  to  get  up 
here  along  with  Jim,'  he  said.  'Him  and  me  are  mates.'"— See  the 
Australian  newspapers,  October  17,  1915. 


ASSAULT  AT  LONE  PINE  235 

Next  second  the  Brigade-Major  blew  his  whistle. 
Whistles  sounded  all  along  the  trench.  The  150 
clambered  over  the  sandbags  without  a  word. 
There  was  no  cheering.  With  eyes  fixed  upon  the 
low  white  line  of  loopholed  parapet  in  front,  the 
heavily  laden  men  trotted  and  stumbled  forward 
across  that  open  patch  of  heath,  rugged  with  pitfalls, 
fragments  of  shell,  and  wire.  The  Turkish  guns, 
sighted  for  our  trenches,  could  not  range  upon  them, 
and  in  the  first  rush  few  fell.  In  less  than  a  minute 
from  the  start,  nearly  all  had  reached  that  white  and 
loopholed  line,  and,  with  sharpened  bayonets  raised, 
were  prepared  to  burst  through  the  entanglements 
and  leap  into  the  trench  below.  They  burst  the 
entanglement,  but  there  was  no  visible  trench  below. 
The  whole  trench  was  thickly  roofed  with  heavy 
baulks  of  fir  timber,  railway  sleepers,  branches  of 
trees,  earth,  and  rocks.  The  trench  was  one 
prolonged,  impenetrable  dug-out,  loophooled  along 
the  front  line  like  a  subterranean  castle. 

Some  of  the  advanced  party  ran  forward  over  the 
solid  roof,  reached  the  open  second  line  of  trenches, 
reached  the  communication  trenches  up  which  the 
Turks  were  crowding,  and  fired  into  the  thick  of  the 
enemy  wherever  they  found  them.  They  sprang 
down  separately  into  the  midst  of  them,  and  fought 
single-handed  with  bayonet  and  bombs,  spreading 
terror  and  confusion  before  they  died.  But  the 
majority  scattered  out  in  line  along  the  face  of  the 
first  parapet,  as  though  along  a  curb,  peering  and 
poking  for  an  entrance,  while  the  Turks  poured 
bullets  upwards  upon  them  through  loopholes  and 
imperceptible   apertures.      Some    of    our   men   fired 


236     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

back  through  the  loopholes  ;  some,  in  groups,  with 
desperate  strength,  wrenched  up  the  heavy  beams 
and  tore  the  roof  open ;  some  discovered  narrow 
man-holes  left  in  the  covering  for  the  exit  and 
entrance  of  "listeners"  at  night.  Wherever  a 
sufficient  opening  was  made  or  found,  a  man 
wriggled  feet  foremost  down  through  it,  helpless 
and  exposed  until  he  dropped  into  the  thick  of  foes 
scarcely  visible  in  the  cavernous  obscurity.  It  took 
fifteen  minutes  for  all  the  men  standing  exposed  in 
the  open  to  get  down. 

Close  upon  the  heels  of  the  advanced  party,  the 
main  bodies  of  the  three  battalions  had  followed, 
leaving  only  their  reserves.  Before  twenty  minutes 
had  passed,  the  reserves  also  went  forward.  Within 
a  few  minutes  of  the  start,  the  Turkish  guns  had  the 
range  of  the  open  ground,  and  swept  it  from  end  to 
end  with  a  cross-fire  of  machine-guns  and  low-bursting 
shrapnel.  At  the  same  time,  Turkish  6-in.  howitzers 
continued  to  fling  their  crunching  shells  sheer  into 
the  emplacements  of  the  Anzac  guns,  drawn  right  up 
among  the  parapets  of  the  firing  line.  So  thick  was 
the  air  with  shrieking  missiles  of  death  that  it  seemed 
impossible  to  live  unsheltered.  Yet  as  soon  as  the  gun 
parapets  were  shattered,  they  were  rebuilt,  and  across 
that  deadly  open  space  of  heath,  now  thickly  strewn 
with  lumps  of  khaki  marked  with  white,  group  after 
group  of  companies  steadily  ran  forward,  and  the 
wounded — only  the  wounded — came  staggering  or 
crawling  back.  Along  the  foot  of  that  first  white 
parapet  the  dead  lay  in  line,  and  here,  as  at  the 
landing  on  W  Beach,  eager  watchers  in  our  trenches 
asked  each  other  what  the  men  were  doing  there. 


FIGHTING  IN  THE  TRENCHES  237 

Fifty  minutes  from  the  start,  the  ist  Battalion 
was  sent  up  to  reinforce  and  consolidate,  but  the 
blind  struggle  for  life  or  death  continued  in  the 
trenches.  No  one  will  ever  fully  describe  what 
happened  in  those  twisting  galleries  and  passages 
and  pits,  for  neither  actors  nor  witnesses  of  the  deeds 
survived.  Crowded  in  places  so  tightly  together  that 
they  could  hardly  use  their  rifles,  in  other  places 
hidden  singly  in  dark  corners,  or  lurking  in  groups 
behind  angles  of  traverses,  the  unhappy  Anatolians, 
Syrians,  and  peasants  from  the  Asiatic  shores  awaited 
and  repelled  the  fiery  and  tumultuous  onset  with 
unyielding  persistence.  Rifles  were  fired  at  scorch- 
ing range ;  bayonet  clashed  with  bayonet,  and 
plunged  into  the  softness  of  living  bodies  full  of 
blood  ;  bomb-thrower  flung  his  bomb  into  the  face 
of  bomb-thrower  flinging  at  him.  It  was  like  a  battle 
of  infuriated  beasts  tearing  each  other  to  death  in  the 
narrow  confines  of  a  pit.  The  bottom  of  the  trenches 
was  soon  so  thick  with  the  dead  and  dying  that 
Australians  and  Turks  alike  trampled  upon  bodies 
without  discrimination  of  race,  and  the  sides  of  the 
trenches  no  longer  sheltered  from  fire  the  heads  of 
those  who  still  fought  on. 

Where  all  displayed  a  reckless  disregard  of  life 
beyond  the  imagination  of  peace,  it  is  hard  to  select 
conspicuous  courage.  But  one  may  mention  Major 
Fullerton,  an  army  surgeon,  who  stumbled  through 
the  rain  of  fire  across  the  open  ground,  and  stayed 
for  six  hours  dressing  the  wounded  in  the  midst  of 
the  fighting;  also  Captain  J.  W.  Bean,  who  went  to 
and  fro  under  the  terrifying  shell-fire  which  crumbled 
up  the  parapets  of  our  former  line,  and  attended  to 


238     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

the  wounded  till  he  fell  wounded  himself.  Of  the 
calm  gallantry  of  some  signallers,  his  brother, 
Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean,  the  correspondent,  made 
mention  in  some  notes  which  he  jotted  down  hour  by 
hour  on  that  wild  evening  and  night,  until  he  himself 
fell  wounded  also  ;  at  7  p.m.  he  wrote  : 

"  Presently  two  men  come  racing  back  carrying  a 
reel  between  them.  One  drops  suddenly  out  of  sight 
below  the  scrub  ;  the  other,  who  overran  him,  drops 
in  also  ;  they  had  hit  a  concealed  pit  in  our  front  line 
of  trenches.  They  were  signallers,  and  carried  a 
telephone  at  least  five  times  across  that  space,  but 
the  line  was  generally  cut  by  shrapnel. 

"  I  can  see  a  few  bayonets  sticking  out  from  the 
Turkish  trench  immediately  to  the  north  "  (probably 
Johnston's  Jolly).  "A  report  comes  along  that 
Turks  have  been  seen  massing  for  a  counter-attack. 
.  .  .  Messengers  say  the  head-cover  of  the  Turkish 
trench  consisted  of  beams  9  inches  by  4  inches." 

At  7.30.  "Messages  sent  back  from  all  com- 
manders in  the  captured  trenches  say  the  position  is 
satisfactory.  Seventy  Turkish  prisoners  are  awaiting 
an  opportunity  to  be  sent  across.  We  have  taken 
three  trenches,  about  200  to  300  yards  ahead.  Fire 
is  quietening,  although  shells  are  still  falling  thick."  ^ 

The  Turks  thus  seen  were  indeed  massing  for  a 
counter-attack.  At  6.30  the  signal,  "  Everything 
O.K.,"  had  been  passed  to  the  Brigade  Headquarters, 

^  As  to  these  seventy  prisoners  (who  were  caught  and  disarmed 
in  one  tunnel)  and  the  Turkish  wounded,  Major-General  Walker, 
commanding  the  division,  and  my  old  schoolfellow  at  Shrewsbury,  told 
me  shortly  afterwards  as  we  stood  on  the  spot  that,  until  they  could  be 
brought  safely  across  the  open,  they  were  carefully  placed  lying  down 
in  line  under  the  shelter  of  that  white  loopholed  parapet  as  the  most 
secure  place  the  Australians  could  find  for  their  comfort. 


TURKISH  COUNTER-ATTACKS  239 

but  about  half  an  hour  later  the  enemy  came  swarm- 
ing up  the  slope  through  communication  trenches, 
bent  upon  recovering  the  position  with  bombs  and 
bayonets.  The  desperate  hand-to-hand  conflict  was 
renewed  in  the  gathering  darkness ;  but,  impeded 
though  they  were  by  prisoners,  wounded,  and  the 
numbers  of  dead  bodies  (which  they  attempted  to 
arrange  in  rows  along  the  sides  of  the  trenches  so  as 
to  leave  a  gangway  clear),  the  Australians  held  the 
ground  already  won.  Again,  at  1.30,  in  the  black- 
ness of  night,  the  Turks  in  great  masses  attempted  to 
bomb  them  out  with  showers  of  hand  missiles,  and  for 
seven  hours  the  counter-attacks  continued.  So  heavy 
were  the  losses  that  the  12th  Battalion  (South 
Australian,  West  Australian,  and  Tasmanian),  which 
had  been  held  as  reserve  for  the  3rd  Brigade,  was 
thrown  in  to  reinforce.  At  1.30  p.m.  of  Saturday  the 
7th,  the  attacks  were  renewed,  and  the  struggle  lasted 
till  about  5  p.m.  (twenty-four  hours  after  our  first 
assault),  broke  out  again  at  midnight,  and  was  con- 
tinued till  dawn  on  Sunday  the  8th. 

Meantime,  the  peril  of  crossing  the  open  ground 
had  been  to  some  extent  averted  by  parties  of  sappers 
under  Colonel  Elliott  and  Major  Martyn.  In  the 
early  afternoon  of  the  6th,  before  the  attack  began, 
three  mines  had  been  exploded  from  tunnels  thrown 
forward  from  the  subterranean  trench  or  gallery  above 
mentioned.  Taking  advantage  of  the  craters  thus 
made,  the  sappers  hurriedly  bored  tunnels  through 
into  the  Turkish  trenches,  so  connecting  the  gallery 
with  the  Lone  Pine  position.  Down  these  new 
tunnels  the  wounded  and  prisoners  could  be  safely 
conveyed  on  the  7th,  past  the  craters  into  the  gallery, 


240     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

and  from  the  gallery  down  the  old  tunnels  into  our 
original  trenches  on  the  Pimple.  It  was  a  noble  piece 
of  engineering,  saving  many  lives,  and  for  the  rest  of 
the  campaign  all  communication  with  the  Lone  Pine 
outpost  passed  through  tunnels. 

Sunday  was  chiefly  spent  in  barricading  the 
entrances  of  the  enemy's  communication  trenches 
with  hundreds  of  sandbags,  and  in  fortifying  the  posi- 
tion at  other  points.  As  it  was  impossible  to  bring 
away  all  the  dead  for  burial,  some  of  the  bodies,  both 
Turk  and  Australian,  were  buried  by  being  built  in 
among  the  sandbags  and  other  barricades,  so  that  for 
many  weeks  afterwards  the  position  was  haunted  by 
the  smell  of  corruption.  During  this  fortification,  the 
men  were  continually  exposed  to  bombing  and 
assaults.  So  heavy  had  been  the  2nd  Battalion's  loss 
that  on  Sunday  it  was  relieved  by  the  7th  Battalion 
(Victoria),  which  had  been  held  in  reserve  for  the 
2nd  Brigade.  The  reinforcement  was  fortunate,  for 
at  dawn  on  Monday  the  9th  the  new  battalion  was 
called  upon  to  resist  the  last  of  the  violent  counter- 
attacks, when  for  nearly  three  hours  the  Turks 
attempted  to  recover  the  position  by  repeated  assaults 
up  the  southern  and  eastern  slopes.  After  this  re- 
pulse, the  enemy  continued  to  attack  with  bombs  and 
guns  till  Thursday  the  12th,  but  with  less  determina- 
tion. Thus  the  conflict  lasted  for  six  days  and  nights 
in  all.  The  position  was  finally  won  and  held,  but 
Lone  Pine  remained  a  dangerous  or  "unhealthy" 
point  to  the  end.  Our  losses  were  very  heavy. 
After  the  first  counter-attacks,  1000  dead — Anzac 
and  Turk — were  roughly  reckoned  in  the  trenches. 
But  the  service  in  gaining  the  fortress,  and  in  holding 


GERMAN  OFFICERS'  TRENCHES  ATTACKED    241 

a  large  Turkish  force  in  position,  was  incalculable. 
Praising  the  resolute  tenacity  of  the  Australian  men 
and  officers,  Sir  Ian  wrote  in  his  dispatch  : 

"The  stout-heartedness  with  which  they  clung  to 
the  captured  ground  in  spite  of  fatigue,  severe  losses, 
and  the  continual  strain  of  shell-fire  and  bomb  attacks 
may  seem  less  striking  to  the  civilian  ;  it  is  even  more 
admirable  to  the  soldier." 

In  this  manner  Lone  Pine  was  taken  and  held. 
But  before  the  sun  rose  on  August  7,  the  remainder 
of  the  Australian  Division's  line  from  the  Pimple 
running  left  or  north  to  the  apex  of  the  triangle  at  the 
Nek  was  the  scene  of  contests  no  less  heroic  though 
less  successful.  The  whole  line  was  engaged,  but  the 
points  from  which  our  attacks  issued  were  four — 
Steel's  Post,  Quinn's  Post,  Pope's  Hill,  and  Russell's 
Top — from  right  to  left.  The  2nd  Infantry  Brigade 
(Victoria)  was  holding  the  line  at  Steel's  Post,  and 
the  6th  Battalion  (Colonel  Bennett)  was  chosen  for 
an  assault  upon  the  opposite  Turkish  stronghold, 
known  as  German  Officers'  Trenches,  because  at  the 
armistice  some  German  officers  came  out  of  them.  It 
was  a  position  of  strength  almost  equal  to  Lone  Pine, 
and  here  also  tunnels  had  been  dug  forward  from  our 
lines  and  connected  by  a  gallery  at  the  end.  Three 
mines  were  exploded  between  eleven  and  twelve  on 
the  night  of  the  6th,  and  a  heavy  bombardment  was 
concentrated  on  the  Turkish  position,  but  without 
much  effect  beyond  warning  the  enemy  to  expect 
attack.  On  the  stroke  of  midnight,  the  first  line 
struggled  out  of  the  gallery  through  holes  in  the  sur- 
face, but  were  at  once  mowed  down  by  concentrated 
machine-gun  fire.  Few  advanced  more  than  2  yards. 
i6 


242     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

Most  fell  back  dying  or  wounded  into  the  gallery. 
A  second  attempt  was  made  just  before  4  a.m.  on  the 
7th,  but  failed  in  like  manner.  It  seems  that  a  third 
attempt  was  contemplated  by  General  Walker,  but 
Brigadier-General  Forsyth  perceived  the  uselessness 
of  further  sacrifice,  believing  that  the  object  of  hold- 
ing the  Turks  in  position  had  been  gained  now  that 
the  main  attacks  on  Sari  Bair  and  at  Suvla  were  in 
full  progress.-^ 

Farther  to  the  left,  the  line  was  held  by  the 
ist  Light  Horse  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  H.  G. 
Chauvel),  and  from  Quinn's  Post  the  2nd  Regiment 
(Queensland)  was  ordered  to  attack  in  four  lines  of 
fifty  each,  apparently  about  dawn.  The  Turkish 
trenches  were  barely  more  than  15  yards  away,  but 
not  one  of  our  first  line  reached  them,  unless  it  was 
Major  Logan,  who  led  one  of  the  two  parties  into 
which  the  line  was  divided,  and  is  believed  to  have 
fallen  dead  over  the  Turkish  parapet.  Lieutenant 
Bourne,  who  led  the  other  party,  was  killed  in  the 
first  10  yards.  All  in  the  line  were  killed  or  wounded, 
except  one  man,  who  said  he  observed  where  the 
machine-gun  bullets  were  striking  our  parapet  most 
thickly,  and  leapt  clean  above  them  and  over  the  top. 
So  terrible  was  the  loss  that  the  order  for  the  other 
three  lines  to  attack  was  cancelled.^ 

During  this  brief  and  deadly  attempt,  the  ist  Regi- 
ment (New  South  Wales)  of  the  same  Light  Horse 
Brigade  made  a  sortie  from  Pope's  Hill,  lying  to  the 
left  of  Quinn's  but  slightly  in  rear.  The  object  was 
to  recover  some    trenches  dug    by  the  4th  Infantry 

^  Australia  in  Arms,  p.  238. 

2  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean,  in  the  Australian  papers,  October  4,  191 5. 


THE  NEK  243 

Brigade  on  May  2  upon  the  farther  side  of  a  steep 
cleft  in  which  one  of  the  ravines  contributing  to 
Monash  Gully  ends.  From  these  trenches,  one  above 
the  other,  the  Turks  harassed,  not  only  Pope's  Hill 
and  Monash  Gully,  but  exposed  parts  of  the  main 
Shrapnel  Gully  itself.  Soon  after  dawn  Major  T.  W. 
Glasgow  led  the  attack  with  two  squadrons,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  storming  the  first  three  trenches,  though 
at  one  moment  the  men  in  the  second  trench  were 
bombing  their  own  comrades  in  the  third,  in  ignor- 
ance of  their  rapid  advance.  It  was  a  fight  with 
bombs,  and  our  supply  had  to  be  brought  from  Pope's 
across  the  open.  The  Turks,  flinging  bombs  from 
the  top  edge  of  the  steep  gully,  which  is  only  40  or 
50  yards  across  at  this  point,  had  every  advantage, 
and  after  two  hours'  conflict  the  survivors  of  the 
squadrons  were  withdrawn,  but  carried  in  the  wounded. 
Major  Glasgow,  though  in  the  thick  of  the  fighting 
throughout,  was  almost  the  only  man  untouched. 

Even  more  terrible  than  these  lesser  contests 
along  the  right  side  of  the  Anzac  triangle  was  the 
attempt  to  capture  the  open  Nek,  still  farther  to  the 
left,  just  at  the  apex  of  the  whole  Anzac  position,  as 
has  been  before  explained.  The  Nek  itself  is  an 
isthmus  of  high  cliff,  flat  and  open  at  the  top,  con- 
necting the  main  range  of  Sari  Bair  with  the  elevated 
Anzac  position  known  as  Russell's  Top.  It  is  about 
80  yards  long  and  litde  over  100  yards  in  breadth 
across.  On  the  right  or  south-east  side  it  falls  steeply 
down  into  Monash  Gully,  and  looks  across  to  Pope's 
Hill  and  Quinn's.  On  the  left  or  north-west  side  it 
falls  as  a  precipitous  and  almost  inaccessible  cliff, 
looking   over   the   deep   ravines   that  run  to   Ocean 


244     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

Beach.  Since  the  furious  counter-attacks  in  the  days 
following  the  landing,  the  Nek  had  been  a  vital  point 
for  both  sides,  and  at  their  end,  to  guard  against  a 
sortie  across  the  isthmus,  the  Turks  had  constructed 
a  powerful  redoubt,  known  as  "The  Chessboard" 
from  its  complicated  chequer  of  trenches.  Behind 
this  redoubt  the  ground  slopes  gradually  up  to  the 
smooth,  round  knoll,  called  Baby  700,  whence  the 
main  ridge  could  be  easily  ascended  to  the  height  of 
Chunuk  Bair.  But  Koja  Chemen  Tepe(Hill  971), 
the  loftiest  point  of  the  Sari  Bair  range,  is  divided 
from  Chunuk  Bair  by  a  precipitous  ravine  visible  only 
from  the  Suvla  district. 

The  assault  from  Russell's  Top  across  this  terrific 
position  was  entrusted  to  the  8th  (Victorian)  and  the 
lOth  (West  Australian)  Regiments  of  the  3rd  Light 
Horse  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  F.  G.  Hughes). 
Two  parties  of  1 50  men  apiece  were  selected  for  the 
charge  from  each  of  the  two  regiments — 600  men  in 
all.  Just  before  dawn  on  Saturday,  the  7th,  they  filed 
into  the  Russell's  Top  trenches,  all  in  their  shirts  and 
"shorts,"  with  sleeves  rolled  up,  but  carrying  water- 
botdes  and  their  packs  containing  food,  photographs, 
letters,  and  "souvenirs,"  such  as  soldiers  like,  though 
hardly  one  of  them  wanted  food  or  looked  at  memen- 
toes again.  Each  man  had  200  rounds  also,  but  was 
ordered  to  trust  to  the  fixed  bayonet  alone.  The 
first  line  took  two  scaling-ladders,  and  the  fourth  was 
provided  with  picks  and  shovels. 

At  4  a.m.  a  heavy  bombardment  from  all  available 
guns  was  poured  upon  the  carefully  registered  Chess- 
board, and  it  *  lasted  twenty-five  minutes.  Lieut.- 
Colonel  A.  H.  White,  commanding  the  8th  Regiment, 


THE  LIGHT  HORSE  CHARGE  245 

said  to  the  Brigade- Major,  "  Good-bye,  Antill !  "  and 
with  two  other  officers  stood  by  the  parapet  watching 
the  minute  hand  move.  "  Three  minutes  to  go,"  he 
said,  and  then  simply  "Go  !  "^  Springing  from  pegs 
placed  in  the  parapet  as  foot-rests,  the  1 50  leapt  into 
the  open.  They  leapt  into  a  blinding  storm  of 
bullets.  Turks,  raised  tier  above  tier  in  the  Chess- 
board, poured  bullets  upon  them  at  80  yards'  dis- 
tance. Machine-CTuns  in  the  Chessboard  and  in  the 
trenches  opposite  Quinn's  pumped  bullets  upon  them 
as  from  fire-hoses  in  convergent  streams.  A  French 
"75,"  captured  by  the  Turks  from  the  Serbians  in  the 
first  Balkan  War,  burst  shrapnel  low  above  their 
heads  every  ten  seconds.  Many  rolled  back  from 
the  parapet  to  die  in  their  own  trenches.  Colonel 
White  was  killed  within  the  first  10  yards.  Not  one 
of  the  150  got  more  than  half-way  across  the  brief 
space  of  the  Nek. 

Two  minutes  later,  the  second  line  sprang  over 
the  parapet  in  like  manner,  and  followed  to  the  same 
destruction.  But  by  some  means  unknown  a  few  of 
them — probably  not  more  than  five  or  six — actually 
reached  an  enemy's  trench  opposite  our  extreme  right ; 
for  a  small  red  and  yellow  flag  was  seen  for  about 
two  minutes  waving  over  the  enemy's  parapet,  and 
this  was  the  agreed  signal  for  another  stage  in  the 
attack.  It  disappeared,  but  none  the  less  a  party  of 
the  8th  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers  (40th  Brigade,  13th 
Division)  answered  the  signal  by  attempting  to  force 

1  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean's  account  in  Australian  papers  of  October  4, 
191 5.  Phillip  Schuler  {Australia  in  Arms^  p.  241)  says  his  words  were  : 
"  Men,  you  have  ten  minutes  to  live,"  and  "  Three  minutes,  men."  But 
this  is  an  unlikely  utterance  from  so  good  an  officer. 


246     THE  VINEYARD,  LONE  PINE,  AND  THE  NEK 

their  way  up  the  end  of  Monash  Gully  on  to  the  Nek, 
and  their  first  two  groups  shared  the  fate  of  the 
Australians  on  the  open  top.  Almost  at  the  same 
moment  (ten  minutes  after  the  second  line  had  gone) 
the  third  line  (Western  Australians)  followed  them. 
But  while  about  forty  were  still  under  cover  of  a 
depression  on  our  left,  General  Hughes,  no  doubt 
appalled  at  the  useless  slaughter,  ordered  the  attack 
to  cease,  and  a  few  crawled  back  into  safety.  The 
next  night  a  private  who  had  shammed  death  all  day 
at  the  foot  of  the  Turkish  parapet  also  came  in.  The 
assault  lasted  just  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  and  so  far  as 
holding  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  went,  it  was  suc- 
cessful. But  in  that  quarter  of  an  hour  the  loss  was 
435,  including  20  officers  and  232  men  killed  or 
missing — the  words  were  identical. 

If  we  seek  a  parallel  to  the  600  at  Balaclava,  it 
was  there.  But  a  Turkish  schoolmaster,  who  fought 
in  the  first  trench  of  the  Chessboard  that  morning  and 
was  afterwards  taken  prisoner,  said  that  the  Turks  did 
not  lose  a  single  man.-^  Our  two  scaling-ladders 
remained  abandoned  in  the  open. 

^  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean  in  the  Australian  papers  of  November  2, 
1915. 


CHAPTER   XI 
SARI   BAIR 

FROM  the  Nek,  the  Chessboard,  and  Baby  700, 
the  main  ridge  or  mountain  of  Sari  Bair  rises 
steadily,  like  a  great  rounded  shoulder,  to 
Battleship  Hill  (so  called  from  an  early  naval  bom- 
bardment), and  thence,  after  a  long  but  slight  depres- 
sion, which  from  the  sea  looks  like  a  continuous  ridge, 
rises  again  to  the  broad  and  massive  front  of  Chunuk 
Bair,  about  850  feet  in  height.  Towards  the  sea,  the 
mountain  Chunuk  shows  an  apparently  precipitous 
face,  split  in  the  centre  by  a  cleft  too  steep  to  be 
called  a  watercourse.  It  is  rather  what  mountaineers 
mean  by  a  "chimney."  But  except  on  this  actual 
face,  the  mountain  range  is  not  so  steep  as  it  appears, 
nor  so  inaccessible,  being  of  softish  sandstone  mixed 
with  marl,  like  the  whole  of  the  district.  Hard  lime- 
stones, or  the  only  formations  which  are  called  "  rock  " 
by  every  one  but  geologists,  are  not  found  till  one 
reaches  the  genuinely  rocky  hill  on  the  south  side  of 
Suvla  Bay,  and  the  still  more  rocky  edge  on  the 
north. 

From  Chunuk  Bair  the  range  continues  its  north- 
easterly trend,  the  sky-line  again  showing  a  slight  de- 
pression or  dip  till  it  rises  to  a  similar  but  lesser 
height,  which  we  at  first  called  "  Nameless  Hill,"  but 

more  generally   "Hill   Q."     Beyond   "Hill   Q  "   the 

247 


248  SARI  BAIR 

ridge  is  again  slightly  lower  and  flattish  along  the 
summit  till  it  is  split  across  unexpectedly  by  a  pre- 
cipitous ravine,  which  appears  to  cut  sheer  down  to  a 
level  of  less  than  half  the  mountain's  heio-ht.  Both 
sides  of  the  ravine  are  unusually  steep  and  jagged,  so 
that  it  would  be  impossible  for  troops  by  continuing 
an  advance  along  the  sky-line  of  the  ridge  to  gain  the 
highest  summit,  which  rises  steeply  from  the  farther 
side  of  the  ravine.  This  summit,  the  crowning-point 
of  the  range  gradually  rising,  as  we  have  seen,  from 
the  beach  at  Chatham  Post,  is  Koja  Chemen  Tepe, 
generally  known  as  Hill  971  (its  height  in  feet).  The 
top,  being  thrown  back  to  the  north-east,  is  invisible 
from  Anzac,  but  plainly  seen  from  Imbros,  the  sea, 
and  Suvla,  dominating  the  region.  The  ravine  is  not 
revealed  till  Suvla  is  reached. 

These  joint  heights  of  Chunuk  and  "  Hill  Q," 
together  with  the  disconnected  height  of  Koja 
Chemen,  were  the  first  objectives  in  the  main  attack 
of  August  6  to  10.  The  ultimate  objective  remained 
as  before — the  clearing  of  the  Narrows  by  reaching 
Maidos,  cutting  the  Turkish  communications  with 
Achi  Baba  and  Krithia  over  the  Kilid  Bahr  plateau, 
and  dominating  the  forts  on  the  Asiatic  side.  Some 
critics,  both  at  the  time  and  since,  have  maintained 
that  the  ultimate  objective  could  better  have  been 
won  by  making  the  main  attack  from  Suvla  with  all 
available  forces.  But  at  the  time,  when  many  believed 
this  to  be  Sir  lan's  design,  an  advance  from  Suvla 
into  the  heart  of  the  Peninsula  appeared  to  me  im- 
possible so  long  as  the  enemy  held  the  Sari  Bair  range 
as  a  perpetual  threat  to  the  right  flank  of  our  ad- 
vancing columns ;   and  not  merely  the  heart  of  the 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  COUNTRY     249 

Peninsula,  but  the  coast-line  of  the  Straits,  would  have 
to  be  reached  before  the  enemy's  forces  to  the  south 
could  be  cut  off.  It  is  true  that  an  advance  from 
Anzac,  or  even  from  Suvla,  was  partially  threatened 
by  forces  on  Kilid  Bahr  plateau.  But  from  Anzac 
the  passage  to  the  Straits  was  brief,  and  from  Suvla  it 
was  protected  by  Sari  Bair  itself,  provided  only  that 
we  held  that  mountain  range.  Otherwise  it  was  out 
of  the  question. 

So  the  objective  of  the  main  attack  from  Anzac 
was  simple  ;  but  the  means  of  approach  presented 
extraordinary  difficulties.  As  at  Anzac  itself,  the 
front  of  the  range  breaks  down  to  the  sea  in  a 
crumbled  and  complicated  formation  of  edges,  ridges, 
spurs,  cliffs,  and  ravines,  the  haphazard  and  perennial 
work  of  winter  storms  and  rains  acting  for  ages  upon 
soft  sandstone  and  sandy  deposits  mixed  with  clay 
and  a  little  chalk.  This  labyrinthine  region  naturally 
follows  the  north-easterly  course  of  the  hills  out  of 
which  water  has  carved  it,  leaving  a  gradually  extend- 
ing plain  along  the  seacoast  as  far  as  the  low  hills 
forming  Nibrunesi  Point,  the  southern  extremity  of 
Suvla  Bay.  Sometimes  at  night  small  parties  of 
chosen  New  Zealand  officers  stole  out  to  explore  the 
labyrinth,  and  their  reconnaissance  was  of  the  highest 
value.  But  the  district  had  never  been  surveyed, 
and  the  tortuous  watercourses,  the  unexpected  cliffs 
and  ravines,  complicated  by  almost  impenetrable  and 
spiky  bush,  threatened  inextricable  error  to  any 
wanderer  there,  even  by  daylight  and  in  peace. 
Imagine,  then,  the  perplexity  of  threading  those 
unknown  ways  in  a  total  darkness  haunted  by  the 
expectation  of  deadly  fire  at  every  turn  in  the  ravines, 


250  SARI  BAIR 

from  the  blackness  of  every  thicket,  and  the  edge  of 
every  cHff!  One  or  two  Greek  and  Turkish  guides 
were  available,  but  employed  without  much  confidence. 

For  the  better  understanding  of  the  great  assault, 
the  following  points  in  the  geography  might  be 
remembered.  Proceeding  by  the  Long  Sap,  then 
lately  constructed,  parallel  with  the  seashore  from 
Ari  Burnu  northward,  soon  after  passing  No.  i  Post 
one  crosses  Sazli  Beit  Dere,  a  dry  watercourse  on 
.which  the  "  Fishermen's  Huts "  of  the  first  landing 
stood.  About  600  yards  farther  on,  after  passing 
No.  2  and  No.  3  Posts,  one  reaches  Chailak  Dere, 
close  to  the  mouth  of  which  the  "diviner"  discovered 
copious  subterranean  water,  as  previously  described. 
Both  these  Deres,  or  dry  watercourses,  run  at  right 
angles  to  the  coast,  coming  down  from  the  fort  of 
Chunuk  Bair  by  devious,  zigzag  courses,  but  generally 
parallel  in  direction,  though  the  upper  courses  tend 
to  converge.  The  steep  and  lofty  ground  standing 
between  the  two  Deres  is  marked  by  the  three  points 
of  Old  No.  3  Post,  Table  Top,  and  Rhododendron 
Spur,  which  runs  up  to  the  shoulder  of  Chunuk  Bair 
itself. 

Emerging  from  the  Long  Sap  near  the  mouth  of 
Chailak  Dere,  and  proceeding  along  the  flats  sheltered 
after  this  attack  by  a  parapet  for  about  1000  yards, 
one  reaches  the  Aghyl  Dere,  which  runs  fairly  parallel 
with  the  other  two  in  its  lower  course,  but  splits  into 
two  Deres  about  a  mile  from  the  mouth,  the  right- 
hand  tributary  converging  rapidly  with  Chailak  Dere, 
till  they  almost  meet  at  the  foot  of  Chunuk  Bair,  the 
left-hand  tributary  bearing  away  north-east  towards 
the  foot  of  Hill  Q  and  Koja  Chemen  Tepe.     The 


THE  MAIN  WATERCOURSES  251 

ground  between  Chailak  Dere  and  Aghyl  Dere  is 
chiefly  marked  by  Bauchop's  Hill  and  Little  Table 
Top.  At  the  source  of  Aghyl  Dere's  southern 
tributary,  high  up  the  front  of  the  mountain,  and  just 
at  the  foot  of  Chunuk  Bair's  precipitous  cliff,  lies  a 
small  patch  of  cultivated  ground,  in  that  year  yellow 
with  corn  stubble,  conspicuous  from  Suvla  and  the 
sea.  A  few  brown  sheds  and  a  sort  of  dwelling  stood 
on  the  farther  side.     This  was  the  Farm. 

Proceeding  northward  again  along  "Ocean  Beach  " 
from  the  mouth  of  Aghyl  Dere,  one  reaches  a  Dere 
commonly  called  Asmak,  though  it  has  other  names 
(Iram  Chai  or  Kasa  Dere).  This  is  the  main  water- 
course draining  the  broad  and  open  valley  in  which 
Biyuk  (or  Greater)  Anafarta  stands  in  a  beautiful 
grove  of  cypresses,  about  three  and  a  half  miles  from 
the  sea.  Several  other  Deres  in  the  district  are  called 
"Asmak,"  and  it  is  probable  that  the  name  " Asma," 
by  which  we  knew  the  main  tributary  to  this  Dere,  is 
really  the  same  word.  But,  to  keep  the  distinction, 
the  Asma  Dere  runs  into  the  Asmak  nearly  a  mile 
from  the  mouth,  and  following  its  course,  instead  of 
going  straight  on  to  Biyuk  Anafarta,  one  proceeds  by 
a  wide  arc  southward  till  the  foot  of  Koja  Chemen 
is  reached.  There  one  finds  that  the  source  is  not 
far  removed  from  the  source  of  the  northern  branch 
of  the  Aghyl  Dere,  since  both  drain  the  highest 
section  of  the  main  ridge.  The  large  space  of  ground 
thus  almost  enclosed  between  the  Aghyl  Dere  on  the 
south  and  the  Asmak  and  Asma  Deres  beyond  is 
singularly  difficult  and  intricate.  The  low  but  steep 
hills  and  cliffs  are  sharply  intersected  by  ravines 
running  in  every  direction.     The  district  is  a  jumble 


252  SARI  BAIR 

of  sandy  but  hard  mounds  and  scarps  and  fissures, 
with  here  and  there  a  narrow  slip  or  tongue  of  level 
ground  running  up  among  them.  Few  distinctive 
features  mark  locality,  but  about  a  mile  from  the  sea 
stands  a  mass  of  low  hill  or  broken  plateau  called 
Damakjelik  Bair  or  Hill  40;  and  about  another  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  inland  to  the  north-east,  across 
a  brief  but  steep  watercourse  called  Kaiajik  Dere 
(another  tributary  to  the  Asmak),  rises  a  similar  but 
slightly  higher  mass  of  low  hill  or  broken  plateau 
called  Kaiajik  Aghala,  soon  to  be  famous  as  Hill  60. 
The  Asma  Dere  runs  past  the  farther  side  of  Hill  60, 
and  beyond  the  Asma  rises  the  steep,  long  ridge  of 
Abdel  Rahman  Bair,  one  of  the  main  northern  spurs 
or  buttresses  of  Koja  Chemen  itself. 

This  bare  analysis  of  a  difficult  country  covers 
the  ground  of  the  main  August  attack,  and  the  hills 
or  watercourses  named  may  serve  as  guides  to  the 
comprehension  of  the  obscure  and  desperate  conflicts. 
But  no  analysis  or  map  or  description  can  adequately 
express  the  roughness  and  complexity  of  that  desert 
jungle,  the  steepness  of  its  cliffs  and  spurs  and  edges, 
or  the  bewilderment  of  its  dry  watercourses,  creeks, 
fissures,  and  ravines.  Neither  in  the  British  island 
nor  in  Ireland  is  there  a  scene  to  compare  with  it, 
because  in  our  islands  the  frequent  rain  and  prevailing 
moisture  smooth  off  the  edges,  fill  the  ravines  with 
water,  and  cover  even  the  crags  with  moss  and  ferns 
or  grasses.  The  nearest  resemblance  I  have  seen 
was  in  the  crinkled  hills  and  cliffs  upon  the  West 
Coast  of  Africa  near  Benguela.  But  there  the  yellow 
spurs  and  ravines  are  absolutely  bare.  On, the  Sari 
Mountains,  parts  of  the  lower  slopes  are  concealed 


GENERAL  GODLEY'S  FORCE       253 

with  the  thick,  prickly  bush  so  often  mentioned  ;  parts 
with  low  pines.  The  summits  are  coated  with  thin 
grass  and  heath,  while  some  of  the  ravines  and 
sheltered  spurs  were  then  brilliant  with  the  crimson 
flowering  oleander,  which  our  men  called  rhodo- 
dendron, though  it  differs  from  the  alien  product 
introduced  as  an  embellishment  into  English  parks. 

The  design  of  the  main  attack  was  drawn  by 
Brigadier-General  A,  Skeen,  the  very  able  Chief 
of  Staff  at  Anzac.  It  was  accepted  by  Lieut. - 
General  Bird  wood,  and  approved  by  Sir  Ian.  Its 
execution  was  entrusted  to  Major  -  General  Sir 
Alexander  J.  Godley,  commanding  the  New  Zealand 
and  Australian  Division,  It  was  a  complicated 
scheme — perhaps  necessarily  complicated  owing  to 
the  intricacy  of  the  ground,  which  prevented  the 
united  action  of  large  bodies  of  troops,  and  rendered 
advance  impossible  except  by  thin  columns  sinuously 
winding  up  the  Deres  like  snakes.  Accordingly, 
General  Godley  was  compelled  to  divide  his  troops. 
For  the  night  attack  of  August  6-7  he  divided  them 
into  two  columns — a  right  and  a  left — each  column 
being  subdivided  into  a  covering  or  advanced  force, 
and  an  assaulting  or  main  force.  In  Anzac  as  a 
whole  (Sir  Ian  in  his  dispatch  tells  us)  the  troops 
at  General  Birdwood's  disposal  amounted  in  round 
numbers  to  37,000  rifles  and  72  guns,  with  naval 
support  from  two  cruisers,  four  monitors,  and  two 
destroyers.  Of  these  military  forces  the  following 
contingents  were  allotted  to  Major-General  Godley 
for  his  enterprise  : 

His  own  New  Zealand  and  Australian  Division 
(less  the  ist  and  3rd  Light  Horse  Brigades,  desperately 


254  SARI  BAIR 

engaged  upon  the  Anzac  heights  and  the  Nek,  as  we 
have  seen) ; 

The  13th  Division  under  Major- General  Shaw 
(less  the  38th  Brigade  allotted  to  Army  Corps 
Reserve  and  two  battalions  of  the  40th  Brigade  at 
Anzac) ; 

The  29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade  (Major- General 
Cox)  ; 

The  Indian  Mountain  Artillery  Brigade  ( Lieut. - 
Colonel  Parker,  R.A.). 

The  Army  Corps  Reserve  was  the  29th  Brigade, 
loth  Division  (less  one  battalion),  the  38th  Brigade, 
13th  Division,  and  two  battalions  of  the  40th  Brigade. 

For  the  approach  and  first  assault  General  Godley 
divided  this  force  as  follows,  assigning  to  each  of 
the  four  parts  the  objective  mentioned  below  : 

(i)  Right  Covering  Force — 

Brigadier-General  A.  H.  Russell,  New  Zealand  Mounted  Rifles — 
New  Zealand  Mounted  Rifles  Brigade  (Auckland,  Canter- 
bury, and  Wellington  Regiments)  ; 
Otago  Mounted  Rifles  Regiment  (Divisional  Troops) ; 
New  Zealand  Engineers  Field  Troop  ; 
The  Maori  Contingent  (about  500  under  Lieut. -Colonel 
A.  H.  Herbert). 

This  force  was  to  advance  up  Sazli  Beit  and 
Chailak  Deres,  and  seize  Old  No.  3  Post,  Big  Table 
Top,  and  Bauchop  Hill. 

(2)  Right  Assaulting  Cohtmn — 

Brigadier-General    F.   E.    Johnston,   New    Zealand    Infantry 
Brigade — 
New  Zealand   Infantry   Brigade   (Auckland,  Canterbury, 

Otago,  and  Wellington  Battalions) ; 
26th  Indian  Mountain  Battery  (less  one  section)  ; 
No.  I  Company  New  Zealand  Engineers. 

This  assaulting  column  was  to  follow  the  cover- 
ing force  up  the  Sazli  Beit  and  Chailak  Deres,  and 
push  on  to  the  attack  of  Chunuk  Bair. 


HIS  ARRANGEMENT  OF  THE  FORCE         255 

(3)  Left  Covering  Force — 

Brigadier-General  J.  H.  du  B.  Travers,  40th  Infantry  Brigade — 
Two  Battalions  of  the  40th  Infantry  Brigade,  z>.  4th  South 

Wales  Borderers  and  5th  Wiltshire  ; 
Half  the  72nd  Field  Company  Royal  Engineers. 

This  force  was  to  occupy  Damakjelik  Bair  so  as 
to  cover  the  advance  up  Aghyl  Dere,  and  to  come 
into  touch  with  the  troops  landing  at  Suvla. 

(4)  Left  Assaulting  Column — 

Brigadier-General  H.  V.  Cox,  29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade — 

29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade  (14th  Sikhs,  5th,  6th,  and 
loth  Gurkha  Rifles)  ; 

4th  Australian  Infantry  Brigade  (13th  New  South  Wales, 
14th  Victoria,  15th  Queensland  and  Tasmania,  i6th 
South  and  West  Australian  Battalions)  ; 

2ist  Indian  Mountain  Battery  (less  one  section) ; 

No.  2  Company  New  Zealand  Engineers. 

This  left  assaulting  column  was  to  advance  up 
the  Aghyl  Dere  to  the  attack  on  Koja  Chemen 
(Hill  971),  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect  the 
left  flank  of  the  whole  force  as  soon  as  it  had 
cleared  its  own  covering  force. 

The  Divisional  Reserve  was  made  up  of  remain- 
ing battalions  of  the  13th  Division  under  Major- 
General  F.  C.  Shaw,  two  battalions  being  stationed 
at  Chailak  Dere,  and  the  39th  Brigade  at  Aghyl 
Dere,  with  half  the  72nd  Field  Company  R.E. 

The  total  forces  under  General  Godley's  command 
were  estimated  at  about  12,000  men/ 

For  the  sake  of  clearness,  the  ensuing  movements 
may  be  divided  into  four  stages  of  about  twenty-four 
hours  each,  counting  from  evening  to  evening. 

Evening,  August  6,  to  evening,  August  7. 
In    the    gathering   darkness,    about    9    p.m.,    on 
Friday,  August  6,  the  whole  force  mustered  between 
No.   2   and   No.   3   Posts,  having  marched  out  from 

^  The  arrangement  of  these  forces  is  given  in  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


256  SARI  BAIR 

Anzac  concealed  by  the  shelter  of  the  Long  Sap. 
General  Godley  fixed  his  headquarters  at  No.  2 
Post,  and  here  the  main  supply  of  ammunition  and 
water-cans  was  organised.  The  movements  of  the 
two  covering  forces  and  the  two  assaulting  columns 
may  be  followed  in  the  order  given  above,  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that,  in  point  of  time,  they 
were  frequently  simultaneous.  The  first  task  of  the 
Right  Covering  Force  (Brigadier-General  Russell 
with  his  New  Zealanders)  was  to  clear  the  Turkish 
positions  which  dominated  the  lower  course  of  the 
Sazli  Beit  and  Chailak  Deres — Old  No.  3  Post, 
Big  Table  Top,  between  the  Deres,  and  Bauchop's 
Hill  on  the  farther  side  of  Chailak. 

Old  No.  3  Post  is  a  steep  and  prominent  hill, 
some  200  feet  high,  which  we  occupied  as  an  ex- 
treme outpost  soon  after  the  landing,  but  lost  on 
May  30,  since  when  No.  3  Post,  a  similar  but 
lower  hill  close  to  the  shore,  had  been  held  as  out- 
post by  Lieut. -Colonel  Bauchop  with  his  Otago 
Mounted  Rifles,  other  New  Zealanders,  and  Maoris 
in  turn.  Since  the  Turks  had  recovered  the  Old 
Post  they  had  converted  it  into  a  fortress  of  great 
strength,  with  entanglements,  deep  trenches,  and 
head  cover  of  solid  timber  balks.  For  its  recapture 
a  successful  ruse  was  practised.  For  some  weeks 
past,  the  destroyer  Colne  (Commander  Claude 
Seymour)  had  turned  a  vivid  searchlight  on  to  the 
hill,  and  bombarded  it  from  9  p.m.  to  9.10  p.m. 
precisely,  always  repeating  both  operations  from 
9.20  to  9.30.  This  regularity  had  persuaded  the 
Turks  to  regard  the  bombardment  as  a  kind  of 
Angelus  or  signal  for  a  consecrated  interval  during 


Elliott  &^  Fry\ 


MAJOR-GENERAL   SIR   ALEXANDER   GODLEY 


OLD  NO.  3  POST  CAPTURED  25; 

which  it  was  permissible  to  retire  from  the  front 
trenches  into  the  restful  seclusion  of  tunnels  and 
dug-outs.  When  the  rite  concluded,  an  old  Turk, 
naturally  nicknamed  Achmet,  used  to  trot  round  like 
a  lamplighter,  tying  up  the  broken  wires,  and  in  a 
friendly  spirit  the  New  Zealanders  agreed  not  to 
shoot  him.^  But  now  there  was  no  more  work  for 
Achmet.  Hidden  beneath  the  blaze  of  the  search- 
light during  the  second  customary  bombardment,  the 
Auckland  Regiment  (Lieut. -Colonel  Mackesy)  stole 
across  to  the  hill  and  climbed  to  the  very  top  of  the 
trenches.  The  moment  that  the  light  was  switched 
off  they  were  in  among  the  Turks  with  bayonet  and 
bomb  (no  rifle  cartridges  were  issued  to  the  covering 
forces  that  night).  They  found  many  Turks  taking 
their  ease  in  the  cool  of  the  evening,  without  coats 
or  boots.  Seventy  were  captured.  The  rest  died, 
or  scurried  away  down  communication  trenches. 
These  trenches  were  not  finally  cleared  till  11  p.m. 

Meanwhile  the  attack  on  Big  Table  Top  had  far 
advanced.  This  hill,  so  conspicuous  from  northern 
Anzac  for  its  precipitous  sides  and  a  flat  top  which 
appears  even  to  overhang  the  sides,  in  reality  forms 
part  of  the  same  long  spur  as  Old  No.  3  Post,  and 
is  connected  with  it  by  a  ridge  worn  to  a  razor-edge 
by  weather.  The  main  hill,  which  rises  to  about 
400  feet,  was  heavily  bombarded  by  howitzers  from 
the  shore  and  by  the  Colne,  as  she  turned  her 
guns  off  the  Old  Post  at  9.30.  It  appears  probable 
that  the  destroyer  Chelmer  (Commander  Hugh  T. 
England)  joined  in  this  bombardment ;  at  all  events, 
for  this  or  other  service  she  was  coupled  with  the 

^  Captain  Bean,  Australian  papers,  October  14,  1915. 
17 


258  SARI  BAIR 

Colne  in  dispatches.  The  bombardment  lasted  half 
an  hour,  and  at  lo  p.m.  the  infantry  assault  began 
upon  a  precipice  steeper  than  the  angle  noted  in 
text-books  as  "impracticable  for  infantry."  The 
Canterbury  Regiment  led  the  way.  Impeded  by 
rifles,  fixed  bayonets,  packs,  and  other  equipment, 
in  darkness  lit  only  by  stars,  they  scaled  a  height 
which  appears  as  precipitous  as  any  overhanging 
English  cliff,  held  by  a  brave  and  religiously  inspired 
enemy.  Of  this  exploit  Sir  Ian  in  his  dispatch 
justly  observes,  "there  are  moments  during  battle 
when  life  becomes  intensified."  In  such  a  moment 
the  New  Zealanders,  some  of  whom  had  practised 
mountain-climbing  in  the  New  Zealand  Alps  under 
such  mountaineers  as  Mr.  Malcolm  Ross,  their 
correspondent,  climbed  that  seemingly  inaccessible 
redoubt,  more  like  a  huge  fortress  tower  than  a  hill. 
Pulling  themselves  up  by  their  arms,  while  their  legs 
hung  in  air,  they  stood  upon  the  summit  and  stormed 
in  upon  the  Turkish  defences.  The  surviving  Turks 
escaped  up  a  long  communication  trench  running 
across  a  narrow  dip  or  Nek  to  the  main  Rhododendron 
Ridge,  and  the  second  dominating  height  between 
the  Sazli  Beit  and  Chailak  Deres  was  won.  The 
time  was  close  upon  midnight. 

Whilst  part  of  the  covering  force  was  thus 
victorious,  the  Otago  Mounted  Rifles,  with  some 
Maoris,  had  been  for  a  while  checked  in  attempting 
to  penetrate  up  the  Chailak  Dere.  Not  more  than 
a  few  hundred  yards  up  this  watercourse  (then  no 
more  watery  than  those  mounted  troops  were  on 
horseback)  the  Turks  had  constructed  an  enormously 
Strong  barricade  of  thick  wire  and  beams,  commanded 


CAPTURE  OF  BAUCHOFS  HILL  259 

by  an  outpost  only  a  few  yards  farther  up.  Right 
aofainst  this  obstacle  the  Ota^o  men  came.  A  sudden 
outburst  of  fire  from  the  trench  beyond  cut  many 
down.  They  were  so  thick  and  close  that  no  bullet 
which  made  its  way  through  the  deep  network  of 
wires  could  miss.  The  cutters  came  forward  and 
began  snipping  the  spiky  ropes  of  iron.  But  many 
fell  before  a  party  of  New  Zealand  Engineers  (Cap- 
tain Shera)  forced  a  narrow  passage.  The  advance 
up  the  Dere  was  thus  delayed ;  but  we  who  saw 
the  remains  of  that  barricade  after  it  was  partially 
cleared  know  there  was  nothing  to  choose  between 
the  heroism  of  those  who  cut  the  way  through  and 
of  those  v/ho  scaled  the  Table  Top. 

Perhaps  owing  to  this  delay,  or  perhaps  by  plan, 
the  main  body  of  Otago  Mounted  Rifles  did  not 
follow  up  the  Chailak  Dere,  but  crossed  it  near  the 
mouth,  and  turning  sharply  to  the  right  a  little 
farther  on,  advanced  to  assault  the  mass  of  low  and 
complicated  hill  already  known  as  Bauchop's  owing 
to  his  reconnaissance.  Nature  and  military  art  had 
entrenched  the  position  throughout,  and  it  was 
intersected  criss-cross  by  deep  ravines.  But  the 
Turks  did  not  hold  it  strongly.  Startled  by  the 
Otago  men,  who  worked  round  their  right  flank 
and  attacked  from  the  north  side,  they  began  to 
clear  out  of  the  bivouacs  in  which  they  had  long 
lived  in  fairly  comfortable  leisure  and  were  now 
surprised.  At  the  first  assault,  Lieut.-Colonel  A, 
Bauchop,  while  shouting,  "  Come  on,  boys  !  Charge  !  " 
fell  mortally  wounded  by  a  bullet  in  the  spine.  The 
army  thus  lost  one  of  its  most  capable  officers,  and 
a   man    of  exceptionally  attractive    nature,  who   for 


26o  SARI  BAIR 

months  had  commanded  a  position  of  great  risk 
and  responsibility.  The  occupation  of  the  hill  or 
system  of  ravines  was  completed  just  after  i  a.m. 
(August  7).  The  task  set  the  Right  Covering  Force 
was  accomplished. 

Half  an  hour  after  midnight  the  Right  Assaulting 
Column  was  thus  enabled  to  begin  its  advance  up 
the  two  Deres.  As  above  mentioned,  its  main  force 
was  the  New  Zealand  Infantry  Brigade  (Brigadier- 
General  F.  E.  Johnston).  The  Canterbury  Battalion 
proceeded  alone  up  the  Sazli  Beit  Dere,  and  met 
with  small  difficulty  except  from  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  which,  indeed,  was  so  intricate  that  half  the 
battalion  lost  its  way  and  found  itself  back  at  the 
starting-point.^  In  consequence.  Colonel  J.  G. 
Huo-hes  could  not  muster  the  battalion  for  the 
ascent  of  the  main  spur  (Rhododendron  Ridge,  at 
first  called  Canterbury  Ridge)  till  just  before  dawn. 
The  other  three  battalions  (Otago,  Auckland,  and 
Wellington,  in  that  order)  advancing  up  the  Chailak 
Dere  were  equally  hampered  by  the  obscure  and 
tangled  country.  They  also  encountered  violent 
opposition,  which  compelled  the  leading  battalion  to 
deploy  in  the  darkness.  Some  of  the  troops  were 
told  off  to  assist  the  covering  force  on  their  left  in 
finally  clearing  Bauchop's  Hill  and  another  smaller 
eminence  known  as  Little  Table  Top.^     But  pushing 

^  See  "  From  Quinn's  to  Rhododendron,"  in  the  Chronicles  of  the 
N.Z.E.F.,  August  8,  1917. 

2  It  was  either  on  this  position  or  upon  a  neighbouring  knoll  known 
as  Destroyer  Hill  that  the  following  peculiar  event  occurred,  as  narrated 
by  Captain  Bean  (Australian  papers,  October  25,  191 5):  "  The  Otago 
Battalion,  which  was  clearing  out  the  small  trenches  ahead  of  it  as  its 
head  wormed  up  the  Chailak  Ravine,  swung  up  the  slopes  of  this  hill. 


<!•<. 


IIIG   TABLK   TOP 


CLIMBING  OF  RHODODENDRON  RIDGE      261 

steadily  forward,  the  three  battalions  succeeded,  though 
late,  in  joining  up  with  the  Canterbury  Battalion  on  the 
lower  slopes  of  the  main  Rhododendron  Ridge,  which 
ran  straight  up  to  the  right  or  southern  shoulder  of 
Chunuk  Bair,  now  deep  purple  against  the  rising  sun. 
The  attack  upon  this  central  height  was  to  have 
been  made  before  dawn.  It  was  late.  Under  in- 
creasing daylight,  shrapnel  began  to  spit  and  shower 
overhead,  striking  with  cross-fire  from  Battleship 
Hill  and  a  position  on  the  left  crest  of  Chunuk.  The 
men  were  much  exhausted.  They  had  accomplished 
a  night  march  of  extreme  difficulty,  exposed  to  con- 
tinuous perils  and  surprises.  Nevertheless,  the 
united  battalions  struggled  forward  up  the  ridge, 
rough  with  every  obstacle  and  rising  with  a  steep 
gradient.  After  a  toilsome  climb,  at  8  a.m.  they 
reached  a  point  (almost  at  once  called  the  Mustard 
Plaster,  but  afterwards  known  as  the  Apex)  where 
a  depression  in  the  ridge  afforded  some  slight  cover 
from  the  guns,  and  there  they  hurriedly  entrenched 
a  position.  On  the  left  it  hangs  above  the  Farm, 
upon  which  the  farthest  end  of  it  looks  steeply  down. 
A  narrow  but  uninterrupted  Nek  of  some  400  or  500 
yards  (roughly  a  quarter-mile)  extends  the  ridge  to 
the  sky-line  summit — the  right  or  southern  shoulder 
of  Chunuk  Bair. 


The  battalion  had  just  reached  the  shelf  below  the  Table  Top,  and  was 
pushing  up  its  line  for  the  final  rush  over  the  hill  when  there  arose  a 
strange  uproar  on  the  top  above  them.  There  was  the  sound  of  the 
piling  of  arms,  followed  by  vociferous  cheering  and  wild  rounds  of 
applause  and  hand-clapping.  It  was  the  Turks  on  the  top  of  the  hill 
who  had  decided  to  surrender,  and  who  did  not  want  any  mistake  to  be 
made  as  to  their  intention."  The  Otagos  alone  are  said  to  have  taken 
250  prisoners  that  night  {Australia  in  Arms,  p.  253). 


262  SARI  BAIR 

Meantime,  on  the  previous  evening,  the  Left 
Covering  Force  (Brigadier-General  Travers)  had 
followed  so  closely  upon  the  heels  of  the  Right 
Covering  Force  along  the  shore  that  they  had  to 
pass  through  them  at  the  mouth  of  Chailak  Dere. 
When  clear,  they  proceeded  straight  forward  along 
the  level  to  Aghyl  Dere,  though  exposed  to  desultory 
fire  from  Bauchop's  Hill,  not  yet  fully  occupied. 
Turning  sharply  up  the  Dere,  they  emerged  from  it 
to  the  left  and  seized  the  entrenchments  on  the 
confused  heights  of  Damakjelik  Bair  with  so  im- 
petuous a  rush  that  some  Turkish  officers  were  caught 
in  the  unsuspecting  security  of  pyjamas.  In  this 
attack  the  4th  South  Wales  Borderers  (under  Lieut. - 
Colonel  F.  M.  Gillespie,  an  exceptionally  fine  officer) 
especially  distinguished  themselves,  and  by  1.30  a.m. 
the  position  was  securely  held.  The  force  was  thus 
able  to  cover  the  advance  of  the  assaulting-  column 
up  the  Aghyl  Dere,  and  to  come  into  touch  with  the 
Suvla  landinor  farther  north. 

The  Left  Assaulting  Column,  consisting,  as  was 
mentioned,  of  the  4th  Australian  Infantry  Brigade 
(Brigadier-General  Monash)  and  the  Indian  Brigade, 
the  whole  under  command  of  Brigadier-General  Cox, 
after  breaking  from  their  permanent  camp  at  the  foot 
of  the  Sphinx,  came  at  once  under  a  storm  of  shrapnel. 
They  followed  the  Covering  Force  almost  too  closely, 
and  found  themselves  strongly  opposed  after  advanc- 
ing some  distance  up  the  Aghyl  Dere.  General 
Monash  threw  out  one  battalion  as  a  screen,  and 
progress  was  very  slow,  the  intersecting  ravines 
making  the  ground  almost  impenetrable.  At  the 
confluence    of    the    two    tributaries   which    form    the 


THE  ASMA  DERE  AND  THE  FARM    263 

main  Dere,  General  Monash  moved  up  the  northern 
fork,  keeping  two  battalions  well  away  to  his  left 
in  the  hope  of  co-operating  with  the  Suvla  force  in 
the  projected  assault  upon  Koja  Chemen  Tepe. 
During  this  slow  and  obstructed  advance,  the  Aus- 
tralians discovered  the  emplacements  of  two  "  75's," 
which  had  long  troubled  Anzac,  where  they  were 
called  "the  Anafartas,"  but  the  guns  had  been  hurried 
away.  It  was  not  till  dawn  that  the  brigade  reached 
the  ridge  above  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Asma  Dere. 
There  General  Monash  received  the  order  to  con- 
centrate the  battalions,  leave  a  guard  for  his  present 
position,  and  attack  the  towering  height  of  Koja 
Chemen.  The  Sikh  Battalion  of  the  Indian  Brigade 
was  sent  up  from  the  southern  branch  of  the  Aghyl 
Dere  in  his  support.  But  the  enemy  in  front  was 
now  strong  and  fully  aroused.  The  Australians 
were  exhausted  by  their  toilsome  and  hazardous 
march.  No  farther  advance  could  be  made,  and 
the  ridge  overlooking  the  Asma  was  hurriedly 
entrenched. 

The  remaining  three  Indian  Battalions  (Gurkha 
Rifles)  persistently  clambered  up  the  steep  course 
of  the  Aghyl  Dere's  southern  fork,  till  they  reached 
a  position  facing  the  Farm.  Their  right  thus  came 
into  touch  with  the  New  Zealanders  on  Rhododendron 
Ridge,  while  their  centre  and  left  stood  ready  to 
climb  the  steep  front  of  the  main  range  and  assault 
"  Hill  Q."  By  about  9  a.m.  (August  7)  the  whole 
force  was  thus  extended  in  a  broken  and  irregular 
line  from  the  upper  slopes  of  Rhododendron  Ridge, 
past  the  front  of  the  Farm,  down  the  southern  fork 
of  the    Aghyl   Dere,   along   the   northern   fork,    and 


264  SARI  BAIR 

across  the  rugged  ground  above  the  Asma  Dere, 
The  right  flank  rested  on  Anzac  and  held  the 
important  positions  of  Old  No.  3  Post  and  Table 
Top.  The  left  flank  was  guarded  by  Damakjelik 
Bair  and  by  the  division  now  landed  at  Suvla,  whose 
co-operation  was  counted  upon.  Except  for  a  delay 
of  about  three  hours,  all  the  movements  had  been 
carried  out  as  designed.  But  the  Turks  could  now 
be  seen  swarming  along  the  summits  from  Battleship 
Hill.  Every  hour  the  heat  was  increasing  to  extreme 
intensity.  General  Birdwood  truly  said  in  his  report, 
"  The  troops  had  performed  a  feat  which  is  without 
parallel."  But  by  this  feat  they  were  now  exhausted. 
A  general  attempt  to  renew  the  attack  was  made 
at  9.30  a.m.,  but  the  task  was  too  heavy.  About 
II  a.m.  again,  the  Auckland  Battalion,  hitherto  in 
reserve,  bravely  struggled  up  the  narrow  Nek  (only 
some  40  yards  broad),  which,  as  described  above, 
forms  the  end  of  Rhododendron  Ridge,  connecting 
it  with  the  summit.  But  they  were  swept  by  Turkish 
guns  apparently  near  "  Hill  Q,"  and  on  reaching  a 
Turkish  trench  only  about  200  yards  from  the  top, 
they  were  driven  back.^  Orders  were,  therefore, 
issued  to  both  columns  to  strengthen  and  hold  their 
present  positions  with  a  view  to  further  advance 
before  dawn  on  the  following  day.  Meantime, 
supplies  were  sent  up,  so  far  as  possible,  from  the 
advanced  base  at  No.  2  Post.  As  usual  throughout 
the  campaign,  the  supply  of  water  was  the  greatest 
need   and    the   greatest   difficulty,    fine   as    was    the 

^Captain  Bean,  Australian  papers,  October  25.  He  adds:  "I 
believe  that  fifteen  men  actually  managed  to  reach  the  Turkish  trench 
on  the  summit.     They  never  came  back." 


RE-ARRANGEMENT  FOR  AUGUST  8         265 

conduct  of  the  Indian  drivers  of  water  mules.  The 
convoys  were  also  continually  exposed  to  shrapnel 
from  the  heights,  and  to  the  rifle-fire  of  snipers  still 
lurking  in  large  numbers  invisible  among  the  bushes 
and  ravines  of  the  wide  stretch  of  country  occupied 
during  the  night. 

From  the  evening  of  August  7  to  the  evening  of 
August  8. 

During  the  evening  both  of  the  Assaulting 
Columns  were  reinforced.  The  Right  Column 
(Brigadier-General  F.  E.  Johnston)  received  the 
Auckland  Mounted  Rifles  and  the  Maori  contin- 
gent from  the  Right  Covering  Force,  together  with 
two  battalions  (8th  Welsh  Pioneers  and  7th  Glou- 
cesters)  from  the  13th  Division  in  reserve.  The 
Left  Assaulting  Column  (Brigadier-General  H.  V. 
Cox)  received  three  battalions  from  the  39th  Brigade, 
13th  Division  (9th  R.  Warwicks,  9th  Worcesters, 
and  7th  North  Staffords,  the  7th  Gloucesters  going 
to  the  Right  Column,  as  above),  together  with  the 
6th  South  Lancashire  (38th  Brigade).  The  Right 
Column  was  to  proceed  with  the  attack  on  Chunuk 
Bair;  the  Left  Column  to  assault  "  Hill  Q"  in  the 
centre,  and  with  its  left  to  work  round  north-east 
to  the  steep  ridge  called  Abdel  Rahman  Bair  for 
an  assault  upon  Koja  Chemen  Tepe. 

Before  daylight  on  Sunday,  August  8,  the  edge 
of  the  heights  from  Batdeship  Hill  to  "  Hill  Q  "  was 
heavily  bombarded  by  monitors  and  cruisers,  together 
with  the  batteries  on  the  flats.  At  the  first  dawn 
(4.15)  a  column,  led  by  Lieut. -Colonel  W.  G.  Malone, 


266  SARI  BAIR 

the  hero  of  Quinn's  Post,  with  his  accustomed  en- 
thusiasm, dashed  up  the  steep  and  narrow  slope 
to  the  summit  of  Rhododendron  Ridge.  Colonel 
Malone's  own  Wellington  Battalion  went  first.  The 
7th  Gloucesters  closely  followed.  The  Auckland 
Mounted  Rifles  and  Welsh  Pioneers  came  in  support. 
The  Wellingtons  reached  the  actual  top  of  the  ridge. 
They  sprang  into  a  long  Turkish  communication 
trench,  which  they  found  empty  but  for  an  isolated 
party  with  a  machine-gun  just  arrived  from  Achi 
Baba.  They  spread  out  towards  the  right.  Immedi- 
ately on  their  left,  two  companies  of  the  Gloucesters 
also  reached  the  summit,  and  sprang  into  the  trench. 
Against  the  sunrise  their  figures  could  be  dimly 
discerned  from  the  sea,  and  the  hope  of  victory 
rose  high.  Two  other  Gloucester  Companies  swung 
slightly  to  the  right  and  entrenched  below  the  sky-line 
in  rear  of  the  Wellingtons.  But  during  the  rush 
the  Gloucesters  had  been  exposed  to  a  terrible  storm 
of  shrapnel  and  rifle-fire  coming  from  the  higher 
ground  northward  on  their  left,  and  were  already 
much  reduced.  As  often  happens  in  a  charge,  the 
supports  came  under  a  heavier  fire  than  the  first  lines, 
and  though  the  Auckland  Mounted  Rifles  got  through 
and  joined  the  Wellingtons,  it  was  not  till  the 
afternoon.  The  remainder  appear  to  have  been 
checked.^ 

In  the  meantime  the  position  of  the  British  and 
New  Zealanders  upon  the  summit  was  indeed  terrible. 
Perceiving  how  small  their  numbers  were,  the  Turks 
turned  every  kind  of  fire  upon  the  trench.  Large 
parties   of  them  kept  creeping  up  the  trench    itself 

^  Captain  Bean's  account  in  Australian  papers,  October  25,  1915. 


THE  SUMMIT  OF  RHODODENDRON  RIDGE     267 

from  the  right  or  southern  end,  and  hurHng  bombs. 
So  exposed  was  the  position  that  Colonel  Malone 
drew  his  men  out  of  the  trench,  and  marked  out  a 
fresh  trench  15  yards  in  rear  of  it.  Here  they  dug  ; 
but  tools  were  short,  bombs  were  short,  and  water 
had  run  out.  The  trench  was  less  than  a  foot  deep. 
On  the  left,  the  Gloucester  companies  were  almost 
annihilated.  Attack  after  attack  swept  up  against 
them.  Every  officer  was  killed  or  wounded.  In  his 
dispatch,  Sir  Ian  says  that  by  midday  the  battalion 
(apparently  the  other  two  companies  had  by  that  time 
come  into  line)  consisted  of  small  groups  of  men 
commanded  by  junior  non-commissioned  officers  or 
privates. 

"Chapter  and  verse,"  he  adds,  "maybe  quoted 
for  the  view  that  the  rank  and  file  of  an  army  cannot 
long  endure  the  strain  of  close  hand-to-hand  fighting 
unless  they  are  given  confidence  by  the  example  of 
good  officers.  Yet  here  is  at  least  one  instance 
where  a  battalion  of  the  New  Army  fought  right  on, 
from  midday  till  sunset,  without  aiiy  officers." 

In  a  few  hours  Colonel  Malone  was  compelled  to 
withdraw  again  to  a  new  trench  a  few  yards  to  the 
rear,  because  the  trench  recently  dug  was  too  full  of 
dead  and  dying  to  give  the  slightest  cover.  He 
himself,  as  was  told  me  by  one  present,  carried  a 
rifle  pierced  with  bullets,  which  he  said  he  was 
keeping  as  a  trophy  for  his  home.  Whilst  he  was 
still  carefully  marking  the  completion  of  the  new 
trench,  sedulously  cultivating  the  domestic  virtues  to 
the  last,  a  terrific  outburst  of  shrapnel  showered  down 
upon  his  devoted  party,  and  he  fell.  It  was  about 
4  p.m.,  just  after  the  Auckland  Mounted  Rifles  had 


268  SARI  BAIR 

succeeded  in  reaching  the  position.  At  5  o'clock 
he  died.  Colonel  Moore  of  the  Otago  Battalion 
succeeded  him,  but  was  wounded  during  the  night 
while  the  dwindling  force  still  clung  to  the  position, 
and  the  south-west  shoulder  of  Chunuk  Bair  was 
ours — was  uncertainly  ours. 

In  the  centre,  around  the  Farm  at  the  foot  of  the 
precipitous  front  of  Chunuk  Bair,  the  remaining  three 
battalions  of  the  39th  Brigade  attempted  to  advance 
up  the  mountain  side  by  keeping  to  the  right  or 
south  of  the  cultivated  yellow  patch  and  empty 
buildings.  Similarly,  on  the  left  or  north-east  side, 
the  three  Gurkha  battalions  crept  some  distance  up 
the  spurs  leading  to  the  dip  or  saddle  between 
Chunuk  Bair  and  "  Hill  Q."  This  advance  served 
them  well  on  the  following  day,  but  on  the  Sunday 
the  proposed  attack  upon  this  section  of  the  summit 
line  came  to  nothing  owing  to  the  murderous  fire 
poured  upon  both  attempts. 

On  the  same  Sunday  (August  8)  the  extreme  left 
of  Brigadier-General  Cox's  assaulting  columns  was 
under  orders,  as  mentioned,  to  attack  the  dominating 
height  of  Koja  Chemen  Tepe  itself  by  way  of  the 
precipitous  northern  ridge  or  spur  called  Abdel 
Rahman  Bair.  The  advance  began  in  darkness  at 
3  a.m.  Leaving  the  13th  (New  South  Wales) 
Battalion  to  hold  the  ridge  overlooking  Asma  Dere 
and  now  entrenched,  Brigadier-General  Monash 
placed  the  15th  (Queensland  and  Tasmania,  under 
Lieut.-Colonel  Cannan)  Battalion  of  his  4th  Australian 
Brigade  in  front,  the  14th  (Victoria,  under  Major 
Rankine)  and  the  i6th  (S.  and  W.  Australia,  under 
Lieut-Colonel  Pope)  following  closely.     Sliding  down 


ATTEMPT  AT  ABDEL  RAHMAN  269 

the  steep  descent  of  sandstone  rock  from  the  top  of 
their  ridge,  the  men  formed  up  into  column  in  the 
valley  of  Asma  Dere  below,  and  cautiously  advanced, 
avoiding  a  field  of  standing  wheat  lest  the  rustle  should 
arouse  the  enemy.  They  had  not  gone  far  over  the 
rough  and  pathless  waste  when  a  few  shots  and  dimly 
discerned  figures  hastening  away  showed  that  they 
had  struck  into  the  enemy's  outposts.  The  15th 
Battalion  accordingly  deployed,  and  threw  a  platoon 
forward  as  a  screen.  Thus  the  advance  was  continued 
for  about  half  a  mile,  when  the  dark  mass  of  Abdel 
Rahman  was  seen  against  the  gradually  increasing 
light,  running  like  a  vast  barrier  straight  across  their 
course.  Hardly  had  their  right  touched  the  first 
slopes  when  an  overwhelming  machine-gun  and  rifle- 
fire  burst  upon  them  from  the  whole  length  of  the 
front.  All  three  battalions  deployed  into  platoons, 
and  attempted  to  continue  the  advance  in  spite  of 
continuous  loss.  A  screen  was  thrown  out  to  protect 
the  left  flank,  which  hung  "in  air,"  exposed  to  attack 
from  Biyuk  Anafarta  valley  and  any  guns  there 
chanced  to  be  on  Ismail  Oglu  Tepe  ("W  Hill") 
beyond  it.^  If  only  the  Divisions  landed  at  Suvla 
had  seized  that  vital  hill !  Now  if  ever  was  their 
support  called  for.  But  no  help  came.  The  platoons 
struggled  up  the  steep  bastions  of  the  ridge  in  their 
attempt  to  scale  the  height.  But  the  fire  was 
impenetrable  :  the  deaths  too  numerous.  It  appears 
that  the  brigade  had,  in  fact,  fallen  up  against  strong 
Turkish  reinforcements  coming  from  Biyuk  Anafarta 

^  Fortunately  for  the  brigade,  the  Turks  had  withdrawn  their  guns 
during  the  night  (7th  and  8th)  owing  to  the  Suvla  landing,  and  had  not 
yet  brought  them  back  to  W  Hill. 


270  SARI  BAIR 

to  the  main  range.  Sir  lan's  dispatch  describes  the 
battalions  as  "virtually  surrounded."  Overwhelmed, 
at  all  events,  by  numbers  and  forced  into  an  untenable 
position,  they  had  no  choice  but  to  hew  their  way 
back.  Their  loss  was  already  looo — more  than  a 
third  of  their  force.  Grimly  they  retired,  bringing 
their  wounded  in.  By  9  a.m.  they  were  back  behind 
the  ridge  they  had  entrenched  the  night  before. 
There,  though  exhausted  by  heat,  thirst,  and  the 
weariness  of  prolonged  effort  without  sleep,  they 
maintained  themselves  for  the  rest  of  the  day  against 
violent  and  repeated  attacks. 

That  Sunday  evening  the  Right  Assaulting 
Column  lay  upon  Rhododendron  Ridge,  the  main 
body  partially  sheltered  in  the  depression  afterwards 
called  the  Apex,  and  the  relics  of  three  battalions 
clinging  to  the  top  where  it  reaches  the  summit  of  the 
Chunuk  Bair  right  shoulder.  The  Left  Assaulting 
Column  was  divided,  part  round  the  Farm  and  high 
upon  its  north-east  ridges,  part  entrenched  but  heavily 
attacked  upon  the  ridge  overlooking  Asma  Dere. 

From  the  evening  of  August  8  to  the  evening 
of  August  9. 

For  the  renewed  attack  next  morning,  a  third 
assaulting  column  was  organised  out  of  the  loth  and 
13th  Divisions  in  the  Army  Corps  reserve.  Brigadier- 
General  A.  H.  Baldwin  (38th  Brigade)  was  instructed 
to  take  two  battalions  of  his  own  brigade  (6th  East 
Lancashire  and  6th  Loyal  North  Lancashire)  together 
with  two  from  the  29th  Brigade  (loth  Hampshire 
and  6th  Royal  Irish  Rifles)  and  one  from  the  40th 


BALDWIN'S  COLUMN  ON  AUGUST  9         271 

Brigade  (5th  Wiltshire),  and  assemble  in  the  evening 
of  August  8  in  the  Chailak  Dere.  Advancing  thence 
through  the  night,  he  was  to  follow  up  Rhododendron 
Ridge,  and  co-operating  with  the  Right  Assaulting 
Column  (General  Johnston's)  was  to  move  in 
successive  lines  to  the  summit,  and  thence  to  the 
left  towards  "Hill  Q."  This  was  to  form  the  main 
attack  of  the  day.  General  Baldwin  sent  the  Loyal 
North  Lancashires  forward  in  advance,  and  with  the 
remaining  four  battalions  began  the  long  and  toilsome 
march  upward.  The  track  was  by  this  time  fairly 
well  trodden,  and  every  precaution  was  taken  to  keep 
it  clear  of  wounded  and  "empties"  coming  down. 
Guides  for  the  column  were  also  provided.  It  is 
true,  the  night  was  pitch  dark,  the  ascent  rough  and, 
towards  the  end,  very  steep.  The  column  moved 
slowly,  and  was  behind  the  appointed  time  ;  but  it  is 
difficult  to  imagine  that,  in  Sir  lan's  words,  "in  plain 
English,  Baldwin  lost  his  way — through  no  fault  of 
his  own."  It  was  sunrise  by  the  time  the  main 
ascent  was  reached.  His  column  would  be  perfectly 
visible  to  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  the  fire  was  very 
heavy.  Perhaps  the  officers  were  attracted  by  the 
Farm  as  a  sheltered  place  in  which  to  pause  and 
reorganise.  At  all  events,  the  column  did  not  reach 
its  appointed  destination,  but  found  itself  at  5.15  a.m. 
down  in  the  deep  hollow  of  the  Farm  on  the  left  of 
the  ridge  which  it  should  have  climbed  to  the  Apex. 
The  Farm,  being  a  definite  point  visible  for  miles 
around  owing  to  its  patch  of  yellow  stubble,  and 
affording  also  a  certain  amount  of  cover  against  fire 
from  the  height,  probably  tended  to  attract  or  mislead 
guides  and  troops  from  their  proper  direction. 


272  SARI  BAIR 

Just  at  the  very  time  when  General  Baldwin's 
brigade  began  at  last  to  emerge  upon  the  Farm,  a 
tragic  and  much  disputed  scene  was  being  enacted 
upon  the  summit  far  above  them.  On  the  previous 
day,  as  we  have  noticed,  part  of  General  Cox's 
column  had  worked  their  way  up  the  spurs  on  the 
left  (north-east)  of  the  Farm.  During  the  night  they 
pushed  still  farther  up  the  height,  which,  as  noticed, 
appears  almost  precipitous.  The  6th  Gurkhas  were 
leading,  under  command  of  Major  Cecil  G.  L. 
Allanson.  The  6th  South  Lancashires  (38th  Brigade) 
were  close  behind,  supported  by  the  9th  Warwicks 
and  7th  North  Staffords  (39th  Brigade),  sent  up  to 
reinforce  this  column  on  the  night  of  August  y-S, 
as  above  mentioned.  The  Gurkhas  climbed  during 
the  darkness  to  a  line  about  150  yards  below  the 
crest.  Here  they  dug  what  trench  or  shelter  was 
possible  upon  such  an  angle  of  slope,  and  two  com- 
panies of  the  South  Lancashires  joined  them.  At 
early  dawn,  about  4.30,  the  warships,  monitors,  and 
guns  along  the  shore  began  a  terrible  bombardment 
of  the  whole  crest  along  Chunuk  Bair,  "  Hill  Q," 
and  the  saddle  between.  The  enormous  shells  burst 
upon  the  edge  just  above  the  small  assaulting  party 
which  crouched  below,  almost  deafened  but  unharmed. 
A  monitor's  shell  striking  the  sky-line  flings  up  a 
spout  of  black  smoke,  huge  fragments,  and  dust 
which  spreads  fan-shape  like  the  explosion  of  a 
sudden  volcano.  With  such  explosions  the  whole 
mountain  edge  smoked  and  shook.  All  parapets 
and  shallow  trenches  lining  the  top  were  torn  to 
pieces,  uprooted,  and  flattened  out.  It  seemed  im- 
possible  for   any    human   being  to   endure  so  over- 


SUMMIT  NEAR  HILL  Q  STORMED  273 

whelming  a  visitation  or  to  remain  alive.  Yet  Turks 
remained. 

According  to  orders,  this  terrific  bombardment 
was  to  be  switched  off  on  to  the  flanks  and  reverse 
slopes  at  5.16  a.m.^  The  moment  came.  Suddenly 
the  guns  were  silent.  It  was  the  signal  for  the 
storming  party.  The  little  Gurkha  mountaineers 
crawled  up  the  precipice  like  flies.  The  South 
Lancashire  crawled,  mixed  up  among  them.  They 
reached  the  topmost  edge.  Hand  to  hand  the  Turks 
rushed  upon  them  as  they  rose.  The  struggle  was 
for  life  or  death.  Major  Allanson  was  wounded. 
Men  and  officers  fell  together.  But  the  fight  was 
brief.  Shaken  by  the  bombardment,  overcome  in 
daring  and  activity  by  some  400  startling  Gurkhas 
and  solid  Lancastrians,  the  surviving  Turks  suddenly 
turned  and  ran  for  life  down  the  steep  slope  to  the 
refuge  of  the  steeper  gullies  below. 

For  a  moment  Major  Allanson  and  his  men 
paused  to  draw  breath.  They  were  standing  on  the 
saddle  between  Chunuk  Bair  and  "  Hill  Q."  The 
dead  lay  thick  around  them.  But  below,  straight  in 
front,  lit  by  the  risen  sun,  like  a  white  serpent  sliding 
between  the  purple  shores,  ran  the  sea,  the  Narrows, 
the  Dardanelles,  the  aim  and  object  of  all  these  battles 
and  sudden  deaths.  Never  since  Xenophon's  Ten 
Thousand  cried  "  The  sea  !  the  sea  !  "  had  sight  been 
more  welcome  to  a  soldier's  eyes.  There  went  the 
ships.  There  were  the  transports  bringing  new 
troops  over  from  Asia.  There  ran  the  road  to 
Maidos,  though  the  town  of  Maidos  was  just  hidden 
by  the  hill  before  it.     There  was  the   Krithia  road. 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch  quotes  the  order. 
18 


2;4  SARI  BAIR 

Motor-lorries  moved  along  it  carrying  shells  and 
supplies  to  Achi  Baba.  So  Sir  Ian  had  been  right. 
General  Birdwood  had  been  right.  This  was  the 
path  to  victory.  Only  hold  that  summit  and  victory 
is  ours.  The  Straits  are  opened.  A  conquered 
Turkey  and  a  friendly  Bulgaria  will  bar  the  German 
path  to  the  East.  Peace  will  come  back  again,  and 
the  most  brilliant  strategic  conception  in  the  war 
will  be  justified. 

In  triumphant  enthusiasm,  Gurkhas  and  Lan- 
castrians raced  and  leapt  down  the  reverse  slope, 
pursuing  the  Turks  as  they  scattered  and  ran.  Major 
Allanson,  though  wounded,  himself  raced  with  them. 
They  fired  as  they  went.  It  was  a  moment  of 
supreme  exultation.  Suddenly,  before  they  had  gone 
a  hundred  yards,  crash  into  the  midst  of  them  fell 
five  or  six  large  shells  and  exploded.  In  the  words 
of  Sir  lan's  dispatch  :  "  Instead  of  Baldwin's  support 
came  suddenly  a  salvo  of  heavy  shell." 

Where  those  fatal  shells  came  from  was  at  the 
time,  and  still  remains,  a  cause  of  bitter  controversy. 
All  on  the  summit  believed  them  British.  This  may 
have  been  a  mistake.  It  is  a  common  error  for  an 
advance  line  to  suppose  it  is  being  shelled  by  its  own 
side.  But  probably  the  shells  were  British.  Outside 
the  navy,  nearly  every  one  at  the  time  believed  them 
to  be  naval, ^  and  though  the  range  must  have  been 

1  Phillip  Schuler  definitely  says  :  "  Mistaking  the  target,  the 
destroyers  dropped  6-inch  high-explosive  shells  amongst  the  Indian 
troops  "  {Australia  in  Arms,  p.  261).  But,  accurate  though  he  generally 
was,  I  believe  he  is  here  mistaken.  I  never  heard  the  destroyers 
mentioned  at  the  time,  and  I  doubt  if  their  guns  could  have  shelled  a 
reverse  slope.  Further  on  (p.  263)  he  says  that  during  the  Turkish 
counter-attack  next  day  the  Anzac  guns  shelled  "the  reverse  slope."     If 


WHENCE  CAME  THE  DISASTROUS  SHELLS?     275 

some  four  or  five  miles,  the  accuracy  of  the  naval 
shooting  at  a  visible  mark  had  been  proved  by  that 
morning's  bombardment,  over  the  same  distance. 
But  the  general  belief  may  have  been  founded  on 
a  mere  suspicion  constantly  repeated.  It  has  long 
appeared  to  me  that  two  sentences  in  Sir  lan's 
dispatch  suggest  a  more  probable  explanation.  As 
quoted  above,  he  says  the  orders  were  for  the 
bombardment  to  be  switched  on  to  the  flanks  and 
reverse  slopes  of  the  heights  at  5.16  a.m.  He  further 
says  that  the  Gurkhas  and  South  Lancashires,  after 
reaching  the  crest,  "began  to  attack  down  the  far 
side  of  it,"  i.e.  down  the  reverse  slopes  of  the  hill.  It 
would  be  natural  for  our  gunners  to  wait  some  minutes 
before  bombarding  the  reverse  slope,  so  as  to  catch 
the  enemy  retreating  or  reinforcements  coming  up. 
In  any  case,  they  were  under  orders  to  bombard  the 
reverse  slope,  and  they  obeyed.  But  what  guns 
could  bombard  a  reverse  slope }  As  was  proved 
throughout  the  campaign,  the  trajectory  of  naval 
guns  was  so  flat  that  either  they  hit  the  top  of  the 
mountain  (as  they  almost  invariably  did)  or  their 
shells  skimmed  across  the  top  to  burst  miles  away 
in  Asia.  A  reverse  slope  would  be  exactly  the  thing 
they  could  never  hit.  For  a  reverse  slope,  mortars 
or  howitzers  are  wanted.  There  were  howitzers 
near  No.  2  Post  and  along  the  flats  beside  the  shore, 
and  their  orders  were  to  bombard  the  reverse  slope 
after  5.16  a.m.  This  explanation  is  suggested,  but 
the  controversy  will  be  forgotten  before  settled. 

Whatever  the  cause,  the  effect  was  disaster  irre- 

that  was  possible,  another  explanation  besides  the  one  I  suggest  above 
may  be  considered. 


2/6  SARI  BAIll 

trievable — disaster  leaving  its  lamentable  mark  upon 
the  world's  history.  Amid  the  scattered  limbs  and 
shattered  bodies  of  their  comrades,  the  exultant 
pursuers  stopped  aghast.  They  began  to  stumble 
back.  They  scrambled  to  the  crest  and  over  it. 
Major  Allanson  with  a  small  group  stood  firm,  taking 
one  last  look  upon  that  scene  of  dazzling  hope.  But 
the  Turkish  officers  with  the  supports  had  observed 
the  check.  Seizing  the  moment,  they  urged  their 
fresh  companies  upward,  in  turn  pursuing.  Against 
the  gathering  crowd  a  handful  could  not  stand. 
Wounded  and  isolated,  Major  Allanson  withdrew 
the  last  of  his  men.  Down  the  face  of  the  mountain 
they  came  upon  the  little  trench  from  which  they 
had  adventurously  started  less  than  half  an  hour 
before.  They  alone  had  witnessed  and  shared  the 
crisis.  They  alone  had  watched  the  moment  when 
the  campaign  swung  upon  the  fateful  hinge.  No 
soldier  in  our  army  was  ever  to  behold  that  triumphant 
prospect  again.^ 

Why  the  troops  who  were  a  little  lower  down  the 
slope,  in  support,  did  not  at  once  push  up  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Gurkhas  and  Lancastrians  on  the 
summit  has  not  been  explained.  They  belonged  to 
the  New  Army,  and  were  rushed  into  a  most  difficult 

^  Apparently,  it  was  mainly  to  this  incident  that  Dr.  Stiirmer  referred 
in  the  following  passage:  "In  those  September"  (he  means  August) 
"  days  I  had  already  had  some  experience  of  Turkish  politics  and  their 
defiance  of  the  laws  of  humanity,  and  my  sympathies  were  all  for  those 
thousands  of  fine  Colonial  troops^such  men  as  one  seldom  sees— sacri- 
ficing their  lives  in  one  last  colossal  attack,  which  if  it  had  been  pro- 
longed even  for  another  hour  might  have  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Straits 
and  would  have  meant  the  first  decisive  step  towards  the  overthrow 
of  our  forces  ;  for  the  capture  of  Constantinople  would  have  been  the 
beginning  of  the  end." — Tivo  War  Years  in  Constatitinople,  p.  86. 


/ 


TURKS  RECAPTURE  THE  SUMMIT  277 

and  terrible  conflict.  It  was  Monday  morning,  and 
they  had  been  given  little  sleep  since  Saturday,  and 
little  if  any  food  or  water  except  in  the  rations  and 
water-bottles  {i^  pint)  which  they  brought  with  them. 
No  doubt  they  were  exhausted.  But  every  one  was 
exhausted,  and  others  had  been  out  longer  in  the 
assaulting  column.  One  might  have  supposed  that 
here  their  great  opportunity  had  come.  Why  they 
did  not  take  it,  we  are  not  informed. 

It  was  in  vain  now  that  General  Baldwin's  brigade, 
arriving  at  the  Farm  at  the  very  crisis  of  frustrated 
design,  began  to  push  up  the  steep  with  the  loth 
Hants  and  two  companies  of  the  6th  East  Lancashires. 
They  appear  to  have  attempted  a  spur  nearer  the 
Farm  than  the  point  where  the  Gurkhas  climbed, 
which  was  half  a  mile  away  to  the  left.  But  they 
made  little  progress.  The  Turks,  crowding  the 
summit,  now  exultant  in  their  turn,  poured  down  such 
storms  of  fire  that  the  new  advance  was  checked,  and 
General  Baldwin  was  compelled  to  order  re-concentra- 
tion at  the  Farm,  where  the  brigade  remained. 

The  Turks  in  their  triumph,  though  not  daring 
as  yet  to  advance  far  over  the  crest,  turned  in  exultant 
assault  upon  the  exhausted  body  of  New  Zealanders 
and  Gloucesters  still  lying  exposed  near  the  summit 
of  the  Chunuk  Bair  shoulder,  just  to  the  right  of  the 
Nek  on  Rhododendron  Ridge,  up  which  Baldwin's 
brigade  ought  to  have  advanced  at  dawn.  About 
800  men  still  clung  to  the  shallow  and  hastily  con- 
structed trenches  there.  They  lay  unprotected  by 
wire,  and  below  the  sky-line,  so  that  when  the  enemy 
came  swarming  over  the  summit  with  bayonet  or 
bomb,  our  rifles  had  only  some  twenty  or  thirty  yards' 


278  SARI  BAIR 

interval  in  which  to  mow  them  down.  This  mistake 
in  position  was  thought  at  the  time  to  spring  from  a 
memory  of  old  South  African  tactics,  in  which  the 
sky-line  was  always  avoided.  But  we  have  seen  the 
reasons  why  Colonel  Malone  had  been  compelled 
twice  to  remove  the  trenches  a  few  yards  farther 
from  the  top. 

Through  the  heat  of  the  day  and  afternoon  the 
men  lay  there  resisting  repeated  onset.  Late  on  that 
Monday  evening,  they  were  at  last  withdrawn  and 
relieved.  The  New  Zealanders  had  been  fighting 
continuously  and  under  extreme  strain  since  Friday 
night ;  the  Gloucesters  since  Saturday.  The  noblest 
endurance  could  stand  no  more.  The  6th  Loyal 
North  Lancashires  (38th  Brigade)  and  the  5th  Wilts 
(40th  Brigade)  were  sent  up  to  occupy  the  extreme 
position  which  had  been  so  steadfastly  retained. 


Fro7n  the  evening  of  Attgtist  9  to  the  evening  of 
August  10. 

No  more  than  these  two  battalions  were  ordered 
because,  in  Sir  lan's  words,  "  General  Sir  William  Bird- 
wood  is  emphatic  on  the  point  that  the  nature  of  the 
ground  was  such  that  there  was  no  room  on  the  crest 
for  more  than  this  body  of  800  to  1000  rifles."  Had 
Major  Allanson  been  able  to  hold  his  splendidly  won 
position  to  the  right  of  "  Hill  Q,"  the  whole  crest  of 
Chunuk  Bair  would  have  been  free  for  our  occupation. 
Had  the  expected  advance  from  Suvla  been  pushed 
forward  with  vigour  between  August  7  and  9,  the 
Turks  could  not  have  concentrated  forces  for  the 
fatal  counter-attack  upon  Chunuk  Bair  on  the   loth. 


LANCASHIRES  AND  WILTSHIRES  DESTROYED  279 

Those  two  failures  combined  to  frustrate  the  admirably 
designed  movement  of  August,  and  ultimately  in- 
volved the  whole  campaign  in  failure. 

As  it  was,  the  6th  Loyal  Lancashires  passed  up 
the  Rhododendron  Ridge  in  good  time  during  the 
night,  and  duly  occupied  the  trenches  near  the  summit 
as  the  New  Zealanders  and  Gloucesters  were  with- 
drawn. Their  commandant,  Lieut-Colonel  H.^  G. 
Levinge,  even  attempted  to  improve  the  position  by 
throwing  out  observation  posts  to  the  sky-line,  so  as 
to  command  the  reverse  slope.  The  5th  Wiltshire 
(Lieut.-Colonel  J.  Garden),  delayed  by  the  difficulties 
of  the  steep  and  encumbered  ascent,  did  not  arrive 
till  4  a.m.,  just  as  dawn  was  breaking,  and  lay  down 
in  a  position  believed  to  be  covered  but  really 
exposed. 

Hardly  had  they  settled  down  when  every  avail- 
able Turkish  gun  was  turned  upon  the  two  weak 
and  harassed  battalions.  The  bombardment  was 
endured  for  about  an  hour,  and  then,  at  5.30  a.m., 
the  Turks  under  German  leaders  directed  an  over- 
whelming counter-attack  upon  the  devoted  New 
Army  men.  For  this  attack  they  were  able  to 
employ  a  full  Division  and  three  extra  battalions, 
certainly  not  less  than  12,000  men,  probably  more. 
Crouching  in  their  unfortunate  positions,  our  two 
battalions  were  engulfed  or  swept  away,  as  by  an 
irresistible  tide.  They  were  driven  from  their  shallow 
and  hurriedly  constructed  trenches.  Both  their 
Colonels  were  killed.  The  Wiltshires  were  "  literally 
almost  annihilated."  ^ 

Recognising  the  significance  of  the  summit's  re- 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


28o  SARI  BAIR 

occupation,  and  triumphant  as  never  before,  the  Turks 
swarmed  over  the  edge  down  into  the  deep  gullies  on 
the  right  or  south  of  Rhododendron  Ridge,  probably 
with  the  design  of  cutting  our  assaulting  columns  off 
from  the  base  at  Anzac  and  encircling  them  to  de- 
struction. This  threatening  movement  was  checked 
partly  by  the  battalions  in  support  upon  the  Ridge 
itself,  but  mainly  by  the  naval  guns  (now  secure  of 
a  visible  target),  the  New  Zealand,  Australian,  and 
Indian  guns,  and  the  69th  Brigade  R.F.A.  The 
service  of  a  ten  machine-gun  battery,  part  of  the 
New  Zealand  Machine-gun  Section  organised  and 
commanded  by  Major  J.  Wallingford  (Auckland 
Battalion),^  was  the  subject  of  great  eulogy  at  the 
time.  This  battery  "  played  upon  their  serried  ranks 
at  close  range  until  the  barrels  were  red-hot. 
Enormous  losses  were  inflicted,  especially  by  these 
ten  machine-guns."^  Reinforcements  hurrying  along 
the  sky-line  from  Battleship  Hill  were  similarly  ex- 
posed to  the  larger  guns.  Brave  as  the  Turks  showed 
themselves  in  this  their  hour  of  apparent  triumph, 
they  could  make  no  progress  against  so  violent  a 
storm  of  destruction.  The  attack  melted  away.  Few 
struggled  back  into  safety  over  the  summit,  and  the 
right  flank  of  our  columns  was  secured. 

Simultaneously  with  the  onset  which  overwhelmed 
our  two  battalions  on  the  summit,  the  Turks  appear- 
ing in  similar  massed  lines  along  the  sky-line  of 
Chunuk  Bair  itself  and  the  saddle  between  that  and 
"  Hill  Q,"  began  to  pour  down  the  face  of  the  range. 
They  must  have  swept  over  the  thin  defences  which 

^  77/1?  Story  of  the  Anzacs  (Messrs.  Ingram  &  Son,  Melbourne),  p.  87. 
*  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


THE  FIGHTING  AT  THE  FARM  281 

had  sheltered  the  6th  Gurkhas.  They  broke  through 
the  outposts  of  General  Baldwin's  central  column. 
They  broke  through  our  line  at  various  points.  They 
reached  the  Farm.  Some  of  our  companies  were 
driven  in  confusion  down  the  tangled  spurs  and 
ravines.  Near  the  foot  of  the  mountain  they  were 
finely  rallied  by  Staff-Captain  Street,  who  was  look- 
ing after  the  supply  of  food  and  water.  By  sheer 
force  of  personality,  he  led  them  unhesitatingly  back 
into  the  thick  of  the  intense  conflict  upon  that  con- 
spicuous stubble-field.      In  Sir  lan's  words  : 

"  It  was  a  series  of  struggles  in  which  Generals 
fought  in  the  ranks  and  men  dropped  their  scientific 
weapons  and  caught  one  another  by  the  throat.  So 
desperate  a  battle  cannot  be  described.  The  Turks 
came  on  again  and  again,  fighting  magnificently, 
calling  upon  the  name  of  God.  Our  men  stood  to  it, 
and  maintained,  by  many  a  deed  of  daring,  the  old 
traditions  of  their  race.  There  was  no  fiinching. 
They  died  in  the  ranks  where  they  stood." 

Here  fell  General  Baldwin,  whom  I  had  known  first 
as  a  Captain  in  the  ist  Manchesters  on  Caesar's  Hill 
in  Ladysmith,  and  later  in  the  lines  at  Helles.  As 
in  some  medieval  battle,  all  his  Staff  fell  with  him. 
Lieut-Colonel  M.  H.  Nunn,  9th  Worcesters,  was 
killed.  The  Worcesters  were  left  that  day  without 
a  single  officer.  So  were  the  Warwicks.  So,  as  we 
have  seen,  were  the  Gloucesters.  At  the  Farm  also 
Brigadier-General  Cooper  (29th  Brigade)  was  severely 
wounded.  Brigadier-General  Cayley  (39th  Brigade) 
was    mentioned    for    distinguished    courag-e.        The 

o  o 

Farm,  though  recovered  that  day,  was  ultimately 
abandoned  to  the  Turks,  who    drove   an    enormous 


282  SARI  BAIR 

trench  across  the  stubble-field,  and  entangled  the 
whole  front  with  wire.  But  to  the  end  the  shrunken 
relics  of  the  dead  who  fell  that  morning  remained  in 
lines  and  heaps  upon  the  ground. 

Hearing  of  the  violent  and  almost  successful 
counter-attack,  General  Birdwood  hurried  up  the 
last  two  battalions  of  his  Corps  Reserve — the  5th 
Connaught  Rangers  (29th  Brigade)  being  one.^  But 
by  10  a.m.  the  immediate  danger  was  over.  The 
force  of  the  attack  was  spent.  The  few  surviving 
Turks  began  to  scramble  back  over  the  summit.  As 
Captain  Bean  wrote  at  the  time  : 

"  A  few  Turks  could  still  be  seen  at  about  two 
o'clock,  hopping  desperately  into  any  cover  that  sug- 
gested itself.  Out  of  at  least  three  or  four  thousand 
who  came  over  the  ridge  only  twos  and  threes  got 
back — probably  not  five  hundred  in  all.  But  the 
attack  had  one  result.  It  had  driven  the  garrison 
down  from  the  trenches  which  Wellington  and  the 
Gloucesters  had  won  on  the  summit  of  Chunuk  Bair, 
and  back  on  to  the  high  spur  500  yards  distant  which 
New  Zealand  had  won  the  first  night.  The  lines 
were  now  beginning  to  coagulate  into  the  two  settled 
rows  of  opposing  trenches  in  which  every  modern 
battle  seems  to  end." 

The  Turks  cleared  the  dead  from  the  summit  by 
dropping  them  over  the  edge  at  the  highest  point 
of  Chunuk  Bair,  and  letting   them    slide   down    that 

^  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  four  battalions  in  the  29th  Brigade 
during  this  action  see  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  i?t  Gallipoli,  pp.  62- 
120.  Two  companies  of  the  5th  Connaught  Rangers  (Colonel  Jourdain) 
went  up  to  the  Farm  on  the  evening  of  the  loth  after  the  other  troops 
had  been  withdrawn,  and  brought  in  many  wounded  whom  they  found 
lying  there  in  great  need  of  water  and  attention. 


OUR  LOSSES  283 

precipitous  ravine  or  "  chimney  "  which  was  mentioned 
above.  To  the  end  of  the  campaign  that  chimney- 
was  black  with  corpses  and  uniforms,  weathered  and 
wasting  between  the  rocky  sides. 

Far  away  to  the  left,  on  the  low  but  deeply 
intersected  hills  and  ridges  overlooking  the  Asma 
Dere,  General  Monash's  4th  Australian  Brigade  and 
the  4th  South  Wales  Borderers  were  also  compelled  on 
the  morning  and  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (August 
10)  to  resist  violent  counter-attacks  coming  across 
from  the  Abdel  Rahman  spur.  They  held  their 
position,  but  the  South  Wales  Borderers  lost  their 
commandant,  the  excellent  soldier,  Lieut.-Colonel 
Gillespie,  who  left  his  name  on  part  of  the  district 
he  had  helped  to  win. 

The  total  casualties  in  General  Birdwood's  Army 
Corps  from  the  Friday  night  to  the  Tuesday  night 
amounted  to  12,000,^  by  far  the  greater  proportion 
of  whom  were  lost  in  General  Godley's  two  divisions 
allotted  for  the  main  attack  on  Sari  Bair.  The 
gallantry  and  skill  of  divisions  cannot  be  estimated 
by  losses.  But  still  it  is  noticeable  that  the  New 
Army  Division  (13th,  under  Major-General  Shaw) 
lost  more  than  50  per  cent.  (6000  out  of  10,500),  and 
10  commanding  officers  out  of  13.  The  proportion 
of  officers  killed  and  wounded  was,  indeed,  unusually 
high  in  all  brigades.  As  to  the  troops  in  general, 
perhaps  only  those  who  are  well  acquainted  with  the 
extreme  complexity  of  the  country,  and  with  the 
strain  of  night  marches  into  the  heart  of  an  enemy's 
positions,  followed  by  assaults  upon  strongly  held 
mountain  heights  at  dawn,  can  fully  appreciate  the 

^  Phillip  Schuler  put  them  at  18,000  {Australia  in  Arms,  p.  270). 


284  SARI  BAIR 

true  significance  of   the    last    paragraph    in    General 
Godley's  report,  as  quoted  in  Sir  lan's  dispatch  : 

"  I  cannot  close  my  report  without  placing  on 
record  my  unbounded  admiration  of  the  work 
performed,  and  the  gallantry  displayed,  by  the 
troops  and  their  leaders  during  the  severe  fighting 
involved  in  these  operations.  Though  the  Australian, 
New  Zealand,  and  Indian  units  had  been  confined  to 
trench  duty  in  a  cramped  space  for  some  four  months, 
and  though  the  troops  of  the  New  Armies  had  only 
just  landed  from  a  sea  voyage,  and  many  of  them 
had  not  been  previously  under  fire,  I  do  not  believe 
that  any  troops  in  the  world  could  have  accomplished 
more.  All  ranks  vied  with  one  another  in  the 
performance  of  gallant  deeds,  and  more  than  worthily 
upheld  the  best  traditions  of  the  British  Army." 

In  his  dispatch.  Sir  Ian  mentions  that  at  times 
he  thought  of  throwing  his  reserves  (the  53rd  and 
54th  Divisions,  coming  up  through  Mudros)  into  this 
central  battle.  He  thinks  they  probably  would  have 
turned  the  scale.  The  Corps  and  Divisional  Com- 
manders assured  him  there  was  no  room  for  additional 
troops.  But  it  was  the  water  difficulty,  he  says, 
which  made  him  give  up  the  idea.  The  thirst  of  the 
troops  in  this  part  of  the  general  attack  was  such  that 
when  the  mules  with  the  water  "pakhals"  arrived  at 
the  front,  the  men  rushed  up  to  them  just  to  lick  the 
moisture  oozing-  through  the  canvas  bag's.  Thirst  is 
the  most  terrible  of  physical  sufferings,  and  no  one 
who  has  known  it  will  wonder  at  Sir  lan's  decision. 
Still  the  want  of  water  was  almost  equally  cruel  at 
Suvla,  whither  the  Reserve  Divisions  were  ultimately 
sent.  There  they  arrived  after  the  decisive  days 
were   passed,   and    fell   under  the   curse  of  an   inert 


% 


THE  FAILURE  AND  ITS  CAUSES  285 

spirit,  very  different  from  the  spirit  of  the  Sari  Bair 
assault.  If  their  presence  at  Anzac  would  indeed 
have  turned  the  scale,  it  is  part  of  the  Dardanelles 
tragedy  that  the  Commander-in-Chief,  unable  to 
foresee  the  Suvla  conditions,  or  still  hoping  too 
much  from  the  new  landing  there,  did  not  venture 
upon  the  risk,  however  dangerous. 

For  in  spite  of  all  the  gallantry  and  endurance 
(which  Napoleon  counted  a  more  essential  quality  in 
a  soldier  than  courage),  and  in  spite  of  all  the  careful 
organisation  of  supply  and  medical  care,  the  main 
attack  had  failed  by  sunset  of  Tuesday,  August  10. 
A  large  extent  of  ground  had  been  occupied.  From 
Rhododendron  Ridge  on  the  right  to  Asma  Dere  on 
the  left,  and  all  between  those  two  points  and  the  sea, 
the  country  was  now  in  our  possession.  Anzac  was 
enlarged  from  barely  300  acres  to  about  8  square 
miles.^  It  was  possible  now  to  walk  or  ride  from 
Anzac  to  Suvla  Bay,  though  snipers  always  en- 
dangered the  route.  Yet  the  attack  had  failed. 
The  summits  of  Sari  Bair  were  not  held.  The 
Straits  were  still  closed  ;  Constantinople  still  distant. 
Mistakes,  no  doubt,  had  been  made,  but  mistakes 
could  have  been  retrieved.  The  ultimate  cause  of 
failure  was  simply  this  :  our  attacking  forces  were 
outnumbered  and  checked  by  an  enemy  holding 
positions  of  enormous  natural  strength,  and  the  task 
of  diverting  and  reducing  the  enemy's  force  from 
Suvla,  or  of  actually  contributing  new  troops  thence 
to  the  central  movement,  was  not  fulfilled. 

1  Australia  in  Artns,  p.  271, 


CHAPTER    XII 

SUVLA    BAY 

EYOND  the  Asmak  Dere,  which,  as  described 
in  the  last  chapter,  formed  the  northern  limit 
of  the  Anzac  movement  against  the  Sari 
Bair  range,  the  coast  continues  its  north-westerly 
trend  till  the  sharp  and  rocky  headland  of  Nibrunesi 
Point  is  reached.  Inland,  the  plain  naturally  increases 
in  area  as  the  hills  diverge  towards  the  north-east. 
It  is  flat  and  open  land,  studded  with  low  trees  and 
bushes.  Nearly  all  the  surface  is  waste,  but  small 
farms,  surrounded  by  larger  trees  and  patches  of 
cultivation,  occur  here  and  there,  as  at  Kazlar  Chair 
close  to  the  Asmak,  and  Hetman  Chair  about  a  mile 
north  of  it  ("Chair"  meaning  meadow).  The  soil 
becomes  more  and  more  marshy  as  one  proceeds,  and 
in  winter  the  region  nearest  the  Salt  Lake  is  water- 
logged. The  bush  also  grows  more  dense,  but  is 
crossed  by  sheep  tracks,  and  is  nowhere  impenetrable. 
The  plain,  as  we  have  seen,  forms  the  entrance  to 
the  broad  and  open  valley  of  Biyuk  (Big)  Anafarta, 
the  cypress  groves  of  which  are  clearly  visible  about 
three  and  a  half  miles  to  the  right. 

Nibrunesi  Point,  or  Kuchuk  Kemikli,  rises  with 
steep  cliffs  on  both  sides,  but  steeper  on  the  north, 
where  they  fall  abruptly  into  Suvla  Bay.  It  is  the 
extremity  of  what  was  once  a  high  ridge  or  chain  of 


THE   SUVLA    LANDING 


To  face  p.  286 


HILLS  COMMANDING  THE  BAY  287 

reddish  conglomerate  rock,  hard  but  friable.  The 
chain  is  now  marked  by  a  series  of  isolated  knolls — 
first  the  low  knolls  upon  the  Point  itself;  then  the 
broad-based  rounded  hill  of  Lala  Baba,  which  rises 
to  about  1 50  feet ;  then,  beyond  the  southern  end  of 
the  Salt  Lake  and  a  stretch  of  marsh  and  bushy  plain, 
Yilghin  Burnu  (better  known  to  us  as  "Chocolate 
Hill,"  from  its  reddish-brown  colour  even  before  it 
was  burnt),  which  is  a  similar  but  larger  rounded  hill, 
like  an  inverted  bowl,  rising  about  160  feet;  then, 
beyond  a  brief  but  steepish  dip  or  saddle.  Hill  50  or 
"Green  Hill"  (so  called  because  the  thick  bush 
covering  it  was  not  burnt),  rising  to  nearly  equal 
height,  but  not  so  round  or  definite  in  shape  ;  lastly, 
beyond  a  wide  and  distinctive  break,  the  formidable 
mass  of  Ismail  Oglu  Tepe  (known  to  us  as  "  W  Hill" 
from  the  waving  outline  of  its  crest,  but  more  officially 
called  "Hill  112"  from  its  approximate  height  in 
metres).  Ismail  Oglu,  thus  rising  about  330  feet, 
forms  the  rectangular  corner  of  the  high  plateau  on 
which  Anafarta  Sagir  (Kuchuk  or  Little  Anafarta) 
stands,  and  from  the  southern  face  it  commands  the 
Biyuk  Anafarta  valley  and  the  hills  across  it  at  the 
foot  of  Sari  Bair,  while  from  the  western  face  it 
commands  Green  and  Chocolate  Hills,  almost  the 
whole  of  the  plain  north  of  them,  the  Salt  Lake,  and 
the  northern  shores  of  Suvla  Bay.  It  is,  therefore, 
the  most  vital  and  dominating  position,  unless  long- 
range  guns  were  placed  on  the  much  loftier  height  of 
Tekke  Tepe. 

But  of  almost  equal  importance  in  the  campaign 
was  a  rounded  hill  which  projects  sharply  from  the 
Anafarta  ridge  or  plateau  north  of  Ismail  Oglu  Tepe. 


288  SUVLA  BAY 

Down  the  western  front  of  this  hill,  which  looks  over 
the  plain  to  the  very  centre  of  the  Salt  Lake,  and  to 
Suvla  Bay  beyond,  runs  a  broad  yellow  "blaze"  of 
bare  ground,  showing  a  marl  and  soft  sandstone 
surface  (the  formation  of  this  plateau  being  again  of 
the  same  character  as  the  Sari  Bair  range).  This 
"blaze"  appears  from  the  sea  to  be  shaped  like  a 
Gurkha's  "kukri"  or  an  old-fashioned  Turkish 
scimitar,  and  so  the  hill  came  to  be  called  "  Scimitar 
Hill."  But  officially  it  was  "Hill  jo"  from  its 
height  in  metres  (say  200  feet),  and  commonly  the 
soldiers  called  it  "Burnt  Hill,"  which  was  no 
distinction.  It  was  connected,  apparently  without 
much  break  or  dip,  with  the  plateau  behind  it  bearing 
the  general  name  of  Baka  Baba,  on  which  the 
windmills,  the  white  minaret,  and  some  of  the  houses 
of  Little  Anafarta  could  be  distinctly  seen  from  the 
beach.  A  naval  shell,  however,  accidentally  knocked 
down  the  minaret  about  ten  days  after  our  landing. 
This  description  covers  the  southern  and  south-east 
positions  to  be  attacked  in  the  Suvla  district. 

From  Nibrunesi  Point  the  coast-line  curves 
sharply  into  a  semicircular  bay,  the  diameter  of 
which  is  close  upon  two  miles.  The  north  side  of 
the  Point  itself  falls,  as  described,  in  steep  cliffs  to  a 
narrow  and  rocky  beach.  The  cliff  continues  till  the 
foot  of  Lala  Baba  is  passed,  and  then  it  suddenly 
ends  in  low  dunes  of  soft  and  drifting  sand.  These 
in  turn  sink  into  a  spit  or  isthmus,  about  700 
yards  long,  and  some  200  yards  across  at  its  broadest 
part.  It  is  all  of  loose  sand,  very  tiring  to  walk  on, 
though  bent  grass  and  patches  of  heath  bind  it 
together  here  and  there.     The  shallow  bay  lies   on 


THE  SALT  LAKE  AND  BAY  289 

the  left ;  the  large  expanse  of  the  Salt  Lake  on  the 
right.  The  Salt  Lake  measures  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  at  its  greatest  length  and  breadth  each  way, 
forming  a  kind  of  square  with  irregular  sides.  Its 
surface  in  summer  is  thinly  crusted  with  salt  deposit 
upon  caked  and  fissured  mud,  fairly  sound  for  walk- 
ing or  riding,  though  in  places  the  foot  sinks  above 
the  ankle,  and  on  the  south  side  above  the  knees. 
Consequently,  the  south  side,  thickly  covered  with 
high  reeds  and  ending  in  the  marshy  plain,  is 
always  impassable  for  troops,  though  a  track  not  far 
from  the  edge  can  be  used  in  summer  for  carts  and 
even  guns. 

At  the  end  of  the  sandy  spit  is  a  channel,  which  in 
winter  admits  the  sea  into  the  lake  under  a  strong 
west  wind,  and  drains  it  out  again.  In  summer, 
though  sticky,  it  can  be  crossed  on  foot,  but  we 
bridged  it.  After  crossing  it,  one  continues  upon 
loose  and  wearisome  sand,  the  sandhills  on  the  right 
combining  to  form  a  low,  heathy  plateau,  hardly 
distinguishable  as  a  hill,  but  known  as  "Hill  10" 
from  its  height  in  metres  (about  30  ft).  The  beach 
continues  sandy,  the  sea  shallow,  and  walking  very 
tedious  till  nearly  half-way  round  the  northern  side  of 
the  semicircle,  when  one  strikes  the  rocky  formation 
of  the  northern  point.  The  coast-line  then  rises  into 
rocky  cliffs  of  no  great  height  under  a  low  hill  called 
Ghazi  Baba,  and  runs  into  rocky  inlets  or  creeks.  The 
sea  becomes  deeper,  the  land  undulates  and  is  thickly 
covered  with  heath  and  prickly  bush.  So  it  con- 
tinues up  to  the  final  hill,  where  the  bay  ends  in  the 
jagged  rocks  of  the  extremity  called  by  us  Suvla 
Point,  and  by  the  Turks  Biyuk  Kemikli, 
19 


290  SUVLA  BAY 

There  the  coast  turns  suddenly  north-east,  and 
forms  the  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Xeros.  The  land  rises 
into  a  steep  razor-edge  or  whale-back  of  grey  lime- 
stone, looking  white  in  the  sun,  and  bare  but  for 
shrubs  and  aromatic  plants  growing  in  the  crannies 
between  the  rocks.  This  razor-edge  is  really  con- 
tinuous except  for  notches,  knolls,  and  shallow  scoops 
along  the  sky-line.  But  the  Turks  have  given  the 
ridge  the  separate  names  of  Karakol  Dagh  (Coast- 
guard Mountain)  and  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt.  This  Tepe 
Sirt  or  Hill  Summit  rises  to  the  height  of  600  feet  at 
the  points  which  we  afterwards  called  Jephson's  Post 
and  the  Pimple.  Thence  the  ridge  runs  at  a  varying 
but  lower  level  till  it  reaches  Ejelmer  Bay,  where 
there  is  good  anchorage  and  an  opening  into  a 
central  plain  of  the  Peninsula.  The  distance  from 
Suvla  Point  to  Ejelmer  Bay  is  nearly  7  miles. 

The  whole  of  this  ridge  is  steep  and  rocky  on  the 
south  side  overlooking  Suvla  Bay,  but  is  everywhere 
accessible  by  climbing,  and  admits  of  paths  being 
cut  obliquely  or  in  zigzag.  The  northern  side  falls 
abruptly  into  the  Gulf  of  Xeros,  across  which  the 
opposite  coast  of  Thrace,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Maritza  eastward,  can  be  distinctly  seen.  Near  Suvla 
Point  the  cliffs  are  precipitous,  and  leave  little  or  no 
beach.  Farther  along,  the  face  of  the  ridge,  though 
always  very  steep,  becomes  accessible,  and  spreads 
out  at  the  bottom  into  a  kind  of  "undercliff"  above 
the  shore,  which  is  indented  by  a  succession  of 
miniature  bays,  like  bathing  coves.  All  this  part  of 
the  slope  is  deeply  scored  by  ravines,  rocky,  steep, 
and  covered  with  thick  bush.  This  face  was  com- 
manded by  the  enemy's  guns  only  from   Kartal  Tepe, 


HILLS  NORTH  AND  NORTH-EAST  OF  BAY     291 

a  barren  promontory  of  fantastic  cliffs,  different  in 
formation,  and  apparently  of  dark  and  slaty  shale, 
which  projects  from  the  coast  a  mile  or  so  beyond  the 
farthest  point  reached  by  our  lines. 

Farther  along  the  coast  towards  Ejelmer  Bay  the 
razor-edge  meets  almost  at  right  angles  with  a  mass 
of  mountain  running  south  towards  the  Anafarta 
plateau.  The  range  rises  rapidly  to  the  conjoined 
heights  of  Kavak  Tepe  and  Tekke  Tepe  (Saint's 
Hill),  each  about  850  feet.  It  completely  shuts  in 
the  Suvla  region  on  the  north-east  side,  presenting  a 
steep,  though  not  really  a  precipitous,  western  face 
towards  the  bay,  and  commanding  the  whole  district 
from  end  to  end.  It  is  dark  with  thick  scrub  to  the 
rounded  summits,  and  always  reminded  me  of  the 
Wrekin's  western  face,  looking  towards  Shrewsbury, 
as  seen  from  the  site  of  Uriconium.  At  the  southern 
end  it  falls  by  a  similar  steep  slope  to  the  Anafarta 
plateau,  throwing  up  one  little  isolated  hill  above  the 
plateau,  like  the  spadeful  of  rocks  which  the  devil 
dropped  in  his  hurry  to  pile  the  Wrekin. 

From  these  descriptions  of  the  northern,  eastern, 
and  southern  positions  around  Suvla,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  heights,  starting  from  Kiretch  Tepe  and 
running  round  over  Kavak  Tepe  and  Tekke  Tepe  to 
the  elevated  Anafarta  plateau,  Scimitar  Hill,  and 
Ismail  Oglu  Tepe,  form  an  irregular  semicircle, 
roughly  corresponding  to  the  regular  semicircle  of 
Suvla  Bay,  and  commanding  it  from  a  wide  circum- 
ference. This  outer  semicircle  encloses  a  fairly  open 
plain,  cultivated  in  parts  by  ancient  farms,  such  as 
Anafarta  Ova  (Plain)  and  Sulajik.  Large  trees,  so 
rarely  seen  in  the  Near  East,  give  that  part  of  the 


292  SUVLA  BAY 

plain  the  appearance  of  a  park  in  one  of  the  fatted 
counties  of  England.  But  most  of  it  is  bare  except 
for  heath  and  thin  grass,  until  the  foot  of  the  hills  is 
reached,  when  the  prickly  bush  becomes  thick  as  usual, 
interrupting  any  advance  in  line,  effectively  concealing 
numberless  snipers,  and  impenetrable  except  by 
devious  and  isolating  paths.  Each  farm  has  a  well  or 
fountain,  and  one  of  the  watercourses,  running  into 
the  north-east  corner  of  the  Salt  Lake,  contains  water. 
There  is  a  spring  at  the  foot  of  the  Karakol  Dagh, 
not  far  from  the  bay.  Two  good  running  fountains, 
constructed  with  low  bridges,  stone  spouts,  and 
troughs,  are  to  be  found  on  the  plain  north-east  of  the 
Salt  Lake  among  the  large  trees  mentioned ;  and 
there  is  a  smaller  source  just  south-west  of  Chocolate 
Hill.  But  these  wells  and  springs  might  easily  be 
missed  by  troops  advancing  under  fire  across  an 
unknown  and  almost  pathless  country. 

Such  was  the  district  into  which  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  was  launched  in  the  night  of  August  6-^]. 
As  has  been  mentioned,  Lieut. -General  Sir  Frederick 
Stopford  had  arrived  in  the  middle  of  July  to  take 
command,  and  for  a  short  time  had  succeeded 
General  Hunter- Weston  in  command  of  the  VHIth 
Army  Corps  at  Helles,  so  as  to  gain  experience 
in  Peninsula  warfare.  He  had  entered  the  Grenadier 
Guards  in  the  early  "Seventies";  had  seen  the  usual 
service  of  officers  at  the  end  of  last  century,  in  India, 
West  Africa,  and  Egypt ;  during  the  South  African 
War  he  was  Military  Secretary  to  General  Buller, 
and  entered  Ladysmith  with  him  at  the  relief.  Since 
then  he  had  occupied  various  military  positions  at 
home,  and  was  still  on  the  Active  List  though  a  little 


GENERAL  STOPFORD  AND  THE  IXth  CORPS    293 

over  sixty.  His  reputation  stood  high  as  a  student 
and  teacher  of  military  history,  and  long  experience 
had  given  him  an  accurate  knowledge  of  army  routine. 
But  he  had  never  held  high  command  in  the  field, 
and  neither  history  nor  routine  in  itself  inspires  to 
action ;  still  less  do  years  of  official  duty  in  the 
Metropolis.  Rather  they  suppress  the  hopeful 
buoyancy  of  spirit  and  rapid  fertility  of  resource 
essential  for  generalship,  while  they  tend  to 
accentuate  the  hesitating  deliberation  and  cautious 
apprehension  of  risk  which  too  often  develop  with 
increasing  years.  Habits  mainly  sedentary  are  also 
likely  to  reduce  the  enthusiasm  for  physical  activity 
as  middle  age  is  passing. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  fair  to  remember  that  the 
force  now  entrusted  to  General  Stopford  for  this 
vital  enterprise  was  an  Army  Corps  only  in  name. 
Nominally  it  consisted  of  the  loth,  nth,  and  13th 
Divisions,  composed  as  we  have  seen.  But  the 
13th  Division  (Major-General  Shaw)  had  been 
deflected  to  Anzac  for  the  assault  against  Sari  Bair, 
together  with  the  29th  Brigade  (Brigadier-General 
Cooper)  of  the  loth  Division.  General  Stopford 
was  thus  left  with  only  the  nth  (Northern)  Division 
under  Major-General  Hammersley,  and  two  brigades 
of  the  loth  (Irish)  Division  under  Lieut. -General  Sir 
Bryan  Mahon.  All  the  battalions  in  these  Divisions 
were  New  Army  men,  and  had  never  been  in  action 
before.  Normally  each  Division  should  have 
possessed  sixteen  batteries  of  artillery  (including 
the  H.Q.  Divisional  Artillery),  so  that  (allowing 
for  the  absence  of  the  13th  Division  and  the 
29th   Brigade)   the    IXth   Army  Corps  should  have 


294  SUVLA  BAY 

commanded  twenty-eight  batteries,  or  112  guns ; 
whereas,  at  the  time  of  landing,  it  had  only  one 
Field  Artillery  battery  and  two  Highland  Moun- 
tain batteries  of  small  calibre — all  excellent  in  their 
service,  but  counting  only  12  guns.^  It  is  true 
that  General  Stopford  could  also  command  the 
support  of  naval  guns,  but  by  the  nature  of  the 
case  the  guns  had  been  unable  to  register  for  fear 
of  thwarting  the  surprise,  the  maps  were  inaccurate, 
and  most  of  the  Suvla  plain  was  invisible  from  the 
sea  owing  to  its  flatness. 

Of  the  Divisional  Generals,  Sir  Bryan  Mahon 
was  fifty-three,  was  a  cavalryman  (8th  Royal  Irish 
Hussars),  held  a  long  record  of  service  in  India  and 
Egypt,  and  had  won  distinction  by  the  relief  of 
Mafeking  in  1900.  Since  then  he  had  been  Military 
Governor  of  Kordofan,  and  had  commanded  the 
Lucknow  Division  till  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
Possessing  many  of  the  fine  Irish  qualities,  and 
some  of  the  supposed  Irish  defects,  he  was  regarded 
with  patriotic  affection  by  his  Division  ;  but,  like 
"most  of  our  Generals,  had  seen  no  active  service 
for  fourteen  or  fifteen  years,  and  then  in  wars  unlike 
the  present.  Major-General  Frederick  Hammersley 
(Lancashire  Fusiliers)  had  also  served  in  India, 
Egypt,  and  South  Africa,  and  on  various  Staff 
appointments ;  but  owing  to  serious  illness  had 
recently  held  no  military  position. 

As   in   the  last  chapter,   on  Sari  Bair,  it  will  be 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch  twice  mentions  these  batteries  as  the  sole  land 
artillery.  All  three  belonged  to  the  nth  Division.  Other  batteries  of 
field-guns  and  howitzers  arrived  later,  but  we  are  speaking  of  the  Suvla 
first  landing — the  really  critical  time. 


THE  FORCE  AT  SEA  295 

convenient  to  divide  the  Suvla  fighting  by  days  and 
nights,  counting  from  evening  to  evening. 


From  the  evening  of  Friday,  August  6,  to  the 
evening  of  August  7. 

By  the  time  darkness  set  in,  Brigadier-General 
F.  F.  Hill  was  making  up  the  Asiatic  coast  from 
Mitylene  (120  miles)  v/ith  his  31st  Brigade  and  two 
battalions  of  the  30th  (loth  Division),  which  had 
been  transhipped  from  their  transports  into  ten 
trawlers  and  passeiiger  steamers.  Brigadier-General 
L.  L.  Nicol  was  on  his  way  from  Mudros  (60  miles) 
with  the  remaining  two  battalions  of  his  30th  Brigade 
and  the  5th  Royal  Irish  (Pioneers),  accompanied  by 
Sir  Bryan  Mahon  and  his  Divisional  Staff.  At 
Imbros,  the  three  brigades  of  the  nth  Division 
(the  32nd,  33rd,  and  34th,  under  Brigadier-Generals 
Haggard,  Maxwell,  and  Sitwell)  were  embarked  in 
destroyers  and  "beetles"  (motor-lighters),  about 
500  men  being  packed  in  each  destroyer  and  "beetle." 
The  "beetles"  were  under  charge  of  Captain  Unwin, 
the  hero  of  the  River  Clyde.  Three  of  each  kind  of 
vessel  were  allotted  to  each  brigade,  the  destroyers 
towing  the  "  beetles."  Two  cruisers  ("  blister  ships  ") 
also  carried  1000  men  apiece,  to  be  landed  by  the 
"beetles"  as  soon  as  their  own  contingents  and 
those  on  the  destroyers  had  been  discharged. 
Behind  the  infantry  followed  trawlers  towing  horse- 
boats  with  horses  and  guns  ;  ^  and  the  sloop  Aster  with 

^  Sir  Ian  in  his  dispatch  reckons  twelve  i8-pounder  guns  and  eight 
mountain-guns  as  starting.  Only  the  mountain-guns  and  four  of  the 
i8-pounders  were  in  action  by  August  8,  but  the  59th  Brigade,  R.F.A,, 


296  SUVLA  BAY 

500  men,  presumably  gunners,  towing  a  lighter  with 
eight  mountain-guns,  and  four  water-lighters  specially 
provided  by  Brigadier-General  Lotbiniere,  then 
Director  of  Works. 

Each  of  the  water-lighters  carried  about  50  or 
60  tons,  and  was  to  be  refilled  from  two  water-ships, 
the  Krene  and  Phido,  each  carrying  250  tons  of 
water  brought  from  Alexandria.  The  men  embarked 
with  full  water-bottles,  and  each  "beetle"  and  de- 
stroyer was  supplied  with  water  for  refills  on  landing, 
and  for  the  wants  of  beach-parties.  It  was  also 
confidently  expected  that  plentiful  water  would  be 
discovered  during  the  advance.  But,  though  the 
water  was  there,  it  was  not  discovered,  or  was  not 
accessible.  Inexperienced  soldiers  might  be  expected 
to  drain  their  water-bottles  soon,  and  in  the  excite- 
ment and  confusion  of  landing  to  neglect  the  pre- 
caution of  refilling.  So  it  happened,  and  to  this 
natural  carelessness  must  be  added  the  absence  of 
the  Prah,  an  Elder  Dempster  vessel  of  3000  tons, 
carefully  equipped  with  water-pumps,  hose,  tanks, 
troughs,  and  the  implements  required  for  the  develop- 
ment of  wells  or  springs — exactly  the  stores  which  the 
experience  of  the  April  landings  had  proved  essential 
to  relieve  the  torture  of  thirst  among  men  exhausted 
by  the  nervous  excitement  of  battle,  and  by  the  heat, 
which  in  August  had  risen  to  glaring  intensity.  The 
danger  of  thirst  had  always  been  present  in  the  minds 
of  General    Headquarters    and    the    Administrative 

and  the  4th  Highland  Mountain  Brigade,  R.G.A.,  were  attached  to  the 
nth  Division.  On  the  9th,  two  field  batteries  were  on  Lala  Baba.  On 
August  13  to  15  the  58th  Brigade  also  arrived  at  Suvla,  and  was  attached 
to  the  loth  Division.  On  the  19th  a  battery  of  the  4th  Howitzer  Low- 
land Brigade,  R.F.A.,  was  placed  in  position  on  Lala  Baba. 


THE  WATER  SUPPLY  297 

Staff.  Petrol  tins,  milk  cans,  camel  tanks,  water-bags, 
and  pakhals  for  mules  had  been  provided  in  large 
quantities  from  India  and  Egypt.  More  than  4000 
mules  for  carrying  water  as  well  as  rations  and 
ammunition  were  by  this  time  collected  for  Anzac 
and  Suvla,  about  600  being  allotted  to  Suvla  alone 
for  the  first  landing.  Critics  after  the  event 
suggested  that  the  men  should  have  carried  half  a 
dozen  water-bottles  apiece  instead  of  their  packs. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  nth  Division,  at  all 
events,  carried  only  their  haversacks  with  two  days' 
iron  rations,  and  left  their  packs  at  Imbros.  As  to 
carrying  more  water-bottles,  no  one  could  have 
foreseen  the  partial  failure  of  the  most  elaborate 
precautions,  partly  owing  to  the  inexperience  of  a 
New  Army  Staff.' 

The  naval  side  of  the  whole  landing — the  organ- 
isation of  all  transport  until  each  detail  came  ashore — 
was  in  charge  of  Rear-Admiral  Arthur  Christian,  on 
board  the  sloop  Jonquil,  together  with  General 
Stopford  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Brigadier-General 
H.  L.  Reed,  V.C.  Vice- Admiral  de  Robeck,  with  his 
Chief  of  Staff,  Commodore  Roger  Keyes,  was  also 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch  gives  a  full  account  of  the  warships,  lighters, 
and  trawlers  sent  with  the  landing-force,  together  with  details  about  the 
water-supply  provided.  He  does  not  mention  the  large  transport 
Minneapolis,  which  I  think  must  have  taken  the  place  of  the  sloop 
Asier,  for  we  certainly  had  batteries  of  mountain-guns  with  their  teams 
on  board.  She  was  a  liner,  taken  over  with  all  her  staff ;  and  as  in- 
stances of  petrifying  routine  I  remember  that,  as  I  hoped  to  land  at 
4  a.m.,  I  asked  if  one  could  get  a  cup  of  tea  then,  and  was  haughtily 
informed,  "On  this  ship  breakfast  is  always  at  8.30"  ;  and  later  in  the 
morning,  when  the  fighting  was  at  crisis,  the  "stewards"  were  sweeping 
out  the  gangways  with  vacuum-cleaners  as  they  had  swept  for  years. 
Habits  of  routine  were,  however,  fatally  disturbed  in  the  following  spring 
when  the  Minneapolis  was  torpedoed  between  Egypt  and  Salonika. 


298  SUVLA  BAY 

present  on  the  light  cruiser  Chatham,  and  on  the 
Ho;ht  cruiser  Talbot  was  Brigadier-General  S.  C.  V, 
Smith,  R.A.,  in  command  of  the  guns.  Soon  after 
8  p.m.  the  flotilla  began  to  glide  northward  through 
the  winding  narrows  of  the  netted  and  buoyed  passage 
from  Kephalos  Bay.  The  last  of  the  vessels  except 
the  Prah  and  water-lighters  cleared  about  lo  p.m. 
We  heard  the  firing  round  the  Vineyard  at  Helles, 
and  the  perpetual  whisper  and  rumble  of  rifles  and 
guns  at  Lone  Pine,  On  our  right  front  as  we 
advanced  past  Anzac  the  New  Zealanders  were 
standing  mustered  for  the  great  assault.  The  water 
was  dead  calm,  which  was  a  mercy  for  the  soldiers 
crowded  on  the  destroyers  and  "  beetles,"  No  lights 
were  shown.  There  was  no  lioht  but  the  brilliant 
stars.  No  one  except  the  Generals  and  Admirals 
knew  our  destination. 

Sir  lan's  original  design  had  been  to  land  the 
whole  of  the  1 1  th  Division  at  the  continuous  beach 
just  south  of  Nibrunesi  Point.  Here  the  shore  is 
"steep  to,"  and  the  water  comes  up  deep.  A  large 
part  of  the  force  would  be  concealed  or  sheltered  by 
the  cliffs  and  hills,  but  the  beach  itself  is  level  and 
wide  enough  for  mustering.  The  brigades,  after 
capturing  the  Lala  Baba  promontory,  could  then  have 
advanced  in  unison  along  the  marshy  but  practicable 
ground  south  of  the  Salt  Lake,  or  before  dawn  even 
over  the  centre  of  the  Lake  itself,  to  the  assault  upon 
Chocolate  and  W  Hills.  Meantime,  we  must  sup- 
pose. Sir  Ian  had  intended  the  two  brigades  of  the 
loth  Division  to  land  on  the  north  side  of  the  bay 
near  Suvla  Point  and  occupy  the  commanding  razor- 
edge   of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt.      Most  unfortunately,  as 


THE  LANDING  BEACHES  299 

it  turned  out,  against  his  better  judgment  he  accepted 
General  Stopford's  desire  to  land  one  brigade  inside 
the  bay  itself,  apparently  with  the  intention  of 
advancing  across  the  plain  on  the  north  of  the  Salt 
Lake.  Accordingly,  the  navy  was  directed  to  put 
the  34th  Brigade  (Sitwell's)  ashore  on  the  sands  of 
the  north-east  segment  of  the  bay,  while  the  32nd 
(Haggard's)  and  the  33rd  (Maxwell's)  were  to  land 
on  the  beach  south  of  Nibrunesi  Point.  This  beach 
was  divided  into  C  (nearer  the  Point)  for  the  artillery, 
and  B  for  the  infantry,  but  it  was  one  and  continuous. 
The  navy  originally  chose  the  south-east  arc  of  the  bay 
for  landing,  hence  called  "Old  A  Beach."  Among 
the  rocky  creeks  near  Suvia  Point,  A  East  and  A 
West  were  found  on  the  7th,  and  A  West  ultimately 
became  the  main  landing-place.  But  the  true  A 
Beach  on  which  the  34th  Brigade  was  ordered  to  land 
was  the  long  and  sandy  stretch  just  beside  the 
entrance  or  "cut"  into  the  Salt  Lake;  and  there  the 
34th  Brigade  landed. 

Together  with  the  two  brigades  of  the  loth 
Division  the  total  number  of  all  ranks  and  arms, 
including  transport  and  supply,  was  from  25,000  to 
27,000  to  be  landed.  There  was  no  wire  entangle- 
ment along- the  shore;  the  entrenchments  were  few 
and  slight ;  the  Turkish  force  holding  the  district  was 
estimated  under  4000,  apart  from  possible  reserves 
behind  Sari  Bair ;  and  the  actual  bay  was  guarded, 
as  was  believed,  only  by  about  1000  gendarmes — 
700  on  Lala  Baba,  300  on  Suvla  Point.  Sir  Ian 
confidently  expected,  therefore,  that  the  two  Divisions, 
though  short  in  numbers  (showing  a  total  of  about 
20,000  rifles  or  rather  less),  almost  destitute  of  guns 


300  SUVLA  BAY 

apart  from  the  fleet,  and  quite  destitute  of  experience 
in  actual  war,  would  certainly  be  able  to  occupy  the 
inner  semicircle  of  the  bay  and  the  outer  semicircle 
of  the  commanding  heights,  or  at  all  events  the  vital 
points  of  Kiretch  Tepe  and  W  Hill,  by  the  following 
morning. 

But,  like  nearly  every  movement  in  war,  the  land- 
ing took  longer  than  was  expected,  and  the  customary 
delay  was  increased  by  needless  confusion.  In  the 
darkness  of  midnight  the  32nd  and  33rd  Brigades 
approached  the  shore  at  B  Beach  south  of  Nibrunesi 
Point.  The  destroyers  stopped  and  slipped  the 
"beetles,"  which  crept  ashore  under  their  own  power. 
Driving  close  in,  they  dropped  their  elevated  draw- 
bridges right  on  the  beach  itself,  and  the  crowded 
men  swarmed  over  them  as  over  a  landing-stage. 
The  "beetles"  then  returned  to  the  destroyers  for 
their  second  load,  and  so  the  two  brigades  came  to 
shore  in  good  time  and  without  mishap.  As  soon  as 
the  battalions  were  formed  up,  two  from  the  32nd 
Brigade  (the  6th  Yorkshire  and  the  9th  West  York- 
shire) were  instructed  to  occupy  Lala  Baba.  Advanc- 
ing in  that  order  along  the  beach  and  up  the  hills 
from  the  south,  they  stormed  the  trenches  with  the 
bayonet  in  the  darkness,  but  the  6th  Yorks  lost 
heavily.  Colonel  Chapman,  in  command,  was  killed 
while  cheering  on  his  men.  Fifteen  officers  fell  and 
250  men,  but  apart  from  that  battalion  the  loss  was 
not  great,  and  the  occupation  of  the  Hill  gave  us 
command  of  the  southern  side  of  the  bay. 

With  the  34th  Brigade  things  did  not  go  so 
smoothly.  The  navy  brought  up  the  destroyers  with 
the    "beetles"   in  time  with  the  rest;  but  after  the 


MISFORTUNE  OF  THE  34th  BRIGADE        301 

"beetles"  had  been  cast  off  as  they  approached  the 
shore  in  the  middle  of  the  bay,  it  was  found  that  they 
could  not  make  A  Beach  at  all,  but  went  aground 
with  their  weight  on  the  sandy  shallows.  The 
disaster  might  have  been  anticipated  from  the 
appearance  of  the  sandy  and  shelving  shore,  which 
possessed  all  the  familiar  features  of  a  children's 
bathing-place.  Led  by  their  officers,  the  men 
plunged  into  the  water,  which  in  places  came  up  to 
their  armpits,  and  struggled  ashore.  Dripping  wet, 
they  reached  the  sands  just  in  the  centre  of  the  bay's 
arc,  north  and  south  of  the  entrance  to  the  Salt  Lake, 
fairly  according  to  the  appointed  position.  But  both  in 
the  lighters  and  on  shore  they  were  exposed  to  con- 
siderable fire  from  Lala  Baba  (not  yet  occupied)  and 
the  rocky  promontories  towards  Suvla  Point.  Many 
Turks  even  crept  into  their  midst  in  the  darkness,  and 
at  close  quarters  killed  them  unawares.  Nearly  the 
whole  of  the  northern  shore  had  also  been  sown  with 
land-mines,  exploding  on  contact  and  causing  many 
deaths. 

The  delay  and  confusion  due  to  the  oversight  of 
obvious  shallows  were  serious.  They  were  the  first 
step  in  failure.  For  by  the  time  the  brigade  got 
ashore  and  sorted  itself  out  it  was  useless  to  think  of 
reaching  W  Hill,  or  even  Chocolate  Hill,  under  cover 
of  darkness.  In  fact,  by  the  time  the  battalions  were 
reorganised  it  was  nearly  dawn.  To  protect  the 
left,  one  battalion  (nth  Manchester)  was  now  sent  up 
the  rocky  steep  of  Karakol  Dagh,  which  it  succeeded 
in  clearing  of  the  concealed  parties  of  gendarmes,  but 
after  suffering  considerable  loss.  The  Colonel  was 
wounded,  the  second  in  command  killed,  and  nearly 


302  SUVLA  BAY 

half  the  strength  put  out  of  action.^  But  its  service 
in  saving  the  rest  of  the  brigade  from  enfilading  fire 
was  inestimable. 

About  the  same  time  another  of  the  battalions 
(9th  Lancashire  Fusiliers)  succeeded  in  the  equally 
important  task  of  clearing  Hill  10,  the  low  eminence 
of  heath-covered  sandhill  which  stood  close  at  hand 
to  the  left  front  of  the  landing  beach.  The  Turks 
had  a  strong  outpost  there,  and  the  loss  to  this 
battalion  was  also  considerable.  In  fact,  the  brigade 
stood  in  an  isolated  and  unsatisfactory  position  when, 
just  as  the  eastern  sky  began  to  show  streaks  of 
brown  among  the  purple,  the  32  nd  Brigade 
(Haggard's)  began  to  appear  along  the  sandy  spit, 
coming  from  Lala  Baba,  which  it  had  seized  and 
left  in  charge  of  the  33rd  Brigade  (Maxwell's).  As 
it  approached  it  opened  fire  upon  Hill  10,  where 
confused  fighting  was  still  going  on.  The  9th  West 
Yorks  (32nd  Brigade)  also  joined  in  the  attack,  and 
suffered  considerable  loss. 

Brigadier-General  Sitwell,  as  senior  in  command, 
had  now  two  brigades,  half  of  each  still  untouched 
by  action.  It  was  the  moment  for  him,  one  would 
have  thought,  to  advance  at  all  hazards  upon 
Chocolate  and  W  Hills.  Yet  he  hesitated.  Per- 
haps he  thought  it  went  beyond  his  orders  to  cross 
the  open  plain  now  that  daylight  was  increasing 
every  minute.  Perhaps  he  was  deterred  by  a  brief 
counter-attack  which  the  Turks,  noticing  the  con- 
fusion or  supineness  of  the  brigades,  attempted 
against  Hill  10,  though  the  9th  Lancashire  Fusiliers 
again  drove  them  off  with   the  bayonet,  compelling 

'  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  in  Gallipoli,  p.  142. 


HESITATION  AND  CONFUSION  303 

them  to  retreat  through  the  low  bushes  on  the  north 
edge  of  the  plain.  Now  that  the  sun  was  rising, 
shrapnel  from  one  or  two  Turkish  batteries  posted 
on  the  hills  across  the  Salt  Lake  began  to  burst 
over  his  position,  and  the  naval  guns,  attempting  to 
harass  the  groups  of  enemy  as  they  stole  away,  set 
fire  to  a  large  area  of  bush  straight  in  his  front  and 
to  the  left.^  Perhaps  he  thought  enough  had  been 
done  by  battalions  already  thirsty,  tired  after  a 
sleepless  night,  and  probably  shaken  by  their  first 
losses  in  battle.  At  all  events  he  allowed  the  men 
to  gather  in  crowds  under  the  shelter  of  some  high 
sand  dunes  along  the  shore  north  of  the  spit,  and 
there  for  many  hours  they  lay  immovable.  The 
second  step  in  failure  had  been  taken. 

The  third  was  already  preparing.  About  an 
hour  before  dawn,  the  ten  trawlers  and  steamers 
bringing  Brigadier-General  Hill's  six  battalions  from 
Mitylene  punctually  arrived  off  the  bay.  As  they 
all  belonged  to  Sir  Bryan  Mahon's  loth  Division, 
General  Stopford  had  intended  them  to  land  near 
A  Beach,  to  seize  the  whole  length  of  the  razor- 
edge  on  the  north  of  the  bay,  to  occupy  the  Kiretch 
Tepe  Sirt,  and  advance  as  far  as  possible  towards 
Ejelmer  Bay,  whence  the  great  hills  of  Tekke  Tepe 
could  be  turned.  They  were,  of  course,  to  be  joined 
by  Sir  Bryan  Mahon's  other  three  battalions  on  their 
arrival  with  their  General  from  Mudros.  But  the 
General  had  not  yet  arrived  :  the  navy  had  witnessed 

^  Sir  Ian  in  his  dispatch  says  these  fires  were  caused  by  the  enemy's 
shells  ;  but  they  arose  in  positions  not  yet  reached  by  our  troops,  and  I 
had  no  doubt,  in  watching  the  scene,  that  they  were  lighted  by  the 
naval  guns. 


304  SUVLA  BAY 

only  too  plainly  the  failure  of  A  Beach  as  a  landing- 
place  owing  to  the  shallows,  and  they  had  not  yet 
discovered  the  practicable  creeks  among  the  rocks 
near  Suvla  Point.  Accordingly,  General  Stopford 
was  advised  to  land  them  at  B  Beach,  and  after 
the  delay  of  more  than  two  hours  this  was  done/ 
That  is  to  say,  five  of  the  six  battalions  were  landed 
there  with  Brigadier-General  Hill ;  but  before  the 
5th  Royal  Inniskilling  Fusiliers  (of  Hill's  own  31st 
Brigade)  had  disembarked.  Sir  Bryan  Mahon  put 
into  the  bay  from  Mudros  with  the  remaining  three, 
and  was  landed  in  the  creeks  which  the  navy  had 
now  discovered  among  the  rocks  east  of  Suvla  Point. 
Accordingly,  the  Inniskilling  Fusiliers  were  counter- 
ordered  to  join  him  there.  Thus  the  loth  Division 
was  now  divided  into  three  entirely  different  parts  : 
the  29th  Brigade  was  at  Anzac ;  three  battalions  of 
the  31st  and  two  of  the  30th  were  with  Hill  at  B 
Beach;  two  battalions  of  the  30th,  one  of  the  31st, 
and  the  5th  Royal  Irish  (Pioneers)  were  at  Suvla 
Point,  where  the  Divisional  General  landed  with 
nothing"  of  his  Division  left  under  his  command 
except  these  four.  Confusion  of  command  and 
position  was  inevitable.^ 

Confusion  immediately  resulted.  As  Hill  with 
his  five  battalions  was  landed  in  the  sphere  of  the 
iith  Division  on  the  right,  instead  of  being  with 
his  own   loth  Division  on  the  extreme  left,  he  was 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch  says  the  naval  authorities  were  unwilHng  to  land 
them  at  A  Beach  "  for  some  reason  not  specified."  Considering  what 
misfortune  had  already  happened  there,  the  above  explanation  appears 
to  me  at  least  sufficient.  But  A  East  and  A  West  had  been  discovered 
by  the  navy  before  the  unfortunate  landing  at  B  Beach  began. 

2  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  at  Gallipoli^  pp.  125  and  140, 


GENERAL  HILL'S  NEW  ORDERS  305 

ordered  by  General  Stopford  to  put  himself  under 
the  command  of  Major-General  Hammersley.  His 
battalions  did  not  begin  to  disembark  till  5.30  a.m., 
when  it  was  nearly  full  daylight.  The  enemy's 
shrapnel  was  bursting  over  his  boats  and  the  beach. 
Two  of  our  mountain-guns  were  hurried  up  into  the 
Turkish  trenches  on  Lala  Baba,  and  the  battery  of 
Field  Artillery  soon  afterwards  came  into  action 
from  behind  the  cover  of  that  Hill.  The  ships  also 
maintained  a  heavy  but  ineffectual  fire  upon  invisible 
or  unregistered  positions.  But  the  loss  at  the  land- 
ing was  considerable  while  Hill  was  away  looking 
for  the  Divisional  General  and  new  orders.  This 
was  a  long  process.  Finding  at  last  that  his  orders 
were  to  combine  with  the  32nd  and  34th  Brigades, 
now  under  Sitwell's  command  upon  the  dunes  near 
Hill  10,  and  then  to  attack  Chocolate  Hill  and  ad- 
vance to  W  Hill,  he  mustered  the  five  battalions 
behind  the  slopes  of  Lala  Baba,  and  ordered  an 
advance  along  the  sandy  spit.  The  march  round 
by  Hill  10,  and  then  along  the  north  side  of  the 
Salt  Lake,  and  again  south-east  to  Chocolate  Hill, 
would  describe  three  parts  of  a  circle.  An  advance 
from  B  Beach  along  the  south  side  of  the  Salt  Lake 
would  have  followed  an  almost  straight  line  to 
Chocolate  Hill ;  the  ground,  though  marshy  in 
places,  was  everywhere  better  going  than  loose 
sand,  and  was  less  exposed  than  the  open  plain. 
By  selecting  this  route  General  Hammersley  could 
have  brought  these  five  battalions  into  action  many 
hours  earlier,  could  have  occupied  Chocolate  Hill 
by   noon,  and  pushed  on   to   W    Hill    before    night. 

It  is  true  they  would  not  then  have  co-operated  with 
20 


3o6  SUVLA  BAY 

the  brigades   under   Sitwell,   but    the    value    of   that 
co-operation  was  not  great. 

As  it  was,  owing  to  the  delay  of  changed  com- 
mand, and  to  co-operation  with  a  Brigadier  in  another 
Division,  with  whom  Hill,  having  just  come  from 
Mitylene,  was  probably  unacquainted.  Hill's  column 
did  not  begin  to  leave  Lala  Baba  for  the  sandy  spit 
till  noon.  The  march  across  that  unprotected  spit 
was  a  trying  passage.  The  Irishmen  (6th  Inniskilling 
Fusiliers,  5th  and  6th  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers,  of  the 
31st  Brigade,  and  6th  and  7th  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers 
of  the  30th  Brigade)  had  started  closely  packed  to- 
gether for  their  long  sea  voyage  on  the  previous 
afternoon ;  except  for  a  cup  of  tea  at  3  a.m.  and  a 
snatch  of  their  rations  after  landing,  they  were  empty 
of  food  ;  for  some  hours  they  had  stood  uncertain 
under  a  blazing  sun  and  exposed  for  the  first  time 
to  shrapnel,  often  fatal  and  continually  unnerving. 
The  Turkish  guns  on  Chocolate  and  W  Hills  had 
carefully  registered  the  sandy  spit,  and  now  swept  it 
with  shrapnel  from  end  to  end.  For  sleepless,  hungry, 
and  miserably  thirsty  men,  loose  sand  is  the  worst 
of  trials.  They  crossed  in  batches,  or  "  by  a  section 
at  a  time  rushing  over."^ 

^  So  Major  Bryan  Cooper  in  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division^  p.  129.  My 
impression  at  the  time  was  of  no  rush,  but  a  calm  though  laborious 
trudge.  Major  Cooper,  however,  continues  :  "The  7th  Dublins  in  par- 
ticular were  much  encouraged  by  the  example  of  their  Colonel.  .  .  . 
While  every  one  else  was  dashing  swiftly  across  the  neck,  or  keeping 
close  under  cover,  it  is  recorded  that  Colonel  Downing — a  man  of  un- 
usual height  and  girth — stood  in  the  centre  of  the  bullet-swept  zone, 
quietly  twisting  his  stick."  "  Dashing  swiftly  across  "that  sand  would, 
I  think,  be  impossible  under  any  impulse,  and  cover  did  not  exist ;  at 
least  I  never  found  it,  though  I  toiled  over  that  spit  many  dozen  times, 
and  it  always  remained  exposed  to  shell-fire  from  W  Hill. 


HILL'S  ADVANCE  ROUND  SALT  LAKE        307 

As  each  battalion  arrived  after  this  ordeal,  it 
formed  up  under  the  slight  cover  of  the  sand  dunes 
about  Hill  10,  but  it  was  3  p.m.  before  all  the  five 
mustered  there  and  Hill  could  organise  the  attack 
upon  Chocolate  Hill,  which  was  to  have  been  com- 
pleted before  dawn.  Keeping  only  the  6th  Dublin 
Fusiliers  in  reserve,  he  pushed  the  other  four  bat- 
talions forward  across  the  dry  bed  of  the  Asmak 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Salt  Lake,  and  began  the 
difficult  movement  of  wheeling  the  whole  force  south- 
ward through  the  open  country  round  the  lake  shore. 
He  was  thus  marching  across  the  enemy's  front — an 
operation  of  proverbial  risk.  The  farther  he  ad- 
vanced, the  more  exposed  his  left  flank  became. 
Sitwell,  as  senior  officer,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
command  of  the  34th  and  32nd  Brigades,  which  had 
lain  so  many  hours  under  the  sand  dunes.  He  was 
now,  indeed,  in  sole  command,  since  Haggard  had 
been  seriously  wounded  at  noon.  But  he  considered 
he  was  justified  in  sparing  only  two  battalions  in  sup- 
port (6th  Lincolns  and  6th  Borderers,  which,  how- 
ever, belonged  to  the  33rd  Brigade  and  must  have  L^cn 
sent  over  from  Lala  Baba  by  their  Brigadier-General 
Maxwell  under  General  Hammersley's  order).  Even 
these  two  appear  to  have  moved  too  late  to  protect 
the  left  flank,  for  Hill  was  compelled  to  defend  it,  as 
it  was  "  in  air,"  by  deploying  the  5th  Royal  Irish 
Fusiliers  (Colonel  Pike,  an  excellent  officer,  who  was 
with  the  regiment  in  Ladysmith)  and  advancing  them 
so  as  to  face  half-left.  An  increasing  gap  was  thus 
formed  between  left  and  right  as  the  force  slowly 
wheeled  round  the  lake,  and  the  7th  Dublins  had  to  be 
brought  up  to  fill  it. 


3o8  SUVLA  BAY 

As  the  rough  country  in  front  of  Anafarta  plateau 
was  thus  being  crossed,  the  line  was  continually 
harassed  by  an  enfilading  fire  from  swarms  of  snipers 
concealed  in  the  bushes  on  the  left,  as  well  as  by 
copious  shrapnel  and  high  explosives  from  the  hills. 
Contact  mines  also  exploded,  and  a  Taube  dropped 
a  few  bombs.  Fortunately,  about  4  p.m.  a  sudden 
squall  and  shower  of  rain  swept  over  the  bay  and 
plain,  obscuring  the  enemy's  view,  and  refreshing  the 
troops,  who  were  suffering  greatly  from  the  extreme 
heat  and  from  thirst,  though  they  were  passing  close 
to  two  excellent  water-sources,  had  they  but  known 
it.  They  were  much  encouraged  also  by  the  example 
of  their  Brigadier  Hill,  a  man  of  almost  excessive 
indifference  to  personal  danger,  as  I  observed  on 
several  occasions.  By  5  p.m.  they  had  reached  a  line 
within  300  yards  of  Chocolate  Hill,  and  there  they 
lay  down  while  the  ships  and  the  few  batteries  on 
land  bombarded.^ 

The  moment  the  bombardment  ceased,  the  men 

^  The  movements  of  Hill's  battalions,  and  their  relation  to  Sitwell's 
are  difficult  to  follow,  chiefly  owing  to  the  changes  of  command  and  in- 
tention. After  speaking  of  these  changes,  Sir  Ian  in  his  dispatch  con- 
tinues :  "  I  have  failed  in  my  endeavours  to  get  some  live  human  detail 
about  the  fighting  which  followed."  The  detail  has  now  been  largely 
supplied  by  Major  Bryan  Cooper  in  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  in 
Gallipoli,  pp.  127-135.  In  the  main,  I  have  followed  his  account,  the 
chief  outstanding  difficulty  being  the  presence  of  the  6th  Lincoln  and 
6th  Border  Battalions,  which  did  not  belong  to  Sitwell's  or  Haggard's 
Brigades,  but  to  Maxwell's  (the  33rd).  Major  Cooper  says  two  battalions 
of  the  nth  Division  reinforced  Hill's  column,  and  Sir  Ian  mentions 
those  two  as  distinguished  at  the  taking  of  the  hill.  But  how  they  came 
to  be  under  Sitwell's  command,  or  under  Hill's,  is  not  yet  clear.  I  can 
only  suppose  that,  as  Sitwell's  force  could  not  or  did  not  move,  General 
Hammersley  ordered  Maxwell  to  send  them  over  from  Lala  Baba. 
After  Brigadier-General  Haggard  was  wounded,  Colonel  J.  O'B.  Minogue 
(9th  W.  Yorks)  took  temporary  command  of  the  32nd  Brigade. 


CHOCOLATE  HILL  TAKEN  309 

rose  and  charged  up  the  steep  and  bushy  slopes  of 
that  rounded  hill  with  fixed  bayonets.  The  two 
Royal  Irish  Fusilier  battalions  were  on  the  left  (the 
side  of  greatest  danger),  the  Dublins  in  the  centre, 
the  Inniskillings  on  the  right.  The  6th  Lincolns  and 
6th  Borderers  also  came  up  into  line,  and  were  among 
the  first  in  the  charge.  The  hill  was  fortified  by  an 
old  trench  which  ran  completely  round  the  circumfer- 
ence some  yards  below  the  summit.  One  long  com- 
munication trench  afterwards  ran  down  the  saddle  or 
neck  connecting  the  hill  with  "Hill  50"  or  "Green 
Hill "  beyond,  and  probably  followed  the  line  of  an 
old  excavation.  The  Turks  poured  rifle-fire  from  the 
parapets,  and  fought  gallantly  with  bayonets.  But 
they  were  at  last  all  killed  or  chased  away.  Just  as 
the  sun  set  over  the  distant  peaks  of  Samothrace,  the 
summit  was  gained.  If  only  it  had  been  gained  as 
that  sun  rose ! 

The  battalions  spent  the  night  in  sorting  them- 
selves out,  burying  the  dead,  trying  to  collect  the 
wounded  in  the  darkness,  bringing  up  what  supplies 
they  could  find  on  the  beach  (all  of  which  had  to 
be  carried  on  men's  backs),  and,  above  all,  in  the 
endeavour  to  bring  up  water.  A  certain  amount  was 
being  distributed  on  the  beach,  more  than  2  miles  off 
by  the  nearest  way,  which  probably  no  one  could  find 
in  the  dark.  And  every  drop  had  to  be  carried  by 
hand  in  camp  kettles  or  even  in  ammunition  boxes  or 
in  water-bottles  strung  by  the  dozen  round  one  man's 
neck.  The  night  was  thus  occupied,  but  thirst  was 
not  appeased.  Before  sunrise  the  6th  Lincolns  and 
the  6th  Borderers  were  withdrawn  to  rejoin  their  own 
brigade. 


3 to  SUVLA  BAY 

To  return  to  the  remaining  battalions  of  the  loth 
Division.     As  we  have  seen,  the  Divisional  General, 
Sir  Bryan    Mahon,  arrived    from  Mudros  with  only 
three  battalions — the  6th  and  7th  Munster  Fusiliers 
of  the  30th  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  L.  L.  Nicol), 
and  the  5th  Royal  Irish  (Pioneers).      In  addition  he 
was  able  to  retain  the  5th   Inniskilling  Fusiliers  (31st 
Brigade)   before    it   disembarked    with     Hill's    force. 
Orderinsr  it  to  follow,  he  landed  soon  after   11   a.m. 
with  the  three  battalions  among  the  rocks  near  Suvla 
Point,  where    his    men    suffered    much   from  contact 
mines.      He  then  proceeded  to  climb  Karakol  Dagh, 
and  passed  through   the  shattered  companies  of  the 
1 1  th  Manchesters,  who  had  early  occupied  this  part 
of  the  rocky  razor-edge.     Deploying  the  Munsters  in 
two  lines,  he  advanced  to  the  attack  on  Kiretch  Tepe 
Sirt,  the    more   lofty   but   continuous   edge    beyond. 
The  ground  is  very  difficult,  being  a   steep  hillside 
broken    into    rocks    and    craggy    ravines,    the    lower 
slopes  covered  with  high  bush.     The  enemy  delayed 
the    advance    along    the    whole    mountain-side    by 
accurate   and    concealed   fire,   causing  many  wounds 
and  deaths,  especially  among   officers.      It  was  past 
,  .  -  ;et  when  the   attacking    force  of   Munsters,  sup- 
ed    by    the     Royal     Irish,     came    within    about 
ICO  yards  of  the  highest  knoll,  which  the  Turks  held 
strongly.      Here   the    battalions,    wearied    and    tor- 
mented by  thirst,  like  the  whole  army  corps,  lay  for 
the    night.      But   early   next  morning  (August   8),  if 
we  may    anticipate,  the   6th  Munsters  under   Major 
Jephson  took  the  knoll  by  assault.      It  was  afterwards 
always  known  as  Jephson's  Post,  was  strongly  forti- 
fied, and,  but  for  a  few  hours  in  the  next  week,  it 


RESULTS  OF  THE  FIRST  DAY  311 

remained  the    farthest    point    in  our  Hnes  along  the 
north  side  of  the  bay. 

Thus,  on  the  late  evening  of  the  7th,  we  held  the 
bay  and  both  extremities,  the  Salt  Lake,  Hill  10,  a 
point  near  Jephson's  Post  on  the  north,  and  Choco- 
late Hill  on  the  south-east.  We  had  not  even 
attempted  W  Hill,  or  Scimitar  Hill,  or  the  Anafarta 
plateau,  or  the  Tekke  Tepe  mountain,  and  from  all 
those  points  the  bay  was  commanded.  Except  along 
the  shore  we  had  established  no  connection  w^ith 
Anzac,  and  could  give  no  support  at  Sari  Bair.  Still, 
something  had  been  gained.  The  landing  had  been 
effected  punctually  and  with  small  loss.  The  32nd 
and  34th  Brigades  had  certainly  lost  much  time  in 
hanging  about  Hill  10,  as  though  their  work  was 
done.  The  31st  Brigade  had  been  hampered  and 
delayed  by  confused  commands  and  the  varied  posi- 
tions allotted  to  it  apart  from  its  own  Division.  But 
all  seemed  ready  for  the  morrow,  and  with  energy  and 
organisation  all  might  be  retrieved.  Some  battalions 
had  lost  heavily,  but  as  a  whole  the  loss  was  not  great 
— for  so  large  a  movement.  Only  a  little  over  1000 
wounded  were  taken  off  to  the  hospital  ships. 

Front  the  evening  of  August  7  to  the  evening  of 
August  8. 

So  satisfied  was  General  Stopford  with  the  situa- 
tion that  he  telegraphed  to  Sir  Ian  that  in  his  opinion 
Major-General  Hammersley  and  his  troops  deserved 
great  credit  for  the  result  attained.  Anxiously  await- 
ing news  in  General  Headquarters  at  Imbros,  Sir  Ian 
replied    with    congratulations    to    General    Stopford, 


312  SUVLA  BAY 

stating  also  how  much  was  hoped  from  Hammersley's 
bold  and  rapid  advance.  The  message  must  have 
been  prompted  by  Sir  lan's  inborn  optimism  or  by- 
official  courtesy  and  a  desire  to  encourage  action. 
For  even  before  the  telegram  was  sent,  tormenting 
doubts  intruded.  It  was  Sunday  morning.  The 
Wellingtons  and  7th  Gloucesters  had  climbed 
the  shoulder  of  Chunuk  Bair ;  the  4th  Aus- 
tralian Brigade  was  advancing  to  the  assault  up 
Koja  Chemen  Tepe  by  way  of  Abdel  Rahman 
Bair ;  at  Lone  Pine  the  battle  still  raged  desper- 
ately. If  ever  help  from  Suvla  was  called  for, 
it  was  now.  But  from  Suvla  came  only  silence. 
Hardly  a  gun  could  be  heard.  No  further  message 
arrived. 

In  Suvla  Bay  itself  a  Sabbath  peace  appeared  to 
reign.  No  shells  burst;  no  bullets  whined.  It  was 
evident  that  the  Turks  had  withdrawn  both  guns  and 
infantry  during  the  night.  We  could  walk  at  leisure 
round  the  whole  beach  from  Suvla  Point  to  Lala 
Baba.  We  could  examine  the  surface  of  the  Salt 
Lake,  or  climb  Karakol  Dagh  and  view  the  calm 
prospect  over  the  Gulf  of  Xeros  with  equal  security. 
Men  whom  good  fortune  had  stationed  near  the 
beaches  enjoyed  the  enviable  refreshment  of  bathing 
in  the  sandy  shallows.  No  attempt  was  being  made 
seriously  to  push  forward  the  advance,  although  it 
seemed  probable  that  W  Hill,  the  most  vital  point, 
could  have  been  occupied  by  little  more  than  march- 
ing, and  the  distance  even  from  the  beach  was  4  miles 
at  most. 

The  Divisional  Generals  reported  to  the  Corps 
Commander  that  they  were  unable  to  move  owing  to 


FAILURE  OF  WATER  DISTRIBUTION         313 

the  exhaustion  of  their  men.^  Undoubtedly  the  men 
were  exhausted.  The  sea  journey,  the  sleepless 
nights,  the  great  heat,  the  excitement  of  their  first 
battle,  the  toilsome  marching  upon  loose  sand,  and 
the  rations  of  hard  biscuit  and  salt  "bully"  had 
exhausted  them.  The  nth  Division  from  Imbros 
was  also  infected  with  the  prevailing  diarrhoea,  and 
in  a  few  cases  with  dysentery.  But  the  worst 
exhaustion  came  from  thirst.  In  spite  of  all  those 
elaborate  precautions,  the  water  supply  broke  down. 
Plenty  of  water  was  there.  The  water-lighters  had 
arrived  on  the  7th.  One  was  at  A  West ;  one  went 
aground  at  "  Old  A,"  and  men  swam  out  to  her ;  but 
Commodore  Keyes  towed  her  near  enough  ashore  for 
the  hose  to  reach  the  men  that  afternoon.  A  third 
was  on  C  Beach,  and  probably  the  fourth,  for  the 
Krene  had  tugged  in  two,  and  was  there  herself,  her 
stem  on  the  shore.  What  was  wanting  was  not 
water,  but  the  troughs  and  receptacles  for  issuing  and 
distribution.  Men  came  with  nothing  but  water- 
bottles,  sometimes  a  dozen  or  more,  slung  round  their 
necks,  and  went  naked  with  them  into  the  sea  in 
hopes  of  drawing  from  the  tanks.  When  a  hose  was 
attached,  they  pierced  holes  in  the  cover,  and  drank, 
then  leaving  the  water  to  run  waste.  By  Sunday 
morning  a  poor  and  leaking  trough  was  stuck  up  at 
one  point,  but  it  would  not  hold  water,  and  the  men 
and  mules  crowding  round  it  impeded  distribution. 
The  P^'ah  (containing  all  the  requisites  for  supply — 
troughs,  hose,  and  implements  for  well-sinking),  owing 
to  some  over-scrupulous  observance  of  regulations, 
did  not  issue  them  till  some  days  later.     The  anguish 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


314  SUVLA  BAY 

of  thirst  was  intolerable.  Up  in  the  firing  lines  some 
went  almost  mad/  The  suffering  of  the  men  exposed 
to  the  glaring  sun  upon  the  rocks  of  Kiretch  Tepe 
was  most  severe  during  Sunday,  though  it  was  after- 
wards (perhaps  that  night)  relieved  by  the  kindly 
generosity  of  a  destroyer  (the  Wolverine,  Scori)ion, 
or  most  probably  the  Foxhound),  which  was  deputed 
always  to  patrol  that  Gulf  of  Xeros  coast,  and  on  this 
occasion  cut  her  own  water-tank  loose  and  brought 
it  ashore.  Even  on  the  beach,  where  fresh  water 
was  running  to  waste,  men  filled  water-bottles  from 
the  sea.  So  serious  were  the  reports  from  the  front 
that  General  Stopford  ordered  the  disembarkation  of 
the  artillery  horses  to  be  delayed  till  the  mules  for 
carrying  up  water  had  been  landed.^  Thus  one  thing 
acted  upon  another,  for  it  was  want  of  artillery  which 
finally  induced  the  Corps  Commander  to  believe  that 
immediate  advance  was  impossible.  Brigades  and 
even  battalions  were  also  much  confused  and  scattered, 
as  we  have  seen.  But  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  con- 
fusion, and  of  the  failure  in  water  supply,  and  so  of  the 
lack  of  guns,  was  the  decision  to  land  part  of  the  force 
inside  the  bay,  and  at  a  beach  where  any  observer 
might  have  suspected  shallows  fit  only  for  wading.^ 

^  For  an  account  of  the  thirst,  see  Sir  lan's  dispatch  and  The  Tenth 
{Irish)  Division,  pp.  137,  145,  148,  157-158.  Also  Sicvla  Bay  and  After, 
by  Juvenis,  pp.  37,  40-43,  where  the  services  of  the  destroyer  to  the 
loth  Division  are  mentioned. 

2  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 

'  The  water  question  was  much  disputed  at  the  time,  and  many 
contradictory  versions  were  given.  I  have  here  followed  the  account 
given  me  in  recent  (1917)  conversation  by  a  naval  officer  who  was  closely 
connected  with  the  superintendence  of  the  landing.  The  real  causes  of 
the  thirst,  in  any  case,  were  the  want  of  receptacles  and  the  distance 
from  the  firing  line.     As  to  the  failure  at  A  Beach,  it  must  of  course  be 


SIR  IAN  AT  SUVLA  315 

Meantime  Sir  Ian,  growing  continually  more 
impatient  at  the  silence,  resolved  about  noon  to  leave 
his  central  position  at  Imbros  and  investigate  for 
himself  the  situation  of  his  northern  force.  For  some 
unexplained  reason  his  destroyer,  the  Arno,  instead 
of  keeping  steam  always  up,  had  just  had  her  fires 
drawn,  and  could  not  start  till  4  p.m.  During  those 
hours  of  maddening  delay.  Sir  lan's  worst  suspicions 
were  confirmed  by  a  telegram  from  a  General  Staff 
Officer  (Lieut. -Colonel  Aspinall,  a  trustworthy  judge 
of  military  affairs)  "  drawing  attention  to  the  inaction 
of  our  own  troops,  and  to  the  fact  that  golden 
opportunities  were  being  missed."  ^  Arriving  at  Suvla 
at  5  p.m..  Sir  Ian  at  once  visited  General  Stopford  on 
board  the  Jonquil,  where  he  still  kept  his  headquarters 
so  as  to  advise  upon  any  action,  if  any  action  seemed 
advisable.  There  Sir  Ian  heard,  as  he  dreaded  to  hear, 
that  nothing  could  be  done  that  day.  The  exhaustion 
of  the  men,  the  confusion  of  units,  and  other  pleas 
mentioned  above  were  given  as  reasons.  But  the 
deeper  reason  lay  in  comfortable  satisfaction  with 
present  results,  and  in  the  absence  of  inspiring  or 
remorseless  energy.  It  is  an  old  military  principle 
that  "A  General  who  refuses  to  pursue  a  retreating 
enemy  on  the  plea  that  his  troops  are  tired,  should  be 
at  once  relieved  of  his  command."  In  Sir  lan's  own 
words  :  "  Driving  power  was  required,  and  even  a 
certain  ruthlessness,  to  brush  aside  pleas  for  respite 
for  tired  troops.  The  one  fatal  error  was  inertia. 
And  inertia  prevailed." 

remembered  that  the  naval  chart  was  old  and  useless,  and  no  survey  had 
been  possible  without  betraying"  the  point  chosen  for  landing. 
*  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


3i6  SUVLA  BAY 

Finding  it  so,  Sir  Ian,  driven  by  the  extremity  of 
the  crisis,  took  a  step  unusual  in  a  Commander-in- 
Chief.  He  resolved  to  try  what  personal  influence 
he  could  use  upon  the  Divisional  Commanders.  The 
Corps  Commander  raised  no  objection,  and,  accom- 
panied by  Commodore  Roger  Keyes  and  Lieut. - 
Colonel  Aspinall,  Sir  Ian  hastened  to  Major-General 
Hammersley's  headquarters  at  the  foot  of  Lala  Baba. 
He  pointed  out  that  time  above  all  price  was  slipping 
away  unused;  that  "the  sands  were  running  out 
fast " ;  that  information  showed  Turkish  reinforce- 
ments already  approaching.  General  Hammersley 
replied  that  his  force  was  much  scattered ;  it  was 
impossible  to  get  orders  for  a  night  attack  round  to 
the  battalions  ;  and  that  a  general  attack  was  arranged 
for  the  early  morning.  He  admitted,  however,  that 
the  32nd  Brigade  (formerly  under  Haggard,  who  was 
wounded  on  the  previous  day,  and  now  under  Colonel 
Minogue)  was  more  or  less  concentrated  and  could 
move.  His  General  Staff  Officer,  Colonel  Neil 
Malcolm,  an  experienced  soldier,  confirmed  this 
opinion,  and  Sir  Ian  took  the  further  unusual  step  of 
directly  ordering  this  brigade  or  any  force,  even  if  it 
were  only  a  company,  to  advance  at  once  without 
waiting  for  the  morning's  general  attack.  Their 
objective  was  to  be  the  high  ground  rising  towards 
Tekke  Tepe  on  the  north  of  Anafarta  Sagir.  They 
were  to  act  as  the  advance  guard  to  the  attack. 

It  was  now  6  p.m.  In  ignorance.  Sir  Ian  had 
given  an  order  destined  to  entail  disaster.  It  appears 
almost  certain  that  neither  General  Hammersley  nor 
his  Chief  of  Staff  knew  exactly  where  the  battalions 
of  the  32nd  Brigade  stood  at  the  time.     Otherwise 


POSITION   OF   32ND   BRIGADE,   EVENING,   AUGUST   8 


To  Jace  p.  316 


SCIMITAR  HILL  ABANDONED  317 

they  must  have  informed  Sir  Ian  that,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  one  of  the  battaHons  (the  6th  East  York 
Pioneers)  had  advanced  that  day,  had  occupied 
Hill  70  (Scimitar  Hill),  and  were  at  that  moment 
in  position  there — Scimitar  Hill,  next  to  W  Hill  the 
most  vital  of  all  the  semicircle  of  heights  overlooking 
the  bay !  A  battalion  had  occupied  it  that  Sunday 
without  a  blow,  and  were  there  only  waiting  for  the 
brigade's  further  advance  upon  W  Hill  or  Anafarta 
Sagir,  to  both  of  which  it  is  the  key.  Lieut. -Colonel 
Moore,  in  command  of  that  battalion,  had  even  sent 
out  three  officers'  patrols,  one  of  which  actually 
reached  the  top  of  Tekke  Tepe,  another  the  out- 
skirts of  Anafarta  Sagir,  the  third  a  point  near 
Abrikja,  all  without  serious  opposition.  But  no  one 
in  high  authority  appears  to  have  known  of  these 
movements.  In  consequence  of  this  ignorance,  the 
Divisional  General,  instead  of  leaving  the  selection  of 
battalions  to  the  Brigadier,  named  the  6th  East  York 
Pioneers  as  the  battalion  to  lead  the  advance,  believ- 
ing it  to  be  the  freshest  and  least  tried.  Colonel 
Minogue  obeyed  and  ordered  the  battalion  to  rejoin 
the  brigade  concentrated  at  Sulajik.  Colonel  Moore, 
commanding  the  6th  East  Yorks,  obeyed  also,  but  did 
not  receive  the  order  till  3  a.m.  of  the  9th.  He  then 
withdrew  his  tired  and  sleepless  battalion  to  Sulajik. 
Without  a  blow,  Scimitar  Hill  was  abandoned.  It 
was  one  of  those  apparently  casual  misfortunes  which 
throughout  the  campaign  balked  the  fairest  hopes 
just  at  the  moment  of  victory,  as  though  an  evil  and 
ironic  destiny  mocked  at  the  best-laid  schemes. 

Having  heard  from  General  Hammersley  that  the 
water  supply  was  now  arranged  and  the  troops  rested, 


3i8  SUVLA  BAY 

Sir  Ian  returned  to  the  Arno  and  remained  on  board 
that  night  in  the  bay.  Hearing  no  sound  of  fighting, 
he  assumed  that  the  brigade  had  accompHshed  its  task 
and  estabHshed  itself  on  the  slopes  of  Tekke  Tepe 
overlooking  Anafarta,  without  opposition/ 

From  the  evening  of  August  8  to  the  evening  of 
the  gth. 

Unfortunately,  Sir  lan's  assumption  was  ground- 
less. The  32nd  Brigade  was  far  from  being  concen- 
trated as  was  supposed  by  the  Divisional  General. 
One  battalion,  as  we  have  just  seen,  was  actually  on 
Scimitar  Hill.  The  9th  West  Yorks  were  half-way 
up  the  Anafarta  Ridge,  and  they  tried  to  advance 
before  dawn,  but  were  driven  back  by  the  enemy's 
reinforcements,  thus  proving  that  the  intended  morn- 
ing attack  would  have  been  dangerously  late  in  any 
case.  The  remainder  were  among  the  trees  near  the 
farm  Sulajik,  where  there  was  water.  Verbal  orders 
reached  them  at  7.30  p.m.,  but  no  definite  written 
orders  arrived  till  nearly  3  a.m.  The  mistakes  ap- 
pear to  have  been  due  to  bad  Staff  work.  Instead  of 
beginning  at  eight  on  Sunday  evening,  as  Sir  Ian 
intended,  the  movement  did  not  start  till  4  a.m.  on 
Monday.     Then  the  brigade  attacked  the  steep  slope 

^  So  as  not  to  interrupt  the  narrative,  one  is  obliged  to  mention  only 
in  a  note  the  remarkable  achievement  of  our  submarines  on  this  critical 
and  unfortunate  day.  In  order  to  help  E14,  vi^hich  was  already  in  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  Eii  had  forced  her  way  through  the  nets  in  the 
Straits,  and  on  the  8th  torpedoed  a  Turkish  warship  coming  down  to- 
wards Maidos  with  reinforcements.  Both  submarines  joined  in  shelling 
the  road  crossing  Bulair,  while,  on  the  west  side  of  that  isthmus, 
destroyers  kept  a  similar  check  upon  the  movement  of  Turkish  troops. 


THE  TURKS  RETURN  REINFORCED         319 

leading  up  to  Anafarta.  It  is  covered  with  thick  and 
high  bush,  up  which  men  can  advance  only  in  single 
file  along  the  cattle-tracks.  On  their  right,  Scimitar 
Hill  had  been  abandoned,  only  to  be  occupied  now  by 
swarms  of  Turkish  snipers  and  troops  in  formation, 
which  were  coming  up  in  strong  reinforcement.  On 
their  left,  one  company  of  the  6th  East  Yorks  (the 
selfsame  battalion  which  had  occupied  Scimitar  Hill) 
succeeded  in  reachinof  that  isolated  offshoot  from 
Tekke  Tepe  above  mentioned.  But  the  brigade 
retired  to  the  line  of  Sulajik.  The  losses  were  heavy, 
chiefly  among  the  Royal  Engineers,  one  company  of 
whom  (the  67th)  accompanied  the  brigade.  Colonel 
Moore  of  the  6th  East  Yorks  (Pioneers),  who  had 
shown  such  grasp  of  the  situation,  was  killed. 

As  day  advanced,  the  position  only  grew  worse. 
It  was  the  morning  when  the  party  of  Lancastrians 
and  Gurkhas  reached  the  summit  near  Hill  Q  and 
stared  upon  the  Dardanelles  below.  As  at  Chunuk 
Bair,  so  at  Suvla,  the  Turks  were  rushing  up  reinforce- 
ments. Three  Divisions,  starting  from  Bulair,  were 
beginning  to  debouch  along  the  valley  between  the 
two  Anafartas,  and  to  crowd  the  heights.  Perceiving 
our  inactivity  or  hesitation  throughout  the  previous 
day  (Sunday),  they  now  brought  back  the  guns  they 
had  removed  on  Saturday  night,  and  increased  the 
number.  Hill's  31st  Brigade,  and  that  General  him- 
self, were  still  on  Chocolate  Hill,  but  Maxwell's  33rd 
Brigade  had  now  arrived  there  in  full,  and  the  orders 
for  the  morning  attack  devolved  upon  him.  On  the 
right  he  pushed  forward  three  battalions  of  his  own 
33rd  Brigade,  which  made  fair  progress.  Some  of 
the   leading  troops  were  reported  as  even  reaching 


320  SUVLA  BAY 

W  Hill,  but  that  appeared  to  me  very  doubtful,  as  I 
watched  the  movements  all  day  from  a  machine-gun 
emplacement  near  the  top  of  Chocolate  Hill.  In  the 
centre  Brigadier-General  Maxwell  ordered  part  of  the 
32nd  Brigade  to  advance  again,  reinforced  by  two  of 
the  loth  Division  battalions  under  Hill  (6th  Royal  Irish 
Fusiliers  and  6th  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers).  Their  objec- 
tive was  Scimitar  Hill — that  hill  which  had  been  quietly 
occupied  and  quietly  abandoned  only  the  day  before ! 
On  the  left  the  line  was  extended  by  the  6th  Lincolns 
(33rd  Brigade)  and  the  whole  of  the  34th  Brigade,  which 
had  moved  from  the  sand  dunes  near  Hill  10  at  last,  and 
arrived  in  two  detachments.  Beyond  them  were  two 
battalions  from  the  53rd  (Welsh)  Division,  which  had 
been  held  by  Sir  Ian  as  part  of  his  special  reserve,  and 
was  being  thrown  into  Suvla  early  that  morning. 

Partly  owing  to  the  mixture  of  brigades,  the 
attack  went  to  pieces.  There  was  little  combination, 
and  no  cohesion.  Battalions  advanced  separately 
here  and  there,  and  separately  came  back.  Two  or 
three  times  one  or  other  of  them  (especially  the  two 
battalions  of  Hill's  brigade)  came  close  to  the  summit 
of  Scimitar  Hill  and  seemed  likely  to  hold  on.  But 
every  hour  the  enemy's  fire  increased  in  intensity. 
Shrapnel  burst  low  over  us,  and  with  deadly  effect. 
The  men  of  the  32nd  Brigade  were  much  shaken  by 
their  experience  and  heavy  losses  in  the  early  morn- 
ing. All  were  much  exhausted.  Fire  broke  out  on 
the  left  side  of  the  hill  itself,  and  swept  over  the  front 
and  summit,  consuming  the  dry  scrub  in  sheets  of 
flame.  The  wounded,  both  British  and  Turk,  came 
creeping  out  on  hands  and  knees  to  seek  safety  upon 
that    yellow    open    space    or    "  blaze "    which,    as    I 


OUR  ADVANCE  CHECKED  321 

mentioned,  gave  the  name  of  "  Scimitar  "  to  the  hill. 
But  many  perished  from  suffocation  and  the  extreme 
heat.  Many  also  were  burnt  alive,  being  unable  to 
move.  Except  a  few  isolated  parties,  which  bravely 
endeavoured  to  hold  their  ground,  the  firing  lines  and 
supports  came  swarming  back.  It  was  no  wonder. 
The  situation  was  intolerable.  The  most  hardened 
Regulars  could  not  have  endured  it,  and  hardly  any 
of  these  officers  and  men  of  the  New  Army  had 
known  fighting  before.  At  length  they  were  formed 
up  into  a  confused  line  along  the  ditches  and  shallow 
trenches  between  the  Sulajik  and  Green  Hill.  It 
was  about  noon. 

From  Chocolate  Hill  General  Maxwell  ordered 
the  battalions  to  be  reorganised  at  once  for  another 
attack,  but  reorganisation  was  impossible.  One  of 
the  wells,  which  in  the  early  morning  I  had  found 
safe,  was  now  exposed  to  almost  continuous  rifle-fire. 
The  usual  scenes  of  a  battlefield  added  to  the  distress 
and  alarm.  The  dead  were  lying  about ;  the  wounded 
crying  for  help  ;  the  hands  and  faces  of  hastily  buried 
men  protruded  from  the  ground.  The  6th  Lincolns 
and  6th  Borderers,  posted  on  either  flank,  were  men- 
tioned for  "steady  and  gallant  behaviour"  during  this 
ordeal.  The  i/ist  Hereford  Battalion  of  the  newly 
landed  53rd  Division  was  also  mentioned.  But  no 
further  movement  was  attempted.  Walking  back 
to  Lala  Baba  towards  evening,  I  was  asked  to  re- 
port to  General  Hammersley  in  his  headquarters 
there,  but  could  report  little  good.  I  found,  however, 
that  he  had  now  three  R.F.A.  batteries  in  position 
behind  the  seaward  slope  of  Lala  Baba,  and  three 
batteries  of  mountain-guns  ashore,  some  of  the  guns 

21 


322  SUVLA  BAY 

beinof  dose  behind  the  summit  of  the  hill.  The  war- 
ships  were  also  firing  at  intervals  upon  W  Hill  and 
the  farthest  points  of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt. 

Along  that  razor-edge    or    whale-back  ridge,  Sir 
Bryan    Mahon    had   now    firmly   established   himself 
with  the  few  battalions  left  to  his   command  out  of 
the   loth  Division.     Near  the  sea-end  of  the  ridge, 
about   three-quarters   of    a   mile   from   Suvla    Point, 
General  Stopford  was  engaged  upon  the  construction 
of  a   permanent   Corps   Headquarters  in  a  partially 
sheltered  depression  among  the  rocks.     Having  visited 
him  there  in  the  morning,  Sir  Ian  climbed  along  the 
ridge  to  Mahon's  headquarters  among  the  stones  close 
behind  his  firing  line.     He  found  that  General  con- 
fident of  carrying  the  whole  summit  of  Kiretch  Tepe, 
and  it  was  probably  whilst  on    that  point  of  widely 
commanding   view    over   the    whole    plain    to    Koja 
Chemen  Tepe  and  the  Anzac  heights  that  Sir  Ian 
resolved  to  press  forward   the    attack  upon  the  left, 
since  the  advance  upon  W  Hill  and  Anafarta  Sagir 
was  obviously  now    impeded.      If  Mahon's  Division 
could  fight  its  way  along  the  ridge  to  Ejelmer  Bay, 
and  fresh  troops  could  win  the  line  from  Ejelmer  Bay 
over  Kavak  and  Tekke  Tepes  to  Anafarta  Sagir,  not 
only  would  Suvla  remain  safe  from  interference  on 
that  side,  but  the  Turkish  reinforcements  on  W  Hill 
and  Scimitar  Hill  would  be  paralysed  by  the  threat 
from  their  right,  and  rendered  incapable  of  advancing 
farther  towards  the  sea. 

In  the  afternoon  Sir  Ian  went  to  Anzac  with 
Commodore  Keyes,  and,  after  consultation  with 
Generals  Birdwood  and  Godley,  telephoned  to  General 
Stopford,   urging   upon    him    the    importance  of  im- 


RENEWED  ATTACK  ON  SCIMITAR  HILL     323 

mediately  seizing  Kavak  Tepe  and  the  rest  of  the 
Ejelmer-Anafarta  Hne,  which  an  aeroplane  reported 
as  still  unoccupied  and  unentrenched.  At  the  same 
time  he  determined  to  devote  to  this  purpose  the 
last  of  his  own  reserve — the  54th  (East  Anglian) 
Division,  which,  however,  like  the  53rd,  consisted  of 
infantry  only,  and  those  little  over  half  strength.  The 
battle  to  hold  the  summit  just  south  of  Chunuk  Bair 
was  raging  at  the  time.  It  is  possible  that  reinforce- 
ment by  a  new  Division  might  have  made  all  the 
difference  there.  But  to  supply  water  up  those 
heights  was  difficult,  as  we  noticed  in  the  last  chapter, 
and  the  Generals  on  the  spot  considered  there  was 
scarcely  room  for  more  troops  in  the  ravines  and  up 
the  ridges.  So  to  Suvla  the  54th  Division  was 
ordered  to  follow  the  53rd,  and  Sir  Ian  was  left 
without  reserve.  The  new  Division  was  to  arrive  on 
the  next  day  but  one,  the  i  ith. 

Fi^077t  the  evening  of  Attgiist  9  to  the  evening 
of  the  loth. 

General  Stopford,  however,  was  naturally  still 
anxious  to  retrieve  the  check  suffered  by  General 
Hammersley's  command,  and  indeed  W  Hill  was  still 
the  most  vital  and  threatening  point  upon  the  encom- 
passing heights.  He,  therefore,  determined  to  renew 
the  attack  upon  Scimitar  Hill  and  the  more  open 
field  country  between  it  and  W  Hill,  around  the 
Abrikja  farm.  For  this  task  he  allotted  nine  battalions 
of  the  53rd  Division  (Major-General  Lindley),  sup- 
ported by  two  battalions  of  the  nth  Division  on 
each  flank.     The   result  was   more  lamentable  even 


324  SUVLA  BAY 

than  the  failure  of  the  previous  day.  The  troops 
of  the  53rd  Division  set  off  about  six  a.m.  across 
the  Salt  Lake.  The  Turkish  shrapnel  and  rifle- 
fire  poured  upon  them  as  they  advanced,  and  only 
increased  at  the  foot  of  Scimitar  Hill.  To  watch 
parties  of  them  attempting  to  steal  up  sheltered 
portions  of  the  hill  was  a  piteous  sight.  The  cover 
was  much  reduced,  because  the  ground  was  now  black 
with  burning,  and  most  of  the  bushes  gone.  Many 
fell  on  all  sides.  The  corner  of  a  small  wheatfield 
near  Abrikja  was  fringed  with  dead  who  looked  like 
a  company  lying  down  in  the  shade.  One  saw  many 
deeds  of  courage  among  officers  and  men. 

Backwards  and  forwards,  the  fighting  went  on 
all  morning,  but  without  result.  In  the  evening  the 
battalions  were  withdrawn  to  their  original  lines,  only 
more  confused,  more  disheartened,  and  fewer  in 
numbers.  Generals  Maxwell  and  Hill  remained  on 
Chocolate  Hill  that  day.  Hill's  brigade  was  chiefly 
occupied  in  holding  Green  Hill  just  in  front  of  the 
other,  and  we  were  much  exposed  to  shrapnel  there, 
as  the  trenches  were  incomplete.  That  evening, 
however,  the  withdrawal  of  Hill's  five  battalions  in 
turn  began.  They  were  allowed  rest  and  the  joy 
of  bathing  on  the  beach  till  the  13th  (Friday),  when 
they  rejoined  their  own  loth  Division  upon  Kiretch 
Tepe  Sirt.^ 

On  this  day,  the  10th,  Chunuk  Bair  was  lost,  and 
the  chance  of  advance  from  Suvla  was  almost  orone. 
It  was  the  saddest  day  in  the  record  of  the  expedition. 
Sir  Ian  telegraphed  to  General  Stopford,  ordering 
him  not  to  risk  the  proposed  renewal  of  the  attacks 

^  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  pp.  1 58-161. 


THE  LAST  RESERVE  LANDED  325 

with  tired  and  disintegrated  troops,  but  to  consolidate 
the  Hne  from  the  Asmak  Dere  past  the  front  of 
Chocolate  Hill  through  Sulajik  to  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt. 


From  the  evening  of  August  10  to  the  evening 
of  the  1 1  th. 

It  was  indeed  time  that  the  line  was  consolidated. 
During  the  night  and  early  morning,  the  54th  (East 
Anglian)  Division  was  being  landed  on  the  new  A 
Beaches  near  Suvla  Point/  They  formed,  as  has 
been  noticed,  Sir  lan's  last  reserve,  and  were  com- 
manded by  Major-General  F.  S.  Inglefield,  a  stalwart 
and  experienced  soldier,  who  had  seen  service  in 
South  Africa  and  had  commanded  this  Territorial 
Division  for  two  years,  but  was  already  sixty.  As  in 
the  case  of  the  53rd  (Welsh)  Division,  some  of  the 
best  battalions  had  been  taken  for  France,  and  others 
suddenly  inserted  without  knowledge  of  him  or  of  the 
other  battalions,  so  that  the  essential  bond  of  the 
Territorial  spirit  was  severed.  The  landing  of  some 
10,000  or  12,000  inexperienced  Territorials  ignorant 
of  cohesion  was  inevitably  a  confused  business,  though 
only  the  infantry  had  been  sent.  But  that  would  not 
have  mattered  if  the  confusion  upon  the  front  lines 
had  not  been  far  worse.  There  the  condition  was 
indeed  deplorable.     Along  the  most  critical  part  of 

^  One  of  these  was  called  A  East,  the  other  A  West.  Between  them 
was  Kangaroo  Beach,  where  the  Australian  Bridging  Train  built  a  land- 
ing-stage. They  also  built  a  very  useful  little  pier  close  to  the  "  cut " 
into  the  Salt  Lake,  chiefly  for  the  service  of  the  wounded  being  taken 
off"  to  hospital  ships.  Of  the  Suvla  beaches  A  West  was  the  most 
generally  used,  though  a  small  harbour  was  afterwards  blasted  out  of 
the  rocks  at  the  extreme  point. 


326  SUVLA  BAY 

the  line,  between  Green  Hill  and  Sulajik,  battalions 
and  brigades  were  hopelessly  mixed  together.  The 
men  had  lost  sight  of  their  officers  and  their  units. 
They  lay  in  any  ditch  or  cover  they  could  find. 
Here  and  there  a  party  dug  trenches  or  improved  the 
trenches  dug  at  night.  But  theirs  was  not  the  spirit 
of  victory.  One  of  the  bridged  fountains  was  now 
almost  deserted,  as  it  came  under  fire  from  snipers  or 
from  the  troops  on  Scimitar  Hill.  But  round  the 
other,  which  was  concealed  among  large  trees,  the 
men  still  swarmed.  In  consequence,  there  was  much 
delay  and  much  waste  of  the  plentiful  water,  nor  did 
any  attempts  to  get  them  into  file,  so  that  each  might 
take  his  turn,  avail  for  long. 

There  was  no  help  for  it.  The  only  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  pull  out  the  battalions  gradually  and 
reorganise.  It  was  now  Wednesday,  and  so  far  as 
action  went  the  day  was  wasted,  as  Sunday  had  been, 
though  there  was  better  reason  for  the  waste. 


Fro7n  the  evening  of  August  1 1  to  the  evening 
of  the  \2th. 

That  evening  Sir  Ian  again  sailed  over  to  Suvla 
with  the  object  of  urging  forward  his  project  for  the 
occupation  of  the  Kavak  Tepe  and  Tekke  Tepe 
heights  before  the  Turkish  reinforcements  could 
arrive  and  entrench  there.  He  had  expected  the 
54th  Division  to  start  at  once  upon  a  night  march, 
so  as  to  make  the  ascent  at  dawn,  while  the  53rd 
Division  stood  in  reserve.  But  General  Stopford 
raised  objections,  foresaw  difficulties,  and  asked  for 
at  least  twenty-four   hours'  delay.      He    hoped    that 


THE  5th  NORFOLKS  DISAPPEAR  327 

by  that  time  the  53rd  Division  would  have  been 
reorganised  sufficiently  to  clear  the  way  for  the 
passage  of  the  54th  through  the  jungly,  tree-covered 
ground  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain. 

Unfortunately,  even  this  hope  was  disappointed. 
Though  the  54th   Division  had  not  come  under  fire 
at  all,  the  Brigadiers  in  both  Divisions  reported  that 
they    were    not   yet    ready  for  the   attack.     General 
Inglefield,  however,   was  able  to   send    forward    one 
brigade  in  advance.      It  was  the    163rd   (Brigadier- 
General  F.  F.  W.  Daniell),  consisting  of  the  4th  and 
5th    Norfolks  and    the  5th   and   loth  Bedfordshires. 
The  advance  began  in  the  afternoon,  and  the  brigade 
reached    the  farm  called    Anafarta  Ova,  though  the 
enemy's   opposition    steadily  increased    as  the  forest 
and  bush  became  thicker.     Then  occurred  one  of  the 
minor    but  startling  tragedies  of  the  war.     The  5th 
Norfolks,  on  the  right  of  the  brigade,   were  led   by 
Colonel    Sir    Horace    Beauchamp,  a  bold    and    self- 
confident    cavalry    officer,  who    had  commanded  the 
20th   Hussars,  and  seen  hard  service  in  Egypt,  the 
Soudan,  and  South  Africa.      In  the  army  he  had  been 
known   as    "  The    Bo'sun "    owing    to    his   love   and 
knowledge    of    the    sea.^     Perhaps   inspired    by    old 
memories,  perhaps  hoping  to  inspire  Territorials  also 
with  the  tradition  of  Regulars,  or  to  show  the  Generals 
what  this  Division  could  do  under  dashing  leadership, 
he  led  his    battalion  rapidly  forward    in  advance    of 
the  brigade.      He  was  last  seen  among  the  scattered 
outbuildings    of  the    farm,  carrying  a  cane  and    en- 
couraging   his    men    to    follow.     They   reached    the 
rising  ground  from  which  the  steep  front  of  Tekke 

^  The  "  Times^'  History  of  the  IVar,  chap.  cxii.  p.  198. 


328  SUVLA  BAY 

Tepe  springs.  Whether  Colonel  Beauchamp  intended 
to  carry  the  mountain  unassisted,  or  to  secure  the 
edge  of  the  Anafarta  plateau  to  his  right  front,  cannot 
be  known.  The  bush  grew  thicker ;  the  battalion 
lost  formation ;  the  enemy's  fire  increased ;  many 
stragglers  turned  back  and  reached  the  Division 
during  the  night. 

*' But,"  in  Sir  lan's  words,  "the  Colonel,  with 
1 6  officers  and  250  men,  still  kept  pushing  on,  driv- 
ing the  enemy  before  him.  Amongst  those  ardent 
souls  was  part  of  a  fine  company  enlisted  from  the 
King's  Sandringham  estates.  Nothing  more  was 
ever  seen  or  heard  of  any  of  them.  They  charged 
into  the  forest,  and  were  lost  to  sight  or  sound.  Not 
one  of  them  ever  came  back." 

One  cannot  doubt  that  their  bones  lie  among  the 
trees  and  bushes  at  the  foot  of  that  dark  and  ominous 
hill  and  the  last  real  hope  of  Suvla  Bay  faded  with 
their  tragic  disappearance. 

In  spite  of  all  discouragement.  Sir  lan's  mind  was 
still  set  on  securing  a  further  advance  by  the  occupa- 
tion of  Kavak  and  Tekke  Tepes.  He  agreed  to  the 
postponement  of  attack  for  another  twenty-four  hours, 
and  it  was  arranged  for  the  night  and  morning  of 
August  13-14.  But  on  the  afternoon  of  the  13th 
(Friday),  on  returning  to  Suvla  with  Major-General 
Braithwaite,  his  Chief  of  Staff,  he  found  that  General 
Stopford  still  raised  objections.  Two  out  of  his  four 
Divisional  Generals  despaired  of  success.  The  line, 
he  considered,  was  already  too  long  for  his  troops. 
Some  of  the  brigades  were  still  disorganised  and 
shaken.  Finding  that  this  temper  of  uncertainty  and 
depression  prevailed,   Sir   Ian   could  do  nothing  but 


THE  10th  division  ON  AUGUST  15  329 

cancel  the  scheme  of  attack,  and  order  the  IXth 
Corps  to  reorganise  and  consoHdate  a  Hne  as  far 
forward  as  possible. 

One  further  effort  was,  however,  made  on  Sunday, 
August  15,  when  General  Stopford  called  upon  the 
Irish  loth  Division  to  advance  along  the  Kiretch 
Tepe  Sirt  in  the  direction  of  Ejelmer  Bay.  The 
two  brigades  now  under  Sir  Bryan  Mahon  advanced 
along  the  lofty  ridge,  part  along  the  summit,  the  rest 
strung  out  down  the  steep  slope  towards  the  sea. 
The  brigades  were  the  30th  (Nicol's)  and  31st  (Hill's). 
On  the  reverse  or  southern  slope  the  162nd  (De 
Winton's)  Brigade,  54th  Division,  advanced  through 
thick  bushes  and  deep  ravines  in  support.  An 
unusual  amount  of  artillery  was  employed.  The  15th 
Heavy  Battery  had  arrived  a  few  days  before.  The 
58th  Brigade  R.F.A.  (loth  Division)  had  marched 
along  the  coast  from  Anzac  with  safety,  and  all  these 
guns  were  engaged,  besides  a  mountain  battery,  some 
machine-guns,  and  the  guns  of  the  destroyers  Gram- 
pus  and  Foxhound,  firing  from  the  Gulf  of  Xeros. 
But  in  spite  of  this  support  the  advance  moved  very 
slowly.  It  started  about  noon,  and  crept  bit  by  bit 
along  the  "whale-back,"  a  good  line  being  kept  from 
the  summit  down  to  the  sea,  but  halts  frequent,  and 
progress  difficult.  The  ground  was  all  rocky,  and 
most  of  it  covered  with  prickly  scrub,  burnt  in  parts. 
The  summit  was  bare  rock,  and  the  distance  to  be 
traversed  under  fire  about  a  mile  and  a  half.  A 
prisoner  told  us  the  Turks  had  six  fresh  battalions  in 
line  or  in  strongly  fortified  redoubts,  each  battalion 
provided  with  twelve  machine-guns.  That  may  be 
exaggerated,  but  the    machine-guns    were   numerous 


330  SUVLA  BAY 

and  deadly.  Soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  general 
advance,  Major  Jephson  was  mortally  wounded  upon 
the  Post  which  he  had  originally  won  and  which 
always  bore  his  name. 

Meantime,  the  5th  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  supported 
by  the  6th,  had  been  extended  over  the  southern  slope 
in  front  of  the  162nd  Brigade.  Here  the  difficulties 
of  advance  were  even  greater,  owing  to  the  tangle  of 
very  thick  and  lofty  bush,  the  steep  gullies,  the  in- 
ability of  the  naval  guns  to  afford  assistance,  and  the 
deadly  fire  from  the  long  Turkish  trench  running 
down  the  slope  in  front,  as  well  as  from  the  guns  on 
the  Anafarta  and  W  Hills.  Having  left  the  summit, 
I  happened  to  be  with  this  part  of  the  attack  soon 
after  five  o'clock,  and  found  the  men  broken  up  into 
small  groups  by  the  impenetrable  bush.  Their  loss, 
especially  in  officers,  was  very  heavy.  Again  and 
again  the  groups  attempted  to  combine  and  advance, 
but  were  driven  back  by  the  storm  of  fire.  Progress 
on  that  side  was  impossible.  Whether  the  162nd 
Brigade  came  up  to  support  the  attack  one  could  not 
say,  as  the  view  was  impeded  by  the  bushes,  and  the 
men  widely  scattered. 

Suddenly,  hearing  a  yell  of  shouting  on  our  left,  I 
looked  up  to  the  summit,  and  saw  a  body  of  men 
charging  along  it  with  flashing  bayonets.  Others, 
standing  up  on  higher  ground  behind  them,  were 
pouring  out  a  rapid  magazine  fire.  Two  companies 
of  the  6th  Munsters  and  two  of  the  6th  Dublins  had 
worked  half-way  along  the  edge  between  Jephson's 
Post  and  the  Pimple.  The  remaining  250  yards  they 
now  covered  with  a  charge,  cheering  as  they  ran. 
Some    Turks    met  bayonet  with  bayonet,  and  died. 


FAILURE  TO  ADVANCE  ON  KIRETCH  TEPE    331 

Some  threw  up  their  hands.  Most  ran.  One  could 
see  them  scurrying  back  along  the  ridge  and  down 
the  southern  slope.  The  Irish  pursued  them  through 
the  Pimple  redoubt  and  beyond.      It  was  six  o'clock.^ 

In  the  gathering  darkness  the  men  attempted  to 
build  small  sangars  of  the  rocks,  but  no  real  trench- 
ing was  possible.  They  lay  out  in  lines  along  the 
seaward  slope  just  below  the  summit.  Then  the 
failure  to  win  the  southern  slope  was  bitterly  felt. 
Twice  in  the  night  the  Turks  counter-attacked, 
creeping  along  that  landward  side,  and,  for  the  first 
attack,  rushing  over  the  top,  only  to  be  cut  down 
by  rifle  and  bayonet.  In  the  attack  just  before  dawn 
they  trusted  chiefly  to  a  deadly  form  of  round  bomb, 
which  they  lobbed  over  the  crest  in  vast  numbers. 
The  Irish  could  only  reply  with  improvised  jam-pot 
bombs,  and  few  of  those.  Sometimes,  however,  they 
caught  the  Turkish  bombs  and  flung  them  back. 
Private  Wilkin,  of  the  7th  Dublins,  flung  back  five, 
but  was  blown  to  pieces  by  the  sixth. 

So  the  harassing  conflict  continued.  It  continued 
all  next  day  under  the  burning  sun.  The  loss  was 
extreme.  Many  of  the  very  best  officers  fell.  The 
5th  and  6th  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers  were  almost  exter- 
minated. During  the  night  of  the  1 6th- 17th  the 
shattered  brigades  were  withdrawn  from  the  untenable 
position.  It  was  never  recovered.  Jephson's  Post 
and  the  steep  slopes  leading  down  on  either  side, 
one  to  the  sea,  the  other  to  the  plain,  remained  the 
farthest  points  held  by  our  lines  along  the  Kiretch 
Tepe  Sirt. 

^  A  detailed  account  of  this  small  but  gallant  action  is  given  in  The 
Tenth  {Irish)  Division  in  Gallipoli,  pp.  1 61- 180. 


332  SUVLA  BAY 

This  attack  of  August  15  was  General  Stopford's 
last  order.  That  evening  he  gave  up  the  command 
of  the  IXth  Corps,  and  Major-General  De  Lisle  took 
his  place,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Major-General 
Julian  Byng.  Brigadier-General  H.  L.  Reed,  how- 
ever, remained  as  Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Corps. 
Meantime,  in  place  of  De  Lisle,  Major-General 
W.  R.  Marshall  (87th  Brigade)  took  command  of 
the  29th  Division.  A  few  days  later,  Major-General 
Lindley  (at  his  own  request)  gave  up  the  command 
of  the  53rd  (Welsh)  Division,  and  was  appointed  to 
the  military  command  at  Mudros.  Major-General 
Hammersley  retired  from  command  of  the  nth  Divi- 
sion owing  to  serious  illness.  The  same  cause  unfor- 
tunately removed  Major-General  F.  C.  Shaw  from 
the  13th  (Western)  Division,  which  he  had  com- 
manded with  such  skill  and  firmness  during  the 
assault  on  Sari  Bair.  Brigadier-General  Sitwell 
was  succeeded  in  command  of*  the  34th  Brigade  by 
Brigadier-General  J.  Hill.  Soon  afterwards  the 
command  of  the  31st  Brigade  was  taken  over  by 
Lieut.-Colonel  J.  G.  King-King  in  place  of  Brigadier- 
General  F.  F.  Hill,  who  fell  seriously  ill.  It  became 
known  that,  besides  General  Julian  Byng,  Major- 
General  E.  A.  Fanshawe  and  Major-General  F. 
Stanley  Maude  (afterwards  the  hero  of  Bagdad)  were 
coming  out. 


CHAPTER   XIII 
THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

THE  great  assault  of  the  second  week  in 
August,  extending  from  Lone  Pine  to 
Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt,  and  having  the  mountain 
height  of  Chunuk  Bair  as  the  centre  of  its  line,  must 
be  described  as  a  failure.  It  failed  of  its  objects — 
the  objects  of  the  whole  military  campaign — to  open 
the  Straits  for  the  fleet,  to  secure  the  possession  of 
Constantinople,  to  hold  all  the  Balkan  States  steady 
for  our  Alliance,  to  complete  the  blockade  of  the 
Central  Powers  by  land  and  sea,  to  divert  any  possible 
threat  towards  Egypt,  or  towards  the  Persian  Gulf, 
and  so  to  hasten  the  termination  of  the  war.  The 
aim  of  this  fine  strategical  conception  was  not  accom- 
plished, and  the  causes  of  failure  have  been  suggested 
in  the  narrative  of  the  three  preceding  chapters. 
Incidents  and  accidents  contributed — the  gallant  but 
hopeless  attempt  to  cross  the  Nek  in  face  of  the 
Chessboard  redoubt,  the  gallant  but  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  hold  the  summits  at  Chunuk  Bair  and 
"  Hill  Q,"  the  error  of  Baldwin's  brigade,  the  con- 
fusion of  the  landing  inside  Suvla  Bay,  the  separation 
of  the  units  in  the  loth  Division,  the  immobility  of 
the  nth  Division  on  August  7  and  8,  the  break- 
down of  the  water  supply  through  want  of  receptacles, 

333 


334  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

the  unwitting  recall  of  a  battalion  from  Scimitar 
Hill  on  the  evening  of  Sunday  the  8th,  and  the 
apparent  failure  of  the  Higher  Command  at  Suvla 
to  realise  the  vital  necessity  of  speed  and  energy, 
no  matter  at  what  cost,  during  the  four  critical  days 
from  the  morning  of  the  7th  to  the  evening  of  the 
loth. 

But  at  the  back  of  all  these  causes  of  failure  lay 
the  ultimate  reason  that  many  of  the  troops  employed, 
especially  at  Suvla,  were  not  strong  or  experienced 
enough  for  the  difficult  task  of  attacking  an  enemy 
posted  in  the  most  favourable  positions  for  defence, 
over  an  unknown,  complicated,  and  deserted  country, 
and  in  unaccustomed  conditions  of  intense  heat  and 
insatiable  thirst.  Few  in  the  New  Army  or  Territorial 
Divisions  were  acquainted  with  the  realities  of  war  ; 
few  had  been  exposed  to  its  sudden  and  overwhelm- 
ing perils.  They  had  neither  the  traditions,  nor  the 
veteran  experience,  nor  the  disciplined  self-confidence 
of  the  Regular  Army.  They  had  neither  the  physique, 
nor  the  adventurous  spirit,  nor  the  intense  national 
bond  of  the  Anzacs.  What  they  might  have  done 
under  more  decisive  or  youthful  or  inspiring  leader- 
ship we  can  judge  only  from  their  subsequent  rapid 
improvement  even  upon  the  Peninsula,  and  from  their 
excellent  service  in  later  campaigns — such  service  as 
was  performed  in  Palestine  by  these  Territorial 
Divisions.  But  in  August  19 15  their  leadership 
was  not  conspicuously  decisive,  youthful,  or  inspiring. 
And  so  it  came  about  that  General  Stopford  suffered 
the  worst  fate  which  can  befall  a  commanding  officer 
in  the  field. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  gain  had  been  consider- 


GAINS  AND  FAILURES  335 

able.  The  important,  though  not  vital  positions  of 
the  Vineyard  at  Helles,  and  Lone  Pine  on  the  right 
front  at  Anzac,  had  been  won.  In  the  centre,  the 
Anzac  Corps  were  relieved  from  an  arduous,  if  not 
untenable,  situation.  It  could  now  move  freely  over 
a  widely  extended  ground ;  many  points  formerly 
harassed  by  the  enemy's  guns  and  snipers  were  now 
secure  ;  water-springs  had  been  gained  ;  and  the  lines 
were  drawn  three  or  four  miles  nearer  the  summits 
of  Sari  Bair,  On  the  left,  Suvla  Bay  afforded  a 
more  sheltered  winter  roadstead  than  Kephalos,  The 
lofty  ridge  of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt  was  ours  to  the 
summit,  and  the  wide  plain  around  the  Salt  Lake, 
including  Chocolate  and  Green  Hills,  was  ours  also. 
We  held  the  entrance  of  the  broad  valley  leading  up 
to  Biyuk  Anafarta,  and,  but  for  the  risk  from  occa- 
sional snipers,  communication  with  Anzac  was  freely 
open.^  To  these  great  advantages  must  be  added 
the  heavy  losses  inflicted  upon  the  Turks — losses, 
however,  which  were  counterbalanced  by  our  own, 
and  could  be  more  speedily  replaced. 

The  immediate  weakness  of  our  position  was  due 
to  the  enemy's  continued  occupation  of  the  heights 
in  the  range  of  varied  mountain  and  plateau  from 
Ejelmer  Bay  to  W  Hill;  for  guns  on  those  heights 
commanded  the  greater  part  of  the  Salt  Lake  plain 
and  the  positions  round  the  bay,  especially  on  the 
north  side,  where  our  main  landing-places  and  head- 
quarters were  situated.     Another  weakness  was  the 

^  The  daring  of  the  Turkish  snipers,  who  crept  across  our  lines  at 
night  and  perched  in  the  small  trees,  was  proved  when,  on  September  8, 
General  Inglefield's  horse  was  shot  under  him  as  he  rode  along  the 
beach  from  Anzac. 


336  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

enemy's  occupation  of  Hill  60  (Kaiajik  Aghala), 
which  faces  W  Hill  across  the  Biyuk  Anafarta  valley 
and  commanded  the  approach  to  the  upper  reaches, 
as  well  as  threatening  the  communication  between 
Anzac  and  Suvla.  Reckoning  up  the  advantages 
gained,  and  refusing  to  be  discouraged  by  the  ill- 
success  of  his  main  design.  Sir  Ian  resolved  at 
once  to  remove  these  causes  of  weakness  by  a 
renewal  of  the  combined  attack.  It  was  probable 
also  that,  if  the  reinforced  Turkish  Army  were 
allowed  to  remain  undisturbed,  it  would  assume 
a  violent  offensive,  especially  directed  against 
Suvla, 

The  losses  during  the  second  week  in  August 
had  been  serious — not  less  than  30,000  on  all  three 
fronts  together.  Sir  Ian  estimated  his  total  force  at 
95,000  in  the  middle  of  August  (40,000,  including 
17,000  French  troops,  at  Helles  ;  25,000  at  Anzac; 
under  30,000  at  Suvla).^  But  this  was  a  sanguine 
estimate.  The  real  fighting  strength  of  the  British 
and  Anzac  troops  was  probably  not  over  60,000, 
and  of  the  French  about  15,000.  The  British  Divi- 
sions alone  were  short  by  nearly  1500  officers.  On 
August  16  he  telegraphed  to  Lord  Kitchener  stating 
that  45,000  rifles  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the  British  Divi- 
sions, and  50,000  rifles  as  fresh  reinforcements,  were 
essential  for  a  quick  and  victorious  decision.^  Un- 
fortunately, as  it  now  appears,  the  great  strategic  and 
political  conception  of  the  Dardanelles  had  now  less 
support  than  ever  in  the  Cabinet.  The  fall  of 
Warsaw  {August  4)  had  destroyed  the  last  hope 
of     Russian    co-operation.       The    influence    of    the 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch.  *  Ibi4^ 


ADEQUATE  REINFORCEMENTS  REFUSED     337 

"Westerners"  was  supreme.  The  attempt  to  break 
through  the  German  line  at  Loos  in  September  was 
already  in  preparation,  and  all  available  forces  were 
concentrated  upon  that.  By  various  means,  an 
increasingly  despondent  or  hostile  criticism  of  the 
Gallipoli  campaign  was  insinuated  throughout  the 
country,  and  Sir  lan's  request  for  further  assistance 
was  refused.  The  hesitating  Cabinet  may  have 
hoped  that,  if  the  Western  offensive  succeeded,  the 
Dardanelles  campaign,  after  remaining  suspended  for 
two  or  three  months,  might  then  be  pushed  forward 
again  without  loss  of  opportunity.  If  that  was  their 
expectation,  they  had  forgotten  Napoleon's  maxim, 
that  war  is  like  a  woman  in  that,  if  once  you  miss 
your  opportunity,  you  need  never  expect  to  find  either 
war  or  woman  the  same  again. 

All  the  reinforcement  allowed  for  the  moment  was 
the  2nd  Mounted  Division  from  Egypt,  where  it  had 
been  in  training  since  April.  This  Division  of  four 
brigades,  numbering  just  under  5000  men,  was  com- 
posed of  Yeomanry  regiments  from  the  Midland  and 
Southern  counties.  The  men  were  of  singularly  fine 
physique,  accustomed  to  hunting,  and  well  trained  in 
cavalry  manoeuvres.  But,  like  all  "  mounted  "  forces 
on  the  Peninsula,  they  left  their  horses  in  Egypt  and 
fought  on  foot.  They  were  under  the  command  of 
Major-General  William  Peyton,  a  cavalry  officer,  who 
had  served  with  distinction  in  Egypt  and  South 
Africa,  and  was  now  about  fifty. ^  His  Brigadiers 
and  regimental  officers  were  also  cavalrymen  of  dis- 
tinction,   and,    so    far  as    its    numbers   allowed,    the 

^  In  the  spring  of  1916,  General  Peyton  commanded  the  successful 
expedition  against  the  Senussi,  west  of  Egypt. 
22 


338  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

Division  could    be  counted    upon   to  strengthen  any 
attack/ 

But,  however  excellent  in  itself,  the  Mounted 
Division  was  not  numerous  enough  to  give  stability 
to  the  Suvla  Divisions,  most  of  which  were  still 
fatigued  and  disheartened  by  the  ill  success  of  their 
first  attempts  at  warfare.^  In  the  hope  of  affording 
the  much-needed  stiffening  to  the  IXth  Corps,  Major- 
General  De  Lisle,  accordingly,  was  instructed  to 
bring  the  three  brigades  of  his  own  29th  Division 
round  from  Helles  by  night,  and  land  them  at  Suvla 
for  the  attack.  They  were  under  the  command  of 
their  next  senior  officer,  Major-General  W.  R. 
Marshall  of  the  87th  Brigade.  De  Lisle  himself, 
being  in  temporary  command  of  the  IXth  Corps, 
directed  the  whole  action.  His  scheme  was  very 
simple.       On   his    right,   the   nth    Division    was    to 

1  The  brigades  were  composed  as  follows  : 

(i)  IJ/  South  Afz(^/a«(^  (Brigadier-General  Wiggin) — 

Warwickshire  and  Worcestershire  Yeomanry,  Gloucester- 
shire Hussars. 

(2)  znd  South  Midland  {?>x\%?idi\^x-Gt.'s\&x'aS.  Lord  Longford) — 

Bucks  Hussars,  Berks  and  Dorset  Yeomanry. 

(3)  North  Midland  (Brigadier-General  F.  A.  Kenna,  V.C.)— 

Derbyshire  Yeomanry,  Sherwood   Rangers,  South  Notts 
Hussars. 

(4)  London  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Scatters  Wilson) — 

City  of  London  Roughriders,  ist  County  of  London  Middle- 
sex Hussars,  3rd  County  of  London  Sharpshooters. 
Divisional  Cavalry — 

Westminster  Dragoons,  Herts  Yeomanry. 

2  The  two  brigades  (30th  and  31st)  of  the  loth  Division,  at  Suvla, 
having  lost  nearly  three-quarters  of  their  officers  and  half  the  men,  were 
withdrawn  to  rest  near  Suvla  Beach  on  August  17,  and  on  August  22 
General  F.  F.  Hill,  the  trusted  Brigadier  of  the  31st,  was  invalided  away 
with  dysentery.  As  previously  noticed,  he  was  succeeded  in  command 
by  Brigadier-General  J.  G.  King-King,  General  Staff  Officer  (i).—  r/;^ 
Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  p.  208. 


THE  ASSAULT  OF  AUGUST  21  339 

assault  the  trenches  which  the  Turks  had  now  dug 
across  the  Biyuk  Anafarta  valley  or  plain,  south  and 
a  little  east  of  Chocolate  and  Green  Hills,  and  so  to 
protect  the  right  flank  until  the  moment  came  for  a 
general  attack  upon  W  Hill,  the  ultimate  objective 
of  the  whole  movement.  On  his  centre,  the  29th 
Division  was  to  storm  Scimitar  Hill,  the  possession 
of  which,  as  before  explained,  was  essential  to  any 
advance  against  W  Hill  itself.  To  his  left,  the  long 
line  from  Sulajik  Farm  across  the  wooded  plain  up  to 
the  summit  of  Kiretch  Tepe  was  held  by  the  two 
Territorial  Divisions,  the  53rd  and  54th,  so  as  to 
check  any  attempt  to  turn  the  flank  on  that  side  by 
getting  behind  our  attacking  force.  Chocolate  Hill, 
1000  yards  from  the  summit  of  Scimitar  Hill,  was  the 
centre  of  our  advance,  and  on  the  night  of  August 
20-21  the  29th  Division  entered  the  trenches  close 
to  the  left  of  that  hill,  the  nth  Division  stretching 
down  the  slope  and  into  the  plain  on  the  right. 

The  action  was  to  open  with  the  customary  bom- 
bardment, intended  to  shatter  the  enemy's  trenches 
and  shake  his  confidence.  For  this,  three  cruisers 
were  available,  and  on  land  the  IXth  Corps'  artillery 
now  counted  two  R.F.A.  Brigades  (short  of  horses), 
two  heavy  batteries,  two  mountain  batteries,  and  two 
batteries  of  5-inch  howitzers.^  For  an  Army  Corps 
of  nominally  six  Divisions  the  number  of  guns  was 
absurdly  small.  But  as  the  front  to  be  attacked 
measured  only  a  mile,  it  was  hoped  the  bombardment 
would  be  effective.  Unfortunately,  even  this  hope 
was  frustrated  by  a  condition  which  could  not  be  fore- 
seen. Usually,  in  the  afternoon,  the  prospect  from 
^  The  "  Times''''  History  of  the  tVar,  Part  84,  p.  205. 


340  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

Suvla  towards  the  hills  is  brilliantly  clear.  The 
whole  range  stands  visible  in  every  detail.  The 
westering  sun  appears  to  reveal  every  kink  and 
cranny,  every  tree  and  mass  of  bush.  Even  as  far 
away  as  Sari  Bair,  the  rocks  of  Koja  Chemen  ravine, 
the  "chimney"  down  the  face  of  Chunuk  Bair,  and 
the  yellow  patch  of  the  Farm  are  distinct  in  the  clear 
air  and  sunlight.  For  this  reason  the  afternoon  had 
been  chosen  for  attack,  the  sun  being  then  behind  us, 
but  glaring,  as  might  be  hoped,  in  the  enemy's  eyes. 
But  that  day  it  so  happened  that  the  whole  country 
was  covered  with  a  thin  grey  mist,  as  on  an  October 
morning  in  England.  From  the  sea,  the  hills  were 
dim.  From  the  front,  all  details  were  obscured. 
Sir  Ian,  who  had  come  over  from  Imbros,  wished  to 
postpone  the  attack,  and  prudence  might  have  been 
wise  for  once.  But  he  tells  us  that  "  various  reasons  " 
which  remain  unknown,  but  were  perhaps  concerned 
with  the  presence  of  the  29th  Division  in  the  Suvla 
sphere,  made  postponement  impossible. 

Accordingly,  at  2.45  a  violent  bombardment 
began,  directed  upon  Scimitar  and  W  Hills.  It  was 
a  terrific  sight.  Our  large  shells  flung  up  great 
spouts  and  fountains  of  earth  and  stones,  so  that  the 
summits  smoked  with  repeated  eruption.  At  the 
same  time,  the  air  was  full  of  the  white  balls  of 
bursting  shrapnel.  But  the  Turks  could  answer  now. 
At  first  they  directed  their  shrapnel  and  high  ex- 
plosives upon  Chocolate  Hill,  where  we  had  twenty- 
eight  machine-guns  in  position.  Besides  the  guns  on 
W  Hill,  the  Turks  now  had  guns  concealed  some- 
where on  the  Anafarta  plateau  or  on  the  foot-hills  of 
Tekke  Tepe,  whence  they  could  bring  a  converging 


lO.ooo 


500  Yards 


J L 


SCALE 


Yards.  W?o 


To  face  p.  341 


CoKIbliss  ia  NUtRBS, 
ATTACK  OF    IITH   DIVISION,   AUGUST  21 


MISTAKES  IN  ADVANCE  ON  RIGHT  341 

fire  to  bear.  Their  bombardment  of  our  position  was 
very  heavy.  The  shells  tore  at  our  parapets.  The 
air  above  our  trenches  hissed  with  bullets  and 
fragments.  Many  of  us  were  struck.  But  at  3.15 
our  infantry  began  to  advance.^ 

On    the    right    the    34th     Brigade    (now   under 
Brigadier-General     J.      Hill)    advanced    successfully 
across  the  narrow  front  of  plain   between  the  small 
farms  of  Hetman  Chair  and  Aire  Kavak  (a  quarter- 
mile   south    of  Hetman).      They  took    the    trenches 
on    the  plain   without    great    loss.       But    the    32nd 
Brigade  (now  under  Lieut. -Colonel  J.  T,  R.  Wilson), 
which    was    to    have    kept    in    touch    with    them   at 
Hetman    Chair,  and    to    have   seized  a   long  trench 
running  thence  towards  W   Hill,  lost  direction   and 
kept  edging  off  to  their  left  or  north-east,  instead  of 
due  east.     The  plain  is  open  but  for  a  sprinkling  of 
small   trees,  and  the  mist  was  not  thick   enough  to 
confuse.      They    may   have   been    attracted    by    the 
chance  of  cover  among  the  slopes  leading  up  to  the 
hills   on  their  left,  and   the  fire  from  the  long  com- 
munication   trench    was    certainly    very   severe.       It 
was  still  more  unfortunate  that  when  the  33rd  Brigade 
(Maxwell's)  was  sent  up  to  capture  the  trench  at  all 
costs,  they  "fell  into  precisely  the  same  error,"  as  we 
are  told.      Some  of  the  brigade  followed    the  32nd 

^  It  was  unfortunate  that,  standing  beside  a  machine-gun  at  the  front 
parapet  of  Chocolate  Hill,  I  was  just  at  that  moment  struck  on  the  head 
by  shrapnel,  and  so  was  unable  to  witness  the  confused  advance  which 
led  to  the  failure.  By  the  time  I  returned  to  my  position  at  4.1^,  the 
mistake  had  been  made.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  medically  interesting 
that  for  the  previous  forty-eight  hours  I  had  been  suffering  from  high 
fever,  but  the  violent  rush  of  blood  from  the  wound  appeared  to  reduce 
the  temperature,  and  at  night  I  walked  to  the  dressing-station  at  Suvla 
Point  in  perfect  health,  except  for  mere  pain  and  exhaustion. 


342  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

to  the  left ;  some  edged  away  to  their  right  in  the 
direction  of  Susuk  Kuyu,  which  must  have  taken 
them  behind  the  34th  Brigade,  almost  into  the  Anzac 
country.  But  as  we  are  further  told  that  the  32nd, 
though  without  success,  attempted  to  rectify  the  error 
by  bravely  attacking  the  trench  from  the  north-east, 
the  solution  remains  uncertain/  The  attack  on  that 
side  did  not  develop  further.  After  4.30  p.m.  one 
could  perceive  that  the  battalions  were  confused,  and 
still  suffering  heavily  both  from  that  long  and  loop- 
holed  trench  which  ran  across  the  open  almost 
diagonally  to  their  right  flank,  and  from  most 
formidable  trenches  which  the  Turks  had  now 
visibly  constructed  right  across  the  sombre  face  of 
W  Hill,  against  which  they  showed  up  as  lines  of 
whitish  grey,  loopholed  also  and  roofed  with  head- 
cover.  Parties  tried  to  press  forward  here  and  there, 
and  the  dead  lay  scattered.  Two  stretcher-bearers 
I  saw  quiedy  going  up  a  slope  under  very  heavy 
fire,  when  both  fell  dead  simultaneously,  dropping 
on  hands  and  knees,  so  that  the  stretcher  remained 
supported  on  their  shoulders  after  they  were  dead. 
But  no  individual  courage  could  retrieve  the  error 
of  direction.  On  the  right  we  had  gained  one  trench 
and  about  300  yards,  but  we  gained  no  more. 

The  attack  in  the  centre  suffered  from  the  mistake. 
The  29th  Division  now  contained  far  less  than  half  of 
the  troops  who  landed  in  April.  Few  indeed  of  their 
original  officers  were  left,  few  of  the  trusted  sergeants 
and  corporals  whom  they  knew.  They  had  been 
brought  hurriedly  into  the  midst  of  an  unknown 
scene,  and  found  themselves  included  between  lines 

S'Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


THE  29th  division  IN  THE  CENTRE        343 

of  unknown  and  untried  battalions.  Their  former 
General  was  gone.  His  successor  was  compelled  to 
remain  in  the  Corps  Headquarters  far  away  on 
Karakol  Dagh.  The  Division  was  commanded  by 
the  CO.  of  a  brigade.  None  the  less,  this  indomi- 
table Division,  in  this  its  last  battle  upon  the  Peninsula, 
displayed  to  the  last  the  indomitable  spirit  habitual  to 
its  nature,  and  fought  with  the  same  proud  self-sacrifice 
and  confident  enthusiasm  as  had  distinguished  it  at  the 
landing. 

Between  3.30  and  4,  the  87th  Brigade  (2nd  South 
Wales  Borderers,  istK.O.S.B.,  ist  Royal  Inniskilling 
Fusiliers,  and  ist  Border  Regiment)  advanced  from 
our  front  trenches,  and  began  working  up  through 
the  bush  on  the  left  front  of  Scimitar  Hill.  At  first 
they  were  partially  concealed  by  the  thickets  or 
covered  by  dead  ground  in  ravines.  Reaching  the 
top  of  the  slope,  they  charged  forward  to  the  summit. 
The  Inniskillings,  who  were  leading,  actually  gained 
it.  They  drove  the  Turks  back  along  the  communi- 
cation trenches  towards  Anafarta  Sagir.  They  even 
pursued  them  down  the  reverse  slope,  which  is  not 
steep  but  runs  without  much  fall  toward  the  village 
plateau.  For  a  few  minutes  the  Hill  was  ours.  But 
still  stronger  trenches  had  been  constructed  on  the 
edge  of  the  plateau  beyond.  They  were  invisible 
from  the  ascent  to  Scimitar  Hill ;  but  from  Chocolate 
Hill  we  could  see  fire  flashing  from  them,  and  Turks 
springing  on  to  the  parapets  to  pour  bullets  upon  our 
scattered  line  as  it  advanced.  At  the  same  time  the 
enemy's  guns  on  W  Hill  and  on  the  concealed  point 
near  the  foot  of  Tekke  Tepe  hurled  a  storm  of  in- 
cessant shrapnel  over   the  summit  of  Scimitar  Hill 


344  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

and  all  its  slopes.  The  converging  fire  was  intoler- 
able. Unless  help  came  speedily,  the  position  could 
not  be  held.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  help  could 
have  retained  the  hold.      But  none  came. 

On   the  right  of  the  hill   the  86th  Brigade  (2nd 
Royal  Fusiliers,  ist  Lancashire  Fusiliers,  ist  Munster 
Fusiliers,  and   ist  Dublin  Fusiliers)  was  intended  to 
storm  the  position  in  a  similar  manner  from  that  side. 
But   as    they    advanced    they    found    their    progress 
hindered  by  battalions  of  the  32nd  and  33rd  Brigades, 
which,  as  narrated  above,  had  edged  off  to  their  left 
instead  of   keeping   their  direction   straight  forward 
and  working  on  parallel  lines  with  the  29th  Division. 
Battalions  in  the  three  brigades  thus  converged  and 
became  confused.     The  men  were  mixed  up  in   the 
shallow  valley  beyond  Green  Hill  and  upon  the  south- 
west   slopes    of   Scimitar    Hill.       Instead    of    being 
covered  by  the  nth  Division  as  intended,  the  right 
flank  of  the  29th  Division  was  hampered  and  almost 
paralysed.      Such  battalions  as   got   clear  attempted 
to  work  up  that  side  of  the  hill,  turning  north-east. 
But  the   confusion   was    increased   by  a  raging  fire, 
which  with  lono-  tongfues  of  flame  consumed  what  was 
left  of  the  bush  around   the  base  of  the  hill  already 
called    "  Burnt,"  and   entirely  shut   off  co-operation 
with  the  87th  Brigade  on  the  left.     Such  parties  as 
reached  the  broad  bare  patch  of  ravine  from  which 
the  other  name  of  "Scimitar"  was  derived,  became 
at  once  exposed  to  the  storm  of  shrapnel  and  rifle- 
fire.      Sir    Ian   in   his    dispatch   says,    "The    leading 
troops  were  simply  swept  off  the  top  of  the  spur,  and 
had  to  fall  back  to  a  ledge  south-west  of  Scimitar  Hill, 
where  they  found  a  little  cover."     If  the  "top  of  the 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  YEOMANRY  345 

spur"  means  the  summit  of  the  hill,  it  is  certain  that 
none  of  this  brigade  ever  reached  it.  The  Innis- 
killings  were  the  only  men  who  occupied  it  even  for 
a  time. 

About  five  o'clock    the  Yeomanry  Division   was 
ordered   to  advance   from   the  cover  of  Lala   Baba, 
where  it  had  remained  in  reserve,  and  to  take  up  its 
position  under  the  slighter  cover  of  Chocolate  Hill. 
In  extended  order  the  small  brigades,  each  numbering 
about  350,  advanced  with  the  steadiness  and  regu- 
larity  of  parade  across   the   bare  and  fully  exposed 
level  of  the  Salt  Lake.     Some  of  the  enemy's  guns 
diverted  their  fire  from  Scimitar  Hill   and  showered 
shrapnel  over  the  slowly  moving   lines.      But    their 
regularity  was  exactly  maintained,  and  owing  to  the 
accurate  distance  kept  in  the  intervals  the  loss  was 
small.      Only    too    eager    to    reach    the   firing    line, 
they   forced  their  way  through   the  reserves   of  the 
nth  Division  around  the  slopes  on  the  left  side  of 
Chocolate  Hill,  and  plunged  into  the  brigades  at  the 
centre  of  the  lines,  already  so   much  confused  and 
embarrassed.     There  was  much  delay,  and  in  places 
the  crowding  troops  exposed  themselves  unnecessarily 
to  heavy  fire.      But  the  2nd  South  Midland  Brigade 
(Bucks,    Berks,    and    Dorsets)    concentrated,   as   was 
intended,  behind   Chocolate    Hill    itself,   and  was  at 
last  able  to  advance  with  fair  cohesion.     Very  slowly 
the  men  made  their  way  across  our  trenches  to  the 
left  front  of  the   hill,  and  through  the   difficult  and 
intricate  ground  beyond,  still  swept  by  the  flames  of 
the  burning  bushes,  and   encumbered   by  groups   of 
men  who  had  lost  leadership.      It  was  past  seven  by 
the  time  they  reached  the  foot  of  the  main  ascent, 


346  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

and  began  to  work  their  way  up  through  fire  and 
smoke  and  shrapnel. 

At  7.30,  through  the  gathering  obscurity  of  mists 
and  evening,  we  from  the  parapet  in  front  of  Choco- 
late Hill  dimly  discerned  a  crowd  of  khaki  figures 
struggling  at  full  speed  up  that  broad,  bare  patch 
of  the  "  Scimitar."  They  seemed  to  gain  the  summit, 
and  then  darkness  covered  them.  All  thought  the 
terrible  position  was  won  at  last,  and  though  there 
was  no  cheering,  and  hardly  a  word  was  said,  all  felt 
the  joy  of  hope  renewed.  We  did  not  know  the  hope 
was  disappointed  as  soon  as  raised.  The  cross-fire  of 
shrapnel,  machine-guns,  and  rifles  from  the  two 
hidden  trenches  beyond  the  summit,  swept  off  the 
Yeomanry  as  it  had  swept  off  the  87th  Brigade  at  an 
earlier  hour.  Hearing  that  the  position  was  utterly 
untenable,  General  Marshall  was  compelled  to  order 
a  withdrawal  to  the  original  line,  and  in  the  darkness 
the  sorely  tried  and  exhausted  men  came  back.  One 
regiment,  working  round  the  right  of  the  hill  later  in 
the  evening,  gained  a  knoll  between  Scimitar  and 
W  Hills,  apparently  near  the  Abrikja  Farm,  and 
reported  they  had  taken  W  Hill  itself.  When  the 
mistake  was  discovered,  they  also  were  withdrawn, 
for  in  daylight  they  would  have  been  exterminated 
there.^ 

This  unsuccessful  attempt  to  capture  the  hill  so 
ominously  known  as  "Scimitar,"  and  occupied,  it 
may  be  remembered,  without  opposition  by  a  single 
battalion  on  Sunday  evening,  August  8,  cost  little 
less  than  5000  casualties.  Most  of  the  loss  fell  on 
the    29th    Division,    but   the   Yeomanry   lost    nearly 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


FAILURE  AT  SCIMITAR  HILL  347 

1000  of  their  small  force,  and  among  the  killed  were 
Brigadier-General  F.  A.  Kenna,  V.C.  (formerly  of 
the  2 1  St  Lancers),  Brigadier-General  the  Earl  of 
Longford  (formerly  of  the  2nd  Life  Guards),  whose 
body  was  never  found,  and  Sir  John  Milbanke,  V.C. 
(formerly  of  the  loth  Hussars),  commanding  the 
Sherwood  Rangers.^  The  failure  of  the  attempt  had 
proved  that  even  when  acting  in  combination  with 
the  finest  Regulars,  inexperienced  and  untried 
brigades  cannot  be  hurried  into  the  firing  lines  of 
an  important  attack  without  risk  of  confusion  or 
collapse.  For  neither  in  officers  nor  in  men  had  the 
sense  of  leadership,  confidence,  or  even  of  direction 
been  trained  into  an  instinct  strong  enough  to  bear 


^  As  usual  throughout  this  history,  I  have  found  it  impossible  to 
record  the  countless  instances  of  individual  bravery,  but  I  may  mention 
the  case  of  Captain  O'Sullivan  (ist  Inniskilling  Fusiliers).  Early  in 
July,  describing  one  of  the  actions  at  Helles,  Sir  Ian  had  written  : 
"A  young  fellow  called  O'SuUivan,  in  the  Inniskilling  Fusiliers,  led  a 
bombing  party  into  one  end  of  an  enemy  trench,  and  cleared  it  of  the 
enemy.  The  Turks  counter-attacked  with  bombs,  and  drove  him  and 
his  men  out  with  a  good  deal  of  loss.  Again  he  cleared  the  trench, 
filling  his  pockets  and  belt  with  bombs.  Again  he  was  driven  back. 
A  third  time  he  led  the  attack,  and  this  time  the  trench  was  held  and 
remains  in  our  possession.  Within  an  hour  of  this  last  feat  of  arms,  a 
trench  was  lost  to  the  right  in  prolongation  of  the  Inniskilling  Fusiliers. 
This  same  young  fellow,  who  had  already  gone  through  enough  to 
shake  the  nerves  of  the  most  veteran  soldiers,  led  his  company  down 
into  the  trench  himself,  running  along  a  few  yards  ahead  of  them  out 
on  the  parapet,  exposed  to  a  tremendous  musketry  fire,  chucking  bombs 
into  the  trench  just  in  front  of  the  leading  files,  so  as  to  clear  the  way 
for  them.  There  is  a  limit  to  luck,  and  this  time  he  was  wounded,  but 
I  hope  he  may  pull  through."  He  pulled  through,  and  on  August  21 
twice  led  his  company  up  against  the  Turkish  trenches  on  Scimitar  Hill, 
and  twice  was  driven  back.  Collecting  the  men  in  a  little  hollow  of  the 
ground,  he  said,  "  Now  I  depend  on  you,  my  lads,  and  we'll  just  have 
one  more  charge  for  the  honour  of  the  regiment."  He  led  them  all  by 
a  clear  20  yards  up  the  hill,  leapt  into  the  trench,  and  there  died. 


348  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

the  strain  of   the  shocks   and    confused    impressions 
inevitable  to  a  violently  opposed  advance. 

On  the  south  or  Anzac  side  of  the  broad  valley- 
leading  up  to    Biyuk   Anafarta,   the    action    was    far 
more  successful.     The  main  object  in  this  region  was 
to  secure  complete  possession  of  the  Kaiajik  Aghala, 
that  rough  and  intersected  ridge  partly  occupied  by 
the    4th     Australian     Infantry    Brigade    during    the 
general  attack    upon    Sari    Bair   a   fortnight   earlier. 
That  brigade,  reduced  to  some   1500  men,  now  held 
a  position  separated  by  a  deep  creek  from  the  main 
ridge,  the  whole  of  which,  and  especially  the  broad 
and  flattish  eminence  at  the  northern  extremity,  had 
been  occupied  by  the  Turks  and   strongly   fortified. 
The  white  lines  of  their  trenches  were  visible  from 
Suvla  and  the  whole  district,  the  earth  being  whitish 
there,  as  though  mixed  with  chalk.     The  eminence, 
which  we  knew  as  Hill  60,  was  chequered  with  these 
lines,  and  resembled  the  back  of  a  large  tortoise  with 
the  markings  picked  out  in  white.      It  was,  indeed, 
converted  into  a  fortress  commanding;  the  broad  and 
flattish  valley  between  it  and  W  Hill  about  one  and  a 
half  miles  away.     As  before  explained,  the  possession 
of  Hill  60  was  essential  for  the  security  of  communi- 
cation  between   Anzac  and   Suvla.      If  W    Hill  had 
been    occupied,    Biyuk    Anafarta    and    the    northern 
approaches  to  Koja  Chemen  Tepe  would  also  have 
lain  open. 

Only  a  short  distance  west  of  Hill  60,  just  where 
the  ridge  begins  to  rise  from  the  plain,  two  wells 
called  Kabak  (or  Kaba)  Kuyu  are  situated,  equally 
desirable  to  the  enemy  and  to  ourselves.  These  also 
the  Turks  had  strongly  fortified,  and  our  first  stroke 


ATTACK  ON  KABAK  KUYU  WELLS  349 

was  to  seize  them.  Major-General  Sir  Herbert  Cox, 
who  was  in  command  of  the  whole  movement,  had  at 
his  disposal  his  own  Indian  Brigade,  two  regiments 
(Canterbury  and  Otago)  of  New  Zealand  Mounted 
Rifles,  a  mixed  force  of  the  4th  Australian  Infantry 
Brigade,  the  4th  South  Wales  Borderers  (40th 
Brigade,  13th  Division),  the  5th  Connaught  Rangers, 
and  the  loth  Hampshires  (both  of  the  29th  Brigade, 
loth  Division,  now  under  Lieut.-Colonel  Agnew)/ 
His  guns  were  commanded  by  Brigadier-General 
Napier  Johnston.  He  arranged  his  line  so  as  to  have 
the  5th  Gurkhas  in  the  open  ground  on  his  extreme 
left,  guarding  the  communication  with  Suvla,  the 
Connaught  Rangers  in  the  centre  opposite  the  wells, 
the  New  Zealanders  under  Brigadier-General  Russell 
to  the  right  of  them,  the  Hampshires  in  support  of 
the  Australians  who  attacked  on  the  right,  and  the 
remainder  in  reserve.  After  a  preliminary  but  in- 
sufficient bombardment,  the  advance  began  about  3.30 
p.m.  on  August  21,  almost  exactly  at  the  same  time  as 
the  attack  upon  Scimitar  Hill  across  the  broad  valley. 
The  moment  the  guns  ceased,  the  Connaught 
Rangers,  who  were  finely  commanded  throughout  by 
Lieut.-Colonel  Jourdain,  issued  from  a  ravine  in  the 
maze  of  Damakjelik  Hill,  where  they  had  lain 
concealed  all  day.  "  With  a  yell  like  hounds 
breaking  covert,"  they  dashed  forward  by  platoons 
in  line.  They  had  nearly  400  yards  to  run,  and  the 
ground  was  open.  A  terrible  fire  from  the  parapets 
around  the  wells  and  from  the  slopes  of  Hill  60  itself 
met  them  at  once.     Without  firing  a  shot  in  answer, 

^  Brigadier-General  R.  S.  Vandeleur  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
this  brigade  on  September  22. 


3  so  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

they  charged  forward  with  bayonets  level.  It  was  a 
race  which  a  young  officer  won — an  International 
football  player  for  Ireland.  The  Turks  stood  the 
wild  onset,  but  not  for  long.  In  a  few  minutes 
they  had  died  or  escaped ;  the  wells  were  ours,  the 
communications  cleared.  A  reserve  company  charged 
still  farther  forward  to  assist  the  New  Zealanders  at 
the  foot  of  Hill  60,  but  was  almost  exterminated.^ 
The  remainder  became  scattered  in  the  confusion  of 
the  assault,  lost  direction,  and  were  not  re-formed  till 
nightfall. 

To  the  right  of  the  Connaught  Rangers,  the  New 
Zealanders  issued  at  the  same  time  from  the  almost 
inextricable  gullies  of  the  Damakjelik,  but  between 
them  and  Hill  60  ran  a  singularly  deep  ravine,  one 
of  the  branches  of  the  Kaiajik  Dere.  In  climbing 
down  the  steep  side  of  this  ravine,  entangled  in 
prickly  bushes,  many  fell  to  the  bullets  poured  from 
the  opposite  trenches,  and  the  bodies  of  many  who 
fell  there  could  not  be  recovered  for  burial.  The 
only  chance  for  safety  was  to  rush  down  to  the 
bottom  of  the  ravine  and  shelter  in  the  dead  ground 
against  the  steep  side  of  the  hill  itself.  The  New 
Zealanders  made  the  rush,  and  some  succeeded  in 
climbing  up  the  dead  ground  opposite  and  driving 
the  enemy  out  from  50  yards  of  his  lowest  trench. 
Others  remained  clinging  to  the  steep  side,  and  there 
a  few  of  the  South  Wales  Borderers,  who  came 
between   the    New    Zealanders   and   the   Connaught 


1  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  pp.  188-192.  Until  that  volume 
appeared,  the  Connaught  Rangers  had  not  received  the  public  credit 
due  to  this  serviceable  exploit,  though  in  Gallipoli  they  were  spoken  of 
with  the  highest  praise. 


FIRST  ATTACK  ON  HILL  60  351 

Rangers,  succeeded  in  joining  them.  Three  hundred 
yards  farther  to  their  right,  a  party  of  the  4th 
AustraHan  Brigade  rushed  across  the  ravine  in  the 
same  manner,  and  the  hundred  who  came  over 
untouched  also  clung  to  the  side  of  the  hill  just  below 
the  trench.  So  the  night  was  passed,  our  men  along 
the  steep  dead  ground  just  holding  their  position,  but 
exposed  to  repeated  bombing  from  the  trench  above 
them.  Fortunately,  the  Australian  Brigade  dug  a 
deep  zigzag  right  across  the  middle  of  the  ravine  as 
a  communication  trench,  thus  rendering  the  approach 
over  the  upper  or  southern  reach  of  the  Dere  fairly 
secure.  During  the  night  also  many  wounded,  lying 
on  the  exposed  slope  of  the  ravine,  and  drawing 
attention  by  their  cries,  were  brought  in.  But  the 
hours  passed  in  great  peril  and  discomfort.^ 

^  During  the  night  Captain  Gilleson,  the  Anglican  chaplain  of  the 
14th  Australian  (Victoria)  Battalion,  worked  incessantly  at  bringing  the 
wounded  back  to  safety.  After  daylight  next  morning,  still  hearing 
cries  from  the  exposed  slope  over  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  he  crept  out 
and  found  a  British  soldier  (probably  Hants  or  Connaught  Rangers) 
wounded  and  tormented  by  ants.  With  the  help  of  two  others  (one  a 
Presbyterian  chaplain)  he  had  dragged  the  man  about  a  yard  when  he 
fell  mortally  wounded.  The  man,  I  believe,  was  also  killed  ;  the 
Presbyterian  was  wounded.  Later  on  (August  28)  Captain  Grant,  a 
New  Zealand  padre  (the  form  of  religion  was  not  mentioned  to  me  at 
the  time)  went  searching  for  a  wounded  friend  along  a  trench  filled  with 
dead  and  wounded  Turks.  To  the  wounded  he  attended  on  his  way  ; 
but  hearing  conversation  farther  on,  he  thought  he  recognised  his 
friend's  voice.  Turning  a  sharp  corner  of  a  traverse,  he  came  face  to 
face  with  the  Turks,  and  was  instantly  killed. 

Both  Captain  C.  E.  W.  Bean  (Australian  papers,  Oct.  28,  191 5)  and 
Phillip  Schuler  {Australia  in  Arms,  p.  275)  mention  these  incidents, 
which  were  described  to  me  on  the  spot  a  few  days  after  they  happened. 
Taken  with  Sir  lan's  dispatch,  these  two  authorities  give  a  clear  idea 
of  the  confused  fighting  around  Hill  60.  For  the  action  of  the 
Connaught  Rangers,  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division  in  Gallipoli  should  be 
read,  as  mentioned  above.     For  myself,  I  had  the  great  advantage  of 


352  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

Next  morning  a  new  battalion  (the  1 8th  AustraHan) 
appeared.  It  had  arrived  at  Anzac  only  the  day 
before  as  the  first  instalment  of  the  2nd  Australian 
Division,  commanded  by  Major- General  J.  G.  Legge, 
who  had  occupied  various  military  positions  in  New 
South  Wales,  had  served  in  South  Africa,  and  re- 
presented Australia  on  the  Imperial  General  Staff.^ 
Early  on  August  22  the  i8th  Battalion  ( Lieut. - 
Colonel  A.  E.  Chapman)  passed  through  the  Gurkhas 
on  our  left,  and  charging  across  the  open,  fought 
their  way  up  the  northern  end  of  the  hill  and 
captured  another  piece  of  the  outer  trench.  Bombed 
and  enfiladed  there,  most  of  them  struggled  along 
the  trench  to  their  right — a  difficult  task,  for  the 
Turks  had  dug  it  so  deep  and  narrow  that  only  one 
man  at  a  time  could  squeeze  along  it.  Thus  they 
linked  up  with  the  New  Zealanders,  still  in  the  same 
position  where  they  had  passed  the  night.  The 
trench,  in  fact,  ran  continuously  all  round  the  oval 
of  the  hill,  and  for  the  next  five  days  we  could  but 
cling  on  to  the  small  segment  gained.  Meantime 
the  Connaught  Rangers  were  withdrawn  for  four 
days  to  rest.  They  had  lost  12  officers  and  over 
250  men.2     After  the  first  attack,  the  29th  (British) 

going  over  the  ground  with  General  A.  H.  Russell  a  day  or  two  after 
the  final  action  of  August  29. 

^  Lieut.-Colonel  C.  W.  Gwynn  was  Chief  of  Staff.     The  Division 
consisted  of: 

^th  Australiatt  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  W.  Holmes) — 

17th,  1 8th,  19th,  and  20th  Battalions. 
dth  Australiaft  Brigade  (Colonel  R.  S.  Browne) — 

2 1  St,  22nd,  23rd,  and  24th  Battalions. 
Tth  Australian  Brigade  (Colonel  J.  Burston) — 
25th,  26th,  27th,  and  28th  Battalions. 
2  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  p.  197. 


SECOND  ATTACK  ON  HILL  60  353 

Brigade  under  Colonel  Agnew  was  employed  by 
General  Russell  to  dig  a  communication  trench 
past  Kaba  Kuyu  to  Hill  60.  They  therefore  had 
little  rest. 

The  hill  was  not  taken,  but  so  important  was  the 
position  considered  that  Major-General  Cox  was 
instructed  to  attack  once  more  on  August  27,  three 
weeks  after  the  beginning  of  the  great  battle  of 
Suvla-Sari  Bair.  The  fighting  round  Hill  60  had, 
in  fact,  been  almost  continuous  since  the  21st.  The 
battalions  were  now  worn  so  thin  by  losses  and  sick- 
ness (especially  by  dysentery)  that  definite  numbers 
of  men  were  allotted  for  action  instead  of  units. 
On  the  right,  350  men  were  chosen  from  the  4th 
Australian  Brigade ;  in  the  centre,  100  Maoris  and 
300  New  Zealanders  from  the  Mounted  Rifles  Brigade 
(Auckland,  Canterbury,  Wellington,  and  Otago),  to- 
gether with  100  of  the  new  i8th  Australian  Battalion  ; 
on  the  left,  250  of  the  Connaught  Rangers — only  1 100 
men  in  all.^  This  attacking  party  was  under  the 
direct  command  of  Brigadier- General  Russell. 

The  action  began  at  4  p.m.  with  the  usual,  as  it 
was  the  last,  bombardment.  Sir  Ian  describes  it 
as  "the  heaviest  we  could  afford,"  and  certainly 
it  appeared  sufficient  to  flatten  out  any  trenches. 
None  the  less,  as  was  usual  from  first  to  last  in 
this  campaign,  its  terrors  were  deceptive,  and  the 
moment  that  the  assaulting  parties  advanced  they 
were  met  by  overwhelming  fire.  The  Australians 
on  the  right  were  swept  back  by  a  whole  battery 
of  machine-guns.  The  Connaught  Rangers  on  the 
left,  though  much  enfeebled  by  dysentery,  charged 
^  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  p.  199. 

23 


354  THE  LAST  EFFORTS 

upon  the  northern  trenches  with  their  accustomed 
enthusiasm.  Torn  by  accurate  shrapnel  as  they  ran 
forward,  they  still  fought  their  way  into  the  first 
narrow  trench,  and  occupied  it  by  6  p.m.  But  all 
that  evening  and  night,  by  the  light  of  the  crescent 
moon,  the  Turks  stormed  down  upon  them  in  suc- 
cessive waves,  shouting  their  battle-cry  of  "Allah! 
Allah!"  At  10.30  p.m.  they  bombed  and  shot  the 
Rangers  out  of  the  northern  extremity,  and  drove 
them  along  the  trench  upon  the  centre.  It  was  in 
vain  that  their  own  reserves  (forty-four  sick  men !) 
came  up  to  reinforce,  and  the  9th  Light  Horse  (3rd 
Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade)  attempted  about 
midnight  to  recapture  the  position.  Only  in  the 
centre  were  the  New  Zealanders  able  to  cling  tight 
to  the  1 50  yards  they  had  by  this  time  already  won. 

All  next  day  (August  28)  the  Turkish  attacks 
upon  that  position  continued  with  repeated  violence. 
The  shattered  remnants  of  the  Connaught  Rangers 
were  withdrawn,  but  still  the  New  Zealanders  held 
on  through  the  long  hours  and  the  next  night,  until 
at  I  a.m.  on  the  29th  all  that  remained  of  the  loth 
Light  Horse,  after  their  wild  assault  upon  the  Nek 
three  weeks  before,  formed  up  in  the  trenches 
occupied  by  the  New  Zealanders,  and  stormed 
across  the  centre  of  the  fortified  hill,  driving  the 
enemy  sheer  off  the  circumference  of  the  western 
semicircle.  The  eastern  side  of  the  hill  was  never 
taken,  but  our  line  was  advanced  till  it  ran  across 
the  summit,  and  there  consolidated.  Our  loss  was 
about  1000.  The  Turkish  loss  was  roughly  esti- 
mated at  5000,  and  we  captured  46  prisoners  and  a 
considerable  quantity  of  rifles  and  ammunition,  besides 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  355 

three  trench-mortars  and  three  machine-guns.  It 
was  not  a  great  action  judged  by  the  standard  of 
the  battles  in  the  war  elsewhere.  But  it  was  an 
action  worthy  of  the  persistence,  courage,  and  en- 
durance displayed  throughout  by  Anzacs,  Irish,  and 
British  upon  the  Peninsula ;  and  it  was  the  last. 

The  whole  of  the  Anzac  force,  which  had  never 
left  the  fighting  zone  since  the  landing  in  April,  was 
now  gradually  withdrawn  by  battalions  (only  200  or 
300  men  in  each)  to  rest  in  Mudros,  their  places 
being  filled  in  turn  by  the  newly  arrived  2nd  Australian 
Division,  which,  however,  was  not  completely  settled 
upon  that  hard-won  ground  till  after  the  first  week 
in  September.^  The  54th  (East  Anglian)  Division 
was  also  brought  round  from  Suvla,  Major-General 
Inglefield's  headquarters  being  dug  upon  the  Aghyl 
Dere,  and  his  Division  extended  north  over  the 
ravines  of  Damakjelik  up  to  the  confines  of  Hill  60 
itself  But  the  13th  Division,  now  under  Major- 
General  F.  Stanley  Maude,  was  returned  to  the 
IXth  Corps  at  Suvla,  so  that  Anzac  did  not  gain. 

^  One  of  the  transports  (the  Southland),  conveying  a  battahon  of  the 
2nd  Australian  Division,  was  torpedoed  near  Mudros,  but  brought  safely 
to  port  by  the  soldiers,  who  stoked  and  ran  the  engines  themselves. 


CHAPTER   XIV 
SIR    lAN'S    RECALL 

UPON  the  Peninsula,  it  was  difficult  to  esti- 
mate the  general  spirit  of  the  army  during 
the  six  weeks  which  followed  the  valiant 
but  only  partially  successful  efforts  of  August,  They 
were  a  period  of  enforced  inactivity  seldom  interrupted, 
and  the  usual  effect  of  inactivity  upon  an  army,  as 
upon  civilians,  is  depression.  During  the  campaign  it 
was  often  observed  that  in  most  Divisions  the  prospect 
of  action,  however  perilous,  at  once  reduced  the  sick- 
ness, as  though  to  prove  tedium  more  unwholesome 
than  death.  But  in  September  tedium  supervened, 
and  the  diseases  of  dysentery  and  diarrhoea,  always 
prevalent  since  June,  spread  like  a  plague.  The 
average  of  serious  cases  rose  to  looo  a  day,  and 
though  of  course  by  far  the  greater  number  of 
the  patients  returned  to  duty,  the  percentage  of 
"casualties"  from  sickness  alone  was  in  some  weeks 
calculated  at  300  per  annum,  so  that  very  large 
drafts  were  required  to  maintain  the  army  even  at 
its  shrunken  strength.  It  must  also  be  remembered 
that  both  these  diseases  have  a  peculiarly  depressing 
effect  upon  the  spirit,  weakening  the  will  equally 
with  the  bodily  powers.  Certainly  it  was  expected 
that  the  approach  of  winter  would  compel  the  perilous 

germs  to  hibernate  in  torpor,  and  would  reduce  the 

356 


SICKNESS  AND  MONOTONOUS  FOOD         357 

multitude  of  flies  which  now  enjoyed  a  livehhood  so 
rich  and  unexpected  upon  that  desert  land.  But  in 
other  respects  the  prospect  of  a  winter  campaign 
was  not  exhilarating. 

The  Indians  stood  the  climate  far  better  than  the 
British  or  Australians,  either  as  vegetarians  or  as 
habituated  to  the  sun  and  protected  by  their  colour, 
whereas  the  Australians  and  many  of  the  British 
sought  to  avoid  heat  by  going  naked,  and  so  ex- 
posed their  white  skins  to  the  unaccustomed  and 
baleful  rays.  Life  in  the  bazaar  or  jungle  had  also 
rendered  Indians  immune  to  diseases  against  which 
our  civilisation  stands  unprotected,  and  flies  did  not 
pursue  the  cleanly  food  of  Hindus  and  Sikhs  with 
the  same  persistent  avidity.  If  some  of  the  British 
troops  upon  the  Peninsula  had  been  exchanged  for 
the  Indian  troops  serving  in  France  and  Flanders, 
both  armies  would  have  gained  in  health.  But 
perhaps  a  greater  cause  of  disease  than  sun  or  flies 
or  infection  was  the  monotony  of  the  diet,  as 
mentioned  before.  Sir  lan's  appeals  for  canteens 
remained  unheard  till  August  30,  when  a  canteen- 
ship  actually  appeared  at  Anzac.  Deputed  purchasers 
from  every  unit  hurried  down  to  buy.  Bursting 
with  money,  they  stood  in  queues,  but  none  received 
more  than  one-sixth  of  what  he  asked,  and,  as  in 
a  starving  town,  scarcity  laughed  at  cash.  None  the 
less,  after  the  arrival  of  that  one  meagre  shipload 
of  variety,  the  numbers  on  the  sick  list  suddenly 
fell,  though  only  for  a  time.  Allowance  must  also  be 
made  for  the  arrival  of  the  2nd  Australian  Division, 
which  raised  the  average  of  health,  until  the  infection 
spread  among  its  members  also  ;  and  that  was  soon. 


358  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

But  more  disheartening  even  than  inactivity  or 
disease  was  the  disappearance  of  the  dead  and 
wounded.  During  August  some  40,000 — about  one- 
third  of  the  whole  force — had  gone.  Entirely  suffi- 
cient provision  had  now  been  made  for  the  wounded 
alike  in  the  largely  increased  number  of  hospital  ships 
running  to  Alexandria,  and  in  the  hospital  camps 
established  near  Suvla  A  Beach  (too  near  the  Hill  10 
batteries)  and  on  two  positions  along  the  Suvla  pro- 
montory (also  disturbed  by  shells  owing  to  the 
proximity  of  store  depots,  landing-places,  and  Corps 
Headquarters) ;  at  well-sheltered  points  along  the 
Ocean  Beach,  near  Anzac ;  upon  the  flats  at  the  end 
of  Kephalos  Bay,  in  Imbros  ;  and  especially  on  the 
breezy  rising  ground  overlooking  Mudros  harbour  on 
the  opposite  side  to  Mudros  town.  The  dead  either 
lay  beyond  reach,  gradually  shrinking  to  dust  on 
"  No  Man's  Land,"  or  were  buried  in  carefully 
tended  little  cemeteries,  their  graves  marked  with 
wooden  crosses  and  decorated  with  shell-cases  or 
white  stones  arranged  in  patterns.  Brief  as  regret 
and  lamentation  must  be  in  war,  it  is  melancholy  to 
return  to  familiar  dug-outs  and  find  that  the  familiar 
occupants  have  gone,  leaving  possessions  which  they 
will  not  need  again,  and  perhaps  a  written  notice  to 
warn  off  intruders  from  the  deserted  habitation.  The 
sense  of  loss  was  especially  poignant  at  Anzac,  where, 
united  by  the  bonds  of  adventure  and  nationality, 
the  men  had  lived  as  in  a  crowded  community  of 
fellowship. 

Drafts  came,  but  though  the  drafts  were  small 
they  sometimes  overwhelmed  the  original  battalions, 
and,  partly  owing  to  the  unavoidable   suspension  of 


DISADVANTAGES  OF  NEW  DRAFTS  359 

drill,  they  were  long  in  imbibing  a  good  battalion's 
spirit.^  Even  more  serious  was  the  necessity  of 
hurrying  new  drafts  at  once  into  advanced  positions. 
In  a  note  written  at  Helles  on  August  30,  after  visit- 
ing the  lines  before  Krithia,  I  observed  : 

"  A  newly  arrived  draft  has  usually  to  join  the  rest 
of  the  battalion  in  the  trenches  or  firing  line  at  once. 
The  men  know  nothing  of  the  realities  of  war  and 
weather.  Shells  and  bullets  affect  them  as  they  affect 
every  one  at  first,  and  most  people  to  the  end.  The 
sun  strikes  through  them  like  X-rays.  Dust  fills 
their  eyes  and  mouths.  Flies  cover  their  food,  and 
keep  them  irritated  and  sleepless.  In  the  advanced 
trenches,  ten  to  one  they  get  little  beyond  biscuit  and 
bully  beef,  with  an  occasional  share  in  an  onion  or 
pot  of  jam.  Diarrhoea  begins  to  affect  them.  They 
grow  weak  and  their  spirit  sinks.  In  that  condition 
they  are  probably  called  upon  to  resist  or  deliver  an 
attack  against  a  tough  race  of  semi-barbarous  soldiers 
famous  at  trench  fighting  for  generations." 

Interrupted  by  only  few  cool  and  rainy  days,  the 
heat  continued  through  September,  and  the  victims 
to  dysentery  increased.  The  shadow  of  approaching 
winter  also  lay  upon  the  army,  and  its  horrors  were 
exaggerated,  partly  through  the  classic  reputation  of 
inhospitable  Thrace,  partly  by  the  inexperience  of  the 
Anzacs,  who  had  never  seen  snow  or  endured  cold. 

^  "  It  was  not  entirely  an  easy  matter  to  assimilate  these  reinforce- 
ments. As  a  rule,  a  draft  is  a  comparatively  small  body  of  men  which 
easily  adopts  the  character  of  the  unit  in  which  it  is  merged.  In  Galli- 
poli,  however,  units  had  been  so  much  reduced  in  strength  that  in  some 
cases  the  draft  was  stronger  than  the  battalion  that  it  joined,  while  it 
almost  invariably  increased  the  strength  of  what  was  left  of  the  original 
unit  to  half  as  much  again.  As  a  result,  after  two  or  three  drafts  had 
arrived,  the  old  battalions  had  been  swamped." — The  Tenth  {Irish) 
Division,  p.  235. 


36o  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

More  serious  than  cold  was  the  anticipated  downpour 
of  rain,  which  would  convert  our  roads  along  ravines 
into  torrents,  and  fill  the  dusty  communication  trenches 
with  mud.  Unhappily,  owing  to  the  steep  ascent  to 
such  positions  as  Quinn's  Post,  and  the  far  longer 
climb  to  the  Apex,  where  we  still  clung  to  a  scarcely 
tenable  position  overhanging  the  Farm  below  the 
summit  of  Chunuk  Bair,  the  chief  hardships  of  winter 
were  likely  to  fall  upon  Anzac,  where  the  men  were 
least  accustomed  to  resist  them.  In  a  note  during 
the  first  week  of  September  I  observed  : 

"  If  we  remain  through  the  winter,  Anzac  will 
need  looking  to.  Cement,  solid  iron  plates,  corru- 
gated iron  to  support  sandbag  roofs,  timber  such  as 
the  Turks  already  use  for  trenches,  careful  and  diffi- 
cult drainage  in  a  country  where  the  dry  watercourses 
which  become  torrents  in  winter  are  now  used  as 
roads,  spiked  boots  to  climb  the  slimy  paths  now  deep 
in  dust — all  must  be  prepared.  The  daily  toil,  already 
severe,  will  be  much  increased,  and  the  fighting  force 
can  hardly  be  expected  to  carry  it  out.  A  crowd  of 
ordinary  labourers  will  be  needed." 

Gangs  of  Egyptian  labourers  were,  in  fact,  brought 
to  Imbros  and  set  to  work  upon  the  main  road 
through  the  camps  there. 

As  to  numbers,  at  the  end  of  August  we  had 
83,000,  including  15,000  French  troops,  on  the 
Peninsula,  as  against  an  estimate  of  100,000  Turks 
there,  with  25,000  in  reserve.  During  September,  a 
few  small  but  serviceable  units  arrived,  such  as  the 
Scottish  Horse  (about  3000  men  unmounted)  under 
their  commandant,  the  Marquis  of  Tullibardine  ;  the 
ist  and  2nd   Regiments  of."Lovat's  Scouts,"  under 


BYNG  IN  COMMAND  OF  IXth  CORPS         361 

Lord  Lovat,  between  whose  force  and  Lord  Tullibar- 
dine's  a  rivalry  as  of  old  Highland  clans  persists ;  a 
brigade  of  East  and  West  Kent  and  Sussex  Yeo- 
manry (Brigadier-General  Clifton-Browne);  a  South- 
western Mounted  Brigade  of  North  Devons,  Royal 
ist  Devons,  and  West  Somersets  ;  and  the  ist  New- 
foundlanders' Battalion  (Colonel  Burton)  attached  to 
the  29th  Division.  These  units,  together  with  drafts, 
brought  the  forces  upon  the  Peninsula  up  to  about 
half  their  nominal  strength  at  the  end  of  September. 
In  the  beginning  of  that  month,  two  brigades  of  the 
loth  Division's  artillery  also  arrived  at  last.  The 
55th  was  stationed  at  Helles,  the  56th  at  Suvla.^ 
But  even  so,  on  September  10,  there  were  only 
60  guns  at  Suvla  in  place  of  the  full  complement 
of  340. 

None  the  less,  in  spite  of  inactivity,  sickness,  and 
the  discouragement  of  decreasing  strength,  the  Divi- 
sions continued  to  improve.  The  improvement  was 
most  marked  in  the  53rd  Division  (now  under  Major- 
General  Marshall),  the  54th  (still  under  Major-General 
Inglefield),  and  the  nth  (now  under  Major-General 
E.  A.  Fanshawe).  The  13th  Division,  which  had 
done  so  well  at  Anzac  under  Major-General  Shaw, 
was  sure  only  to  increase  its  reputation  under  so  fine 
and  ardent  a  commandant  as  Major-General  Stanley 
Maude.  Finally,  there  was  Major-General  Sir  Julian 
Byng,  who  arrived  from  his  cavalry  command  in 
France  together  with  Generals  Maude  and  Fanshawe 
on  August  23.  He  took  over  the  command  of  the 
IXth  Corps  at  Suvla  from  Major-General  De  Lisle, 

^  The  Tenth  {Irish)  Division,  p.  229.    The  54th  Brigade  remained  in 
Egypt. 


362  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

who  returned  to  his  29th  Division,  which  was  re- 
tained at  Suvla,  except  that  the  brigades  went  separ- 
ately to  the  rest  camp  on  Imbros. 

Every  one  expected  the  order  for  fresh  advance  so 
soon  as  the  new  Generals  had  thoroughly  re-estab- 
lished confidence  and  the  IXth  Corps  Staff  had 
recovered  a  more  sanguine  temper.  As  is  usual  in 
times  of  inaction,  rumours  flew.  The  French,  it  was 
stated,  were  sending  out  new  Divisions  under  General 
Sarrail.  Another  landing  was  to  be  made  on  the 
Asiatic  coast,  perhaps  at  Kum  Kali,  perhaps  at 
Smyrna,  more  likely  at  Adramyti  Bay,  a  scheme 
much  favoured  by  authorities  in  Mitylene.  Another 
very  persistent  rumour  was  for  sending  the  fleet  up 
the  Dardanelles  again,  and  hope  rose  high  in  the 
Navy,  tired  and  irritated  at  their  effective  but  sub- 
sidiary service  to  the  military  force.  Meantime,  the 
actual  fighting  was  limited  to  the  stationary  trench 
warfare  of  bombing,  casual  bombardments,  and  local 
assault  or  defence  on  either  side.  It  gradually  be- 
came evident  that  the  fate  of  the  expedition  depended 
no  longer  upon  itself,  but  upon  events  and  specula- 
tions far  removed  from  the  scene.^ 

On  the  Western  Front,  the  Allied  armies  were 
occupied  through  September  in  preparing  for  the 
combined  effort  which  culminated  during  the  last 
week  of  the  month  in  the  prolonged  battles  known  by 
the  names  of  Loos  and  Champagne.  As  I  before 
noticed,  it  was  mainly  for  fear  of  weakening  this  effort 

^  During  this  period  of  comparative  inaction,  it  was  announced  that 
Flight-Lieutenant  Edmonds  in  a  seaplane  sank  a  Turkish  transport  full 
of  reinforcements  with  a  heavy  bomb,  and  that  a  submarine  sank  a 
transport  of  ii-inch  guns  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora  (September  7). —  The 
"  Times''''  History  of  the  War,  Part  84,  p.  211. 


EFFECT  OF  EUROPEAN  EVENTS  363 

that  British  reinforcements  were  refused  to  Sir  Ian, 
and  that  the  scheme  of  advancing  on  the  Asiatic  side 
of  the  Straits  with  new  French  Divisions  was  aban- 
doned, if  ever  seriously  intended  by  the  High  Com- 
mand in  France.  The  efforts  so  carefully  prepared 
and  gallantly  carried  out  succeeded  in  gaining  valu- 
able positions  for  future  advance,  but  were  not  suffi- 
ciently successful  to  break  through  the  German  line 
or  to  diminish  the  increasing  peril  of  Near  Eastern 
complications.  It  would  be  difficult  to  compute  the 
exact  proportion  of  the  men  and  explosives  thus 
expended  without  definite  result  in  France  which 
might  have  effected  a  decisive  and  permanent  victory 
in  the  Dardanelles ;  but  the  proportion  would  not 
have  been  high,  and  how  beneficent  the  issue  for 
the  world's  history !  Successive  disasters  upon  the 
Russian  Front  continued  to  encourage  the  military 
parties  in  the  Balkan  States  which  trusted  to  German 
victory  for  the  furtherance  of  their  national  aggrandise- 
ment. In  August  the  Russian  armies  were  driven 
from  Warsaw,  Kovno,  and  Brest- Litovsk ;  in  Sep- 
tember from  Grodno  and  Vilna.  Although  their 
skilful  retirement  won  military  praise,  and  although 
the  exhausted  German  forces  were  unable  to  break 
the  lines  beyond  their  points  of  advance,  or  even  to 
occupy  Riga,  it  was  evident  that  from  Russia  neither 
danger  to  her  enemies  nor  assistance  to  her  friends 
could  be  expected,  even  though  her  unmilitary  and 
vacillating  Autocrat  assumed  command.  The  en- 
couraging effect  of  such  events  as  the  fall  of  Warsaw 
upon  the  Turkish  moral  was  distinctly  marked. 

In  the   Balkan   Peninsula,  fate  was  supposed  still 
to  hang  upon   the   decision  of  Bulgaria — a  decision 


364  SIR  lAN^S  RECALL 

secretly  taken  two  months  before  (July  17),  although 
Ferdinand,  with  lachrymose  solicitude,  continued  to 
profess  the  neutrality  of  a  fox  between  two  packs  of 
hounds.  From  the  first,  both  belligerents  had  rightly 
calculated  that,  in  spite  of  the  strong  national  sym- 
pathy with  England  and  Russia  inherited  by  the 
Bulgarian  people,  their  Tsar,  if  not  their  representa- 
tive Government,  could  be  won  by  the  highest  bidder 
for  alliance,  and  each  side  attempted  to  outbid  the 
other  with  profuse  offers  of  other  people's  territory. 
But  when,  in  mid-September,  England  and  her  Allies 
proposed  the  cession  of  Serbian  territory  at  Monastir 
(a  mainly  Bulgarian  district),  Doiran  and  Ghevgheli 
(mainly  Turkish  in  race),  and  part  of  the  Dobrudja, 
then  occupied  by  Roumania,  they  had  been  forestalled 
by  more  tempting  promises  from  Turkey  and  the 
Central  Powers.  To  the  force  of  such  temptation 
was  added  the  animosity  rankling  in  all  Bulgarian 
hearts  against  the  neighbouring  states  which  two  years 
before  (August  191 3),  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  had 
torn  from  their  country  the  reward  of  her  decisive 
victories  over  the  Turk  in  191 2.  Especially  against 
Serbia  was  this  animosity  directed,  and  one  might 
have  supposed  that  even  a  slight  acquaintance  with 
the  Balkan  States  would  have  warned  the  Allied 
Governments  of  Serbia's  extreme  and  imminent  peril. 
Yet  up  to  September  20  they  continued  to  hope. 

On  that  day,  M.  Radoslavoff  announced  that 
Bulgaria  had  signed  a  treaty  with  Turkey,  but  would 
maintain  an  armed  neutrality  for  the  protection  of 
her  frontiers.  No  one,  except  perhaps  the  British 
Government,  was  deceived  as  to  the  real  intention. 
On    September    19    a   large   German- Austrian   army 


ATTITUDE  OF  BULGARIA  AND  GREECE      365 

under  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  had  renewed 
the  attack  upon  Serbia's  capital,  and  Bulgaria  after 
mobilising  her  350,000  rifles  could  strike  at  Serbia's 
exposed  eastern  flank  almost  without  opposition  from 
the  exhausted  Serbian  army.  Serbia's  one  poor 
chance  was  to  attack  her  hereditary  enemy  at  once, 
before  the  Germans  had  crossed  the  rivers  in  the 
north.  But  from  this  course  England  discouraged 
her,  and,  with  unfounded  confidence,  she  awaited  the 
assistance  due  from  Greece  according  to  her  treaty  of 
1913.  But  Greece,  always  so  justly  apprehensive  of 
warlike  risks,  was  presented  with  a  passable  means 
of  escape  by  her  own  warrior  King,  that  "  Bulgar- 
slayer"  and  "Napoleon  of  the  East,"  whose  titles 
belied  his  earlier  reputation  as  a  leader  of  panic- 
stricken  flight  at  Larissa  in  April  1897. 

As  a  result  of  the  Greek  elections  in  June,  when 
his  supporters  were  returned  to  power  by  a  two-thirds 
majority,  Venizelos  had  resumed  the  Premiership 
in  the  middle  of  August.  Clearly  perceiving  the 
enemy's  intention  of  overwhelming  the  relics  of  the 
Serbian  forces  by  armies  converging  from  the  north 
and  east,  he  imagined  that  Greece  was  bound  by 
honour  and  treaty  to  hasten  to  her  ally's  protection, 
Greece  could  nominally  mobilise  eighteen  Divisions, 
but  their  fighting  strength  was  probably  not  over 
200,000,  for  the  most  part  ill-equipped,  ill-instructed, 
and  averse  from  war.  Of  the  Serbian  army  probably 
little  over  100,000  organised  and  disciplined  troops 
was  left  after  the  struggles  of  a  year.  The  German- 
Austrian  invaders  were  estimated  at  200,000 ;  the 
Bulgarians  at  300,000,  or  perhaps  not  more  than 
250,000,  since  the  Roumanian  frontier  needed  watch- 


366  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

ing.  Attacked  on  two  fronts,  Serbia's  strategic  posi- 
tion, in  any  case  perilous,  became  desperate  with  such 
inferior  numbers.  In  his  zeal  for  the  Serbian  alliance, 
which  he  recognised  as  the  ultimate  defence  of  Greece 
herself,  Venizelos  called  upon  the  Entente  to  furnish 
150,000  men  (September  21),  and  two  days  later 
induced  King  Constantine  to  mobilise. 

On  September  28  Sir  Edward  Grey  spoke  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  the  most  significant  part  of  his 
speech  being  the  sentence  : 

"If  the  Bulgarian  mobilisation  were  to  result  in 
Bulgaria  assuming  an  aggressive  attitude  on  the  side 
of  our  enemies,  we  are  prepared  to  give  to  our  friends 
in  the  Balkans  all  the  support  in  our  power  in  the 
manner  that  would  be  most  welcome  to  them,  in 
concert  with  our  Allies,  without  reserve  and  without 
qualification."^ 

Our  friends  in  the  Balkans  can  only  have  been 
Serbia  and  Greece.  The  support  most  welcome  to 
them  was  men,  but  arms,  money,  and  equipment  were 
welcome.  To  provide  the  men,  Lord  Kitchener 
asked  Sir  Ian  if  he  could  spare  two  British  Divisions 
and  one  French  for  Salonika.  Sir  Ian  replied  by 
offering  the  53rd  (Welsh)  and  the  loth  (Irish)  Divi- 
sions. The  French  offered  their  2nd  Division  on  the 
Peninsula  (156),  and  the  veteran  General  Bailloud, 
anxious  for  fresh  fields  of  youthful  ambition,  claimed 
command. 

The  loth  Division — perhaps  the  pick  of  the  New 
Army  troops  on  the  Peninsula — being  ordered  to  sail 
at  once,   embarked    on    September  30,  and,   though 

*  The  full  speech   is   quoted  in  Nelson's  History  oj  the  War,  by 
Colonel  John  Buchan,  vol.  xi.  p.  18. 


BRITISH  &  FRENCH  DIVISIONS  FOR  SALONIKA    367 

passing  by  way  of  Mudros,  was  able  to  land  its  first 
detachments  at  Salonika  on  October  5,  finding  two 
French  Divisions  already  there.^  General  Bailloud's 
Division,  leaving  on  October  3,  began  to  reach  the 
rendezvous  on  the  same  day.  There  the  whole  force 
soon  came  under  the  command  of  General  Sarrail, 
who  arrived  on  October  12,  and  it  was  shortly  after- 
wards augmented  by  other  French  and  British 
Divisions,  two  of  which  were  believed  to  have  left 
England  as  reinforcements  for  Sir  Ian,  but  to  have 
been  diverted  to  the  new  scene  of  action  upon  their 
way.^ 

So  far  as  the  immediate  protection  of  Serbia  was 
concerned,  the  Allied  force  thus  hurried  over  from 
Gallipoli — not  more  than  15,000  men^ — was  almost 
an  absurdity,  though  its  arrival  caused  futile  rejoicing 
among  the  Serbian  people.  Its  only  possible  service 
was  to  inspire  some  sort  of  confidence  in  a  Greek 
army  hastening  to  save  the  ally  of  Greece  from  de- 
struction. But  the  Greek  army  did  not  hasten.  On 
September  28  (the  day  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech) 
Venizelos  announced  the  necessity  of  mobilisation. 
On  October  3  Russia  issued  an  ultimatum  to  Bul- 
garia warning  her  to  break  off  relations  with  the 
Central  Powers  and  dismiss  their  officers  from  Sofia. 
Two  days  later,  the  Entente  withdrew  their  repre- 
sentatives, and  Bulgaria  entered  the  war  as  an  ally 

^  See  Sir  Charles  Monro's  dispatch  on  the  Dardanelles  evacuation. 

2  The  further  history  of  the  loth  Division  (which  I  visited  once  more 
among  the  mountains  beyond  Lake  Doiran),  as  well  as  of  the  whole 
Salonika  campaign  up  to  summer  191 7,  is  told  in  The  Story  of  the 
Salonika  Army,  by  my  colleague,  Mr.  G.  Ward  Price. 

3  Colonel  John  Buchan  puts  the  number  at  13,000  {Nehoris  History 
of  the  War,  xi.  26). 


368  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

of  Germany,  though  England  did  not  actually  declare 
war  upon  her  till  October  15.  But  on  the  very  day 
upon  which  Bulgaria's  intentions  were  declared,  an 
unexpected  blow,  which  might  have  been  expected, 
fell.  King  Constantine  informed  Venizelos  that  he 
did  not  support  the  policy  of  intervention.  "  I  do 
not  wish  to  assist  Serbia,"  he  said,  "because  Germany 
will  be  victorious,  and  I  do  not  wish  to  be  defeated." 
After  pleading  the  cause  of  honour  and  probable  ad- 
vantage, not  for  the  first  time  in  vain,  Venizelos 
resigned,  and  M.  Zaimis,  a  peaceful  banker,  formed 
a  Government  based  on  a  neutrality  of  "complete 
and  sincere  benevolence  "  toward  the  Western  Allies.^ 
It  was  in  vain  that  on  October  7  England  again 
offered  to  cede  Cyprus  to  Greece  as  a  tempting  in- 
ducement to  fulfil  the  claims  of  honour.  The  King 
could  only  repeat  his  sentiment  of  "complete  and  sin- 
cere benevolence,"  while,  as  for  honour,  he  maintained 
a  benevolent  correspondence,  at  least  equally  complete 
and  sincere,  with  the  Court  and  General  Staff  in 
Berlin.  He  further  soothed  the  conscientious  scruples 
of  his  people — a  task  well  within  the  limits  of  his 
capacity — by  pointing  out  that  the  treaty  with  Serbia 
did  indeed  bind  them  to  resist  an  attack  upon  her 
by  Bulgaria,  but  not  an  invasion  supported  by  other 
Powers.  Once  again  the  people  of  Greece  had  cause 
to  congratulate  themselves  upon  possessing  a  monarch 
resolute  enough  to  resist  the  popular  will,  and  adroit 
enough  to  interpret  the  code  of  honour  in  accordance 
with  their  interests  and  their  conscience.  It  was  true 
that  the  most  complete  and  sincere  benevolence,  as 

^  See  the  speech  of  Venizelos  to  the  Athenian  Chamber,  August  26, 


BULGARIAN  INVASION  OF  SERBIA  369 

practised    by   the    Greek    officers    and    officials    at 
Salonika,  was  designed  to  hinder  rather  than  assist 
the  small  and  war-worn  body  of  Allies  now  landing 
there.     So  far  as  saving  Serbia  went,  their  landing 
had  now  become  a  belated  and  unserviceable  chivalry. 
But  a  King's  function  is  to  further  the  interests  of  his 
own  people,  and  Greeks  might  fairly  hope  to  derive 
material  advantage  from  the  presence  of  a  lavishly  ex- 
pensive foreign  army  in  their  port ;  and  they  derived  it.^ 
As  any  one  with  some  knowledge  of  Macedonia, 
Drama,  and  the  Bulgarian  frontier  might  have  antici- 
pated, the  objects  of  the    Salonika  adventure   were 
frustrated  from    the  outset.      Serbia  was  not  saved ; 
Bulgaria  was  not  penetrated  ;  the  enemy's  communi- 
cation   with     Sofia    and     Constantinople     was    not 
threatened.      Salonika    certainly    was    rescued   from 
Austrian    or  Bulgarian  occupation ;    the    enemy  was 
thwarted  of  its  possible  use  as  a  submarine  base  (a 
dubious  possibility,  as  many  naval  authorities  thought) ; 
the  Entente  retained  some  hold,  however  small,  upon 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  could  treat  their  position 
as  a  fulcrum  for  levering  the  Greek  monarch  from  his 
throne.     Those  were  the  only  advantages,  and  one 
may  estimate  them  as  considerable.      But  upon    the 
far  grander  strategic  conception  of  the  Dardanelles, 
the    Salonika   project   fell   like   a   headsman's   blow. 
Little  life  was  left  beyond  the  subsiding  spasms  of  a 
decapitated  man.     Balked  of  reinforcement,  deprived 

^  Belgrade  fell  to  Mackensen  on  October  9  ;  the  Bulgarians  crossed 
the  Serbian  frontier  on  the  nth,  occupied  Uskub  on  the  22nd,  and  Nish 
on  November  5,  thus  opening  direct  railway  communication  between  the 
Central  Powers  and  Constantinople  through  Sofia.  Monastir  fell  on 
December  2,  and  by  the  middle  of  that  month  the  Serbian  army  and  the 
Allies  had  been  entirely  driven  out  of  Serbian  territory. 
24 


370  SIR  lAN'S  RECAIX 

of  half  the  French  contingent  and  one  among  his 
finest  new  Divisions,  Sir  Ian  called  up  all  his  reserve 
of  indomitable  hopefulness — a  General's  finest  quality 
— for  the  support  of  himself  and  the  army  that  still 
remained,  however  diminished.  But  the  powers  of 
darkness  gathered  round.  In  front  lay  the  Turks, 
soon  to  be  supplied  with  more  German  officers,  more 
heavy  guns,  high  explosives,  and  food.  Close  around 
him,  and  at  the  centre  in  London,  unexpected  figures 
could  be  discerned  moving  in  obscurity,  whispering 
despair,  and  suggesting  disaster  with  the  malign 
satisfaction  of  prophets  whose  gloomy  forebodings 
fulfil  their  prognostications.  It  became  evident  that 
a  General's  essential  supports — the  confidence  and 
zealous  co-operation  of  his  own  Government,  never 
very  enthusiastic  in  Sir  lan's  case — were  melting 
away  faster  even  than  his  army. 

The  Turks,  on  their  side,  evidently  knew  that 
the  Irish  and  French  Divisions  were  going  and  had 
gone  ;  for  the  morning  after  the  departure  of  the  last 
detachments  their  aeroplanes  dropped  messages  over 
the  Indian  encampments  telling  the  Indians  that 
they  were  being  abandoned  only  to  have  their  throats 
cut  on  the  Peninsula.  Otherwise,  except  for  occasional 
air-raids  to  drop  bombs  upon  the  General  Head- 
quarters at  Imbros,  the  impenetrable  Turks  remained 
quiescent,  perhaps .  already  calculating  that  the  Pen- 
insula would  be  relieved  of  invaders  without  their 
stir,  or  perhaps  merely  awaiting  the  supply  of  big 
guns  and  ammunition,  soon  to  be  so  easily  transmitted 
by  way  of  Nish  and  Sofia.  Their  very  silence  was 
ominous ;  but  more  ominous  still,  for  the  moment, 
seemed  a  violent  southerly  gale  which  on  the  night  of 


KITCHENER  INQUIRES  ABOUT  EVACUATION     371 

October  8-9  swept  away  the  two  landing-piers  at 
Anzac,  sank  the  valuable  water-lighters  there,  and 
drove  three  of  the  motor-" beetles"  ashore  at  Suvla. 
Happily,  the  Australians  had  recently  constructed  a 
new  pier  in  the  bay  north  of  Ari  Burnu,  sheltered 
from  the  south  wind  by  that  small  promontory. 
There  supplies  could  be  landed  in  any  weather  both 
for  Suvla  and  Anzac,  but  the  storm  presaged  evil  for 
the  approaching  winter. 

Two  days  later  (on  October  11)  Lord  Kitchener 
telegraphed  asking  Sir  Ian  for  an  estimate  of  the  losses 
which  would  be  involved  in  an  evacuation  of  the  Pen- 
insula. After  consultation  with  Major- General  Braith- 
waite,  his  Chief  of  Staff,  and  other  members  of  the  Staff, 
Sir  Ian  replied  that  the  probable  loss  was  estimated  at 
50  per  cent.  No  estimate  could  be  anything  but  a 
guess.  All  depended  upon  incalculable  weather  and 
incalculable  Turks.  Earlier  in  the  campaign,  General 
Gouraud  had  estimated  a  loss  of  two  Divisions  out  of 
six  in  case  of  evacuation  at  Helles.  In  any  case.  Sir 
Ian  replied  on  October  12  in  terms  showing  that  such 
a  step  as  evacuation  was  to  him  unthinkable.^  Apart 
from  losses,  evacuation  would  release  an  army  of  the 
best  Turkish  troops  for  renewed  attack  in  Meso- 
potamia or  Egypt,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Caucasus  and 
Persia.  The  risk  to  our  position  throughout  Asia, 
dependent  as  it  was  upon  prestige  rather  than  power, 
had  in  such  a  case  also  to  be  gravely  considered. 

On  October  16  Lord  Kitchener  again  telegraphed, 
saying  that  the  War  Council  wished  to  make  a  change 
in  the  command.  As  he  afterwards  informed  Sir  Ian, 
"  the  Government  desired  a  fresh,  unbiased  opinion, 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch,  last  section  but  two. 


372  SIR  lAN'S  RECALL 

from  a  responsible  Commander,  upon  the  question  of 
early  evacuation."^  To  supply  this  fresh,  unbiased 
opinion  they  had  appointed  General  Sir  Charles 
Monro,  with  Major- General  Lynden-Bell  as  his  Chief 
of  Staff.  Until  their  arrival,  General  Birdwood  was 
to  assume  command  on  the  Peninsula. 

During  the  morning  of  the  17th  General  Brulard, 
who  had  succeeded  General  Bailloud  in  command  of 
the  French  contingent,  came  over  to  Imbros  with  his 
Staff  to  say  good-bye.  Generals  Davies  and  Byng, 
with  the  Staffs  of  the  VII I th  and  IXth  Corps, 
followed.  To  say  good-bye  to  his  own  Staff,  Sir  Ian 
rode  to  the  new  Headquarters  at  the  entrance  of  the 
main  valley  across  the  bay,  whither  he  was  himself  to 
have  removed  that  very  afternoon.  To  the  army  he 
issued  the  following  special  order  as  farewell  : 

"  On  handing  over  the  command  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean Expeditionary  Force  to  General  Sir  Charles 
Monro,  the  Commander-in-Chief  wishes  to  say  a  few 
farewell  words  to  the  Allied  troops,  with  many  of 
whom  he  has  now  for  so  long  been  associated.  First, 
he  would  like  them  to  know  his  deep  sense  of  the 
honour  it  has  been  to  command  so  fine  an  army  in 
one  of  the  most  arduous  and  difficult  campaigns  which 
have  ever  been  undertaken  ;  secondly,  he  must  ex- 
press to  them  his  admiration  of  the  noble  response 
which  they  have  invariably  given  to  the  calls  he  has 
made  upon  them.  No  risk  has  been  too  desperate ; 
no  sacrifice  too  great.  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  thanks  all 
ranks,  from  Generals  to  private  soldiers,  for  the 
wonderful  way  they  have  seconded  his  efforts  to  lead 
them  towards  that  decisive  victory  which,  under  their 
new  Chief,  he  has  the  most  implicit  confidence  they 
will  achieve." 

^  Sir  lan's  dispatch. 


SIR  IAN  LEAVES  THE  PENINSULA  373 

On  the  Triad  he  said  good-bye  to  Admiral  de 
Robeck,  and  to  Commodore  Roger  Keyes,  the 
Admiral's  Chief  of  Staff.  He  then  embarked  on 
the  cruiser  Chatham.  As  she  passed  down  Kephalos 
Bay,  each  of  the  war  vessels  manned  ship  in  salute. 
Cape  Kephalos  was  rounded  ;  Suvla,  Anzac,  and  the 
Helles  of  the  landings  were  seen  by  their  Commander- 
in-Chief  for  the  last  time,  and  the  Peninsula,  which 
had  been  the  dramatic  stage  of  such  high  hopes, 
noble  achievement,  and  bitter  frustration,  faded  in 
the  distance,  as  the  living  events  there  enacted  were 
already  fading  into  a  story  of  the  past. 


CHAPTER  XV 
THE    FIFTH   ACT 

THE  departure  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  acts 
upon  an  army  like  sudden  heart  disease  in 
a  man,  or  the  collapse  of  a  ship's  steering- 
gear.  All  is  at  once  bewilderment  and  uncertainty. 
A  sense  of  loss  and  change  and  failure  pervades  all 
ranks.  The  daily  routine  appears  hardly  worth  the 
trouble  of  accurate  performance,  and  for  enterprise 
no  spirit  is  left.  This  is  so,  even  when  the  General 
stands  aloof  and  regards  his  men  with  small  esteem, 
as  was  Wellington's  way ;  but  the  depression  is 
increased  when  the  recall  removes  one  who  is  by 
nature  tempted  to  companionship  in  action,  and  who, 
at  the  lowest  ebb  of  fortune,  stands  always  ready 
with  the  encouraging  word  and  the  outwardly  serene 
aspect  of  hope. 

In  General  Birdwood,  it  is  true,  such  another 
leader  was  found.  His  adventurous  and  sunny  spirit, 
always  alert,  free  of  intercourse,  and  incapable  of 
depression,  made  him  accepted  as  Sir  lan's  natural 
successor  by  all  except  the  few  whose  minds  were  set 
immovably  towards  despair.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this 
well-justified  confidence,  the  mere  fact  of  the  change 
suggested  speculation  upon  other  changes,  and  the 
pulse  of  action  flagged,  as  though  paralysed  by  un- 
certainty.     In    this    condition    General    Sir    Charles 

374 


GENERAL  MONRO'S  REPORT       375 

Monro  found  the  army  when,  after  two  days  spent  in 
the  Headquarters  at  Imbros,  he  visited  the  Peninsula 
on  October  30.  He  was  a  man  of  fifty-five,  who 
before  the  war  had  performed  the  services  usual  to 
an  officer  of  that  period  in  South  Africa,  India,  and  at 
home.  During  the  war  he  had  won  reputation  in  high 
command  on  the  Western  Front.  The  Government 
had  sent  him  out  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  report 
of  an  unbiased  opinion,  and  by  appointing  a  General 
from  the  Western  Front,  and  a  man  of  opposite 
temperament  to  his  predecessor's,  they  had  ensured 
themselves  against  any  possible  bias,  at  all  events  in 
one  direction.  His  orders  were  to  report  upon  the 
military  situation ;  to  give  an  opinion  whether  on 
purely  military  grounds  the  Peninsula  should  be 
evacuated ;  and,  otherwise,  to  estimate  the  troops 
required  (i)  to  carry  the  Peninsula,  (2)  to  keep  the 
Straits  open,  and  (3)  to  take  Constantinople.^ 

Upon  all  these  points  General  Monro  formed  a 
rapid  and  decisive  opinion.  He  represented  the 
military  situation  as  unique  in  history,  and  in  every 
respect  unfavourable.  The  Force,  he  maintained, 
held  a  line  possessing  every  possible  military  defect. 
The  position  was  without  depth,  the  communications 
insecure  and  dependent  on  weather,  the  entrench- 
ments dominated  almost  throughout  by  the  enemy, 
the  possible  artillery  positions  insufficient  and  defec- 
tive, whereas  the  enemy  enjoyed  full  powers  of  ob- 
servation, abundant  artillery  positions  and  opportunity 
to  supplement  the  natural  advantages  by  all  the 
devices  of  engineering.  For  the  troops,  they  could 
not  be  withdrawn  to  rest  out  of  the  shell-swept  area, 

^  Sir  Charles  Monro's  dispatch  (March  6,  1916). 


376  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

because  every  corner  of  the  Peninsula  was  exposed  ; 
they  were  much  enervated  by  the  endemic  diseases 
of  the  summer  ;  there  was  a  grave  dearth  of  compet- 
ent officers  ;  and  the  Territorial  Divisions  had  been 
augmented  by  makeshifts  in  the  form  of  Yeomanry 
and  Mounted  Brigades.  As  to  military  objects,  the 
Turks  could  hold  the  army  in  front  with  a  small 
force  ;  an  advance  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  reason- 
able operation  to  expect ;  and  any  idea  of  capturing 
Constantinople  was  quite  out  of  the  question.  These 
considerations,  in  General  Monro's  opinion,  made  it 
urgent  to  divert  the  troops  locked  up  on  the  Peninsula 
to  a  more  useful  theatre,  and  convinced  him  that  a 
complete  evacuation  was  the  only  wise  course  to 
pursue.^ 

About  that  judgment  there  was,  at  all  events,  no 
hesitating  ambiguity.  Having  condemned  the  whole 
expedition,  root  and  branch,  the  General  was  ob- 
viously not  called  upon  to  discuss  such  minor  details 
as  reinforcements,  or  the  reports  of  Turkish  exhaustion 
and  demoralisation,  or  the  exact  "  theatre  "  in  which 
the  army  would  be  likely  to  immobilise  so  large  a 
Turkish  force  (Mr.  Asquith  estimated  it  as  200,000),^ 
and  restrain  them  from  co-operating  in  further  assaults 
upon  Mesopotamia  or  Egypt.  To  be  sure,  there  was 
Salonika  as  a  possible  alternative  ;  but  Sir  Charles 
Monro  must  have  been  aware  that  Serbia  was  by 
that  time  past  saving,  and  that  the  transference  of 
the  Gallipoli  army  to  Salonika  would  simply  relieve 
Turkey  of  all  anxiety  and  restraint.  The  probable 
loss     of    prestige     and     of     men     involved     in     the 

^  Sir  Charles" Monro's  dispatch  (March  6,  1916). 

*  Speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  November  2,  1915. 


THE  ADVOCATES  OF  EVACUATION  377 

evacuation  does  not  appear  to  have  influenced  his 
decision ;  and,  indeed,  as  the  event  afterwards 
proved,  the  loss  in  both  was  vastly  overestimated 
by  the  advocates  of  evacuation  as  well  as  by  its 
opponents. 

The  report  was,  naturally,  grateful  to  such  of  the 
Generals  on  the  spot  and  such  of  Sir  lan's  former 
Staff  as  had  already  abandoned  hope.  Some,  indeed, 
were  now  of  opinion  that  the  evacuation  should  have 
been  ordered  at  midsummer  or  before.  Still  more 
welcome  was  the  report  to  the  party  in  England 
which  had  always  distrusted  the  Dardanelles  adventure, 
and  had  so  largely  contributed  to  its  failure  both  by 
their  depreciation  and  by  their  encouragement  to  irre- 
sponsible counsellors  of  despair.  They  kept  their 
thoughts  fixed  upon  the  Western  Front,  since,  by  a 
law  of  human  nature,  interest  varies  directly  with 
proximity,  and  some  mental  or  imaginative  effort  is 
required  to  realise  the  importance  of  distant  under- 
takings. Already  (on  October  14,  two  days  before 
Sir  lan's  recall)  Lord  Milner  had  made  the  following 
statement  in  the  House  of  Lords : 

"  When  I  hear  that  it  would  be  a  terrible  thing 
to  abandon  our  Dardanelles  adventure  because  this 
would  have  so  bad  an  effect  in  Egypt,  in  India, 
upon  our  prestige  in  the  East,  I  cannot  help 
asking  myself  whether  it  will  not  have  a  worse 
effect  if  we  persist  in  that  enterprise  and  it  ends 
in  complete  disaster." 

Lord  Lansdowne,  naturally,  deprecated  so  public 
a  suggestion  ;  but  Lord  Milner  found  support  in  Lord 
Ribblesdale,  who  urged  the  Government  to  "get  out 


378  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

of  the  unfortunate  adventure. "  ^  A  few  days  afterwards 
(October  i8)  Sir  Edward  Carson,  the  Attorney- 
General,  resigned  in  protest  against  the  Government's 
hesitation  to  evacuate  the  Peninsula  and  concentrate 
upon  Serbia's  protection,  for  which,  however,  any 
efforts  would  then  have  been  at  least  a  month  too  late. 
Thus  impelled,  Mr.  Asquith's  Cabinet,  in  hopes  of 
justifying  their  firm  resolution  to  adopt  one  course  or 
the  other,  decided  upon  another  preliminary  step. 
They  commissioned  Lord  Kitchener  to  visit  the 
Dardanelles  in  person  and  assume  the  responsibility 
of  decision. 

Lord  Kitchener  left  England  on  November  5, 
and  on  reaching  Mudros  consulted  with  Sir  Charles 
Monro,  who  meantime  had  visited  Egypt  and  now 
returned  in  company  with  Sir  H.  McMahon,  the  High 
Commissioner,  and  Sir  John  Maxwell,  Commanding 
the  Forces  in  Egypt.  On  his  part,  Lord  Kitchener 
was  strongly  opposed  to  evacuation.  His  military 
and  political  instinct  showed  him  the  advantage  of 
maintaining  this  "thorn  in  the  side"  of  Turkey,  even 
if  no  farther  advance  were  possible  during  the  winter, 
— an  advantage  illustrated  too  late  when  Kut-el- 
Amara  fell  in  the  following  April.  Some  of  the  most 
active  spirits  in  the  navy  were  also  continually  urging 
a  renewed  attempt   to   force  the   Narrows  with  the 

1  See  The  "  Titnes  "  History  of  the  War,  Part  84,  p.  213.  It  is  worth 
noticing  that  on  November  18,  Lord  Ribblesdale  in  the  House  of  Lords 
declared  that  it  was  common  knowledge  that  Sir  Charles  Monro  had 
"  reported  in  favour  of  withdrawal  from  the  Dardanelles,  and  adversely 
to  the  continuance  of  winter  operations  there."  One  can  only  suppose 
that,  in  saying  this.  Lord  Ribblesdale  deliberately  intended  to  mislead 
the  enemy,  who  could  hardly  believe  so  rash  a  betrayal  of  intention 
could  be  made  with  impunity,  if  the  statement  were  true. 


LORD  KITCHENER  VISITS  THE  PENINSULA     379 

fleet  now  that  ships  were  far  more  numerous,  the 
position  was  better  understood,  and  the  army  could  at 
least  effect  a  strong  diversion  on  the  Peninsula  and 
protect  the  communications  in  case  of  success.  To 
them,  as  to  many  of  the  Generals  ashore,  it  seemed 
still  possible  to  retrieve  the  situation  and  terminate 
the  war  from  the  Eastern  side.  But  on  the  Aragon 
at  Mudros  Lord  Kitchener  was  surrounded  by 
advocates  of  evacuation.  We  know  with  what  solici- 
tous anxiety  he  always  regarded  any  possible  danger 
that  might  threaten  Egypt,  and  the  highest  repre- 
sentatives of  our  authority  there  were  present,  always 
ready  to  urge  the  danger  of  a  Turco-German  invasion 
from  the  East,  and  trouble  with  the  Senussi  on  the 
West.  Sir  Charles  Monro  was  also  present,  and  we 
have  seen  his  opinion — an  opinion  decisively  supported 
by  his  Staff.  Support  also  came  from  one  or  two 
recently  attached  members  of  Sir  lan's  old  Staff.  As 
one  among  them  said,  "We  brought  Lord  Kitchener 
round  to  our  way  of  thinking."  ^ 

This  congenial  task,  perhaps  less  difficult  than  it 
might  have  proved  ten  years  before,  was  no  doubt 
rendered  easier  still  by  Lord  Kitchener's  hurried 
visits  to  the  main  points  on  the  Peninsula.  At  Helles 
the  visit  was  little  more  than  a  call  upon  the  Head- 
quarters of  the  VII Ith  Corps,  and  a  walk  among  the 
remnant  of  the   French  force   at  Seddel  Bahr.     At 

^  Lord  Kitchener's  original  objection  to  evacuation  may  perhaps  be 
supported  by  a  passage  in  an  article  by  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  {Fortnightly 
Review,  February  1918)  :  "The  evacuation  of  Gallipoli  was  not  war- 
ranted in  the  light  of  all  the  elements  of  the  problem,  because  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Coalition  it  meant  the  asphyxiation  of  Russia  and 
her  ultimate  disappearance  as  a  belligerent,  and  to  ward  off  this  calamity 
the  sacrifice  of  several  warships  would  not  have  been  excessive." 


38o  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

Anzac  (November  13),  the  Australians  received  Lord 
Kitchener  with  an  enthusiasm  due  to  his  massive 
personaHty  and  his  record  of  service.  With  resolute 
energy,  outdistancing  his  retinue,  he  strode  up  the 
steep  ascent  of  Walker's  Ridge  to  Russell's  Top,  and 
penetrated  the  front  trenches  whence  the  assault  upon 
the  Nek  had  started  to  destruction.  By  coincidence, 
it  was  a  day  of  singular  calm,  and  not  a  shot  or  shell 
was  fired.  At  Suvla,  in  the  same  way,  he  climbed  up 
Karakol  Dagh  to  a  prominent  cluster  of  rocks  whence 
a  wide  view  is  obtained  over  the  Salt  Lake  and  the 
plain  to  the  encompassing  arc  of  heights  still  held  by 
the  enemy,  and  to  the  unassailed  eminence  of  Koja 
Chemen  Tepe  and  the  fateful  bastion  of  Chunuk  Bair 
beyond.  At  the  conclusion  of  a  Special  Order  issued 
to  the  Anzac  Corps  (now  under  command  of  General 
Godley),  General  Bird  wood  wrote  : 

"  Lord  Kitchener  much  regretted  that  time  did 
not  permit  of  his  seeing  the  whole  corps,  but  he  was 
very  pleased  to  see  a  considerable  proportion  of  officers 
and  men,  and  to  find  all  in  such  good  heart  and  so 
confidently  imbued  with  that  grand  spirit  which  has 
carried  them  throug-h  all  their  trials  and  manv  dang-er- 
ous  feats  of  arms — a  spirit  which  he  is  quite  confident 
they  will  maintain  until  they  have  taken  their  full 
share  in  completely  overthrowing  their  enemies." 

The  passage,  though  apparently  confident,  was 
guarded.  Upon  a  sudden  and  hurried  visit  to  such 
scenes,  even  the  shrewdest  and  most  rapid  mind  would 
be  likely  to  exaggerate  the  disadvantages  of  the 
unusual  positions,  without  taking  account  of  trenches 
and  shelters  rendered  impenetrable,  or  of  supplies 
stored  in  quantity  to  defy  ihe  weather  on  sea  ;  and 


BIRD  WOOD  COMMANDS  ON  PENINSULA     381 

Lord  Kitchener's  mind  was  deliberative  and  vasty 
rather  than  shrewdly  alert  to  the  moment.  But 
ultimately  it  was  the  political  situation,  and  especially 
the  deflection  of  Bulgaria  into  open  hostility,  together 
with  the  stealthy  neutrality  of  King  Constantine, 
which  compelled  Lord  Kitchener  and  even  the  most 
high-spirited  of  the  Peninsula  Generals  reluctantly  to 
assent  to  the  surrender  of  hope. 

While  at  Mudros,  Lord  Kitchener  ordered  General 
Monro  to  assume  command  of  all  British  forces  in 
the  Mediterranean  east  of  Malta,  excluding  Egypt. 
General  Monro  naturally  divided  these  forces  into 
the  "Salonika  Army,"  under  command  of  Lieut- 
General  Sir  Bryan  Mahon,  and  the  "  Dardanelles 
Army,"  under  command  of  Lieut. -General  Sir  William 
Birdwood.  Part  of  the  original  Headquarters  Staff 
of  the  Mediterranean  Expeditionary  Force  was  now 
transferred  from  Imbros  to  the  Aragon  in  Mudros 
harbour,  where  Sir  Charles  Monro  himself  fixed  his 
headquarters.  For  there  he  could  keep  closely  in 
touch  with  General  Altham,  Inspector-General,  Line 
of  Communications,  whose  energy  and  accurate 
organisation  continued  to  confront  the  perpetual  or 
increasing  difficulties  caused  by  weather,  submarines, 
and  the  absence  of  wharves  and  piers  for  transferring 
all  ordnance  and  engineering  stores  from  one  ship  to 
another.  General  Birdwood  henceforward  to  the  last 
retained  command  upon  the  Peninsula,  and  to  him 
the  main  credit  for  the  unexpected  issue  of  the 
following  weeks  is  due.  He  and  his  Staff 
occupied  the  newly  constructed  headquarters  at 
the  foot  of  the  hills  rather  more  than  a  mile  from 
the  chief  landing-stage  at  Imbros,  handing  over  his 


382  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

command  at  Anzac  to  General  Godley,  as  has  been 
mentioned. 

Few  events  varied  the  monotony  of  trench  warfare. 
The  mine-sweeper  Hythe  was  sunk  in  collision  on 
October  28  and  155  men  lost,  including  two  military 
officers.  The  submarine  E20  was  sunk  in  the  Sea 
of  Marmora  early  in  November,  Lieut-Commander 
Clyfford  and  nine  others  being  rescued  and  made 
prisoner.  On  November  15  part  of  the  156th  Brigade 
(52nd  Division)  captured  nearly  300  yards  of  Turkish 
trench  between  the  Vineyard  and  the  Gully  Ravine. 
Once  or  twice  the  Turks  attempted  half-hearted 
attacks  both  at  Helles  and  Anzac,  but  were  easily 
repulsed.  For  the  rest,  little  was  done,  except 
bombing,  mining,  and  preparing  for  the  winter. 
Wooden  beams  and  sheets  of  plate  iron  arrived  in 
some  quantity,  and  v/ere  especially  needed  at  Anzac. 
The  beaches  were,  as  far  as  possible,  cleared.  Stores 
which  had  been  piled  up  in  the  gullies  were  removed 
to  higher  positions.  On  the  left,  among  the  Anzac 
foothills,  Brigadier-General  Monash  ordered  vast 
caverns  to  be  excavated  as  sheltered  barracks  for  his 
4th  Brigade.  Up  at  the  "Apex,"  long  subterranean 
galleries  were  dug  clean  through  the  crest  of 
Rhododendron  Ridge,  so  as  to  command  the  deep 
ravines  between  it  and  Battleship  Hill.  On  one 
occasion  the  fumes  in  an  exploded  mine  tunnel 
caused  several  deaths.  On  another,  an  Anzac  party 
was  cut  off  in  a  gallery  exploded  by  a  Turkish  mine, 
but  dug  themselves  out  and  reappeared  over  the 
parapet  after  three  days'  burial,^ 

^  See  Australia  in  Arms,  pp.  284,  285.     The  fate  of  those  suffocated 
by  fumes  perhaps  caused  the  rumour  that  the  Turks  used  poison  gas. 


GREAT  STORM  OF  NOVEMBER  383 

To  the  end  of  November  the  weather  remained 
fairly  fine,  except  for  heavy  showers  and  occasional 
mists  and  frosts.  The  dust  was  laid,  even  at  Helles 
and  Suvla ;  flies  almost  disappeared,  and  the  prevail- 
ing sickness  was  much  reduced.  But  on  November  27 
and  the  following  four  days  a  natural  disaster  as 
deadly  as  a  serious  engagement  befell  the  Peninsula. 
A  heavy  south-westerly  gale  brought  with  it  a 
thunderstorm  accompanied  with  torrents  of  rain, 
which  poured  down  upon  the  ^gean  and  the 
Peninsula  for  nearly  twenty-four  hours.  In  half  an 
hour  the  wind  rose  to  a  hurricane,  lashing  the  sea  to 
tempest.  At  Kephalos  one  of  the  ships  forming  a 
breakwater  was  sunk,  and  all  the  craft  inside  the  little 
harbour  were  driven  ashore.  At  Helles  and  Suvla 
the  light  piers  and  landing-stages  were  destroyed, 
and  the  shores  strewn  with  wreck.  A  destroyer  was 
driven  ashore  in  Suvla  Bay.  At  Anzac  the  trenches 
were  filled  with  water,  and  streams  roared  down  the 
gullies.  The  fate  of  Suvla  was  more  terrible.  Across 
a  long  and  deep  ravine  leading  obliquely  down  from 
the  "whale-back"  ridge  of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt,  high 
parapets  had  been  constructed  by  Turks  and  British 
alike.  Against  these  parapets  the  water  was  dammed 
up,  as  in  a  reservoir.  They  gave  way,  as  when  a 
reservoir's  embankment  bursts,  and  the  weight  of 
accumulated  water  swept  down  the  ravine  into  the 
valley,  and  from  the  valley  into  the  Salt  Lake  and 
the  shore,  bearing  with  it  stores  and  equipment,  and 
mule-carts  and  mules  and  the  drowning  bodies  of 
Turks  and  Britons,  united  in  vain  struggles  against 

I  never  heard  an  authentic  case  of  this,  though  at  one  time  we  were  all 
ordered  to  carry  gas-masks. 


384  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

the  overwhelming  power  of  nature.  Along  the  other 
sections  of  the  lines,  the  men  stood  miserably  in  the 
trenches,  soaked  to  the  skin,  and  in  places  up  to  their 
waists  in  water. 

Then,  of  a  sudden,  the  wind  swung  round  to  the 

north  and  fell  upon  the  wrecked  and  inundated  scene 

with  icy  blast.      For  nearly  two  days  and  nights  snow 

descended   in  whirling  blizzards,  and  two  days  and 

nights    of    bitter    frost    succeeded    the    snow.     The 

surface  of  the  pools  and  trenches  froze  thick.     The 

men's  greatcoats,  being  soaked  through  with  the  rain, 

froze   stiff  upon  them.      Men   staggered  down  from 

the  lines  numbed  and  bemused  with  the  intensity  of 

cold.     They  could  neither  hear  nor  speak,  but  stared 

about  them  like  bewildered  bullocks.     The  sentries 

and  outposts  in  the  advanced  trenches  could  not  pull 

the  triggers  of  their  rifles  for  cold.     They  saw  the 

Turks  standing  up  on  their  firing  steps  and  gazing 

at  them  over  the  parapets,  and  still  they  did  not  fire. 

It  was  reported  at  the  time  that  the  General,  knowing 

that  the  condition  of  the  enemy  was  probably  worse 

than  ours,  desired  a  general  attack.      But  movement 

was    hardly    possible.     Overcome    by    the    common 

affliction,  our  men  also  stood  up  and  gazed  back  at 

the  Turks.     Few  can  realise  the  suffering  of  those 

four  days. 

As  though  to  test  their  power  of  endurance  up  to 
the  very  last,  the  full  weight  of  misery  fell  upon  the 
29th  Division,  detained  at  Suvla  since  their  final 
battle  of  August  21.  Of  that  Division's  celebrated 
battalions,  the  2nd  Royal  Fusiliers  (86th  Brigade) 
suffered  most,  their  sentries  standing  immovable  at 
their  posts  until  they  froze  to  death,  and  being  found 


ANZAC   IN   SNOW 


EFFECT  OF  THE  BLIZZARD  385 

afterwards  watching  from  the  parapet,  rifle  in  hand. 
The  dead  in  the  IXth  Army  Corps  alone  numbered 
over  200.  From  the  Peninsula  about  10,000  sick 
had  to  be  removed.  Many  were  "frost-bitten"; 
many  lost  their  limbs;  some,  their  reason.  It  is 
probable  that  the  Turks  suffered  even  worse ;  for 
prisoners  said  their  men  had  no  blankets,  no  covering 
at  all  except  their  thin  uniforms  and  frozen  great- 
coats. But  an  enemy's  suffering  is  small  consola- 
tion for  one's  own ;  nor  throughout  the  campaign 
was  the  element  of  vengeful  hatred  of  the  Turk 
ever  one  of  the  impelling  motives  among  our 
fighting  men,  whether  British,  Irish,  Anzac,  or 
Hindu.1 

This  disastrous  storm,  though  none  raged  again 
with  such  fury,  may  have  hastened  the  approach- 
ing end ;  but  the  Cabinet's  decision  was  probably 
taken  immediately  after  Lord  Kitchener's  visit.  On 
November  15,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  in  resigning 
his  office  as  Chancellor  of  the   Duchy  of  Lancaster 

^  That  little  animosity  existed  on  the  Turkish  side  either  is  shown  by 
the  following  note  which  I  made  early  in  December,  though  I  cannot 
date  the  incident  precisely  :  "  The  community  of  human  nature  between 
men  who  are  out  to  kill  each  other  was  lately  shown  here  by  an  interval 
of  friendliness,  as  often  in  France.  It  began  with  the  wagging  of  a 
Turkish  periscope  over  the  sandbags.  One  of  the  Australians  (it  was  at 
Anzac)  wagged  his  periscope  in  answer.  Then  Turkish  hands  were 
held  up,  moving  the  fingers  together  in  the  Turkish  sign  of  amity. 
Presently  heads  appeared  on  both  sides,  the  few  words  that  could  be 
understood  were  said,  cigarettes  and  fruit  were  thrown  from  one  side  to 
the  other,  and  a  note,  written  in  bad  French,  was  thrown  to  the 
Australians,  saying,  '  We  don't  want  to  fight  you.  We  want  to  go  home. 
But  we  are  driven  on  by  the  people  you  know  about.'  I  presume  that 
meant  the  Germans.  Then  signs  were  made  that  an  officer  was 
approaching.  The  heads  disappeared,  and  bombs  were  thrown  from 
trench  to  trench  in  place  of  fruit." 

25 


386  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

— an  office,  it  is  true,  which  afforded  little 
scope  for  the  activity  of  his  restless  interests — 
defended  his  conception  of  the  Dardanelles  Ex- 
pedition in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  expressed 
a  judgment  which  I  believe  will  be  the  judgment 
of  future  time  until  the  campaign  fades  from 
memory  : 

"  If,"  he  said,  "there  were  any  operations  in  the 
history  of  the  world  which,  having  been  begun,  it 
was  worth  while  to  carry  through  with  the  utmost 
vigour  and  fury,  with  a  consistent  flow  of  reinforce- 
ments, and  an  utter  disregard  of  life,  it  was  the 
operations  so  daringly  and  brilliantly  begun  by 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton  in  the  immortal  landing  of 
April  25." 

That  was  the  natural  and  just  lamentation  over 
the  decease  of  the  fine  conception  of  whose  being 
Mr.  Churchill  was  the  author.  But  now  nothing 
remained  for  it  but  decent  burial.  On  November  30, 
having  visited  Salonika  and  Italy,  Lord  Kitchener 
returned.  On  December  8,  Sir  Charles  Monro 
ordered  General  Birdwood  to  proceed  with  the 
evacuation  of  Suvla  and  Anzac.  By  him  the 
whole  scheme  was  designed,  in  co-operation  with 
Rear-Admiral  Rosslyn  Wemyss,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  the  naval  side  owing  to  the  tem- 
porary absence  of  Vice-Admiral  de  Robeck  through 

illness. 

To  bring  away  an  army  from  open  beaches  fully 
exposed  to  a  resolute  enemy  has  always  been  recog- 
nised as  one  of  the  most  difficult  military  operations, 
involving  risk  of  heavy  loss  if  not  disaster.  On 
principle   it  is    not  to  be  undertaken  except  after  a 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVACUATION  387 

defeat  of  the  enemy's  forces.  But  in  this  case  there 
could  be  no  question  of  defeat,  and  the  enemy  was 
nowhere  more  than  300  yards  distant  from  our  front, 
and  at  many  points  no  more  than  10  or  20  yards. 
At  Anzac  and  Suvla  alone,  rather  more  than  83,000 
men  had  to  be  embarked,  together  with  nearly  5000 
horses  and  mules,  nearly  2000  carts,  about  200  guns, 
and  at  each  place  thirty  days'  supply  at  an  average  of 
4  lb.  per  man,  to  say  nothing  of  engineering  and 
medical  stores,  and  all  the  baggage  of  Staffs  and 
officers.^ 

The  highest  estimate  of  the  probable  loss  was 
50  per  cent.  ;  the  lowest  (and  this  was  the  estimate 
I  heard  most  commonly  given  by  Staff  officers  just 
before  the  event)  was  15  per  cent.  At  Mudros  pre- 
paration was  made  for  6000  to  10,000  wounded,  and 
in  case  of  such  losses,  many  of  the  wounded  must  have 
been  left  ashore.^ 

The  force  of  the  enemy  opposite  Suvla  and 
Anzac  was  roughly  calculated  at  about  60,000, 
equally  divided  between  the  two  positions,  and  con- 
sisting   of    Anatolians,    Syrians,    and    Arabs.       But, 


^  The  figures  for  Suvla,  as  given  me  by  the  Staff  at  the  time,  were 
44,000  men  ;  90  guns  of  all  calibre,  including  one  anti-aircraft  gun  ; 
3000  mules  ;  400  horses  ;  30  donkeys  ;  1800  carts  ;  4000  to  5000  cart- 
loads of  stores. 

^  The  account  of  the  Suvla  evacuation  is  founded  on  notes  I  made 
at  the  time  and  on  an  article  of  mine  which  passed  the  Military  Censor 
two  days  after  the  event,  but  was  not  published  in  full  till  I  received 
General  Birdwood's  permission  in  the  following  spring.  It  is  perhaps 
worth  while  here  contradicting  the  report  that  the  Turks  were  bribed 
to  allow  the  army  to  withdraw  without  opposition.  That  malignant 
depreciation  of  a  most  skilful  enterprise  was  a  libel  both  on  the  enemy 
and  on  our  own  officers  and  men.  There  was  not  a  vestige  of  truth 
in  it. 


388 


THE  FIFTH  ACT 


including  reserves,  it  was  thought  there  were  120,000 
in  all  upon  the  Peninsula.^ 

They  were  engaged  upon  constructing  new  gun- 
positions  with  cement  platforms,  especially  behind 
Kavak  Tepe.  It  was  reported  that  a  battery  of 
12-inch  howitzers  and  two  or  three  batteries  of  9-inch 
guns    were    on  their   way   from    Germany,   and    the 


^  The  following  rough  estimate  of  the  Turkish  forces  was  made  by 
the  General  Staff  about  a  week  before  the  evacuation  : 


Place. 

Regiment. 

Number. 

Suvla  Lines — 

Kiretch  Tepe 

126th 

2100 

At  foot  of  Kiretch  Tepe 

127th 

3000 

Farther  in  plain 

33rd 

3000 

Anafarta  plain 

79th 

Uncertain 

Farther  south 

3Sth 

Uncertain 

Still  farther  south  . 

34th 

1800 

Near  Scimitar  Hill 

66th 

Uncertain 

Foot  of  W  Hill       . 

25th 

2400 

Opposite  Hetman  Chair 

66th 

Uncertain 

Anzac  Lines — 

Opposite  Kabak  Kuyu    . 

17th 

1600 

Opposite  Hill  60     . 

i6th 

1200 

Upper  Asma  Dere. 

20th 

1800 

Abdel  Rahman  Bair 

19th 

2300 

Koja  Chemen  Tepe 

24th 

2000 

The  Farm 

22nd 

1800 

Battleship  Hill 

48th 

2000 

Opposite  Russell's  Top 

72nd 

2000 

In  reserve  there 

48th 

Uncertain 

Opposite  Quinn's    . 

27th 

2000 

German  Officers'  and  Johnston'sl 
Jolly                                                   J 

57th 

2000 

Lone  Pine 

125th 

1600 

South  of  Lone  Pine 

47th 

1800 

Leane's  Trench       .... 

36th 

1000 

Extreme  south  to  Gaba  Tepe 

77th 

2700 

Three  regiments  were  in  reserve  at  Suvla,  and  three  at  Anzac. 
The  Army  Headquarters  were  just  south  of  Koja  Dere  ;  Corps  Head- 
quarters in  the  north  behind  Anafarta  Sagir ;  in  the  south  at  Koja 
Dere.     There  were  large  camps  at  Ejelmer  Bay  and  Turchen  Keui 


OUR  SIMPLE  RUSES 


389 


violence  of  the  shell-explosions  upon  our  lines  proved 
that  superior  ammunition  had  already  arrived.  For 
the  rest,  the  Turks  laboured  continuously  at  deepen- 
ing or  multiplying  their  trenches,  and  up  to  the 
final  evening  we  watched  their  spades  throwing  the 
earth  over  their  parapets.  To  keep  them  thus  occu- 
pied in  improving  their  time,  the  army  and  navy 
employed  many  ingenious  devices.  Men  who  had 
been  embarked  at  night,  or  under  tarpaulins  by  day, 
were  brought  back  again  fully  exposed  to  view,  as 
in  a  stage  army.  The  Indian  muleteers  were  ordered 
to  drive  their  carts  continuously  to  and  fro,  making 
as  much  dust  as  possible.  On  the  final  days  all  ranks 
were  ordered  to  maintain  the  immemorial  British 
custom  of  showing  themselves  upon  the  sky-line  and 
serving  their  country  by  walking  where  they  could 
best  be  observed.  Both  at  Anzac  and  Suvla  the 
guns  also  had  during  the  last  few  weeks  been  ordered 

(a  few  miles  inland  from  the  bay)  in  the  north,  and  at  Koja  Dere  in 
the  south. 

At  Helles  the  numbers  were  then  uncertain  or  not  available,  but  the 
following  regiments  were  posted  opposite  our  lines  from  our  left  to  right  : 


Place. 

Regiment. 

West  of  Gully  Ravine    .... 

70th 

East  of  Gully  Ravine     . 

71st 

West  of  Krithia  Nullah  . 

124th 

East  of  Krithia  Nullah  . 

38th 

On  Achi  Baba  Nullah    . 

45th 

Between  that  and  Kerevez  Dere 

S6th 

In  Kerevez  Dere    . 

5Sth 

Opposite  Fort  Gouez 

42nd 

Overlooking  the  Strait   . 

41st 

Taking  an  average  of  2000  per  regiment,  this  gives  a  total  of  18,000, 
apart  from  reserves  ;  but  it  is  a  low  estimate.  The  Headquarters  were 
at  Ali  Bey  Farm. 


390  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

not  to  fire  a  shot  during  certain  intervals,  which  some- 
times lasted  three  days  together.  At  Anzac  on  one 
occasion,  the  Turks  came  creeping  over  towards  our 
parapets,  and  even  entered  the  galleries  to  see  if  we 
still  were  there ;  but  they  were  so  terribly  received 
with  rifles  and  bayonets  that  the  question  of  our 
intentions  appeared  to  them  settled.  Prisoners  and 
deserters  (who  continued  to  come  in  up  to  the  last 
hour)  told  us  that,  in  consequence  of  these  simple 
artifices,  the  Turks  were  even  expecting  a  renewed 
attack.  They  also  spread  a  persistent  rumour  that 
the  Turks  themselves  contemplated  evacuation.  This 
report  was  probably  due  to  the  deserter's  natural 
exaggeration  of  his  miseries ;  but  since  the  tempest 
and  snow  the  condition  of  the  men  in  the  Turkish 
trenches  had,  no  doubt,  been  deplorable. 

At  Suvla,  so  soon  as  the  order  to  evacuate 
arrived,  our  men  began  fortifying  the  points  at  each 
end  of  the  bay,  as  positions  where  a  last  stand  could 
be  made.  The  front  line  extended  for  ii,ooo  yards, 
running  from  the  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Xeros,^  over 
the  lofty  "  whale-back "  of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt  at 
Jephson's  Post,  down  the  steep  southern  slope,  across 

^  The  nth  Division  (Major-General  Fanshawe)  now  held  the  Xeros 
shore  and  the  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt.  On  the  broad  and  deeply  ravined 
undercliff  below  Jephson's  Post,  and  even  beyond  it,  the  32nd  Brigade 
(9th  West  Yorks,  6th  Yorkshire,  8th  West  Riding,  and  6th  York  and 
Lancaster)  had  elaborately  entrenched  and  fortified  positions  which  they 
called  the  "  Green  Knoll "  and  "  The  Boot."  Brigadier-General  Dallas 
was  justifiably  proud  of  the  work  and  of  his  Yorkshire  Brigade.  After 
going  round  the  complicated  trenches  with  me  on  December  11,  he 
whispered  sorrowfully,  "  Pity  to  leave  them  !  Pity  to  leave  them  !  " 
And  to  the  last  he  went  from  man  to  man,  adjuring  one  to  shave, 
another  to  wash  his  shirt,  and  all  to  keep  smart  whatever  happened. 
To  such  temper  the  difficult  operation  owed  its  success. 


ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  EMBARKATION       391 

the  tree- covered  and  partly  cultivated  plain  through 
the  farms  of  Anafarta  Ova  and  Sulajik,  in  front  of 
Green  and  Chocolate  Hill,  and  out  into  the  swampy 
level  of  the  Biyuk  Anafarta  valley,  till  it  joined 
up  with  the  Anzac  lines.  Fortunately,  the  recent 
tempest  had  filled  the  Salt  Lake  with  water  to  an 
average  depth  of  4  feet ;  so  that  in  the  centre  of  the 
Suvla  position  no  further  defence  was  required,  and, 
on  the  right,  only  about  1000  yards  of  marshy  and 
waterlogged  plain  had  to  be  entrenched  or  covered 
by  wire  entanglement.  The  remaining  positions 
were  defended  by  three  lines,  wired  and  entrenched, 
barbed-wire  gates  ready  to  close  being  prepared  at 
all  openings  of  paths  and  roads. 

The  embarkation  was  carried  out  from  the  north 
and  south  points  of  Suvla  Bay.  At  the  extreme  end 
of  the  north  or  Suvla  Point  a  small  harbour,  capable 
of  receiving  rafts,  "beetles,"  and  even  trawlers,  had 
been  constructed,  chiefly  by  the  skill  of  the  5th 
Anglesey  Company  R.E.  (Captain  Glenn),  who  had 
blasted  away  the  rock  and  built  an  oblong  of  low 
walls  to  serve  as  wharves.  Near  the  narrow  entrance 
of  this  small  harbour  a  steamer  was  also  run  aground 
as  a  stage  alongside  of  which  larger  transports  could 
lie.  Guns,  horses,  mules,  and  stores  were  taken  off 
on  rafts  and  "  beetles "  in  the  little  harbour.  The 
battalions  embarked  from  the  sunken  steamer,  usually 
also  on  "beetles"  or  trawlers.  The  53rd  Division 
went  first.  Of  the  old  fighting  29th  Division,  the 
86th  Brigade  followed,  getting  away  on  the  night  of 
December  14-15.  There  remained  the  nth,  13th, 
and  Mounted  Divisions,  together  with  the  88th 
Brigade  of  the   29th,    and  it  was  arranged  that  the 


392  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

nth  Division  with  the  88th  Brigade  and  one  brigade 
of  the  13th  should  leave  from  the  north  point,  and 
the  other  two  brigades  of  the  13th,  together  with 
the  "  mounted  "  forces  and  500  Gurkhas  of  the  Indian 
Brigade  from  Anzac,  from  the  south  or  Nibrunesi 
Point,  where  they  could  embark  from  the  C  and  B 
Beaches  of  the  original  landing,  under  cover  of  Lala 
Baba  and  the  cliffs.  A  new  pier  had  also  been 
constructed  near  the  point  on  the  inside  of  Suvla  Bay, 
fairly  sheltered,  though  exposed  to  observation  and 
shell-fire  from  "  The  Pimple  "  and  that  part  of  Kiretch 
Tape  Sirt.  In  fact,  on  the  very  last  day  (December 
19),  while  I  was  at  General  Maude's  13th  Division 
Headquarters  overlooking  the  pier  from  the  cliff, 
a  57-inch  shell  tore  a  large  gap  in  the  middle  of  it ; 
but  it  was  rapidly  repaired  by  the  Engineers.  A 
similar  pier  had  been  constructed  on  the  far  or  Xeros 
side  of  Suvla  Point,  below  the  cliff  on  which  General 
Byng  had  now  fixed  the  IXth  Army  Corps  Head- 
quarters. This  was  entirely  sheltered  and  unobserved, 
but  was  only  to  be  used  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
very  last  detachment.  The  naval  part  of  the  em- 
barkation at  Suvla  Point  was  under  the  direction  of 
Captain  Unwin,  who  organised  and  conducted  it 
with  the  same  enthusiastic,  not  to  say  explosive, 
energy  which  he  had  displayed  during  the  landing  on 
V  Beach  from  the  River  Clyde. 

Night  after  night,  and  all  night  long,  the  anxious 
labour  was  resumed.  Guns — the  "heavies,"  the 
howitzers,  and  the  field-guns — were  drawn  down  to 
the  harbour,  and  pushed  or  pulled  with  ropes  upon 
the  rafts.  Mules  and  horses  were  brought  down,  but 
gradually,  lest  the  enemy  should  notice  the  emptiness 


RISKS  DURING  THE  FINAL  NIGHTS  393 

of  the  horse-lines  along  the  point.^  Stores  were 
brought  down,  all  that  might  have  been  needed  only 
for  summer  or  for  a  long  campaign  coming  first.  Then 
came  the  men,  brigade  by  brigade,  battalion  by 
battalion,  mustering  at  definite  points  about  half  a 
mile  from  the  harbour,  and  in  turn  filing  down  to  the 
transports.  There  was  no  confusion,  no  visible  ex- 
citement. Silently  the  men  took  their  places,  and 
moved  to  quiet  orders.  Each  carried  full  kit  with 
pick  and  shovel  or  periscope. 

As  each  night  of  the  final  week  passed  and  the 
defences  became  weaker,  the  anxiety  increased, 
though  none  was  shown  or  mentioned.  Apart  from 
a  general  attack,  danger  lay  in  three  points — the 
wind,  the  moon,  and  shelling  by  night.  A  south- 
west gale,  or  even  a  strong  breeze  arising  in  the  last 
two  days,  would  have  stopped  embarkation  and  left 
us  almost  defenceless.  The  moon  was  waxing,  but  a 
thin  mist  veiled  it  almost  every  night,  and  the  half- 
obscured  radiance  helped  to  guide  our  men  down  the 
paths,  and  did  not  betray  the  meaning  of  the  thin 
black  lines  which  were  just  visible  upon  the  twilit  sea 
as  trawlers,  "  beetles,"  and  rafts  slid  away.  The 
Turks  had  the  beaches  exactly  registered.  At  any 
hour  of  the  night  a  dozen  of  their  heavy  shells  would 
have  reduced  the  little  harbour  to  a  bloody  mash  of 
animals  and  men.  On  the  morning  of  December  16 
they  threw  six  47-inch  shells  of  improved  bursting 

^  The  management  of  their  mules  by  the  Indians  was  remarkable. 
They  controlled  those  incalculable  animals  as  though  they  were  trained 
dogs.  It  was  pathetic  that  the  Indians  mistook  the  name  of  their 
destination  (Mudros)  for  Madras.  "Do  you  want  to  go  to  India  so 
much,  then  ? "  an  officer  asked.  "  Does  a  man  want  to  go  to  heaven  ?  " 
was  the  reply. 


394  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

quality  right  into  the  middle  of  the  embarkation 
beach,  but  it  was  almost  empty  then,  and  only  one 
man  was  hurt.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  they 
shelled  A  West  Beach  heavily  for  an  hour.  Such 
events  showed  their  power  for  our  destruction,  but 
the  nights  remained  undisturbed,  except  by  our  own 
ceaseless  toil.  An  immense  blaze  of  stores,  lighted 
accidentally  at  Anzac  before  dawn  on  December  18, 
increased  the  peril  of  discovery,  but  the  Turks  re- 
mained indifferent  to  portents. 

The  last  day  came.  It  was  Sunday,  December  19. 
Little  by  little  the  forces  at  Suvla  had  been  reduced 
to  12,000  men  and  16  guns,  whereas,  to  hold  a  front 
line  the  length  of  ours,  SSyO^'^  ^^^  would  be  required 
by  regulation.  The  day  was  passed  as  usual,  each 
man  doing  his  utmost  to  give  a  crowded  appearance 
to  the  scene.  At  sunset,  the  guns  fired  their  parting 
salute  and  were  withdrawn — the  last  at  9.30.  The 
men  were  then  brought  away  —  rather  more  than 
6000  to  Suvla  Point,  rather  less  to  Nibrunesi.  A 
small  party  was  left  to  keep  up  rifle-fire  in  the  front 
trenches.  Larger  parties  were  left  to  hold  the  second 
and  third  lines.  The  rest  embarked.  Shortly  before 
midnight  the  front  line  came  in,  leaving  lighted 
candles  which  at  irregular  intervals  burnt  a  string 
to  discharge  a  rifle,  so  that  a  desultory  fusilade  was 
maintained  for  about  an  hour.  The  second  and  third 
lines  followed  in  turn,  only  sappers  remaining  behind 
to  close  up  the  barbed-wire  gates,  to  cut  the  tele- 
phone wires,  and  to  set  trip-  and  contact-mines  at 
points  of  likely  resort.  A  party  of  200  (I  think,  9th 
West  Yorks)  were  to  hold  the  fourth  line  to  the  last, 
and  sacrifice  themselves  if  the  Turks  attacked. 


I 


THE  FINAL  NIGHT  AT  SUVLA  395 

Intermittent  outbursts  of  firing  came  from  the 
Turks,  and  we  could  hear  the  rumbling  explosions  as 
they  toiled  at  blasting  new  trenches — an  interesting 
example  of  labour  lost.  Once  an  aeroplane  whirred 
overhead,  invisible  until  she  dropped  one  green  star, 
which  blazed  for  a  few  seconds  just  below  Saturn 
and  showed  her  to  be  ours.  On  the  earth  a  few 
fires  burned  where  camps  were  once  inhabited,  but 
gradually  they  faded  out.  Two  lights  glimmered 
from  deserted  hospital  tents  along  the  curving  shore  ; 
for  our  doctors  had  remained  to  the  last  in  readiness 
for  the  deaths  and  wounds  of  disaster.  But  now 
even  they  had  gone,  leaving  notes  to  thank  the  Turks 
for  their  consideration  towards  the  Red  Cross. 
Otherwise,  only  the  sea  and  the  moon  showed  light, 
and  over  the  white  surface  of  the  water  those  thin 
black  lines  kept  moving  away. 

From  the  little  harbour  arose  the  varied  noise  of 
screaming  mules,  rattling  anchor  chains,  shouting 
megaphones,  engines  throbbing  and  steamers  hooting 
low.  Still  the  Turks  gave  no  sign  of  hearing, 
though  they  lay  almost  visible  in  the  moonlight  across 
that  familiar  scene.  At  last  the  final  lines  of  defenders 
began  silently  to  steal  down  the  paths  of  Karakol 
Dagh.  Sappers  began  to  come  in,  some  having  just 
fired  vast  piles  of  abandoned  stores — biscuits,  bully- 
beef,  and  bacon.  Officers  of  the  beach  party,  which 
had  accomplished  such  excellent  and  sleepless  work, 
collected.  At  3.30  a.m.  of  the  20th  the  defenders  of 
the  fourth  line — about  200  in  all — embarked  from 
the  concealed  pier  on  the  Gulf  of  Xeros  side  of  the 
cliffs.  And  at  the  same  time,  General  Byng,  motion- 
ing   Brigadier- General  Reed,  his  Chief  of  Staff,    to 


396  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

pass  in  front  of  him,  left  Suvla  Point,  being  the  last 
to  leave. 

From  Nibrunesi  Point,  under  the  direction  of 
General  Maude,  the  evacuation  was  accomplished  in 
the  same  manner  and  with  the  same  success.  The 
whole  movement  involved  the  loss  of  only  two  men, 
and  those  by  accident.  Hospital  tents  remained 
standing,  and  some  provisions  were  burnt.  Not  a 
man  or  gun  or  cart  or  horse  was  left  behind. 

Those  of  us  who  had  reached  the  Cornwallis  in 
Captain  Unwin's  pinnace  at  three  in  the  morning, 
were  roused  at  six  by  bugles  sounding  to  action 
quarters.  Dawn  was  just  breaking,  as  on  the  day 
when  we  landed  upon  that  shore  four  and  a  half 
months  earlier.  But  it  was  still  dark  except  for  the 
glare  of  flames  consuming  the  piles  of  stores  on  Suvla 
Point  and  Lala  Baba,  and  the  lesser  flames  of  a 
wrecked  hospital  lighter  ashore  by  the  "cut"  in  the 
sandy  spit.  By  seven  it  was  almost  daylight,  and  the 
Turks  began  pouring  shells  into  the  fires  to  deter  us 
from  putting  them  out.  With  the  increasing  light, 
they  turned  all  their  guns  on  to  the  empty  beaches, 
trenches,  and  especially  the  positions  on  Hill  lo,  where 
a  battery  had  stood.  Meantime  our  picket-boats  had 
searched  the  shores,  but  found  no  stragglers,  not 
even  an  army  medical,  left  behind.  The  Turkish 
guns  were  then  directed  against  the  battleships,  but 
they  fired  wildly  and  without  effect.  The  Cornwallis 
answered,  her  big  guns  throwing  shells  upon  the  slope 
of  Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt,  her  lesser  armament  destroying 
the  breakwaters,  piers,  and  little  harbour,  so  indus- 
triously constructed.  At  nine  o'clock  she  turned  and 
left  the  long-familiar  scene,  passing  westward  towards 


THE  EVACUATION  OF  ANZAC  397 

the  mountains  of  Imbros  over  a  tranquil  and  sunlit 
sea.  The  evacuation  had  been  hurried  forward  by  a 
day,  and  fortunate  indeed  was  that  anticipation.  By 
nine  o'clock  next  morning  a  south-west  gale  was 
raging,  rain  fell  in  deluge,  and  the  sea  roared  upon  the 
coast.  What  if  the  movement  had  been  delayed  for 
those  few  hours  more  ? 

At  Anzac  the  withdrawal  was  carried  out  with 
equal  daring  and  skill.  The  problem  was  slightly 
different,  for  the  position  extended  in  an  irregular 
fan-shape,  the  centre  being  very  short  (only  about 
500  yards  in  direct  line  from  the  Nek  to  the  Cove) 
but  stretching  northward  on  the  left  for  rather  over 
3  miles  to  Hill  60  and  the  Biyuk  Anafarta  plain  ;  and 
southward  on  the  right  for  about  i|  miles  to  Chatham 
Post.  The  flanks  had  therefore  to  be  brought  in 
first,  and  no  interior  defences  were  made  except  a 
strong  redoubt  as  a  kind  of  "keep"  within  the  Cove 
itself.  It  is  probable  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  left 
flank,  where  the  ground  is  comparatively  open,  could 
not  have  escaped  observation  but  for  the  supposed 
presence  of  a  large  force  at  Suvla,  and,  in  that  sense, 
Suvla  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  salvation  of 
Anzac.  The  embarkation  was  carried  out  partly 
from  the  new  pier  on  Ocean  Beach  north  of  Ari 
Burnu,  partly  from  the  repaired  piers  in  the  Cove. 

Of  the  40,000  at  Anzac,  about  20,000  had  been 
gradually  taken  off  to  Mudros  by  December  18. 
That  night  over  10,000  more  were  sent  away.  All 
but  nine  worn-out  guns  had  gone,  two  being  left  close 
up  to  the  firing  line,  where  they  had  been  stationed 
from  the  first.  Aeroplanes  kept  watch  all  day,  five 
being  at  times  up  together — a  large  number  for  Galli- 


398  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

poll — and  no  hostile  plane  was  allowed  to  approach. 
On  the  morning  of  Sunday,  19th,  the  few  guns  kept 
up  a  brave  show  of  bombardment,  the  Turks  answer- 
ing with  their  increased  number  of  guns,  no  less  than 
seventeen  of  which  were  now  posted  in  the  Olive 
Grove,  commanding  the  main  beach  of  embarkation. 
As  at  Suvla,  the  few  remaining  men  (about  10,000  in 
all)  were  directed  to  show  themselves  freely,  and 
many  spent  the  morning  in  tending  for  the  last  time 
the  graves  of  the  8000  comrades  who  there  lay 
buried. 

The  6000  stationed  in  the  afternoon  to  guard  the 
outer  lines  were  divided  into  three  groups — A,  B, 
and  C — of  2000  each,  and  there  arose  a  violent  com- 
petition to  belong  to  the  C  group,  known  as  "  Die- 
hards,"  because  they  were  to  be  the  last  to  leave. 
Group  A  came  from  the  northern  positions  and  in- 
cluded parties  of  the  ist  and  3rd  Light  Horse 
Brigades,  the  4th  Australian  Brigade,  and  the  New 
Zealand  Mounted  Rifles  with  the  Maoris  (from 
Hill  60).  They  marched  in  absolute  silence,  maga- 
zines empty,  no  smoking  allowed,  footsteps  deadened 
by  sacking  spread  over  the  hard  patches  of  ground 
and  over  the  planks.  By  ten  o'clock  they  had  all 
embarked  from  Ocean  Beach.  At  midnight  Group  B 
gathered  in  the  Cove.  Among  them  were  New 
Zealand  Infantry  from  the  heights  of  Sari  Bair,  20th 
Infantry  from  the  Nek,  17th  Infantry  from  Quinn's, 
23rd  and  24th  from  Lone  Pine,  6th  Light  Horse  from 
Chatham's  Post  far  on  the  right.  Thus  the  veteran 
I  St  Australian  Division  of  the  Landing  was  now 
mingled  with  the  2nd  Division,  sent  to  uphold  them 
and  give  them  some  opportunity  for  relief.     Descend- 


ANZAC  ABANDONED  399 

ing  the  diverse  gullies  from  the  fan-like  extremities, 
each  position  bearing  so  fine  a  record  during  the  eight 
months  of  struggle  and  endurance,  they  concentrated 
punctually  and  without  confusion.  The  Navy  held 
the  transports  ready,  and  they  went. 

Only  2000  men  now  remained  to  guard  the  long 
and  devious  lines  from  Chatham's  Post  to  the  Apex 
and  the  Farm.  About  1.30  a.m.  of  Monday  the  20th, 
a  bomb  thrown  from  the  "Apex"  marked  the  aban- 
donment of  that  hard-won  and  hard-held  position. 
Thence  New  Zealanders  came  down  :  from  Courtney's 
and  Pope's,  i8th  and  19th  Infantry;  from  Quinn's, 
the  17th.  By  3  a.m.  only  800  "  Die-hards"  were  left 
in  groups  at  points  where  the  Turkish  lines  came 
within  a  few  yards'  distance.  By  3.30,  Lone  Pine, 
Quinn's,  and  Pope's  were  finally  abandoned,  and 
Anzacs  rushed  down  White's  Valley  and  Shrapnel 
Gully  for  the  last  time.  As  they  reached  the  Cove, 
a  violent  explosion,  which  seemed  to  shake  even  the 
ships  at  Suvla,  thundered  from  the  heights.  Three 
and  a  half  tons  of  amenol,  laid  by  the  5th  Company 
Australian  Engineers,  had  blown  a  great  chasm  across 
the  Nek,  and  that  ready  entrance  to  the  deserted 
lines  was  blocked  as  by  a  moat  and  rampart.  Rifles 
continued  to  fire  from  the  old  positions — fired  by  sand 
running  from  buckets.  The  Turks  burst  into  one  of 
their  panic  rages  of  fire  against  the  empty  trenches, 
from  which  they  now  expected  a  general  assault. 
The  naval  guns  pounded  the  hills.  The  last  of  the 
transports  departed,  and  Anzac  shore  was  nothing  but 
a  lasting  name. 

A  few  stragglers  were  taken  off  by  picket-boats  in 
the  early  morning.     A  few  guns — four   i8-pounders, 


400  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

two  5-inch  howitzers,  one  47  naval  gun  (said  to  have 
been  in  Lady  smith,  and,  in  that  case,  called  the 
"Lady  Anne"  or  the  ''Bloody  Mary"),  one  anti- 
aircraft, and  two  3-pounder  Hotchkiss  guns  had  to  be 
left,  but  were  disabled.  Some  carts  without  wheels, 
and  fifty-six  mules  were  also  left,  and  some  stores 
burnt.  The  execution  of  the  whole  movement  con- 
ferred just  honour  upon  Major-General  Sir  Alexander 
Godley  and  Brigadier-General  Cyril  B.  B.  White,  his 
Chief  of  Staff,  not  to  mention  other  names  well 
worthy  of  mention,  and  now  regretfully  to  be  parted 
with.^ 

Even  after  the  evacuation  of  Suvla  and  Anzac, 
many  hoped  that  Helles  at  least  would  be  retained  as 
a  perpetual  threat  to  the  heart  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 
But  being  by  this  time  deeply  entangled  at  Salonika, 
where  the  French  and  English  forces  had  lately  been 
driven  back  from  the  edges  of  Serbia  across  the  Greek 
frontier,  the  Cabinet  resolved  to  wipe  out  the  Dar- 
danelles Expedition,  as  a  gambler  "cuts  his  losses," 
and  leave  no  trace  or  profit  of  all  the  army's  incom- 
parable deeds.  Certainly,  it  would  have  been  difficult 
to  remain  at  Helles  now  that  heavy  guns  were  being 
brought  down  from  Suvla  and  Anzac ;  superior 
German  shells  had  arrived,  and  German  guns  were 

^  Beside  my  personal  observation  during  visits  from  Suvla  in  the 
final  days,  my  chief  authorities  upon  the  Anzac  evacuation  are  Phillip 
Schuler's  Australia  in  Arms,  an  officer's  diary  in  the  "  Majtchester 
Guardian's"  History  of  the  War,  Part  43,  p.  187;  Sir  Charles 
Monro's  dispatch  ;  and  conversation  with  men  who  were  present.  A 
German  correspondent  with  the  Turks  on  the  night  of  the  evacuation 
wrote  in  the  Vossische  Zeitung  of  January  21,  1916  :  "  So  long  as  wars 
exist,  the  British  evacuation  of  the  Ari  Burnu  and  Anafarta  fronts  will 
stand  before  the  eyes  of  all  strategists  of  retreat  as  a  hitherto  quite 
unattained  masterpiece." 


EVACUATION  OF  HELLES  ORDERED         401 

on  the  way.  Throughout  the  end  of  December  the 
bombardment  was  at  times  very  violent,  reaching 
extreme  intensity  about  i  p.m.  on  December  24, 
when  the  right  and  centre  of  our  line,  from  the  front 
trenches  to  the  sea,  suffered  the  severest  shelling 
experienced  at  Helles.^  With  the  help  of  the 
Navy,  and  by  the  construction  of  deeper  trenches 
and  solid  shelter,  it  might  have  been  possible  to  hold 
the  position  as  a  kind  of  Gibraltar  guarding  the 
Straits.  But  Imbros  and  Tenedos,  for  a  naval  Power, 
served  that  purpose  with  less  risk,  and  since  the 
glorious  hope  of  advancing  upon  Constantinople  was 
definitely  abandoned,  it  was  argued  best  to  quit  Helles 
and  the  whole  Peninsula. 

On  Christmas  Eve,  General  Birdwood  was 
directed  to  prepare  a  scheme  ;  four  days  later  to 
complete  the  evacuation  as  quickly  as  possible.^  The 
problem  was  to  bring  away  unnoticed  rather  more 
than  35,000  men,  about  4000  animals,  about  no  guns, 
and  over  1000  tons  of  stores.  Most  of  the  remaining 
French  Division  had  been  gradually  withdrawn  dur- 
ing December,  and  the  4000  left  at  the  end  of  the 
year  were  embarked  on  French  warships  during  the 
night  of  January  1-2.  By  consent  of  General  Brulard, 
however,  the  French  guns  were  left  under  command 
of  General  Davies  with  the  Vlllth  Corps.  The 
French  lines  were  taken    over  by  the  Royal  Naval 

^  A  dilatory  and  whispering  6-inch  shell,  thrown  from  a  black-powder 
battery  north  of  Troy,  was  called  "Creeping  Caroline"  by  our  men. 
Similarly  the  French  called  one  particular  shell  '•  Marie  pressee  " — no 
doubt  a  "  high  velocity." 

2  On  December  30  Sir  Charles  Monro  handed  over  his  command  to 
General  Sir  Archibald  Murray  and  left  Mudros  for  Alexandria  on  his 
way  back  to  France. 
26 


402  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

Division — that  military  maid  -  of  -  all  -  work.  Some 
have  said  that  the  soldier  -  sailors  were  dressed  in 
French  grey  to  deceive  such  of  the  enemy  as  could 
not  hear  or  understand  their  language ;  but  this 
was  untrue. 

The  42nd  (East  Lancashire)  Division,  which  had 
throughout  done  such  steady  and  persistent  work 
under  Major-General  Douglas,  was  withdrawn  for  a 
much-needed  rest,^  and  the  13th  (Major- General 
Stanley  Maude),  having  been  at  Imbros  since  the 
Suvla  evacuation,  was  transferred  to  Helles.  The 
redoubtable  29th  Division  was  also  sent  back  to  the 
scene  of  its  early  triumphs.  The  troops  to  go  at  the 
last  belonged,  therefore,  to  the  13th,  29th,  52nd,  and 
Royal  Naval  Divisions. 

During  the  days  of  preparation,  little  happened  to 
break  the  appearance  of  routine.  Almost  the  last 
assault  from  our  side  had  been  made  on  December  1 9, 
when,  simply  to  distract  attention  from  the  evacuation 
in  the  north,  parts  of  the  42nd  and  52nd  Divisions  at- 
tacked beside  the  Krithia  Nullah,  and  the  5th  High- 
land Light  Infantry  (157th  Brigade)  especially  distin- 
guished themselves.  Sir  Charles  Monro  also  mentions 
a  successful  attack  by  the  52nd  Division  on  Decem- 

^  Shortly  before  it  left,  a  deed  of  singular  heroism  added  honour  to 
the  42nd  Division.  On  December  22,  in  front  of  Krithia,  Second  Lieut. 
Alfred  Victor  Smith  (5th  East  Lancashire,  126th  Brigade),  only  son  of 
the  Chief  Constable  of  Burnley,  was  throwing  a  grenade  when  it  slipped 
from  his  hand  and  fell  to  the  bottom  of  the  trench,  close  to  several 
officers  and  men.  He  shouted  a  warning,  and  jumped  clear  into  safety. 
But  seeing  that  the  others  were  unable  to  get  into  cover,  and  knowing 
the  grenade  was  due  to  explode,  he  returned  without  hesitation  and 
flung  himself  down  on  it.  He  was  instantly  killed  by  the  explosion. 
See  the  London  Gazette  announcing  that  the  Victoria  Cross  had  been 
conferred  on  him  after  death. 


LAST  FIGHTING  ON  THE  PENINSULA       403 

ber  29.  But,  for  the  most  part,  on  our  side  we  be- 
guiled the  Turk  by  periods  of  complete  silence, 
especially  between  8  p.m.  and  2  a.m.,  so  as  to 
habituate  him  to  inattentive  repose.  For  the  last 
days,  one  British  6-inch  gun  and  six  old-fashioned 
French  "  heavies "  alone  were  retained,  to  give  a 
semblance  of  active  hostility.  On  January  7,  however, 
the  very  day  before  our  departure,  the  enemy,  possessed 
by  one  of  his  unaccountable  moods,  directed  a 
terrible  bombardment  against  the  13th  Division  on 
our  left  from  Achi  Baba,  and  a  slighter  fire  against 
the  R.N.D.  on  our  right  from  Asia.  It  lasted  all 
afternoon,  and  at  3.30  the  Turks  attempted  an  attack 
near  Fusilier  Bluff,  between  Gully  Ravine  and  the  sea. 
Officers  were  seen  urging  the  men  forward  as  in 
earlier  days ;  but  the  men  had  no  longer  the  spirit  of 
earlier  days,  and  since  they  were  disinclined  to  move, 
the  attack  faded  away.  Fortunately,  our  want  of 
artillery  was  compensated  by  a  naval  squadron  off 
the  west  coast.  None  the  less,  we  lost  a  hundred 
and  six  wounded  and  fifty  -  eight  killed  —  the  last 
to  lay  their  bones  upon  the  earth  of  that  dedicated 
Peninsula.  The  7th  North  Staffords  were  chiefly 
engaged. 

Next  morning  (January  8)  rose  fair,  with  a  light 
southerly  breeze.  The  Turks  kept  unusually  quiet, 
and  it  was  resolved  to  accomplish  the  evacuation 
as  arranged.  Major-General  Lawrence  (CO.  52nd 
Division)  had  been  put  in  charge  of  the  embarkation 
on  the  military  side.  Positions  on  all  the  beaches 
were  fortified  as  redoubts  for  a  small  garrison  to  hold 
to  the  last.  On  Gully  Beach,  Major-General  Maude 
selected  the  position  and  prepared  the  evacuation  of 


404  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

his  13th  Division.  Specially  selected  officers  super- 
intended the  W  and  V  Beaches.  The  naval  arrange- 
ments were  carried  out  by  Captain  C.  M.  Staveley, 
R.N.,  assisted  by  naval  officers  at  each  point  of 
embarkation.  In  addition  to  the  three  strongly 
wired  lines  of  defence  across  the  Peninsula,  a  fourth 
had  been  constructed  from  Gully  Beach  to  De 
Tott's  Battery.  Troops  on  the  left  naturally  with- 
drew from  Gully  Beach  or  W  (four  piers) ;  on  the 
right  from  V  Beach  (three  piers  and  the  River 
Clyde). 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  final  day  the  Divisions 
had  only  four  battalions  apiece  remaining  upon  the 
Peninsula.  They  came  away  in  three  groups  or  trips, 
the  first  withdrawing  soon  after  7  p.m.  and  getting  off 
in  destroyers  and  "  bettles  "  without  difficulty.  But  at 
sunset  the  breeze  freshened,  and  it  began  to  blow 
hard  from  the  south-west,  the  quarter  to  which  W 
Beach  was  most  exposed.  The  connecting  platform 
between  the  shore  and  the  hulks  which  served  as 
wharves  there  was  washed  away  by  heavy  seas. 
Still,  the  second  group,  and  even  guns,  were  safely 
taken  off  about  midnight.  On  V  Beach,  while  the 
second  group  was  waiting  at  eleven  o'clock,  the 
Asiatic  guns  began  to  bombard,  but  fortunately  all 
but  two  shells  fell  short  into  the  sea,  and  only  one 
man  was  wounded.  Hardly,  however,  had  fifty  of 
the  R.N.D.  put  off  to  the  Prince  George  in  a 
"beetle"  at  11.30  and  got  under  way  for  Mudros 
with  1500  others,  when  they  felt  the  dull  thud  of  a 
torpedo  against  the  vessel's  side.  The  torpedo  did 
not  explode,  but  the  presence  of  the  submarine, 
known    to   the   navy  all   the  evening,   added   to   the 


THE  EVACUATION  OF  HELLES  405 

anxiety  of  the  final  hours.  Starting  from  Gully- 
Beach,  a  lighter  also  went  aground  after  all  had  left, 
and  the  160  men  had  to  be  landed  again  and 
marched  over  to  W   Beach  for  embarkation. 

At  11.30  the  final  party  or  rearguard — about 
sixty  men  from  each  Division — withdrew  from  the 
front  lines.  With  bombs  and  rifle-fire  they  had  kept 
up  as  much  noise  as  they  could  to  conceal  the  move- 
ment of  the  rest.  Now,  leaving  lights  and  devices 
by  which  dropping  water  filled  tins  and  discharged 
rifles  when  the  tins  were  full,  they  crept  away  under 
cover  of  officers'  patrols,  who  maintained  a  desultory 
fire,  barred  the  gates,  and  connected  the  mines. 
About  2.30  all  arrived  at  the  beaches,  to  find  a 
heavy  surf  dashing  upon  the  shore.  Nevertheless, 
though  under  great  stress  and  peril,  by  3.30  the 
beaches  were  cleared.  The  Military  Transport 
Officer,  coming  off  the  River  Clyde,  was  the  last 
man  to  leave.  Time  fuses  lighted  the  heaps  of  aban- 
doned stores,  and  exploded  masses  of  ammunition. 
In  all,  fourteen  of  our  well-worn  old  15-pounders,  a 
6-inch  gun,  and  the  six  old  French  "heavies"  were 
abandoned  and  destroyed.  Far  worse  was  the  fate 
of  508  horses  and  mules,  most  of  which  were  killed. 
All  animals  and  stores  might  have  been  embarked, 
had  it  been  safe  to  wait.  But  the  rising  storm  of 
that  night  was  a  warning,  and,  as  at  Suvla,  only  by 
the  barest  luck  in  weather  was  disaster  avoided.  The 
Turks  began  shelling  the  beaches  at  the  first  sight  of 
the  fires,  and  continued  that  unprofitable  expenditure 
till  6.30  a.m.  of  January  9.  At  Helles,  as  at  Suvla 
and  Anzac,  those  incalculable  Orientals  remained 
ignorant  of  our  departure,  though  here  expecting  it. 


4o6 


THE  FIFTH  ACT 


No  doubt  they  were  glad  at  our  going ;  naturally, 
they  were  glad.  And  so,  by  the  evacuation,  our 
authorities,  whether  political  or  military,  were 
acting  contrary  to  Napoleon's  maxim  of  war : 
"  Never  do  what  you  know  your  enemy  wants  you 
to  do." 

So  the  episode  of  the  Dardanelles  Expedition, 
equal  in  splendour  of  conception,  heroism,  and 
tragedy,  came  to  an  end.  During  the  eight  and  a 
half  months  of  its  continuance  upon  the  Peninsula 
itself,  the  land  forces,  including  the  Royal  Naval 
Division,  but  not  counting  the  Navy  or  the  French 
(whose  losses  are  not  published),  suffered  the  following 
loss : 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Total. 

Officers .         .        .       1,745 
Other  ranks  .         .     26,455 

3,143 
74,952 

78,095 

353 
10,901 

5,241 
112,308 

117,549 

Totals       .     28,200 

11,254 

A  large  proportion  of  the  missing  must  be  counted 
as  killed.  The  number  of  sick  admitted  to  hospital 
between  April  25  and  December  11,  19 15,  was 
96,683,  of  whom  also  a  considerable  proportion  died. 
If  we  may  take  about  one-quarter  of  the  missing  as 
killed,  and  about  one-twentieth  of  the  sick  as  having 
died,  the  total  of  lives  lost  amounts  to  about  36,000. 
The  total  losses  of  the  Turks  have  been  variously 
estimated  between  400,000  and  500,000,  but  those 
estimates  are  conjectural. 

The  causes  of  our  failure  have  been,  as   I   hope. 


MILITARY  CAUSES  OF  THE  FAILURE       407 

reasonably  signified  in  the  preceding  account  of  the 
campaign.  They  may  be  summarised  in  relation  either 
to  the  movements  on  the  spot,  or  to  the  attitude  of 
the  home  Government.  On  the  spot,  we  failed  chiefly 
owing  to  the  premature  naval  attacks,  which  gave 
the  enemy  warning  of  our  intention,  and  owing  to  the 
design  of  forcing  the  Straits  with  the  Navy  alone, 
which  might  indeed  have  been  temporarily  successful 
if  persisted  in,  but  in  the  end  would  have  given  us 
only  a  dubious  advantage  ;  for  a  fleet  penetrating  to 
the  Sea  of  Marmora  would  have  remained  danger- 
ously isolated  so  long  as  both  sides  of  the  Straits 
were  strongly  held  by  the  enemy.  The  second  initial 
error  was  the  delay  in  concentrating  the  military 
forces  for  the  land  attack — a  delay  chiefly  due  to  the 
retention  of  the  29th  Division  in  England,  and  to  the 
necessity  of  returning  the  transports  from  Mudros  to 
Alexandria  for  the  rearrangement  of  the  military 
stores  and  munitions.  As  to  the  actual  operations  on 
land,  it  might  be  argued,  in  the  light  of  wisdom  after 
the  event,  that  the  first  landing  had  better  have  been 
made  by  a  combined  force  at  Suvla  Bay  and  on  the 
Ocean  Beach  at  Anzac,  though,  in  that  case,  larger 
numbers  than  those  allotted  to  the  Expedition  at  the 
beginning  must  have  been  demanded.  Again,  with 
regard  to  the  failure  of  the  August  operations,  it 
might  now  be  maintained  that  the  forces  at  Anzac 
were  dissipated  by  the  assaults  at  Lone  Pine  and  the 
Nek,  and  by  the  over-elaborate  subdivision  of  the 
attacking  forces  upon  our  left.  Even  in  spite  of  the 
natural  intricacy  of  the  ground,  a  concentration  of  all 
available  troops  into  one  main  body  (or  at  most  into 
two)  for  a  grand  assault   upon   the  Sari  Bair  range 


4o8  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

from  Chunuk  Bair  to  Koja  Chemen  Tepe  might  have 
given  better  results.  As  to  the  "  inertia "  which 
prevailed  at  Suvla  on  the  critical  day  of  August  8, 
and  the  confusion,  delay,  and  fatal  mistakes  of  the 
preceding  and  following  days,  thus  precluding  the 
support  to  the  Anzac  movement  upon  which  the 
Commander-in-Chief  had  fairly  calculated,  no  more 
need  be  said.  Owing  partly  to  the  temperament  of 
Generals,  partly  to  the  inexperience  of  their  Staffs, 
and  perhaps  chiefly  to  the  want  of  confidence  between 
the  poorly  trained  troops  and  their  senior  officers,  the 
instrument  to  which  he  trusted  broke  in  his  hand. 

The  ultimate  burden  of  failure,  however,  lies  on 
the  authorities  at  home.  The  Allies  were  presented 
with  the  most  brilliant  and  promising  strategical 
conception  of  the  war  up  to  the  present  time  (spring, 
19 1 8).  Success  would  have  given  them  advantages 
already  repeatedly  enumerated :  a  passage  would 
have  been  opened  for  the  supply  of  grain  from 
Russia,  and  a  supply  of  munitions  to  that  country  ; 
the  enemy's  hope  of  advancing  either  towards  Egypt 
or  the  Persian  Gulf  would  have  been  frustrated  ;  the 
Balkan  States  would,  at  worst,  have  remained  neutral, 
or,  calculating  on  future  favours,  would  have  joined 
our  Alliance  in  hurried  gratitude ;  Venizelos  would 
have  remained  in  power,  and  King  Constantine's 
military  and  domestic  predilections  have  been  sup- 
pressed ;  the  belated  attempt  to  rescue  Serbia  after 
her  destruction  was  assured  would  not  have  been 
required ;  Tsar  Ferdinand  would  have  scented  his 
own  advantage  on  the  side  of  Bulgaria's  natural 
sympathies  ;  Roumania,  relieved  from  apprehension 
on   her   southern    frontier,  could   have   watched   the 


POLITICAL  CAUSE  OF  THE  FAILURE        409 

Transylvanian  passes  or  crossed  them  at  pleasure ; 
Russia  might  possibly  have  retained  her  front  lines 
intact,  and,  at  the  worst,  would  have  immobilised  large 
armies  of  the  enemy.  The  Central  Powers  would 
then  indeed  have  been  surrounded  with  an  "iron 
ring,"  and  peace  secured  in  the  spring  of  19 16. 
The  main  disadvantages  of  such  a  peace  to  the 
world  would  have  been  the  probable  occupation  of 
Constantinople  by  Russia,  the  fortification  of  the 
Straits  in  her  interest,  and  the  continuance  in 
power  of  the  autocratic  Tsardom,  surrounded  by 
its  attendant  supporters  in  bureaucrats,  secret  police, 
provocative  agents,  censors  of  public  opinion,  and  all 
the  other  instruments  of  political  and  religious  tyranny. 
At  that  time  the  future  of  Russia  could  not  be 
foretold,  any  more  than  it  can  be  foretold  now.  But 
the  advantages  here  recapitulated  should  have  been 
too  obvious  even  for  insular  statesmen  to  overlook. 
Mr.  Winston  Churchill  was  justified  in  the  protest 
already  quoted,  that  "if  there  were  any  operations 
in  the  history  of  the  world  which,  having  been  begun, 
it  was  worth  while  to  carry  through  with  the  utmost 
vigour  and  fury,"  it  was  those.  Far  from  displaying 
vigour,  let  alone  fury,  the  Government  appears  to 
have  regarded  the  Expedition  rather  as  an  over- 
burdened father  regards  an  illegitimate  child  put  out 
to  nurse  in  a  distant  village.  It  was  a  "by-blow," 
a  "  side-show,"  something  apart  from  the  normal  and 
recognised  order  of  things.  A  certain  allowance  had, 
unfortunately,  to  be  apportioned  for  it,  but  if  the 
person  who  superintended  its  welfare  clamoured  for 
more,  that  person  must  be  kept  in  the  proper  place, 
or  palmed  off  with  gifts   that  were  no  gifts.     Every 


4IO  THE  FIFTH  ACT 

breath  of  suspicion  or  detraction  must  be  listened  to, 
every  chance  of  abandonment  welcomed,  and  the 
news  of  a  peaceful  ending  accepted  with  a  sigh  of 
relief. 

For  myself,  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  of  this 
account — faithful  as  far  as  I  could  make  it,  but  so 
inadequate  to  the  tragic  splendour  of  the  theme — I 
feel  again  a  mingled  admiration  and  poignant  sorrow, 
as  when  for  the  last  time  I  watched  the  scene  from 
the  battered  deck  of  the  River  Clyde  and,  under  the 
dying  brilliance  of  sunset,  looked  across  the  purple 
current  of  the  Dardanelles  to  those  deserted  plains 
which  long  ago  also  rang  with  tragic  battle.  The 
time  is  fast  approaching  when  the  deserted  Penin- 
sula of  Gallipoli  looking  across  to  Troy  will  be 
haunted  by  kindred  memories.  There  the  many  men 
so  beautiful  had  their  habitation.  There  they  knew 
the  finest  human  joy — the  joy  of  active  companion- 
ship in  a  cause  which  they  accounted  noble.  There 
they  faced  the  utmost  suffering  of  hardship  and  pain, 
the  utmost  terrors  of  death,  and  there  they  endured 
separation  from  those  whom  they  most  loved.  The 
crowded  caverns  in  which  they  made  their  dwelling- 
place  are  already  falling  in,  except  where  some 
shepherd  uses  a  Headquarters  as  more  weatherproof 
than  his  hut,  or  as  a  sheltered  pen  for  sheep.  The 
trenches  which  they  dug  and  held  to  the  death  have 
crumbled  into  furrows,  covered  with  grass  and  flowers, 
or  with  crops  more  fertile  for  so  deep  a  ploughing. 
The  graves  are  obliterated,  and  the  scattered  bones 
that  cost  so  much  in  the  breeding  have  returned  to 
earth.  But  in  our  history  the  Peninsula  of  the 
Dardanelles,   the    Straits,  the  surrounding  seas,   and 


THE  END 


411 


the  islands  set  among  them  will  always  remain  as 
memorials  recording,  it  is  true,  the  disastrous  and 
tragic  disabilities  of  our  race,  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
its  versatility,  its  fortitude,  and  its  happy  though 
silent  welcome  to  any  free  sacrifice  involving  great 
issues  for  mankind. 


INDEX 


(I ai/i  indebted io  Mrs.  E. 


M.  White_/»^  undertaking  the  difficult  task  of  this 
Index.— Yl.  W.  N.) 


A  Beach  (true),  299,  301,  304  and  n.,  358, 

A  East  Beach,  299,  304,  325  and  n. 

A  West  Beach,  299,  304,  325  and  n. 

Abdel  Rahman  Bair,  252,  265,  268,  269,  283. 

Abdul  Hamid,  2,  144  and  n, 

Abrikja,  317,  323-4. 

Achi  Baba,  situation  of,  79;  enemy  shelHng 

from,   132,  171,  197,  403  ;  strength  of 

position,  170  «.,  220. 
Achmet,  257. 

Adana  massacres,  99,  128  n. 
Adramyti  Bay,  222,  362. 
Adrianople,  55. 
Aeroplanes — British,     167,    218-19,    397  ; 

enemy,  308. 
African  troops,  136,  147,  149,  151,  175. 
Agatnemnon,  48-9,  51-3,  59,  91. 
Aghyl  Dere,  250,  251,  255,  262,  263,  355. 
Agnew,  Lt.-Col. ,  349. 
Aire  Kavak,  341. 
Albion,  49,  52,  53,  60,  94,  99. 
Alexandria,  transports  reloaded  at,  69-70, 

408. 
Allanson,  Maj.  Cecil  G.  L.,  272-6. 
Altham,  Maj. -Gen.,  212,  381. 
Avuthyst,  49,  108,  109. 
Ammunition,  shortage  of,   133,    148,   171, 

181,    182,   185,  192,   193,   194 «.,  200, 

219,  229. 
Anafarta   Biyuk,   114,   251,  269,  286,  287, 

335  ;  entrenched  by  Turks,  339. 
Anafarta  Hills,  shelling  from,  197. 
Anafarta  Ova,  291,  327. 
Anafarta  plateau,  Turkish  guns  on,  340. 
Anafarta    Sagir— situation    of,    287,    288  ; 

Moore's  patrol  on  outskirts  of  (8  Aug.), 

317  ;  Turkish  headquarters  at,  388  n. 
"  Anafartas,  the,"  263. 
"  Andarti,"  225  and  n. 
Antwerp,  R.N.D.  at,  24,  148,  203. 
Anzac    Cove — conformation     of,    110-12; 

storming  of  (25  April),  iii  ff.  ;  danger 

of,  from  shelling,  196. 
Anzacs.     See  Australian  and  New  Zealand 

Army  Corps. 
Apex,      the,     situation    of,     261,    360-1  ; 

Anzac  occupation  of,  261,  270 ;    sub- 
terranean   galleries     made     at,    382  ; 

abandonment  of  (Dec),  399. 


Aragon — reputation  of,    211-12    and    n,  ; 
Kitchener's       entourage      on,      379  ; 
Monro's  H.Q.  on,  381. 
Arcadian,  80,  148,  166. 
Ari  Burnu,  112,  113,  250;  pier  at,  371. 
Ark  Royal,  49,  218. 
Armstrong,  Lt.-Col.  J.  C,  8r. 
Arno,  315. 
Art  of  war,  189. 
Artillery : 

Inferiority  of,  181. 

Loans  from  the  French,  134,  184,  401. 
Shortage  of,  148,  171,  181,  184,  192,  193, 
194  7Z.,  219,  228,  229,  339,  361 ;  no  anti- 
aircraft guns  till  winter,  219,  400. 
Askold,  88,  120. 

Asma  Dere,  251-2,  263-4,  268-70. 
Asmak  Dere,  251. 
Aspinall,  Lt.-Col,  315,  316. 
Aspinall,  Capt.  C.  F.,  81. 
Asquith,  Arthur,  149  n. 
Asquith,  Rt.  Hon.  H.  H.,   War  Minister, 
16-17 !  agrees  to  Churchill's  plan,  34-5  ; 
encourages     Italy's     entry,    56 ;     the 
Coalition  Ministry,  170 ;    estimate  of, 
19-21  ;   quoted  on  position  of  experts, 
28  ;  cited,  376. 
Aster,  295-6,  igjn, 

Athenian  expedition  to  Sicily,  88-9  and  n. 
Atrocities,  98. 

Augagneur,  M.,  cited,  35  n.  2. 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  Army  Corps  : 
Casualties  of — 25-6  April,  127 ;  2  May, 
139  ;   4-5  June,  190  ;    Lone  Pine,  240  ; 
6-10  Aug.,   283;    of  4th  Austr.  Brig. 
(8  Aug.),  270. 
Characteristics  of,  72-3, 
Egypt,  in,  70-1. 

Engagements  fought    by — 2   May,    138 
advance   on  Krithia  (8  May),   155-6 
19  May,  161-2  ;  4  and  28  June,  188  ff.  . 
Lone  Pine  (6-9  Aug.),  231-41 ;    Sari 
Bair,  253  ff. 
Evacuation  of,  397-400  and  n. 
Godlcy's  tribute  to,  284. 
Kitchener's  visit  to,  380. 
Landing  of  (25  April),  113  ff.  ;    objects, 

79  ;  brigades  confused,  124,  125. 
Officers  of,  list  of,  82-3. 


414 


INDEX 


Australian  and  New  Zealand  Army  Corps, 
continued — 
Quarters  of,  117-18,  125  ;    extension  of, 

by  7-10  Aug.  fighting,  285. 
Turkish  troops  opposite  (Dec),  388  «. 
Units  of,  83,  154  n.  2,  352  n.  i. 
Withdrawn  by  battalions  to  Mudros,  355. 
ist  Australian  Division  : 

ist   (N.S.   Wales)  Infantry  Brigade — 
landing  of,  116  ;  Lone  Pine,  233- 
40. 
2nd     (Victoria)     Infantry     Brigade — 
units  of,  154  n,  2  ;  landing  of,  116  ; 
at  Helles,    147,   153,    233 ;    Lone 
Pine   (8-9   Aug. ),  240 ;    the   Nek 
(7  Aug. ),  241. 
3rd  (Australia)  Infantry  Brigade  : 
9th  (Queensland)  Batt.,  115,  190-1. 
loth  (S.  Austr.)  Batt.,  115. 
nth  (W.  Austr.)  Batt.,  231. 
i2th  (S.  Austr, ,  W.  Austr.,  and  Tas.) 
Batt.,  239. 
New  Zealand  and  Australian  Division : 
Officers'  reconnaissances,  249. 
Reserve  (May),  147. 
Sari  Bair,  253. 
Machine-Gun  Section,  280. 
New      Zealand      Mounted      Infantry 
Brigade — fighting     at     the     Nek 
(30  June),  191  ;  Sari  Bair,  254  ff. ; 
evacuation,  398. 
Auckland      Regiment — Sari     Bair, 
257,    265,    266,     277-8 ;     Hill  60 
attack  (27  Aug.),  353. 
Canterbury  Regt. — Sari  Bair,  258  ; 
Hill  60    attack  (21  Aug.),   349 ; 
(27  Aug.),  353. 
Otago    Regt. — Hill    60    attack  (21 

Aug.),  349;  (27  Aug.),  353. 
WeUington  Regt.,  353. 
ist  Austrahan   Lt.    Horse    Brigade — 
evacuation  of,  398. 
ist  N.S.  Wales  Regt.,  242-3. 
2nd  Queensland  Regt.,  242. 
New  Zealand  Infantry  Brigade — units 
of,  83,  154  «.  I ;  landing  of,  116; 
at  Helles,  147,  153. 
Auckland   Batt. — occupies   Plugge's 
Plateau,    116 ;      Sari     Bair,    254, 
260-1 ;    on    Rhododendron    Nek 
(7  Aug.),  264. 
Canterbury  Batt.,  254,  260-1. 
Otago    Batt. — "  Baby     700,"    139 ; 

Sari  Bair,  254,  260  and  n.  2,  261. 
Wellington    Batt. — Sari    Bair,   254, 
260-1,  266,  277-8. 
4th    (Australian)    Infantry    Brigade — 
landing  of,  116  ;  "  Baby  700,"  139  ; 
Sari  Bair,  255,  262,  283  ;    Hill  60 
attack    (21    Aug.),    348-9,     351 ; 
evacuation  of,  398. 
All  Battalions  of,  in  Sari  Bair  assault, 
268-70. 
Otago  Mounted  Rifles  Regt.,  254,  256, 
258-9. 


Australian  and  New  Zealand  Army  Corps, 
continued — 
2nd  Australian   Lt.  Horse  Brigade,  84  ; 

6th  Regt.,  398. 
3rd  Australian   Lt.  Horse  Brigade,  84 ; 
evacuadon  of,  398. 
8th  (Victorian)  Regt.,  244. 
9th  Regt.,  354. 

loth  (W.  Australian)  Regt.,  244,  354. 
2nd  Australian  Division  : 

Arrival  of,  355  and  n.  ;  of  18th  Batt., 

352- 
Composition  of,  338  n.  i. 
Infection  of,  with  dysentery,  357. 
i8th  Batt.,  352,  353. 
Australian     Engineers — sth     Company, 

399- 
Bridging  Train,  325  n. 
Maori  Contingent,  254,    256,    258,   265, 

268,  353,  398. 
New  Zealand  Engineers,  254,  255,  259. 

B  Beach,  299,  304-5,  392. 
"  Baby  700,"  138,  244. 
Bacchante,  in,  116,  125.  213,  234. 
Backhouse,  Commodore  O.,  84,  137. 
Bagdad  railway,  3-4,  6. 
Bailloud,  G6n.,  152-3,  193,  366. 
Baka  Baba,  288. 

Baldwin,    Brig.-Gen.  A.    H.,  blunder    of, 

(8-9  Aug.),  270-1  ;  belated  arrival  and 

retreat,  277 ;  killed,  281 ;   mentioned, 

204,  216  n,  2. 

Balfour,    Rt.    Hon.   A.  J.,   15,   35,    170 ; 

cited,  28. 
Balkan  races,  German  attitude  to,  3. 
Balkan  States,  forces  available  in,  365. 
Balloons  ("Silver  Babies  "),  219. 
Barrage,  159,  173. 
Bartlett,    Ashmead,    170 «.  ;    cited,    119; 

quoted,  186  n. 
Basrah,  British  seizure  of,  12. 
Battleship  Hill,  247,  261,  264. 
Battles  (after  the  landings  phase) — 6  May, 
147  ff.  ;    8  May — advance  on  Krithia, 
155-6  ;  ig  May,  161  ff.  ;  4  June,  172  ff. ; 
28  June,   182  ff.  ;    12  July,   199  ff.  ;  6 
Aug. — feints    at    Helles,    227  ff.  ;     at 
Anzac,  231  ff.  ;  6-10  Aug. — Sari  Bair, 
253  ff.  ;  6-12  Aug. — Suvla  Bay,  295  ff,  ; 
15  Aug.,  329-32  ;  20-21  Aug. — Scimitar 
Hill,  339  ff.  ;   Kaiajik  Aghala,  348  ff.  ; 
27-28  Aug.,  353-4  ;  19  Dec, — Krithia 
Nullah,  402;  7  Jan.,  403. 
Bauchop,  Lt.-Col.  A.,  206,  259. 
Bauchop's  Hill,  251,  254,  256,  259,  262. 
Baumann,  Gdn.,  84. 

Bean,  Capt.  C.  E,  W.,  photographs  taken 
by,     xiii  ;     assistance    from,    119  w.; 
quoted,  234 «,  2,  238,  264,  282;  cited, 
351  n. 
Bean,  Capt.  J.  W.,  237. 
Beauchamp,  Col.  Sir  Horace,  327-8. 
"  Beetles,"  215-16,  295,  300. 
Bennett,  Col.,  241. 


INDEX 


41S 


Besika  Bay,  French  feint  at,  120-1. 

Bibliography,  xiii-xiv. 

Binns,  Capt. ,  225. 

Birdwood,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  W.  R. ,  criticism 
by,  of  Garden's  scheme— telegram  of 
5  March,  44,  55 ;  advises  immediate 
landing  (22  March),  63  ;  quarters  of, 
210 ;  eulogy  by,  of  Left  Assaulting 
Column  at  Sari  Bair,  264  ;  huiries  up 
reserves  ( 10  Aug. ),  282 ;  supersedes 
Hamilton,  372  ;  Special  Order  on 
Kitchener's  visit,  380 ;  in  command  of 
"Dardanelles  Army"  (Nov.),  381; 
ordered  to  evacuate  (8  Dec),  386; 
scheme  for  Helles  evacuation,  401 ; 
estimate  of,  374 ;  mentioned,  xii,  70, 
82,  90,  118,  207,  253,  279,  322. 

Bin-ell,  Surgeon-Gen.  W.  E.,  81,  141. 

Biyuk  Anafarta.     See  Anafarta  Biyuk. 

Biyuk  Kemiklo.     See  Suvla  Point. 

"  Blister  ships,"  215,  295. 

Boghali,  115,  118, 

Bolton,  Lt.-Col.,  154  n.  2. 

Bolton's  Hill,  125. 

Bombardments — of  3  Nov.  1914,  i,  29  and 
n.  2 ;  of  18  Feb,  1915,  50-1  ;  of  25 
Feb.,  51-2  ;  of  4  March,  52  ;  of  6  March, 
53  ;  of  S  and  7  Mar.,  53,  54  ;  political 
effects  of  Feb.  and  March  bombard- 
ments, 55-6  ;  ineffectiveness  of  bom- 
bardments throughout   the  campaign, 

340.  353. 
Boomerang,  the,  184. 
Boot,  the,  390  n. 
Bordeaux,  Lt.-Col.,  153  «. 
Bourne,  Lt.,  242. 
Bouvet,  49,  50,  60-1. 
Bouyssou,  Capt.,  84. 

Bowman-Manifold,  Lt.-Col.  M.  G.  E.,  81. 
Boyle,  Capt.  the  Hon.  A.,  xii. 
Braithwaite,  Maj.-Gen.  W,  F.,  70,  81,  162, 

328,  371. 
Braithwaite,  Lt.-Col.  W.  G.,  83. 
Brand,  Major,  115. 
Brandreth,  Major,  178. 
Branet,  Lt.-Col.,  84. 
Breslau,  8-9  and  n. 
Bridges,  Maj.-Gen.  W.  T.,  70,  71,  83,  138  ; 

death  and  estimate  of,  160. 
Brighton  Beach,  231. 
British  troops  in  the  campaign  : 
Officers,  shortage  of,  336,  338  «.,  376. 
Positions  of  (6  Aug.),  225. 
Strength  of  (early  Aug.),  219  ;  (mid  Aug.), 
336. 
Vlllth  Army  Corps  {see  also,  for  its  com- 
ponents,   various    Divisions    under 
British  troops) : 
Composition  of,  156,  172,  219. 
French  guns  left  with,  401. 
Hunter-Weston    succeeded    by    Stop- 
ford  and  later  Davies  in  command 
of,  200-1,  292. 
Organisation  of,  with  French  into  four 
sections,  159. 


British  troops  in  the  campaign,  continued — 
IXth  Army  Corps  {see  also,  for  its  com- 
ponents, various  Divisions  under 
British  troops) : 

Blizzard  casualties  (Nov.),  385. 

Composition  of,  219,  293. 

De  Lisle  succeeds  Stopford  in  com- 
mand of  (15  Aug.),  332. 

Godley's  tribute  to,  284. 

Gun  shortage  of,  294,  339. 

Intelligence  and  Staff  work  of,  bad, 
316-17,  318. 

Reorganisation  of,  ordered  (13  Aug.), 

329- 
loth  (Irish)  Division : 
Arrival  of,  from  Mitylene  and  landing 
(7    Aug.),    303-4;    split    up    into 
three,    304 ;     only    two    Brigades 
under    Stopford,    293 ;    task    for, 
298. 
Composition  of,  217  w.  2. 
Guns  attached  to,  296  «.,  361. 
Quality  of,  366. 
Salonika,  transfer  to,  366-7. 
29th  Brigade — at  Anzac,  225,  293. 
loth  Hampshires — Hill  Q,  270  ;   on 

21  Aug.,  349. 
6th  Royal  Irish  Rifles,  270. 
5th    Connaught    Rangers  —  at  Saif- 
Bair  (10  Aug.),  282  ;   fighting  or 
21   Aug.,    349-50  and   «.  ;    with- 
drawn for  rest,  352  ;  attack  of  27 
Aug.,  353-4. 
30th  Brigade — arrival  of,   from    Mity- 
lene   and    Mudros,    295 ;    attack 
along   Kiretch    Tepe    Sirt  (15-17 
Aug.),  329-31  ;  withdrawn  to  rest, 
338  n.  2. 
6th  Munster  Fusiliers — capture  Jeph 
son's  Post  (7  Aug.),  310  ;    storm 
the  Pimple  (15  Aug.),  330-1. 
7th  Munster  Fusiliers,  310. 
6th    Royal    Dublin  Fusiliers  —  with 
Brig. -Gen.   F.    F.   Hill,   295  ;   ad- 
vance on  Chocolate  Hill  (7  Aug.), 
306-9 ;      storm     the     Pimple    (15 
Aug.),  330-1. 
7th   Royal    Dublin    Fusiliers  —  with 
Brig. -Gen.    F.    F.    Hill,   295;  ad- 
vance on  Chocolate  Hill,  306-9. 
31st  Brigade — arrival   from   Mitylene, 
295  ;  withdrawn  from  Green  Hill 
(10  Aug. ),  324  ;  attack  on  Kiretch 
Tepe     Sirt     (15-17    Aug.),    329 ; 
Lt.-Col.   King-King  in  command 
of,    332;    withdrawn    to    rest   (17 
Aug.),  338  n.  2. 
5th  Inniskilling  Fusihers — landed  at 
Suvla    Point,    304 :    with    Mahon 
(7  Aug.),  310;    on  Kiretch  Tepe 
Sirt  (15-17  Aug.),  330. 
6th   Inniskilling  Fusiliers  —  advance 
on  Chocolate  Hill  (7  Aug.),  306-9  ; 
(8  Aug.),  319;    on   Kiretch  Tepe 
Sirt  (15-17  Aug.),  330. 


4i6 


INDEX 


British  troops  in  the  campaign,  continued — 
ioth(  Irish)  Division,  continued — 
31st  Brigade,  cotitinued — 
5th    Royal   Irish   Fusiliers — advance 
on  Chocolate  Hill  (7  Aug.),  306-9  ; 
(8  Aug.),  319;    almost  extermin- 
ated, 331. 
6th   Royal   Irish  Fusiliers — advance 
on  Chocolate  Hill  (7  Aug.),  306-9  ; 
(8  Aug.),  319;    almost   extermin- 
ated, 331. 
5th  Royal  Irish  Pioneers,  295,  304, 

310. 
58th  Brigade  R.F.A.,  296  «.,  329. 
nth  (Northern)  Division : 
Composition  of,  217  n.  i. 
Evacuation  of,  392. 
Guns  attached  to,  295-6  n. 
Hamilton's    design     for    landing    of, 

298. 
Imbros,  at  (6  Aug.),  225-6. 
Improvement  of,  361. 
Inexperience  of,  293. 
Scimitar  Hill  attack  (21  Aug.),  338 ff. 
Tenth   Division    battalions   mixed  up 

with  (7  Aug.),  304. 
Xeros   shore  and    Kiretch   Tape    Sirt 

held  by,  390  «. 
32nd   Brigade  —  landing  of,  at   Suvla 
(6  Aug.),  300;  inaction  of  (7  Aug.), 
302-3,  305-6,  308  n.  ;  Hill  to  co- 
operate   with,     305 ;     attack     on 
Scimitar  Hill  (9  Aug.),  320;  error 
of  21  Aug.,  341,   344;    elaborate 
entrenchments  of,  390  n. 
9th   W.    Yorks — occupy   Lala  Baba 
(6  Aug.),    300;   at  Hill   10,  302; 
on  Anafarta  ridge,  318. 
6th  Yorks,  300. 
33rd   Brigade  —  landing  of,    at    Suvla 
(6  Aug.),  300;  on  Lala  Baba,  302  ; 
error  of  21  Aug.,  341-2,  344. 
6th   Lincolns   and   6th    Borderers — 
reinforce  Hill's  column  (7  Aug.), 
307,  308  n.  ;  storming  of  Chocolate 
Hill,  309 ;  withdrawn,  309  ;  attack 
on   Scimitar   Hill   (9  Aug.),    320, 
321. 
34th    Brigade — landing    of,    in    Suvla 
Bay,    299,   300-1  ;    inaction  of  (7 
Aug.),  302-3,  305-6,  308  71.  ;  Hill 
to  co-operate  with,  305  ;  attack  on 
Scimitar  Hill  (9  Aug.),  320;  Brig.- 
Gen.  J.  Hill  in  command  of,  332  ; 
attack  of  21  Aug.,  341.  ■ 
9th  Lanes.  Fusiliers,  302, 
nth  Manchesters,  301-2,  310. 
6th  E.  York  Pioneers,  317. 
13th  (Western)  Division : 
Arrival  of,  200,  216. 
Composition  of,  216  n.  2. 
Evacuation  of,  392,  396. 
Maude,  Maj.-Gen.  F.  Stanley,  in  com- 
mand of,  355. 
Quality  of,  361. 


British  troops  in  the  campaign,  continued — 
13th  (Western)  Division,  continued — 

Sari  Bair,  allotted  for,  225,  254,  255, 
293  ;  casualties  (7-10  Aug. ),  283 ; 
returned  to  IXth  Army  Corps  at 
Suvla,  355. 

Shaw,  Maj.-Gen.,  invalided  from,  332. 

38th  Brigade — quarters  of,  204. 
6th  E.  Lanes.,  270. 
6th  S.  Lanes.— Sari  Bair,  265;  Chu- 
nak  Bair  and  the  supreme  moment, 
272-4  ;  disaster  and  retreat,  275-6. 
6th  Loyal  N.  Lanes. — Hill  Q,  270-1 ; 
relieve  New  Zealanders  and  Glou- 
cesters  on    Rhododendron   Ridge 
(10   Aug.),  278-9;    overwhelmed, 
279. 

39th  Brigade  —  Divisional   Reserve   at 
Sari  Bair,  255. 
9th       Royal      Warwicks,       216 «., 
265,    268  ;     left    without    officers, 
281. 
7th  Gloucesters — Sari   Bair  assault, 
265-7 !    attacked    by     Turks    (9 
Aug.),  277-8  ;  left  without  officers 
(10  Aug.),  281. 
9th  Worcesters,  216  n.  ;   in  support 
in    Sari    Bair    attack,    265,    268, 
272  ;  inactive,  276-7  ;  left  without 
officers  (10  Aug.),  281. 
7th  N.  Staflbrds — in  support  in  Sari 
Bair  assault,    265,  268,  272  ;    in- 
active,     276-7  ;      attacked     near 
Fusilier  Bluff  (7  Jan.),  403. 

40th  Brigade  : 

4th  S.  Wales  Borderers — Sari  Bair, 
262  ;  fighting  on  10  Aug.,  283 ; 
21  Aug.,  349. 
8th  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers,  245-6. 
5th  Wilts — Hill  Q,  271 ;  relieve  New 
Zealanders  and  Gloucesters  on 
Rhododendron  Ridge  (10  Aug.), 
278-9  ;  "  almost  annihilated  "  \io 
Aug.),  279. 

8th  Welsh  Pioneers,  216  n,  2,  265-6. 
2gth  Division  : 

Allotted  for  Dardanelles,  42 ;  delays, 
42  ;  arrival  at  Malta,  63. 

Battle  of  6-8  May,  148  ff. 

Casualties  of,  heavy,  147  ;  to  9  May, 
157  ;  to  8  June,  178-9  and  «. 

Composition  of,  82. 

Hamilton's  tribute  to,  201. 

Helles  attack  (6  Aug.),  225,  227. 

Landing  task  of,  78-9. 

Quality  of,  127,  133,  201,  243 ;  of 
Territorial  unit,  135. 

Rested  in  brigades  at  Imbros,  362, 

Scimitar  Hill  attack  from  Suvla  (21 
Aug. ),  338  ff. ;  back  at  Helles,  402. 

86th  Brigade — battle  of  28  April,  133  ; 
broken  up  among  87th  and  88th 
Brigades,  147 ;  Scimitar  Hill 
attack  (21  Aug.),  344;  evacuation 
of,  391. 


INDEX 


417 


British  troops  in  the  campaign,  continued — 
29th  Division,  continued — 
86th  Brigade,  continued — 
2nd  Royal  Fusiliers — at  V  Beach,  104, 
105-6  ;  fighting  of  4-6  June,   176, 
178  ;  casualties  of,  178-9  ;  28  June, 
184 ;     sufferings    in    the    blizzard 
(Nov.),  384-5. 
ist  Lanes.  Fusiliers,  101-4. 
ist    Royal    Munster    Fusiliers  —  V 
Beach  landing,  95-8  ;  storm  Seddel 
Bahr,    127-8 ;    amalgamated    into 
the  "Dubsters,"  151. 
ist  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers — V  Beach 
landing,    94-6,   98  ;  storm  Seddel 
Bahr,    127-8 ;    amalgamated   into 
the  "  Dubsters,"  151. 
87th  Brigade — in  the  fight  of  28  April, 
133 ;    6-8   May,    150,    153,     154 ; 
Scimitar   Hill    attack    (21   Aug.), 
343. 
2nd    S.    Wales    Borderers  —  at    De 
Tott's  Battery,  91  ;    at  Y  Beach, 
107-9 1    battle    of    8    May,    154 ; 
casualties,  179  n.  ;  28  June,  183. 
ist  Royal  Inniskilling   Fusiliers — at 
Implacable  Landing,  106  ;   in  the 
fight  of  28  April,  133  ;  of  6-8  May, 
150 ;  of  28  June,  183  ;  take  Fusi- 
lier Bluff,  184. 
ist    Border    Regt.  —  at   Implacable 
Landing,   106  ;  in  the  fight  of  28 
April,  133  ;  of  28  June,  184. 
88th   Brigade — officer    losses    of,    99 ; 
battles   of  28   April,    133 ;    of  29 
April,    135-6 ;    of  6-8  May,   150, 
153 ;     of    4    June,     174 ;     Helles 
attack   (6  Aug.),  227;   evacuation 
of,  392. 
4th    Worcester     Regt. — W    Beach 
landing,    103-4 ;    in    the  fight   of 
28  April,  133 ;  of  i  May,  136  ;  of 
4  June,  174. 
and    Hampshire    Regt.  —  V    Beach 
.'  landing,  95,  97-8  ;    storm  Seddel 

Bahr,  127-8  ;  casualties  of,  179. 
1st  Essex  Regt. — W  Beach  landing, 
103  ;   in  fight  of  i  May,  135  ;   of 
6  Aug.,  228. 
5th  Royal  Scots  (Territorial) — in  fight 
of  I  May,  135  ;  6-8  May,  150. 
87th  and  88th  Brigades,  29th    Indian 
Infantry     Brigade     and     Lanes. 
Fusiliers  added  to,  147. 
ist         Newfoundlanders'         Battalion 
attached  to,  361. 
42nd  (E.  Lanes.)  Division  : 
^  Brigades  of  29th  Division  made  up  by, 
147. 
Composition  of,  137  and  n. 
Egypt,  in,  70,  137. 
Helles  feint  (6-7  Aug.),  225,  227-9. 
Heroism  of  officer  of,  402  n. 
Withdrawn  for  rest,  402. 
125th  Lanes.  Fusiliers,  151,  153,  229. 

27 


British  troops  in  the  cs.m'pTdgn,  continued — 
42nd  (E.  Lanes.)  Division,  continued — 
126th  E.  Lanes. — split  up  among  29th 
Division  (May),  159. 
4th  E.  Lanes.  Batt.  at  the  Vineyard, 
229. 
127th  Manchester  Brigade — at  Gurkha 
Bluff  (12  May),   158  ;   battle  of  4 
June,    173-4 ;     the    Vineyard    (7 
Aug.),  229 ;   quality  of,  158,  174, 
176. 
52nd  (Lowland  Territorial)  Division  : 
Arrival  of,  180. 
Composition  of,  181  ??. 
Helles,  at  (6  Aug.),  225. 
Kereves  Dere  (12  July),  199. 
Quality  of,  181. 
155th  Brigade,  199. 
156th  Brigade — battle  of  28  June,  185; 

success  of  15  Nov.,  382. 
157th     Brigade  —  Kereves     Dere    (12 
July),  199  ;  Krithia  Nullah  attack 
(19  Dec),  402. 
53rd  (Welsh)  Division,  225,  284: 
Composition  of,  218  n. 
Evacuation  of,  391. 
Improvement  of,  361. 
Salonika,  for,  366. 

Scimitar  Hill  attack  (9  Aug.),  320  ;  re- 
newed attack  (10  Aug.),  323-4. 
Sulajik-Kiretch  Tepe  line  held  by  (21 

Aug.),  339. 
i/ist  Hereford  Batt.,  321. 
54th  (E.  Anglian)  Division,  225,  284  : 
Anzac,  brought  to,  355. 
Composition  of,  218. 
Improvement  of,  361. 
Sulajik-Kiretch     Tepe    line    held    by 

(21  Aug.),  339. 
Suvla,     ordered     to    (9    Aug.),    323  ; 

landed  (lo-ii  Aug.),  325. 
162nd  Brigade,  329-30. 
163rd  Brigade,  327-8. 
2nd  Mounted  Division  (Yeomanry) : 
Composition  of,  338  n.  i. 
Quality  of,  337-8. 

Scimitar  Hill  attack  (21  Aug.),  345-6. 
29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade  : 

Anzac,     transferred    to    (4-5    Aug.), 

225. 
Arrival  of,  134. 
Godley's  tribute  to,  284. 
Health  record  of,  357. 
Hill  60  attack  (21  Aug.),  349. 
Mule  management  by,  393  n. 
Reserve  in  battle  of  7  May,  153. 
Sari  Bair,  254,  255,  262-3. 
Turkish  aeroplane  messages  to,  187-8, 

370. 
5th,  6th,  and  loth  Gurkhas — capture 
of  Gurkha  Bluff,  158  ;  battle  of  4 
June,  174 ;  of  28  June,  184 ;  of 
2  July,  197  ;  Koja  Chemen 
assault,  263,  268  ;  Chunuk  Bair 
and  the  supreme  moment,  272-4  ; 


4i8 


INDEX 


British  troops  in  the  campaign,  continued — 

29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade,  continued — 

5th,  6th,  and  loth  Gurkhas,  continued — 

Disaster  and  retreat,  275-6 ;    battle 

of  21   Aug.,  349;   evacuation   of, 

392,  393  «.,  396. 

14th  Sikhs — in  battle  of  4  June,  174  ; 

Koja  Chemen  assault,  263. 

Indian  Mountain  Artillery  Brigade,  254, 

255- 
Indian    Mountain    Battery — at    Anzac 

landing,  116  ;  at  Sari  Bair,  254. 
Lovat's  Scouts,  360-1. 
Royal  Engineers  : 
5th  Anglesey  Company,  391. 
6th  Company,  319. 
Royal  Field  Artillery  : 
loth  Battery,  197. 
15th  Heavy  Battery,  329. 
5Sth  Brigade,  361. 
56th  Brigade,  361. 
58th  Brigade,  zgSn.,  329. 
59th  Brigade,  295  «. 
69th  Brigade,  280. 

4th  Howitzer  Lowland  Brigade,  296  n. 
Royal  Garrison  Artillery — 4th  Highland 

Mountain  Brigade,  296  «. 
Royal  Naval  Division : 
Antwerp,  at,  24,  148,  203. 
Battle   of   6-8    May,    149,    151,     153, 

156. 
Composition  of,  84. 
Feint  at  Karachali,  119-20. 
French  lines  taken  over  by  (Dec. -Jan.), 

402. 
Guns  not  with,  182. 
Headquarters  of,  131,  203. 
Landing  task  of,  79. 
Mudros,  at,  68. 
Port  Said,  at,  70. 
Position  of,  on  6  Aug.,  225. 
Quality  of,  148,  176,  203. 
I  St  Naval  Brigade  : 
Drake  Batt.,  133,  147,  149. 
Nelson  Batt.,  138,  177,  199. 
2nd   Naval  Brigade — part   of    French 
line    taken   over  by  (May),    137 ; 
composite   character    of,    after    4 
June,  175  n. : 
Anson  Batt.,  89  ;  at  V  Beach  land- 
ing, 94-5 ;  battle  of  4  June,  173, 
17s  and  n. 
Collingwood  Batt. ,  175  and  n. 
Hood   Batt.,    149   n.  ;  reinforce  the 
French,  147  ;  battle  of  4  June,  173, 
175  and  n. 
Howe  Batt. — reinforce  the   French, 
147 ;    battle  of  4   June,    173,    175 
and  n, 
3rd  Naval  Brigade : 

Plymouth  Batt.,  89,  147;  at  Y  Beach, 
107-8  ;  in  battle  of  6-8  May,  149. 
Portsmouth  Batt.,  138-9. 
Scottish  Horse,  360-1. 
South-Western  Mounted  Brigade,  361. 


Brodrick,  Lt.-Gen.  St.  John,  81. 

Brooke,  Rupert,  86-7. 

Brooks,  Mr.,  pictures  by,  xiii, 

Bro\4fn,  Col.,  233. 

Browne,  Col.  R.  S.,  352  w.  1. 

Brown's  Dip,  233. 

Bruce,  Lt.-Col.  the  Hon.  C.  G.,  158. 

Brulard,    G6n. ,    succeeds    G^n.    Bailloud, 

i93i  372  ;  succeeds  Gdn.  Masnou,  202  ; 

leaves  guns  to  British  Vlllth  Corps, 

401. 
Buchan,  Col.  John,  366,  367  «. 
Bulair,     Turkish       reinforcements      from 

(9  Aug.),  319. 
Bulair  landing,  drawback  to,  222. 
Bulair  lines,  bombardment  of  (25  April),  119. 
Bulair  position,  75-6. 
Bulgaria  : 
Central  Powers,  leaning  to  (May),  169  ; 

Secret  Treaty  (July),    199 ;      Turkish 

Treaty    signed,    364 ;    joins    Central 

Powers  (Oct.),   367-8  ;    effect   of  this 

adhesion,  381. 
Forces  of,  available,  365. 
Importance  of  attitude  of,  55. 
Overtures  to,  194. 

Paget's  Report  on  (17  March  1917),  55. 
Serbia,  animosity  against,  55,  221,  364. 
Burnt  Hill.     See  Scimitar  Hill. 
Burston,  Col.  J.,  352  n.  1. 
Burton,  Col.,  361. 
Byng,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  Julian,  332,  361,  372, 

395-6. 

C  Beach,  299,  392. 

Callwell,  Gen.,  quoted,  9-10,  41. 

Camber  Beach,  98. 

Camouflage,  150. 

Cannon,  Lt.-Col.,  268, 

Canopus,  49,  119-20,  217. 

Canteen  ship  (Sept.),  206,  357. 

Garden,  Lt.-Col.  J.,  279. 

Garden,  Vice-Adm.  Sir  Sackville,  early 
bombardment  by  (Nov,  1914),  i  ; 
views  on  forcing  the  Straits,  25 ; 
memorandum  on  four  stages,  32-3 ; 
ships  under  (Feb.  1915),  48-50  ;  bom- 
bardment of  the  Forts,  51  ;  urges 
mihtary  co-operation,  58  ;  resigns,  58. 

Carey,  Lt.-Col.  A.  B.,  84. 

Carruthers,  Brig. -Gen.  R.  A.,  82. 

Carson,  Sir  E.,  378. 

Carthage,  196, 

Cass,  Major,  154,  156. 

Casson,  Col.,  91,  92,  133. 

Casson,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  G.,  181 ». 

Casualties : 
Anzac.     See  under  Australian  and  New 

Zealand  Army  Corps, 
Figures — first  ten  days,  140  ;  end  of  May, 
168  «.  ;  4  June,  177  ;  28  June,  185;  to 
end  of  July,  216  ;  August,  358  ;  second 
week  in  August  (Helles,  Anzac,  Suvla), 
336  ;  21  August  (Scimitar  Hill), 
346-7  ;  27-28  August,  354. 


INDEX 


419 


Casualties,  €ontinued — 

French.     See  under  French  Expedition- 
ary Corps. 
Inadequate    provision    for,    118,    140-2, 

213-14. 
Officers  (10  Aug.),  281. 
Sickness,  406  ;  (Sept.),  356. 
loth  Division  (15  Aug.),  330,  331. 
29th  Division,  157. 
Total,  406. 
Gather,  Lt.,  164  n. 

Cayley,  Brig. -Gen.  W.  de  S.,  216  «.,  281. 
Chadwick,  Capt.,  204. 
Chailak    Dere,   250,  254-6,  258,   260  n.  2, 

271. 
Champagne  battle,  362-3. 
Chanak,  52-3,  63  n. 
Chapman,  Lt.-Col.  A.  E.,  300,  352. 
Charletnagne,  49,  52,  60. 
Chatham,  298,  373. 
Chatham's  Post,  231,  248. 
Chauvel,  Brig. -Gen.  H.  G.,  83,  137,  242. 
Chelmer,  256. 

Chessboard,  the,  191,  244-5. 
Chocolate    Hill  (Yilghin  Burnu) — descrip- 
tion of,  287  ;  Hill's  capture  of  (7  Aug.), 
306-9  ;   centre  of  Scimitar  Hill  attack 
(21  Aug.),  339  ;    shrapnel  wound   at, 
341  n.  ;  mentioned,  298,  335. 
Christian,  Rear-Adm.  Arthur,  297. 
Chunuk  Bair : 

"Chimney,"   247;     dead    thrown   over, 

282-3. 
Conformation  of,  247, 
Nek  to  southern  shoulder  of,  261. 
South-west  shoulder  of,  ours,  268. 
Struggle  for,  defeated,  276-8,  323,  324. 
Turkish  attack  from  (10  Aug.),  280-1. 
mentioned,  244,  254,  265. 
Churchill,  Maj.  J.  S.  S.,  81,  170. 
Churchill,    Rt.  Hon.    Winston,    bombard- 
ment of  3  Nov.  1914  ordered  by,   i  ; 
scheme  for  Greek  seizure  of  Gallipoli, 
9  ;    project  for  the  British  expedition, 
12-13  ;    position  in  the  War  Council, 
21  ;  siege  gun  misconception  of,  23-4, 
33)  51  ■>   communications  with  Garden, 
24-5  ;  presses  his  scheme,  35  ;    urges 
Garden  to   press  attack,   57-8  ;    pro- 
posed visit  of,    to  Dardanelles,   214  ; 
his  defence  of  the  expedition,  385-6, 
409. 
Clapham  Junction,  132,  203. 
Clifton  Browne,  Maj. -Gen.,  361. 
Glyfford,  Lt.-Com.,  382. 
ColHns,  Col.,  173 «. 
Colne,  256-7. 

Constantine,  King  of  Greece,  disapproves 
Dardanelles  campaign,  lo-ii  ;  re- 
ported desirous  of  war  (March  1915), 
56  and  n.  i  ;  again  opposed  to  alliance 
with  Entente,  56  ;?.  2  ;  declines  to  assist 
Serbia,  365,  368  ;  stealthy  neutrality 
of,  183  ;  mentioned,  11  «.,48. 
Constantinople,  dismay  in  (Feb.  1915),  144. 


Cooper,  Major  Bryan,  306;/.  ;  cited,  308  «. 
Cooper,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  J.,  217  «.  2,  281. 
Cornwallis,  49,  52,  89,  91,  99,  164,  396. 
Costeker,  Capt.,  97. 
Costemalle,  Comdt. ,  152  n.  2. 
Courtney-Boyle,  Lt.-Com.  Edward,  145. 
Courtney's  Post,  161,  188. 
Cox,    Maj. -Gen.    Sir     Herbert,     captures 

Gurkha   Bluff,  158  ;     Hill    60  attacks 

(21     Aug.),    349;      (27     Aug.),    353; 

mentioned,    85,    134,    254,    255,    262, 

268. 
Creighton,  Rev.  O.,  cited,  lyon. 
Cretan  "  Andarti,"  225  and  n,  i. 
Crewe,  Lord,  15  ;   cited,  28. 
Cribb,  Capt.,  117. 

d'Adh^mar,  Lt.-Col.,  153 7z. 

Dallas,  Brig.-Gen.,  390 w. 

d'Amade,  G^n.-de-Div.,  70,  84,    120,   159- 

60. 
Damakjelik  Bair  (Hill  40),  255,  264,  349, 
35O'  35S  I    description  of,  252  ;    S.  W. 
Borderers'  storming  of,  262. 
Daniell,  Brig.-Gen.  F.  F.  W.,  327. 
D'Annunzio,  170. 
Dardanelles  : 
Character  of  the  Strait,  45-6, 
Current  in,  45. 

View  of,  by  Lancashires  and  Gurkhas 
(9  Aug.),  273. 
Dardanelles  campaign  : 
Advantages     of,   if   successful,   vii-viii, 

22-3,  408-9. 
Amphibious  expedition  considered,   41  ; 

delays,  42-3,  52,  54,  57,  62-3. 
Conditions  of  life  in,  152. 
Failure  of,  causes  of,  406-8. 
Force    required    for,    early  estimates  of 
strength  of,    10,    23,   40 ;    troops  not 
available    before    April,    22,    33,    40 ; 
actual    strength    in    April,  85  ;    on  6 
May,    147 ;     units     engaged,   see    (i) 
Australian    and    New   Zealand  Army 
Corps,     (2)    British    troops,    and    (3) 
French  Expeditionary  Corps. 
Justification  of,  172. 
Military  attitude  towards,  64-5. 
Naval    expedition    alone    ordered,    33 ; 

British  casualties,  62  «. 
Official  attitude  towards,  140,  142,  170  «., 

181,  214,  336-7,  370,  377,  408-10. 
Withdrawal  from  the  Peninsula,  ease  of, 
presupposed,  14,  23,  33. 
"  Dardanelles  Committee,"  214  and  n. 
Dardanus,  Fort,  52-3,  59. 
Davidson,  Capt.  A.  P.,  xii,  92  and«. 
Davies,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  F.  J.,  201,  230,  372, 

401. 
Dawnay,  Capt.  G.  P.,  81. 
de   Bartolom6,    Comdre.,  z6n,;    cited,    i, 

32- 
de  Laborde,  Lt.,  81. 
De  Lisle,   Maj. -Gen.,   takes  command  of 

29th  Division,  177  ;  congratulated,  201 ; 


420 


INDEX 


succeeds  Stopford  in  command  of  IXth 

Corps,  332  ;  attack  of  21  Aug.,  338  ; 

returns  to  29th  Division,  362. 
de  Lotbiniere,  Lt.-Col.  A.  C.  Joly,  82,  296. 
de  Putron,  Capt.  C,  81. 
de  Robeck,  Vice-Adm. ,  59,  89,  297,  386. 
de  Sauvigny,  Com.  de  Cav,  Brev.  Berthier, 

81. 
De  Tott's   Battery  (Eski   Hissarlik),   107, 

121  ;  landing  at,  91  ;  taken  over  by  the 

French,  130. 
De  Winton,  329. 
Dead — built  into  barricades,  240  ;   thrown 

down  Chunuk  Bair  "chimney,"  282-3. 
Deedes,  Capt.  W.  H.,  81. 
Descoins,  Lt.-Col.,  84. 
Desruelles,  Lt.-Col.,  84. 
Destroyer  Hill,  260  n.  2. 
Diet,  monotony  of,  205-6,  357. 
Dillon,  Dr.  E.  J.,  quoted,  ■yi'^n. 
Djemel  Pasha,  72. 
Dobbin,  Col.,  233. 
Doris,  49. 
Doughty- Wylie,    Lt.-Col.,    81,    99,    127-8 

and«. 
Douglas,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  ii,  9,  70,  137, 

201,  402  ;  the  Vineyard,  230. 
Downing,  Col.,  306  «. 
Drafts    swamping    original    units,    358-9 

and  n. 
Drewry,  Midshipman,  86. 
Dublin,  49,  109,  158. 
Duckworth,  Adm. ,  31  n.  i,  59. 

Edmonds,  Flight-Lt.,  362  «. 

Egerton,  Maj.-Gen.  G.  G.  A.,  i8i,  200. 

Egypt : 

Anzacs  in,  71. 

Defences  of,  12. 

Kitchener's  concern  for,    12,   41,  70-1, 

379. 
Egyptian  labourers,  360. 
Einstein,  Lewis,  cited,  147 «. 
Ejelmer-Anafarta  line,  Hamilton's  plan  for 

seizing  (9  Aug.),  322-3. 
Ejelmer  Bay,  290,  335,  388  n. 
Elliot,  Brig.-Gen.  G.  S.  M'D.,  81. 
Elliott,  Lt.-Col.  G.  C.  E.,  83.  239. 
Emden,  72. 

England,  Com.  Hugh  T.,  257. 
Enos,  76,  221. 
Enver  Pasha,  4,  11,  13,  144,  145,  1B6,  190 ; 

von  Sanders'  subservience  to,  198  n, ; 

quoted,  62. 
Erenkeui,  52,  61. 
Erskine,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  F,,  181  m. 
Eski,  the,  132. 

Eski  Hissarlik.    See  De  Tott's  Battery. 
Eski  Keui,  no. 
Eur  op  a,  212. 
Euryalus,  89,  loi. 
Evacuation  of  the  Peninsula : 
Anzac,  at,  397  ff. 
Birdwood's    successful    accomplishment 

of,  381,  386. 


Evacuation  of  the  Peninsula,  continued — 

Devices  to  conceal,  389,  394,  399,  405. 

German  estimate  of,  400  «. 

Helles,  at,  400  ff. 

Numbers  dealt  with,  387  and  n.  i. 

Shell  fire  danger  during,  393-4,  398. 

Suvla,  at,  390  ff. 

Turkish  bribery  story,    untruth  of,   387 
n.  2. 
Evelegh,  Col.,  177  and  «.  2. 

Fahreddin,  Lt.-Col.,  163. 

Fanshawe,    Maj.-Gen.    E.    A.,    332,    361, 

390  «. 
Farm,    the,    Baldwin's  force   deflected   to, 
271  ;  overwhelmed  at  (10  Aug.),  281  ; 
Farm  abandoned   to  the  Turks,  281  ; 
mentioned,  251,  261,  263,  270,  360. 
Farquharson,  Lt.-Col.  H.  D.,  81. 
Ferdinand,  Tsar,  364. 
Fisher,  Lord,  opposed  to  the  naval  scheme, 
28-9,    32,    34-7 ;    reluctantly    agrees, 
36-8  ;  reinforces  de   Robeck,  62  ;  re- 
signs, 170  ;  estimate  of,  25. 
Fisher,  Andrew,  27. 
Fishermen's  Huts,  114,  117,  250. 
Flies,  192,  357. 

Food,  monotony  of,  205-6,  357. 
Forces  engaged.     See  (i)  Australian  and 
New  Zealand  Army  Corps,  (2)  British 
troops,  and  (3)  French  Expeditionary 
Corps. 
Forshaw,  Lt.  W.  T.,  230  «. 
Forsyth,  Brig.-Gen.,  242. 
Fort  No.  I,  100,  104. 
Fortescue,  Martin,  cited,  62  n.  i. 
Forts  on  the  Dardanelles,  50. 
Foxhound,  314,  329. 
Frankland,  Major,  103. 
French  Expeditionary  Corps : 

African  troops  of,  136,  147,  149,  151,  175. 
Artillery  of,    148,    153 «.  ;    75's    lent    to 
British,  173,  200,  401 ;  captured  by 
Turks,  245,  263. 
Casualties — (25  April),   121 ;   (21  June), 
180 ;  in  early  July,  202  ;  figures  not 
published,  216  n.  i. 
Composition  of,  84-5. 
Engagements— feint  at   Kum  Kali  and 
Yenishehr,  120-1 ;  8  May  (advance  on 
Kereves  Ridge),  156  ;  4  June,  174-5  ; 
12  July,  199. 
Evacuation  of,  401. 
Haricot  Redoubt  captured  by,  179-80. 
Health  record  of,  192. 
Helles,  at  (6  Aug.),  225. 
Landing  at  V  Beach,  129 ;  task  of,  80. 
Position  of,  131-2. 

Relations  of  British  with — friendly,  129, 
30 ;  out  of  bounds  to  British,  129, 

202. 

Royal  Naval  Division  reinforcing,   147; 

substituted  for,  401. 
Strength  of,  middle  of  Aug.,  336. 
Tenedos  the  headquarters  of,  i66. 


INDEX 


421 


French  Expeditionary  Corps,  continued — 
V  Beach  depot  constantly  shelled,  196. 
2nd  Division : 
Composition  of,  152  n.  2. 
Salonika,     Bailloud's    contingent    at, 
366-7. 
Freyberg,  Brig. -Gen.,  xii. 
Freyberg,  Lt.-Coni.  Bernard,  120,  122. 
FuUerton,  Maj.  (Surgeon),  237. 
Fusilier  Bluff,  184,  403. 

Gaba  Tepe,  nature  of,  109-10 ;  drawbacks 
to  landing   at,    78 ;    enemy   guns   on, 
116 ;    effort    to   seize    (4    May),    139 ; 
mentioned,  53,  77. 
Gain  poll : 

Campaign.     See  Dardanelles  campaign. 
Churchill's  scheme  for  Greek  seizure  of 

(Sept.  14),  9. 
Enemy  strength  on  (March),  68, 
Routes  across,  no. 
Garside,  Lt.-Col.,  154  «.  2. 
Gaulois,  49,  50,  52,  61. 
George,  Rt.  Hon.  D.  Lloyd,  15,  56,  194  w.  ; 

cited,  28. 
Gerard,  Lt.-Col.,  219. 
German  Officers'  Trenches,  190,  241. 
Germans  : 

Atrocities  by,  98. 

Guns  and  ammunition  supplied  to  Turkey 

by,  388-9,  400-1. 
Turkish     relations     with.       See     under 
Turkey. 
Ghazi  Baba,  289. 
Gilleson,  Capt.  Rev.  — ,  351  n. 
Gillespie,  Lt.-Col.  F.  M.,  262,  283. 
Giraudon,  Col.,  180  n.  i. 
Glasgow,  Maj.  T.  W.,  243  «. 
Glenn,  Capt.,  391. 
Glossop,  Capt.,  72. 
Gloucester,  8. 

Godley,  Maj. -Gen.   Sir  Alex.  J.,   xii,  xiii, 
70,  83,  138,  253,  256,  322,  380  ;  quoted 
on   the  7-10  Aug.   fighting,  284 ;    the 
Anzac  evacuation,  400. 
Goeben,  S-gandw.,  139,  177. 
Goliath,  108,  109,  164. 
Gouraud,  Gen.,  160,  172,  180,  193,  371. 
Grampus,  329. 
Grant,  Capt.,  119,  217,  351. 
Grant,  Rear-Adm.  Heathcote,  xii. 
Great  Sap,  the.     See  Long  Sap. 
Greece : 

British  support  of,  in  1897  campaign,  2. 

Cyprus  offered  to,  368. 

Dardanelles  bombardment  as  affecting, 

5S-6. 
Forces  available  in,  365, 
Russian  jealousy  of,  11,  56. 
Salonika.     See  that  heading, 
Greek  "  Andarti,"  225  and  n. 
Green  Hill  (Hill  50),  description  of,  287  ; 
next  to  Chocolate  Hill,  309  ;  held  by 
Hill's    Brigade   (10  Aug.),    324,    335; 
confusion  between  Sulajik  and,  326. 


Green  Knoll,  390  «. 

Greene,  Sir  Graham,  26  «. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  14,  35  ;  cited  on  experts, 

2-8  ;    quoted  on  the  Balkan  situation, 

366. 
Gully     Beach — conformation     of,     106-7  ; 

deserted   by   Turks,    130 ;    evacuation 

from,  402-5. 
Gully    Ravine    (Saghir   Dere),    nature    of, 

106-7 !      Turkish     snipers     in,     149 ; 

counter-attacks   down,    178 ;    gains  in 

(28    June),    185 ;    Turkish    attack   on 

(2  July),   197;  success  near  (15  Nov.), 

382  ;  mentioned,  108,  131,  150. 
Gurkha  Bluff,  159. 
Gurkhas.     See  under  British  troops — 29th 

Indian  Infantry  Brigade. 
Gwynn,  Lt.-Col.  C.  W.,  332  n,  i. 

Haggard,  Brig.-Gen.  H.,  217  n.  i,  295, 
299  ;  seriously  wounded,  307,  308  n.  i, 

Haldane,  Lord,  17  ;  cited,  28. 

Hamilton,  Sir  Bruce,  201. 

Hamilton,  Gen.  Sir  Ian  —  Kitchener's 
orders  to,  63,  64  ;  arrives  at  Tenedos, 
63  ;  in  Egypt,  69-70 ;  address  to  his 
forces,  85  ;  decides  against  withdrawal, 
124  ;  Order  of  29  April,  134  ;  Admin- 
istrative Staff  of,  delayed  in  Egypt, 
141  ;  Orders  of  9  May,  156  ;  of  12  May, 
157  ;  headquarters  on  Imbros,  166-7  ; 
Order  of  25  May,  167-8  ;  orders  assault 
of  4  June,  172  ;  vain  attempts  at  white 
flag  truce,  178 ;  refuses  burial  arm- 
istice, 198  ;  eulogy  of  29th  Division, 
201 ;  Order  of  5  Aug.,  226  and  n.  ; 
approves  design  of  Sari  Bair  attack, 
253  ;  scheme  for  landing  at  Nibrunesi 
Point,  298  ;  congratulates  Stopford  on 
achievements  of  7  Aug.,  311  ;  visits 
Stopford,  315  ;  urges  on  Hammersley 
the  need  for  prompt  action,  316  ;  re- 
turns to  the  Arno,  318  ;  plan  for  seizing 
Ejelmer-Anafarta  line  (9  Aug.),  322-3  ; 
orders  consolidation  of  existing  line 
(10  Aug.),  324-5  ;  repeatedly  frustrated 
by  Corps  Commander  and  Divisional 
Generals,  326-8  ;  asks  for  further  rein- 
forcements (r6  Aug.),  336;  refused, 
337i  363  ;  attitude  towards  evacuation, 
371  ;  superseded  by  Birdwood,  372 ; 
farewell  special  Order,  372  ;  leaves 
Gallipoli,  373  ;  effect  of  his  recall,  374  ; 
career  of,  65-6 ;  estimate  of,  66-7 ; 
troops  under,  see  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Army  Corps,  and  British 
troops  ;  acknowledgments  to,  xii. 

Hammersley,  Maj. -Gen.  Fred.,  nth 
(Northern)  Division  under,  217,  293; 
career  of,  294  ;  orders  Hill  to  co-oper- 
ate with  Sitwell's  Brigade,  305  ;  inac- 
tion of  (8  Aug.),  316  ;  orders  6th  E. 
York  I'ioneers  from  Scimitar  Hill,  317  ; 
retires  from  command  of  nth  Divi- 
sion, 332 ;  mentioned,  321. 


422 


INDEX 


Hankey,   Col.    Sir    Maurice,   214 ;    cited, 

28. 
Hare,  Brig. -Gen.  S.  W.,  82,  89,  102. 
Haricot  Redoubt,  175,  179-80. 
Harris,  Lt.-Col.  H.,  190. 
Hautville,  Lt  -Col.,  152  «.  2. 
Headquarter.s  —  on   Queen  Elizabeth,    89, 
123 ;    on  the  Arcadian,  142  ;    at  Ke- 
phalos    Bay,    166-7 ;    farther    inland, 
167. 
Hell  Spit,  U2. 
Helles : 
Aeroplane  landing  at,  218, 
Evacuation  of,  401-5. 
Feint  at  (6  Aug.),  227-31. 
Shelling  of,  perpetual,  157,  171. 
Storm  havoc  at  (27  Nov. ),  383. 
Turkish  troops  opposite  (Dec),  389  n, 
Helles,  Cape : 

Fort  on,  bombarded  (19  Feb.),  50,  51  ; 
bombardment   to  cover    landing,    91  ; 
the  landings,   100,    102,   103 ;    French 
railway  to,  129. 
Hendry,  Brig. -Gen.  R.  W.,  181  w. 
Henri  IV.,  62. 
Herbert,  Lt.-Col.  A.  H.,  254. 
Hetman  Chair,  286,  341. 
Higher  Commands,  influence  of,  226. 
Hill,    Brig. -Gen.    F.    F.,   arrival    of,   from 
Mitylene  and  landing   (7  Aug.),  295, 
303-4 ;    under     Hanmiersley's    orders, 
305  ;   on  Chocolate  Hill  (9-10  Aug.), 
319,  324  ;  invalided  and  succeeded  by 
Lt.-Col.   J.    G.   King-King,    332,   338 
n.  2  ;    estimate    of,    308  ;    mentioned, 
217  n.  I. 
Hill,  Brig. -Gen.  J.,  332,  341. 
Hill  10,  289,  302. 
Hill  40.     See  Damakjelik  Bair. 
Hill  50.     See  Green  Hill. 
Hill  6o(Kaiajik  Aghala) — situation  of,  252  ; 
Turkish   possession    of,    336 ;    attacks 
on  (21  Aug.),  348  ff.  ;  (27  Aug. ),  353-4  ; 
importance  of,  348. 
Hill  70.     See  Scimitar  Hill. 
Hill  112.     See  W  Hill. 
Hill  114,  storming  of,  105. 
Hill  138,  102. 

Hill  141,  capture  of,  103-4. 
Hill  971.     See  Koja  Chemen  Tepe. 
Hill  0,  247-8,  263-5. 
Hill  W.     See  W  Hill. 
Hobbs,  Col.  J.  J.  T.,  83. 
Holbrook,  Lt.,  45. 
Holmes,  Brig. -Gen.  W.,  352  «. 
Hordern,  Rev.  A.  C,  81. 
Hornby,  Adm.,  31  n.  i. 
Hospital  camps,  358. 
Hospital  ship  accommodation  inadequate, 

118. 
Howse,  Col.  N.  R.,  118,  124. 
Hughes,   Brig. -Gen.  F.  G.,  84;  attack  of 

30  June,  191  ;  the  Nek,  244,  246. 
Hughes,  Col.  J.  G.,  260. 
Hiimber,  234. 


Hunter-Weston,      Maj.-Gen.,      70,     176; 

battle  of  28  June,  182 ;  breakdown  of 

(July),  200-1. 
Hurd,  Archibald,  cited,  26«.,  40 «. 
Hythe,  382, 

lero  inlet,  217. 
I  mbros : 

Aeroplane  camp  at,  218-19. 

Birdwood's  H.Q.  at,  381. 

Greek  vendors  at,  205. 

Description  of,  165-6. 

Strategic  value  of,  401. 
Implacable,  62,  89  ;  at  X  Beach,  105-6. 
"Implacable  Landing,"  105, 
hidefatigable,  29. 
Indian  Brigade.     See  under  British  troops 

— 29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade. 
Inflexible,  48-9,  59-61. 
Inglefield,  Maj.-Gen.  F.  S.,  325,  327,  335 «•. 

355.  361- 
Irani  Chai.     See  Asmak  Dere. 
Irresistible,  49,  51,  60-1. 
Irvine,  Maj.,  126. 
Ismail    Oglu    Tepe    (Hill    112).      See  W 

Hill. 
Istomine,  Gen.,  169. 

Italy — declares  war  on  Austria,   56,    170 ; 
Isonzo  victories,  194. 

Jackson,  Adm.  Sir  Henry,   Memorandum 

of,   on   proposed  naval  attack,   30-1; 

memorandum   to   Garden   (Feb.),  42 ; 

succeeds  Lord  Fisher,   170  ;  cited,  i  ; 

quoted,  31  ;  mentioned,  26. 
Jackson,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  W.  M.,  81,  213. 
Jeanne  d Arc,  120. 
Jenkinson,  Capt. ,  178-9. 
Jephson,  Maj.,  310,  330. 
Jephson's  Post — height  of,  290  ;    storming 

of,  310  ;  farthest  point  held  by  British, 

3".  331- 
Jerrold,  Lt.  Douglas,  xii. 
Jewish  Refugee  Mule  Corps.     See  Zionists. 
Johnston,  Brig.-Gen.  F.   E.,  83,  154,  254, 

260. 
Johnston,  Lt.-Col.  G.  N.,  83. 
Johnston,  Brig.-Gen.  Napier,  349. 
"  Johnston's  Jolly,"  233  and  n.,  238. 
Jonquil,  297. 
Jourdain,  Lt.-Col.,  282  «.,  349. 

Kaba  Kuyu,  348,  353. 

Kaiajik  Aghala.     See  Hill  60. 

Kaiajik  Dere,  252,  350. 

Kangaroo  Beach,  325  n. 

Karachali,    feint    at    (25    April),    119 ;    (6 

Aug. ),  225. 
Karakol  Dagh,  395;   description  of,  290; 

cleared  by  nth  Manchesters  (7  Aug.), 

301-2,    310 ;     Corps    H.Q.    at,    343 ; 

Kitchener's  visit  to,  380. 
Kartal  Tepe,  290-1. 
Kasa  Dere.     See  Asmak  Dere. 
Kastro,  166, 


\ 


INDEX 


423 


Kavak  Tepe — height  of,  291  ;  Hamilton's 
proposed  occupation  of,  322,  326,  328; 
Turkish  emplacements  behind,  388. 

Kazlar  Chair,  286. 

Keble,  Lt.-Col.  A.  E.  C,  82  ;  in  charge  of 
arrangements  for  wounded,  141. 

Kelly,  Surg.  P.  B.,  97  «. 

Kelly,  Sapper  Stephen,  206. 

Kenna,  Brig. -Gen.  F.  A.,  338  n.  i,  347. 

Kephalos  Bay  : 

Hospital  camps  at,  358. 
Storm  at  (27  Nov.),  383. 
Suvla,  compared  with,  335. 
nth  Division  at,  226. 

Kephalos,  Cape,  165. 

Kephez  Point,  52,  86. 

Kereves  Dere — effort  to  reach  (28  April), 
'^3^j  133  ;  French  capture  of  redoubt 
at  (4  June),  175;  French  gain  (21  June), 
180 ;  redoubt  captured  by  157th 
Brigade,  199. 

Kereves  Ridge,  156. 

Keshan,  76. 

Keyes,  Commodore  Roger,  xii,  80,  297,  313, 
322. 

Kilid  Bahr,  52-3;  fortifications  of,  no, 
118  ;  Turkish  drill  ground,  208. 

King-King,  Lt.-Col.  J.  G. ,  332,  338  n.  2. 

Kiretch  Tepe  Sirt — description  of,  290  ; 
loth  Division  on  (10  Aug.)  324;  their 
advance  along  (15-17  Aug.),  329-31  ; 
flood  water  from  (27  Nov.),  383 ; 
mentioned,  298,  300,  303,  335. 

Kitchener,  Lord,  concern  of,  for  Egypt, 
12,  41,  70-1,  379  ;  opposed  to  Gallipoli 
Expedition  (Nov.  1914),  13,  14 ;  agrees 
to  naval  attack,  14,  24,  33,  36  ;  orders 
to  Hamilton,  63,  64,  85,  222 ;  tele- 
graphs for  estimated  loss  by  evacuation, 
371  ;  visits  Mudros  and  Gallipoli, 
378-9 ;  opposed  to  evacuation,  378  ; 
converted  to  it,  379,  381  ;  estimate  of, 
15-18  ;  his  masterful  way,  18  and  «.,  43. 

Koe,  Col.  (K.O.S.B  ),  108. 

Koe,  Brig. -Gen.  F.  W.  B.,  81,  213. 

Koe,  Brig. -Gen.  L.  C,  181  n. 

Koja  Chemen  Tepe  (Hill  971),  127; 
situation  of,  and  approach  to,  244,  248, 
251-2;  assault  on,  ordered  (8  Aug.), 
25s,  263,  265,  268. 

Koja  Dere,  115,  118,  388  «. 

Krene,  296,  313. 

Krithia,  108,  185  ;  situation  of,  131  ;  effort 
to  reach  (28  April),  131,  133. 

Krithia  Nullah,  402. 

Kuchuk  Anafarta.     See  Anafarta  Sagir. 

Kuchuk  Kemikli.     See  Nibrunesi  Point. 

Kum  Kali,  50,  51,  54,  180  n.  i ;  French 
capture  of  (25  April),  121-2. 

Kut-el-Amara,  378. 

Lala  Baba — situation  of,  287  ;  shelter  from, 
for  Nibrunesi  landing,  298,  392  ; 
Turkish  forces  on,  299  ;  Turkish  fire 
from,  on  Suvla  Bay,  301  ;  stormed  by 


British  (6  Aug.),  300  ;  British  guns  on 

and  behind  (9  Aug.),  296  «.,  321. 
Lancashire  Landing.     See  W  Beach. 
Lancashire  names,  203. 
Land  mines,  301,  308,  310. 
Landings  of  25  April,  results  of,  121-2, 
Lansdowne,  Lord,  cited,  377. 
Larissa  (1897),  365. 
Lawrence,  Maj.-Gen.  H.  A.,  181 ;  succeeds 

Egerton,  200  ;  Helles  evacuation,  403. 
Leane,  Maj.,  231, 
Lee,  Gen.  Noel,  176. 
Legge,  Maj.-Gen.  J.  G.,  352. 
Lemberg,  fall  of,  193. 
Levick,  Staff-Surgeon,  xii,  213-14. 
Levinge,  Lt.-Col.  H.  G.,  279. 
Libau,  German  seizure  of,  169. 
Lindley,  Maj.-Gen.,  323,  332. 
Lister,  Charles,  87. 
Little  Anafarta.     See  Anafarta  Sagir. 
Little  Table  Top,  251,  260. 
Lloyd,  Lt.  E.  E.  L.,  190, 
Lockyer,  Capt.,  105. 
Logan,  Maj.,  242. 
London,  62,  90,  in. 
Lone  Pine,  232-41. 
Long  Sap  or  Great  Sap,  The,   117,  250, 

256. 
Longford,  Brig.-Gen.  Lord,  338  n.  i,  347. 
Loos,  337,  362-3. 

Lord  Nelson,  48-9,  52,  53,  59,  91,  165. 
Lord  Raglan,  9  n. 
Lorrimer,  Surg..  214. 
Lotbinifere.     See  de  Lotbini^re, 
Louis  of  Battenberg,  Prince,  26. 
Lovat's  Scouts,  360-1. 
"Lowland"   Division.     See  British  troops 

— 52nd  Division. 
Lula  Burgas,  146-7. 
Lynden-Bell,  Maj.-Gen.,  372. 

M'Cay,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  W.,  83,  154. 

M'Donald,  Lt.-Col.  T.  W.,  154  n.  r. 

M'Grigor,  Brig.-Gen.  C.  R.,  8r. 

Mackenzie,  Compton,  222,  224 ;  cited, 
180  n.  2. 

Mackenzie,  Sir  Thomas,  27. 

Mackesy,  Lt.-Col.,  257. 

Maclagan,  Col.  E.  G.  Sinclair,  83,  89. 

Maclagan's  Ridge,  1 13-14. 

McLaurin,  Col.  H.  N.,  83,  116,  126. 

McLaurin's  Hill,  116,  117,  125. 

McMahon,  Sir  H.,  378. 

Macnaghton,  Col.,  233. 

McNicol,  154  n.  2. 

Mahon,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  Bryan  T.,  career  of, 
294;  in  command  of  loth  (Irish) 
Division,  217 ;  landing  of,  at  Suvla 
Point,  304,  310 ;  attack  on  Kiretch 
Tepe  Sirt,  310  ;  on  ridge  from  W  Hill, 
322 ;  attack  of  15-17  Aug.,  329 ; 
mentioned,  293,  303. 

Majestic,  48-9,  53,  86,  in  ;  forcing  of  the 
Narrows,  60;  torpedoed,  164,  170 «. 

Malcolm,  Col.  Neil,  316. 


424 


INDEX 


Malleson,  Midshipman,  96. 

Mallet,  Sir  Louis,  11. 

Malone,  Lt.-Col.  W.  G.,  on  Rhododendron 

Ridge,   265-8,    278 ;   estimate   of,    154 

n.  I,  189. 
Manitou,  80  n. 
Maps,  xiii,  iii. 
Margesson,  Maj.,  92. 
Marinetti,  170. 
Marshall,    Maj. -Gen.    J.    W.    R.,    xii,    82, 

182  and  n.\  wounded  at  the  landing, 

106  ;  commanding  29th  Division,  332, 

338 ;    improvement   of    S3rd    Division 

under,  361. 
Martyn,  Maj.,  239. 
Masefield,  John,  cited,  152  n,  i. 
Masnou,  G6n.,  84,  202. 
Matthews,  Col.,  108. 
Maude,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  F.  Stanley,  xii,  182  «., 

332,     355 ;      directs     evacuation      at 

Nibrunesi    Point,    396 ;   evacuation   of 

13th    Division,    403-4 ;     estimate    of, 

361. 
Maxwell,    Maj. -Gen.    Sir   John,    70,    137, 

378. 
Maxwell,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  P.,  217  «.  i,  295, 

299,    307 ;     attack    on    Scimitar    Hill 

(9  Aug.),  319-21;    on   Chocolate   Hill 

(10  Aug. ),  324. 
Maxwell,  Capt.  William,  81. 
Mehmed  v..  Sultan,  6,  144. 
Mercer,  Maj. -Gen.  SirD. ,  xii,  84. 
Messoudieh,  45. 
Millbanke,  Sir  John,  347. 
Milner,  Lord,  quoted,  377. 
Mine-sweepers,  53. 
Mines    in    the    Dardanelles,    61-2 ;     land 

mines,  301,  308,  310. 
Minneapolis,  297  n. 
Minnetonka,  212-13. 
Minnewaska,  90. 
Minogue,  Col.  J.  O'B. ,  308;/. 
Mitrofanoff,  Prof.,  quoted,  6. 
Mitylene,  half   loth  Division  stationed  at, 

215  ;  scare  at,  arranged,  222,  224. 
Monash,    Brig.-Gen.    J.,    83,    138,    262-3; 

Sari  Bair,  268  ;  orders  construction  of 

subterranean  galleries  (Nov.),  382. 
Monash  Gully,  117,  138,  188,  243;  Turkish 

failure  at,  192, 
Monitors,  214-15. 

Monro,    Gen.    Sir    Charles,    appointed    to 
supersede   Hamilton,   372 ;    report   of, 
on  Gallipoli,  375-6;  Lord  Ribblesdale's 
public    disclosure   of  it,    378  //.  ;    con- 
sultation with    Kitchener,   378  ;    H.Q. 
of,  on   the  Aragon,    381  ;   hands  over 
command  to  Murray,  401  n.  2. 
Moore,  Lt.-Col.,  268,  317,  319. 
Morse,  Lt.  John  A.  V.,  97  «. 
Morto  Bay,  78,  79,  91  ;  situation  of,  92-3. 
Mudros     harbour  —  description     of,     47; 
crowding  at,  80  ;  hospital  camps  above, 
212,  358. 
Mudros  village,  212. 


Murray,  Gen.  Sir  Archibald,  401  n.  2. 
Murray,    Sir   James    Wolfe,    18,   26,   33 

quoted,  18  ». 
Mustard  Plaster,  the,  261. 

Naismith,  Lt. -Com,  Eric,  145, 

Nameless  Hill.     See  Hill  Q. 

Napier,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  E.,  82,  97. 

Narrows,  the — description  of,  45 ;  forcing 
of,  attempted,  59  ;  capture  and  loss  of 
hill  commanding  (9  Aug.),  273-6. 

Naval  bombardments  of  Nov,  1914  and 
Feb.  1915,  50  ff. 

Naval  guns,  flat  trajectory  of,  51,  275 ; 
bush  fire  started  by,  303  and  n.  ;  help 
from  (9  Aug.),  322, 

Nek,  the  (from  Russell's  Top),  situation  of, 
243  ;  Shrapnel  Gully  under  fire  from, 
126  ;  attack  of  30  June,  191-2  ;  fight- 
ing of  7  Aug. ,  243-6 ;  blocking  of,  at 
evacuation,  399. 

Nek  of  Rhododendron  Ridge,  See  Rhodo- 
dendron Ridge  Nek. 

Neuve  Chapelle,  23,  33,  43,  87. 

Newenham,  Lt.-Col.,  105,  106. 

Nibrunesi  Point,  249,  286  ;  Hamilton's 
scheme  for  landing  Suvla  force  south 
of,  298-9 ;  evacuation  from,  392, 
396. 

Nicholas,  Tsar,  363. 

Nicholson,  Rear-Adm,  Stuart,  164. 

Nicol,  Brig.-Gen,  L,  L.,  217  n.  i,  295, 
310, 

No.  I  Post.     See  Fishermen's  Huts. 

No.  2  Post,  250,  255-6,  264 ;  howitzers  near 
(9  Aug.),  275. 

No.  3  Post,  250,  255. 

Nogucs,  Lt.-Col.,  85,  120,  180  n.  i. 

Notes  quoted,  202-4,  207-10,  359,  360, 
385  «. 

Nunn,  Lt.-Col.  M,  H,,  281, 

Ocean,  49,  52,  53,  60,  61, 
Ocean   Beach,    117,   243-4,    251  ;   hospital 
camps  along,    358 ;    evacuation  from, 

397.  398. 
Officers,  shortage  of,  336,  338  n.  2,  376, 
Old  A  Beach,  299. 
Old  No,  3  Post,  250,  254 ;    capture  of  (6 

Aug.),  256-7,  264. 
Oliver,  Vice-Adm.  Sir  Henry,  26,  32, 
OUivant,  Lt.-Col.  A.  H.,  84, 
Onslow,  Lt.  B.  W.,  210, 
Orkhanieh,  50. 
O'Sullivan,  Capt.,  347 «. 

Paget,  Gen.,  report  of,  on  Bulgarian  atti- 
tude, 55. 
Panaghia,  165. 

Paris,  Maj. -Gen.  A,,  24,  70,  84,  154, 
Parker,  I^t.-Col.,  254. 
Patterson,  Col.  J.  H.,  71  ««. 
Peirse,  Vice-Adm.,  54. 
Pelliot,  Lt.,  81. 
Peshall,  Rev.  C,  J.  C,  xii. 


INDEX 


425 


Peyton,  Maj.-Gen.  Wm.,  337  and  «. 

Phido,  296. 

Philippe,  Lt.-Col,  84. 

Phillimore,  Adm.,  210. 

Pike,  Col.,  307. 

Pimple,  the,  height  of,  290 ;  stormed  by 
Munsters  and  Dublins,  330-1  ;  Turkish 
entrenchments  opposite,  232 ;  Suvla 
pier  commanded  by,  392  «. 

Plugge,  Lt.-Col.  A.,  154 «.  I. 

Plugge's  Plateau,  112,  117, 

Plunkett,  Maj.  E.  A.,  81. 

Poison  gas — Germans'  earliest  use  of,  87  ; 
rumours  of  Turkish  use  of,  not  sub- 
stantiated, 382  «. 

Pollen,  Capt.  S.  H.,  81. 

Pollok-M'Call,  Lt.-Col.,  181  «. 

Pope,  Lt.-Col.  H.,  126,  188,  268. 

Pope's  Hill,  117,  125,  188;  value  of,  126  ; 
fighting  of  7  Aug.,  241-3. 

Prah,  296,  313. 

Price,  G.  Ward,  cited,  367  n.  2. 

Pridham,  Lt.-Col.  G.  R.,  83. 

Prince  George,  49,  53,  59-60,  404. 

Pritice  of  VVales,  62,  90,  in. 

Przemysl,  captured  by  Russians,  87  ;  fall 
of,  169,  172,  193. 

Queen,  62,  90,  in. 

Queen  Elizabeth,  33  and  n.  i,  48-49  ;  the 
preliminary  bombardments,  51-3  ;  the 
forcing  of  the  Narrows,  59  ;  general 
headquarters,  89,  123  ;  assisting  at  V 
Beach  and  Anzac  Cove,  99,  124-5  '< 
sinks  a  transport,  139 ;  sent  home, 
165. 

Quilter,  Col.  Arnold,  86-7. 

Quinn,  Maj.,  126  and  n.  2,  189. 

Quinn's  Post,  situation  of,  189,  360 ;  hold- 
ing of,  126  ;  danger  of,  189  ;  assault 
of  19  May,  161  ;  fighting  of  7  Aug., 
241-3;  mentioned,  117,  125,  138,  188. 

Rabbit  Island,  61  ;  monitors  off,  215. 

Radoslavoff,  M. ,  364. 

Rankine,  Maj.,  268. 

Reed,  Brig. -Gen.  H.  L.,  297,  332,  395, 

Regimental  spirit,  179. 

Reinforcements : 
Arrival  of — 29th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade, 
134  ;  42nd  East  Lancashire  Division, 
137,  172  ;  52nd  Division  (mid  June), 
172;  13th  and  nth  Divisions  (July), 
200,  216-17;  Yeomanry  (Aug.),  337; 
(Sept.),  360-1. 
Denial  of,  130,  363  ;  10  per  cent,  drafts 

refused,  127. 
Insufficiency  of,  192. 

Reshadie,  7-8. 

Rhododendron  Ridge  or  Spur  (Canterbury 
Ridge),  situation  of,  250 ;  7  August 
attacks  on,  260-1.  263,  266,  270;  an- 
nihilation of  5th  Wilts  on  (10  Aug.), 
279-80  ;  subterranean  galleries  made 
through,  382. 


Rhododendron  Ridge  Nek,  258,  261,  264  ; 
Turkish  attack  on  New  Zealanders 
near,  277-8. 

Ribblesdale,  Lord,  377-8  and  «. 

Richardson,  Brig.-Gen.,  xii ;  maps  of, 
xiii. 

Rifaat,  Col.,  187. 

River  Clyde  at  the  landings,  94-5,  98-9  ; 
breakwater  at  V  Beach,  129 ;  men- 
tioned, 164  n.,  404,  405,  410. 

Roberts,  Col.,  173  «. 

Robertson,  Lt.-Com.  Eric,  86. 

Romieux,  Maj.,  84,  202. 

Ross,  Malcolm,  119  «.,  258, 

Roumania,  408. 

Routine,  297  n. 

Royal  Engineers,  R.F.A.,  and  R.N.D.  See 
under  British  troops, 

Ruef,  Col.,  85,  152  n.  2. 

Russell,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.  H.,  xii,  83,  191, 
254,  349,  352  «.  ;  the  Hill  60  attack  (27 
Aug.),  353. 

Russell's  Top,  191  ;  7  August  fighting,  241 
243-4  I  Kitchener's  visit  to,  380. 

Russia  : 
British  rapprochement  with,  2, 
Bulgaria,  ultimatum  to,  367. 
Difficulties  of  (Dec. -Jan.    1914-15),    13- 
14  ;   reverses  of  May,   168-9  ;    further 
disasters  (Aug.  and  Sept.),  363, 
Failure  to  support  Allies,  171,  193,  198, 
221  ;     collapse    in    Poland,    224 ;    co- 
operation of,  despaired  of,  336, 
Greece,  attitude  towards,  11,  56. 

Ryan,  Col.  C.  S.,  82. 

Ryrie,  Col,  G,  de  L.,  84. 

Saghir  Dere.    See  Gully  Ravine. 
Salonika  : 

Dardanelles  campaign    as    affected   by, 

367,  369. 
French  and  British  troops  in,  367-9. 
Mahon  in  command  at,  381, 
Salt  Lake,  description  of,  289  ;  "cut  "  into, 
325  n.  ;  plain  round,  in  British  posses- 
sion, 335  ;  flood  of  Nov.,  383-4  ;  men- 
tioned, 286,  288. 
Samson,  Com.  Ch.,  218. 
Samson,  Seaman  Geo.  M'Kenzie,  97  w. 
Sapphire,  49,  108,  109. 
Sari   Bair,   77,  79  ;   conformation  of,   1 10, 

247-8. 
Sari  Bair  assault : 

Battalions  fighting  with  loss  of  all  officers, 

267. 
Failure  of,  285  ;  causes,  333-4. 
Forces  available  for,  253-5, 
Gains  achieved  by,  334-5. 
Geographical  points  in,  250-2. 
Left    assaulting    column,    262-4  i    rein- 
forced, 265,  272  ;  exploits  of  (8  Aug.), 
268-70 ;  triumph  and  disaster,  272-6  ; 
supports  inactive,  272,  276-7. 
Left  covering  force,  262. 
Nature  of  the  ground,  252. 


426 


INDEX 


Sari  Bair  assault,  continued — 
Naval  assistance,  265. 
Right   assaulting   column,    254,    260-1  ; 
reinforced,  265  ;  exploits  of  (7-8  Aug.), 
265-8 ;    third    column    to    co-operate 
with  (8  Aug.),  271  ;  attacked  on  9  Aug., 
277-8. 
Right  covering  force,  254,  256-60. 
Suvla  forces'  help   relied   on,    264 ;   not 
forthcoming,   269,  279,  285,  311,  312, 
323.  408. 
Third  assaulting  column,  270-1. 

Sari  Bair  Ravine,  244,  248. 

Sarrail,  Gen.,  362,  367. 

Saiurnia,  213. 

Sazli  Beit  Dere,  250,  254,  256. 

Schuler,  Phillip,  73  n.  ;  cited,  119  «.,  245  «., 
351  n.  ;  quoted  on  shelling  of  Allan- 
son's  force,  274  n. 

Scimitar  Hill  (Burnt  Hill,  Hill 70),  situation 
and  importance  of,  288  ;  occupied  by 
6th  E.  York  Pioneers  (8  Aug.),  317; 
abandoned  (8  Aug.),  317 ;  Turkish 
snipers'  occupation  of,  319  ;  Maxwell's 
attack  on  (9  Aug.),  320-1  ;  fire  on 
{9  Aug.),  320-1  ;  renewed  attack  (10 
Aug.),  323-4;  assault  of  21  Aug., 
339  ff.  ;  captured,  343 ;  lost,  346. 

Scobie,  Col.,  233. 

Scorpion,  182,  197,  314. 

Scott,  Lt.-Col.  P.  C,  8r. 

Scott-Moncrieff,  Brig. -Gen.,  181 «.,  185. 

Scottish  Horse,  360-1. 

Sea-planes,  218,  362  «. 

Seddel  Bahr,  50,  79,  93,  202  ;  capture  of, 
127-8  ;  Kitchener's  visit  to,  379. 

Senegalese    troops,     136,    147,    149,    151, 

175- 
Senussi,  379. 

Senussi  expedition,  337  n. 
Serbia : 

Bulgarian    animosity    against,    55,    221, 

364- 
"Corridor"  through,  5,  6, 
Forces  available  in,  365. 
Peril  of  (Sept.),  364-6. 
Rout  of,  369  n.  ;  hopelessness  of  position 
(Oct.),  376,  378. 
Seymour,  Com.  Claude,  256. 
Sexton,  Maj.  M,  J.,  81. 
Shaw,  Maj-Gen.  F,  C,  200,  254,  255,  283, 

332. 
Shelford,  Capt.  Thos.,  164. 
Shera,  Capt.,  259. 
Shortage  of : 

Artillery,   148,    171,  181,  184,   192,    193, 
194  n.,  219,  228,  229,  339,  361 ;  anti- 
aircraft shortage,  219. 
Ammunition,  133,  148,  171,  181,  185,  192, 

193,  194  n.,  200,  219,  229. 
Officers,  336,  338  n.  2,  376. 
Shrapnel  Gully,   114;  Anzac   position  on, 
125  ;  sniper  danger  in,  126  ;  dangerous 
apex   at,    138,    161,    188 ;    mentioned, 
116,  117,  243. 


Sickness : 
Casualties,  406. 
Diarrhcea,  185,  205,  313,  356. 
Dysentery,  313,  353,  356,  359.. 

Signal  station  destroyed,  196  «. 

Sikhs.  See  tinder  British  troops — 29th 
Indian  Infantry  Brigade. 

"  Silver  Babies,"  219. 

Simonin,  G^n.,  152  «.  2. 

Sitwell,  Brig. -Gen.  W.  H.,  commanding 
34th  Brigade  of  nth  Division,  217  n.  i ; 
misses  his  opportunity  (7  Aug.),  302-3  ; 
Hill  ordered  to  co-operate  with,  305  ; 
in  sole  command  of  34th  and  32nd 
Brigades,  307 ;  succeeded  by  Brig.  -Gen. 
J.  Hill,  332  ;  mentioned,  295,  299. 

Skeen,  Brig. -Gen,  A.,  82,  253. 

Skouloudis,  M.,  11 «. 

Smith,  2nd  Lt.  A.  V.,  402  «, 

Smith,  Col.  Carrington,  99. 

Smith,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  C.  V.,  298. 

Smyrna  Forts,  54. 

Smyrna- Panderma  Railway,  146,  221,  222. 

Smyth,  Brig.-Gen.  N.  M.,  233. 

Soghandere,  Fort,  59. 

Sonnino,  Baron,  56. 

Southland,  355  «. 

Spearman,  Commodore,  175. 

Sphinx,  the,  113,  262. 

Stamboul,  146  n, 

Staveley,  Capt.  C.  M.,  404. 

Steel's  Post,  188,  241. 

Stewart,  Col.  Crauford,  173  n. 

Stewart,  Lt.-Col.  D.  M.,  154 «.  i. 

Stopford,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  Frederick,  career  and 
reputation  of,  292 ;  arrival  of,  201  ; 
plan  for  10th  Division,  303  ;  satisfied 
with  achievements  of  7  Aug.,  311  ; 
visited  by  Hamilton  (8  Aug.),  315  ; 
constructing  Corps  H.Q.  (9  Aug.), 
322  ;  renews  attack  on  Scimitar  Hill 
(10  Aug.),  323;  ordered  to  consolidate 
line,  324-5  ;  demands  24  hours'  delay 
before  advance  on  Kavak  and  Tekke, 
326  ;  still  raises  objections  (13  Aug.), 
328  ;  orders  advance  by  loth  Division 
(15  Aug.),  329;  gives  up  command 
(15  Aug.),  332 ;  leadership  of,  226, 
334  ;  mentioned,  297,  299. 

Street,  Staff-Capt. ,  281. 

Striedinger,  Maj.  O.,  81. 

Stiirmer,  Dr.  H.,  quoted,  63  m.,  276 «.  ; 
cited,  147  n. 

Submarines  : 

Australian  (AE2),  146  w. 
British : 

En,  145-6  and  «.,  318  «, 
E14,  145-6  and  «.,  318  «. 
E15,  86. 
E20,  382. 

Marmora  Sea  invaded,  145-6  and  ti. 
Turkish  transport  sunk  (7  Sept.),  362  n. 
Enemy  : 
Achievements  of,  163-6. 
Carthage  torpedoed,  196. 


i 


INDEX 


427 


Submarines,  continued — • 

Enemy,  continued — 
Evacuation  complicated  by,  404, 
U51,  164. 
Suez  Canal,  41,  72. 
Suffren,  49,  50,  52,  53,  60. 
Sulajik,  291,  318-19,  326. 
Sultan  Osman,  7-8. 
Surprise  Gully,  232. 
Suvla : 

Kitchener's  visit  to,  380. 

Land  mines  in,  301,  308,  310. 

Storm  havoc  at,  383. 

Turkish  troops  opposite  (Dec),  388  «. 
Suvla  Bay : 

Conformation  of,  288  ;  rocky  hills  about, 
247,  289. 

Drawbacks  to,  for  April  landing,  jj. 

Hinterland  of,  jj,  291-2. 

Roadstead    of,    better    than    Kephalos, 

335- 
Water  supply  near,  292. 
Suvla  forces  ; 

Activities   of — 6-7  Aug.,    295-311 ;    7-8 

Aug.,  311-18;    8-9  Aug.,  318-23;  9- 

10  Aug.,  323-5;    lo-ii  Aug.,  325-6; 

11-12  Aug.,  326-8. 
Confusion  among,  300-2,  304,  315,  324, 

325-6,  333,  342,  344-5.  408  ;  mixture  of 

brigades,  320. 
Co-operation  of,  relied  on  for  Sari  Bair 

assault,    264  ;    not   forthcoming,    269, 

279.  285,  311,  312,  323,  408. 
Evacuation  of,  387  and  n,  i,  390  ff. 
Landing  of  (6  Aug.),  299. 
Water  supply  provision  for,  296-7  and 

n.,    313  ;    thirst    torments,    284,    296, 

308-10,  313-14  and  ««.,  333. 
Suvla  Point : 

Distance  of,  from  Ejelmer  Bay,  290. 
Mahon's  battalions  landed  at  (7  Aug.), 

304- 

Pier  at,  392,  395. 

Rocks  at,  247,  289. 

Turkish  force  at  (6  Aug.),  299. 
Swiffsure,  49,  60. 
Sydney,  72. 
Sykes,  Maj.-Gen.  F.  H.,  xii,  219. 

Table  Top,  situation  of,  250 ;  capture   of 

(6  Aug.),  254,  256-8,  264. 
Talbot,  109,  158,  182,  298, 
Talbot,  Capt.,  164. 
Tasmania  Post,  231. 

Tekke  Tape,  dominating  position  of,  287  ; 
height  and  situation  of,  291  ;  Stopford's 
design   against,    303  ;    Moore's   patrol 
on    (8   Aug.),    317,    319;    Hamilton's 
proposed  occupation  of,  322,  326,  328 ; 
5th  Norfolks  lost  on,  327-8. 
Tenedos : 
Aerodrome  at,  218. 
French  occupation  of,  166. 
Situation  and  character  of,  46-7. 
Strategic  value  of,  401. 


Tenth  (Irish)  Division  in  Gallipoli,   The, 

cited,  217  n.  2,  350  «.,  351  n. 
Territorial  Divisions  : 
Inexperience  of,  325,  334,  347. 
Makeshift  drafts  for,  376. 
Quality  of — in  29th    Division,    135  ;    in 
42nd  Division,  137. 
Theotokis,  M.,  j  n. 
Thursby,  Adm.,  90,  iii, 
Travers,  Brig.-Gen.  J,  H.  du  B,,  216  «.  2, 

255,  262. 
Treaty  of  Bucharest  (1913),  364. 
Treloar,  Capt.,  xiii. 
Triad,  201. 

Triumph,      preliminary      bombardments, 
48-9,  52,  54  «.  2  ;  forcing  of  the  Nar- 
rows, 59-60  ;  covering  fire  from,  at  the 
landing,    iii,    116,    125;    exploit    by 
picket  boat  of,  86  ;  torpedoed,  164. 
Troops   in   the  campaign.      See  (i)   Aus- 
tralian and  New  Zealand  Army  Corps, 
(2)  British  troops,  and  (3)  French  Ex- 
peditionary Corps. 
Trotman,  Brig.-Gen.  C.  N.,  84. 
TuUibardine,  Marqtiis  of,  360, 
Turchen  Keui,  388  n. 
Turkey : 

British  pre-war  relations  with,  2-4,  6-7  ; 

declaration  of  war,  11. 
Capitulations,  9. 
German    pre-war    relations    with,    2-9 ; 

alliance  of  4  Aug.  1914,  7  n. 
Revolution  in,  anticipated,  33,  59. 
Young  Turk  revolution  (1908-9),  4. 
Turkey  Trot,  the,  184. 
Turks  : 
Allied  attitude  towards,  385  and  n. 
Artillery  strength,  148,  161. 
Camouflage  by,  150. 

Casualties,  estimated  (early  May),   146  ; 
(19-20  May),  162  ;  (end  of  May),  168  ; 
(21  June),   180 ;  (first  part  of  August), 
335  ;    (27-28  Aug.),   354;    total,  406; 
burials  under  Red  Crescent  (2  May), 
136  ;  (20  May),  162. 
Divisional  Order  (June),  186, 
Filthy  lines  of,  185. 
Germans,  attitude  towards,  385  n. 
Hate    frenzies    of,    190,    196,    209,    399, 

403- 

Headquarters  of,  388  «. 

Mussulman  appeal  of,  187-8. 

Nizam  troops,  148,  168,  191,  198. 

Prisoners,  167,  177,  185,  199  ;  Australian 
treatment  of,  238  ». 

Red  Cross  respected  by,  395. 

Reinforcements  of,  145-6,  161,  198,  319; 
routes  of,  146,  221. 

Snipers,  125-6,  150,  i6c,  335  and  n. 

Strength  of,  estimated — in  all  quarters, 
193 «.;  in  Gallipoli  Peninsula  —  (25 
April),  III  ;  (i  May),  135  ;  (6  May), 
148  ;  (25  May),  168  ;  (Aug.),  220  and 
n.;  (6  Aug.  at  Suvla),  299;  (Dec.), 
387-8  and  n. 


428 


INDEX 


Turks,  continued — 

Sufferings    of,     in     blizzard     of    Nov., 

385- 
Trenches  of,  roofed,  235,  256,  342. 

Unwin,  Com.  Edwin,  at  V  Beach  landing, 
95-6  ;  rescues  the  wounded,  99  ;  super- 
intends Suvla  landing,  295  ;  directs  the 
evacuation,  392. 

V  Beach  : 

Evacuation  from,  404. 

French  landing-place  and  depot,  129. 

Landing    of   25  April,    94-100 ;    Seddel 

Bahr  secured,  127-8. 
Shelling  of,  constant,  148,  196. 
Situation    and     conformation     of,     79, 

93-4- 

Vacher,  Lt.-Col.,  85. 

Valley  of  the  Shadow  of  Death.  See 
Shrapnel  Gully. 

Vandeleur,  Brig. -Gen.  R.  S. ,  349  «. 

Vandenberg,  G^n.,  84. 

Vengeance,  49,  52,  53,  60,  165. 

Venizelos,  M.,  military  aid  offered  by  (i 
March),  56  ;  resignation  of  (6  March), 
56  «.  2 ;  resumes  Premiership  (Aug.), 
365  ;  pro-Serbian  policy  of,  365-6  ;  re- 
signs (Oct.),  368  ;  estimate  of,  10. 

Vineyard,  the  : 

British  capture  of  (Aug.),  229-30. 
Success  near  (15  Nov.),  382. 

von  Biberstein,  Baron  Marschall,  4. 

von  der  Goltz,  Gen.  Colman,  6. 

von  Hindenburg,  169. 

von  Lowenstern,    Gen.,  proclamation  by, 

135- 

von  Mackensen,  Field  Marshal,  365,  369  «. 

von  Miiller,  Capt.  Karl,  72. 

von  Sanders,  Gen.  Liman,  145,  161  ; 
Turkish  army  reorganised  by,  6,  9 ; 
at  the  armistice  (20  May),  163 ;  sub- 
servience of,  to  Enver,  198  n. 

von  Wangenheim,  Baron,  144. 

W  Beach : 

Conformation  of,  100. 

Evacuation  from,  404-5. 

Landing  of  25  April,  101-4. 

Shelling    of,    persistent,    129,    148,    196, 
197. 
W  Hill  (Hill  112— Ismail  Oglu  Tepe): 

Hill  ordered  to  attack  (7  Aug.),  305. 

Importance  of,  287,  323. 

Turkish  entrenchments  on,  342. 

Turkish  guns  withdrawn  from  (7-8  Aug. ), 
269  and  n. 

mentioned,  298,  300,  335. 
Walford,  Capt.,  128. 
Walker,  Corp.  G.  A.,  196 «. 
Walker,   Maj.-Gen.  H.   B.,    xii,  117,   160, 

233,  242  ;  cited,  238  n. 
Walker's  Ridge : 

Kitchener's  visit  to,  380. 

Turkish  failure  at,  192. 


Wallace,  Maj.-Gen.,  210-11. 

Wallingford,  Maj.  J.,  280. 

\\'anliss,  Lt.-Col.,  154  n.  2. 

War  Council,  the,  power  and  personnel  of, 
14-15;  experts  on,  25-8;  meetings 
of  13  Jan.    191S,   33-4;   of  28  Jan.. 

34-6- 
War  Staff  Group,  26  and  «. 
Ward,  Lt.-Col.  M.  C.  P..  81, 
Warsaw,  falls  of,  221,  336  ;  effect  on  Turks, 

363. 
Water : 
Shortage    of,    130,    192,    264-5  !    (7"^° 

Aug.),  284;  at  Suvla — thirst  torments, 

284,    296,    308-10,    313-14    and    nn., 

333- 
Springs  of,  danger  spots,  183,  326. 
Supply  arrangements,  104,  206  ;  at  Suvla, 
296-7      and     «.,     313 ;      difficulties, 
323. 

Watson's  Pier,  163. 

Weber  Pasha,  198  and  n. 

Wedgwood,  Lt.-Com.  Josiah,  149 «. 

Wemyss,  Rear-Adm.,  63,  89,  312  ;  bom- 
bards Seddel  Bahr,  127  ;  in  command 
of  evacuation,  386. 

Westerners,  64-5,  377. 

Wheat  Field,  the,  190. 

"  Whippets,"  215. 

White,  Lt.-Col.  A.  H.,  244-5. 

White,  Brig.-Gen.  Cyril  B.  B.,  83,  400. 

White  flag  fired  on,  178. 

White  Gully,  161,  233. 

Wiggin,  Brig.-Gen.,  338  «.  i. 

Wilhelm  ir.,  Kaiser,  visit  of,  to  Constantin- 
ople and  Jerusalem,  3. 

Wilkin,  Pte.,  331. 

Williams,  Able  Seaman  Wm.,  97  «. 

Williams,  Lt.-Col.  W.  de  L.,  99,  127. 

Wilson,  Adm.  Sir  Arthur,  33  ;  reinforces  de 
Robeck,  62  ;  estimate  of,  25 ;  cited, 
32,  35. 

Wilson,  Lt.-Col.  J.  D.  R.,  135. 

Wilson,  Col.  Leslie  (M.P.),  xii. 

Wilson,  Brig.-Gen.  Scatters,  338  n.  i. 

Winter,  apprehensions  regarding,  359-60  ; 
preparations  for,  382  ;  storm  of  27 
Nov.,  383-4. 

Winter,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  H.,  81,  210. 

Wire  entanglements,  loo-i,  104,  no,  139, 

174,  183,  258. 
Wolverine,  182,  314. 

"Woodbines."     See  Askold. 

Woodward,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  M.,  81,  141. 

WooUy-Dod,  Col.,  103, 

Worcester  Flat,  185. 

Wounded  : 

Inadequate  provision  for,  ii8, 140-2,  213- 

14. 
Unreclaimed  after  4-5  June  battle,  178 
and  n. 

X  Beach.     See  Implacable  Landing. 
Xeros,  Gulf  of : 

British  warships  in,  145. 


INDEX 


429 


Xeros^  Golf  o^ 

FoHts  air-{26  Af^^  1x9^  148 ;  f6.A^^^ 

^^  - 

Masai  aid  fioB^  32^ 


results  ctf 


CImijiIci  oC  107. 
T  iilkn,  aad  &3nre  at,  107-9  i 
bOme,  ISM,  isfL 


Y2. 

Y« 

Y( 


5^?  Gcdly  Bead: 

y,   121. 


5«ie-      British.      Trcicps — 2n>l 
MoiBiBd  DtvisaDB. 
Yilt.lwB  Bml    SaeChoeoiilefflL 
Ypve^  aad  hatlip  o^  Sj^. 

Z  Beach.    SeeAmac 

ZioMles,  70-^. 


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D       Nevinson,  Henry  Woodd 

568        The  Dardanelles  campaign 

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